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TREATISE ON THE TRIUNE GOD ACCORDING TO PERSONS

SECTION I

REVEALED DOCTRINE ON THE NUMERICAL UNITY OF THE DIVINE NATURE AND THE REAL DISTINCTION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

Chapter I

ON THE UNITY OF THE DEITY FROM THE DOCTRINE OF SACRED SCRIPTURE AND ON THIS DISTINCTION OF UNITY

THESIS I

The unity of the deity is taught in the entire revelation of both the Old and New Testament

That God is one not with specific unity but with the unity of singularity or numerical unity is manifest in the revelation of both the Old and New Testament; whence those who in the distinction of the divine persons would also distinguish nature and by any doctrinal configuration would count gods, have always been judged to have fallen away from the fundamental dogma of the entire revelation.

The doctrine of the unity of the divine nature, and universally of the absolute perfections of God, pre-established in the treatise "On the One God," is here indeed presupposed as a foundation. For the revelation concerning the distinction of persons includes this unity, and unless this is perpetually kept before our eyes, the distinction itself cannot be understood as it is contained in Scripture and in the explanation of the Fathers from apostolic times.

Hence it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the manner in which Scripture, professions of faith, and the holy Fathers, especially in that age when the distinction of persons was chiefly and almost uniquely to be defended, presuppose and propose this truth of unity as fundamental and most certain beyond controversy among all the faithful.

For just as the doctrine of distinction perfects the understanding of unity, so conversely the common profession of unity illustrates the preaching of distinction, whenever the Fathers have spoken more obscurely about how this is. On account of this intimate connection of one doctrine with the other, therefore, the order of things demands that, even presupposing the entire treatise "On the One God," we

here more distinctly consider the manner in which revelation and ecclesiastical preaching guards the unity of God as the supreme principle, to which therefore the doctrine of the distinction of persons in revelation and in Catholic profession could never be contrary, but must necessarily be coordinated and understood in a sense consonant with this same unity.

I. The revelation of the Old Testament certainly has the unity of God as the first article and principal foundation expressed most frequently and in all forms of speech.

In the New Testament appeal is made to this same doctrine and to this revealed faith, and the same is confirmed in exactly the same sense in which it was proposed in the Old Testament. But this unity of God is not only inculcated to exclude the fictitious gods who were worshipped by the gentiles; but absolute unity is taught to exclude any distinction and enumeration of Gods.

In the Mosaic legislation the first article in order and dignity is contained in the solemn protestation: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one... You shall fear the Lord your God and serve him alone, and by his name you shall swear" (Deut. 6:4ff). Christ the Lord himself declares this to be the "first commandment" and approves the paraphrase: "because God is one and there is no other besides him" (Mark 12:29-34).

In this same excluding form, in Moses' last testament to the people, the same is repeated, where God is introduced confirming with an oath: "See that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me" (Deut. 32:39-40; cf. John 17:3; Eph. 4:3-6). To confirm this faith God directs portents, theophanies, and special providence toward his people: "that you might know that the Lord himself is God and there is no other besides him... Know therefore today and consider in your heart, that the Lord himself is God in heaven above and on earth below, and there is no other" (Deut. 4:35, 39; cf. 1 Cor. 8:4-5).

So also frequently in the prophets and in the Psalms: "I am the Lord and there is no more: besides me there is no God. That they may know from the rising of the sun and from the west, that there is none besides me. I am the Lord and there is no other" (Is. 45:5-6; cf. Rom. 3:29-30; 1 Tim. 2:5).

Therefore the unity of God and the exclusion of any number of Gods is revealed in such a way that every doctrine explicitly or implicitly teaching two or three Gods should be considered, without further examination, contrary to revelation, which it is not lawful for any of the faithful to ignore.

And therefore if in revelation there is speech about real distinction and plurality in divine things, this certainly does not pertain to the deity and divine nature (Deut. 13; Ps. 81:1, 6-11). Hence also in the prophecies of the Old Testament, regarding this head of doctrine, no such progress is promised for the New Testament by which "rigorous monotheism" would be dissolved, as some now speak not quite properly, but by which the knowledge of the revealed unity of God would become more universal and more distinct.

"And it shall be in that day, living waters shall go out from Jerusalem, half of them to the eastern sea and half of them to the western sea: in summer and in winter they shall be. And the Lord shall be king over all the earth: in that day the Lord shall be one and his name one" (Zech. 14:7, 9; Ps. 86:8-10).

For the tempering of the complete unity and singularity of the divine nature would not be progress, but the negation of revealed truth. For it is not only by affirmation that one God is said, which indeed would itself be abundantly sufficient; but also by negation and exclusion it is repeated that besides the one God revealed to the patriarchs, to Moses, to the prophets, to the people of Israel, there is no other God, he alone is God; and to this one God alone revealed in the Old Testament all the revelation of the New Testament also appeals.

II. From this first principle and foundation it is established that this same numerical unity of God and of the divine substance is always presupposed in the books of the New Testament

And this is signified in them whenever unity is joined together with the distinction and enumeration of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit; when the Father and Son are said to be one; three one; when the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are enumerated under one name; when the Son is said to be in the Father, the Father in the Son; when all things that the Son and Holy Spirit have are said to be revolved and recapitulated to the Father as to a source—which relation of the Son to the Father and of the Holy Spirit to the Father and Son is most extensively evident in the entire doctrine of Christ.

But there will be place to speak of this conjunction of unity with distinction in what follows, for the explanation of this matter constitutes the argument of this entire present treatise.

In the same way this very foundation of substantial unity is presupposed in the profession and explanation of the Christian faith, in all symbols, in the declarations and disputations of Catholic Doctors against various errors mutually opposed to each other.

In the symbols

Which certainly express the profession both of Pastors and of the faithful people, namely in the apostolic symbol, faith "in God" or more expressly "in one God" is the first article, as the framework and containing bond of the underlying distinction, by which it must be believed in the Father and Son and Holy Spirit.

This faith in the unity of God simultaneously with the distinction of the three who are God, all those to be baptized were taught and commanded to profess in the very reception of the sacrament as the password of Christians. This the Fathers and Doctors repeat as the faith of the universal Church from the earliest age.

"First of all believe that there is one God, who created all things" (Hermas, Pastor Bk. II, mandate 1; cf. Clementine Recognitions Bk. II, n. 43ff).

Irenaeus, against the emanations of the Gnostics from the pleroma of God, and against the fiction of one God of the Old Testament and another of the New, frequently inculcates this "rule of truth" (Bk. I, ch. 22), this "first and greatest chapter" (Bk. II, ch. 1), that there is one God, besides whom there is no other.

"Only one God is the fabricator... who made all things through himself, that is, through his Word and Wisdom... this is the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob, the God of the living, whom the law announces, whom the prophets foretell, whom Christ reveals, whom the Apostles hand down, in whom the Church believes. This is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who through his Word, who is his Son, manifests himself to all" (Bk. II, ch. 30, n. 9).

"The Church scattered throughout the whole world to the ends of the earth, received from the Apostles and their disciples faith in one God the Father almighty," etc. Then follows in the same handed-down faith of the whole Church the profession in one Jesus Christ the Son of God, and in the Holy Spirit, who through the prophets preached the dispensations of God and the advent (Bk. I, ch. 10; Bk. III, ch. 4).

Origen, after admonishing that "the ecclesiastical preaching handed down by the Apostles through the order of succession and remaining in the churches up to the present should be preserved," reviews some things from the universal and manifest profession of the Church.

"The forms of those things which are manifestly handed down through apostolic preaching are these. First, that there is one God, who created all things... the God of all the just, of Adam, Abel, the patriarchs, Moses, the prophets." There is subjoined the manifest preaching "that Jesus Christ, born from the Father before every creature, was incarnate and became man while being God, remained what he was, God. Then they handed down that the Holy Spirit was associated in honor and dignity with the Father and Son" (Origen, On First Principles, Preface nn. 2, 4).

Against the Monarchian heretics

Most clearly the unity of God, as the most ancient Fathers always understood it, appears from disputations against the Monarchian heretics, against Praxeas, Noetus, the Sabellians, Paul of Samosata. For when these heretics asserted the unity of the divine substance in such a way that they simultaneously denied the real distinction between the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, the defenders of Catholic dogma have this same substantial unity as most certain and established among Christians beyond doubt.

"The devil has variously emulated the truth; he has sometimes attempted to shake it by defending it. He vindicates the unique Lord, the almighty creator of the world; so that he may make heresy even from the unique, he says that the Father himself descended into the Virgin... But we indeed both always and now more as instructed through the Paraclete, the guide of all truth, believe in the unique God indeed, but under this dispensation, which we call economy, that the unique God has also a Son, his Word... who thence sent from the Father the Holy Spirit the Paraclete, the sanctifier of the faith of those who believe in the Father and Son and Holy Spirit. This rule from the beginning of the Gospel has run down... the very posterity of all heretics will prove...

This perversity (Praxean) thinks it possesses mere truth, while it thinks the unique God should not be believed otherwise than if it says the same one is both Father and Son and Holy Spirit; as if all things are

not thus also one, while all things are from one, namely through the unity of substance, and nonetheless the sacrament of the economy is guarded, which disposes the unity into Trinity, directing the three: Father and Son and Holy Spirit.

But three not in condition (dignity) but in grade (of origin), not in substance but in form (personal character), not in power but in aspect (distinguishing notions): but of one substance and one condition and one power, because one God, from whom these grades and forms and aspects are assigned in the name of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit" (Tertullian, Against Praxeas chs. 1-2; cf. Prescription ch. 13-14).

In exactly the same way the presbyters of Smyrna agree regarding the unity of the divine substance with Noetus, and St. Hippolytus; the Council of Antioch with Paul of Samosata; the Roman Pontiffs Zephyrinus, Callistus, Dionysius with the Sabellians, while however they condemn the confusion of persons of Noetus and Sabellius and Samosata in the same places, and teach that one God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, three distinct.

But these things demand more diligent consideration in the following theses. Meanwhile from the declared foundation these two things are established:

a) If in Scripture and in ecclesiastical preaching of any age there is speech about the unity of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, so that they are enumerated under the aspect of deity or dignity or of exhibiting divine worship, or unity is said to be according to substance, or it is said to be simply one, or any divine attribute is vindicated to the Son and Holy Spirit, and they are exempted from the condition of creatures: all these things must necessarily be understood of the numerical unity of the divine nature in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

b) In Scripture and among the Fathers of the Church, who vindicate unity in any of these ways, the distinction between Father, Son, Holy Spirit cannot be understood according to the divine nature and substance. If therefore locutions sometimes occur which seem to indicate subordination and inferior dignity of one person before another, this subordination certainly was not understood by them and cannot be understood by reason of nature and substance.

However much you may find obscurity in the manner of speaking and in the scientific reconciliation of the unity of God with the distinction of the three among some ancient Fathers, where "the Trinity has not yet been perfectly treated" (Augustine on Ps. 89, n. 22), nevertheless in no age can ignorance of the fundamental dogma about divine unity expressed in the symbol for all the faithful, from the highest pastors down to catechumens, be admitted in such a way that this truth within the very bounds of the Church could ever have been called into question with no one contradicting.

THESIS II: The Complex of Doctrine in the Scriptures of the New Testament Concerning Unity and Distinction

The general consideration of the doctrine of Christ and the Apostles, as presented in the books of the New Testament, demonstrates that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three distinct entities who are one God.

In the Gospels, the apostolic epistles, and the other books of the New Testament, frequent mention is made, and the doctrine is handed down by Christ Himself and the Apostles, concerning God the Father, who is the Father of His only-begotten Son; the Son of God, who has God as His own Father; and the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of the Father, the Spirit of the Son, and the Spirit of God. Here, we are content with a still general and evident consideration of what is taught about each of them: namely, the Son and the Holy Spirit, since from these very things, those matters pertaining to the Father are understood for the present question. Therefore, we say that whenever, whether incidentally or deliberately, the New Testament Scriptures speak of the Son of God according to His higher nature (for the human nature of the incarnate Son is not under consideration here) and whenever the Holy Spirit is mentioned in relation to the Father or the Son or both, everything entirely points to this conclusion: that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three, really distinct from one another—that is, not merely in our consideration but in themselves: the Father is distinct, the Son is distinct, and the Holy Spirit is distinct. Nevertheless, these three, both together and individually, are one God.

I. The Relationship of the Son of God to God the Father

Christ the Lord Himself, throughout His entire life and teaching, always presented, and the Apostles subsequently handed down, the understanding that the Son of God is not a Son by adoption but a Son by nature, which is one with that of the Father.

1. He is everywhere referred to by His proper name as the Son of God, the beloved Son (Matt. 3:17), the Son of paternal love (Col. 1:13), His own Son (Rom. 8:32), whose own Father is God (John 5:18), the true Son (1 John 5:20), the Son over the house and family (Heb. 3:6), who is not the Son because He is obedient to the Father, but became obedient even though He was the Son (Heb. 5:8), the Son remaining forever (John 8:35), the Son by generation and therefore in a sense that no angel can be called a son (Heb. 1:5), the only-begotten Son of God (John 3:16), the only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father (John 1:18), the Son who gave others the power to become sons of God (John 1:12).
2. By the very fact that there is a Father and a Son of the Father, the Father is distinct from the Son. "I and the Father are one" (John 10:30); "The Father is in me, and I in the Father" (John 10:38); "Glorify me, Father, with the glory I had with you before the world was" (John 17:5); "The Father works, and I work" (John 5:17); "I am not alone, but I and the Father who sent me" (John 8:16); "He who loves me will be loved by my Father" (John 14:21), etc.
3. But because He is the Son of God in the proper sense, therefore God the Father and the Son are simply one. "I and the Father are one" (John 10:30). The work of the Father is the work of the Son, and the relationship of the Father and the Son to their faithful is one. "My Father works until now, and I work" (John 5:17). "Whatever He does, the Son does likewise" (John 5:19). "He who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him, and we will come to him and make our dwelling with him" (John 14:21, 23). What was said in the Old Testament about the one God of Israel is said about the Son of God: "But to the Son He says: 'Your throne, O God, is forever and ever' ... and again: 'You, Lord, in the beginning laid the foundation of the earth'" (Heb. 1:8-10).

Therefore, the nature of the Son is the nature of God, equal to God. "Who, being in the form of God, did not consider equality with God something to be grasped" (Phil. 2:6). The essential life that the Father has in Himself, the Son also has, communicated by the Father, and thus, just as the Father is life itself, so is

the Son. "As the Father has life in Himself, so He has given to the Son to have life in Himself" (John 5:26). Therefore, the Son is "the radiance of the Father's glory and the exact representation of His substance, upholding all things by the word of His power" (Heb. 1:3).

For these reasons, the Son demands the same supreme worship that is due to the Father. "That all may honor the Son just as they honor the Father" (John 5:23). (See Treatise on the Incarnation, Thesis III and following.)

II. The Holy Spirit

In like manner, both in the life and teaching of Christ Himself and in the subsequent preaching of the Apostles, the Holy Spirit is everywhere presented as distinct from the Father and the Son, and yet as one God.

1. The distinction of the Holy Spirit as a third entity from the Father and the Son is clearly shown. When the Father bore witness to the Son, the Holy Spirit appeared in bodily form, distinct from both (Matt. 3:16-17, with parallels). Christ Himself declared the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in many ways in His discourse at the Last Supper, where the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit of Truth, is consistently called another Paraclete, distinct from the Son, and distinct from the Father and the Son: who proceeds from the Father, who also receives from the Son, because all that belongs to the Father belongs to the Son; the Spirit of Truth, whom the Father sends in the name of the Son; whom the Son sends from the Father. "I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete to be with you forever" (John 14:16). "But the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you all things" (John 14:26). Although the term "spirit" is used in various ways, and even God, considered absolutely, is spirit, it is clear that in revealed doctrine, the name Holy Spirit is determined as a proper hypostatic name, designating one distinct from the Father and the Son (cf. Epiphanius, Haer. 74).
2. The divinity of the Holy Spirit is revealed in all doctrine just as clearly as His distinction from the Father and the Son, so that if it were not expressly declared, no one would doubt that the term designates God absolutely or a divine attribute. The very names Spirit of God, Spirit of the Father, Spirit of Truth who proceeds from the Father can signify nothing other than God.

This is equally clear from the descriptions of the attributes and effects of the Holy Spirit. He is "the Spirit of Truth, who teaches all truth... another Paraclete, who remains with the Apostles forever, the Spirit of Truth" (John 14:16, 26; 16:13), who is therefore absolute truth. Hence, God reveals all things through His Spirit; yet the one who reveals and the one through whom He reveals are distinct, for the Spirit of God, who searches the depths of God, is the Spirit from God. "God has revealed it to us through His Spirit, for the Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God. For who among men knows the things of a man except the spirit of the man that is in him? So also, no one knows the things of God except the Spirit of God. But we have received the Spirit who is from God" (1 Cor. 2:10-12). These must be compared with what is said about the relationship between God, with whom the Word was, and the Word of God, which was God. Regarding distinction: "The Word was with God" (John 1:1) — "God through His Spirit... the Spirit who is in Him, who is from God." Regarding unity: "And the Word was God" (John 1:1) — "The Spirit searches even the depths of God... no one knows except the Spirit of God."

Just as the Father and the Son come to us and dwell in us, so too does the Holy Spirit come and dwell with the Father and the Son (John 14:17-23). The righteous are the temple of the Holy Spirit, and by this very fact, the temple of God. "Do you not know that you are the temple of God and that the Spirit of God dwells in you?" (1 Cor. 3:16). "Your bodies are the temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have from God, and you are not your own" (1 Cor. 6:19; cf. 2 Cor. 6:16).

The Holy Spirit Himself is the author and cause of supernatural regeneration in us. For just as we are said to be born of God (John 1:13), so it is said: "Unless one is born of water and the Spirit" (John 3:5). Just as it is said: "Love is from God, and everyone who loves is born of God... God is love, and he who abides in love abides in God, and God in him" (1 John 4:7, 16), so it is said: "The love of God has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who was given to us... You have received the Spirit of adoption as sons, by whom we cry, 'Abba, Father.' The Spirit Himself bears witness with our spirit that we are children of God" (Rom. 5:5; 8:15-16; Gal. 4:6).

All charisms, whose author can only be God, have the Holy Spirit as their author. "It will be given to you in that hour what you should say, for it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father speaking in you" (Matt. 10:19-20). "They began to speak in various tongues as the Holy Spirit gave them utterance" (Acts 2:4). "The Holy Spirit testifies to me in every city, saying that chains and tribulations await me in Jerusalem" (Acts 20:23). "They attempted to go into Bithynia, but the Spirit of Jesus did not allow them" (Acts 16:7; cf. Acts 22:18). "No prophecy was ever made by human will, but men moved by the Holy Spirit spoke from God" (2 Pet. 1:21). "The prophets searched... what or what kind of time the Spirit of Christ within them was indicating when He testified beforehand of the sufferings of Christ and the glories to follow" (1 Pet. 1:10-11). In general, no one can say "Lord Jesus" (with faith, hope, and love, as is fitting) except in the Holy Spirit. "There are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit... To one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom... All these are empowered by one and the same Spirit, who apportions to each one individually as He wills" (1 Cor. 12:3-11; Heb. 2:4).

What is called the voice of the Lord in the Old Testament is called the prediction of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament. "I heard the voice of the Lord saying... 'Go and tell this people: Hear indeed, but do not understand'" (Isa. 6:8-9). "The Holy Spirit rightly spoke through Isaiah to our fathers, saying: 'Go to this people and say, You will hear but not understand'" (Acts 28:25-26).

Moreover, Christ the Lord Himself, according to His humanity and in His humanity, is anointed, sanctified, and sent by the Holy Spirit. "When He unrolled the book [in the synagogue at Nazareth], He found the place where it was written: 'The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He has anointed me to preach good news to the poor, He has sent me...' And He began to say to them, 'Today this Scripture is fulfilled in your hearing'" (Luke 4:18-21). (See Treatise on the Incarnation regarding the fact and manner of this sanctification.) Hence, just as it can be understood according to His humanity that Christ says, "The Father is greater than I" (John 14:28), so according to His being human, He presents the Holy Spirit as greater than Himself: "If I cast out demons by the Spirit of God, then the kingdom of God has come upon you... Whoever speaks a word against the Son of Man will be forgiven, but whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven" (Matt. 12:28-32). Thus, before those Jews who thought Christ was merely a man, a comparison is made between sin against the Son of Man and sin against the Holy Spirit (see Athanasius, Against the Arians, Oration 1, n. 50), and the works that the Jews were bound to recognize as works of God are explicitly attributed by Christ Himself to the Holy Spirit. So St. Peter

equates lying to the Holy Spirit with lying to God (Acts 5:3-4, 9), and thus even by name declares the Holy Spirit to be God. (See Bellarmine, On Christ, Book 1, Chapter 13.)

III. Conclusion

Therefore, the entire doctrine of Christ and the Apostles, though proposed on various occasions, in different aspects, and with different words, always converges on the same conclusion. Even at first glance and with evident consideration, it presents the revelation of the unity and distinction in God most clearly in the sense understood and believed by all Catholics, and (as no one denies for many centuries now) in all creeds, in the definitions of Councils, in the declarations of all Catholic Doctors, and finally in the profession of the entire universal Church. It is taught that there are three really distinct from one another: another Father, another Son, another Holy Spirit, and these three—the Son and the Holy Spirit as well as the Father—are true God. But since God is one in a unity of singularity, excluding multiplicity, and thus the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are taught to be the true God Himself who revealed Himself as one, besides whom there is no other God, it follows that the deity or absolute perfection is not distinct but one in number, common to these three who are distinct from one another, by which they are one God.

Now, where there are several distinct from one another who are constituted in the same essential perfection, which answers the question of what a thing is essentially (to ti estin), that common essential perfection is called by all, learned and unlearned, the essence (insofar as essence is the principle of operation) or nature. But those who are distinct from one another, sharing a common nature, are called hypostases and (if the nature is intellectual) persons. Therefore, the Christian profession, by which we believe in one nature and three divine persons, or God one in nature and three in persons, contains nothing other than what we have shown to be proposed in the very doctrine of the Scriptures.

THESIS III: The Distinction of Persons and the Unity of Nature Demonstrated from Specific Testimonies of the New Testament

In the specific testimonies of the New Testament, where the divine persons are enumerated together, both their real distinction from one another is taught, insofar as the Father is formally one, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit another, and their unity is preserved, insofar as there is one God, and the three are one in divinity.

I. The Baptismal Formula

As a compendium of the doctrine and faith to be professed concerning God, one in nature and three in persons, Christ the Lord encapsulated it in the very form of baptism as the sacrament of faith, by which all who embrace the faith are to be initiated and joined to the Church. "All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go, therefore, and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit" (Matt. 28:19). In this solemn formula, prescribed for all Christians in the very sacrament of faith for sanctification and the profession of faith, it is declared as the symbol and testimony of the Christian faith that there is a distinction among the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit according to their formal relation, and their unity insofar as they are one God.

It is entirely evident that a distinction between the Father and the Son is stated here, such that the Father is one and the Son another, and not merely a double designation of one person according to a different manifestation or external operation, or according to a double absolute attribute:
a) From the very names Father and Son, for these names are not said in relation to another term but to each other, such that the Father is the Father of the Son, and the Son is the Son of the Father. Thus, it is necessarily understood that the Father is a person distinct from His Son, and vice versa.
b) Given the meaning of the names expressing the origin of one from the other, the relation of the two to each other is evident from their enumeration with the interposed article: "tou Patros kai tou Huiou" (of the Father and of the Son).
c) Setting aside these considerations of the immediate text, in the entire doctrine of Christ and the Apostles concerning this real distinction—that the Father of the Son is one and the Son of the Father is another, and thus there are two distinct hypostases—no doubt can exist (Thesis II, n. I).

1. d) If it is clear that the enumeration includes the distinct hypostases of the Father and the Son, the third term, to which the enumeration proceeds in the same form, can only signify another hypostasis distinct from the first and second: "tou Patros kai tou Huiou kai tou Hagiou Pneumatos" (of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit). The personal distinction or per se subsistence of the Holy Spirit is further sufficiently established by the arguments indicated in Thesis II, n. II, which are nearly the same as those by which the distinction of the two hypostases of the Father and the Son is known. Therefore, in this form of initiation and profession of the Christian faith established by Christ the Lord Himself, three distinct entities, or three hypostases—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—are enumerated.

2. It remains to inquire what is the principal point, namely, in what unity these three enumerated hypostases are presented.

   a) The unity of the divinity of the three distinct entities is demonstrated from the initiation, or from the sanctification and consecration in the name of the three. The question is, what does it properly mean to be baptized in the name? In baptism, a twofold order can and should be considered: that of God to humans and that of humans to God. In the first consideration, God is understood to regenerate us through baptism, cleanse us from sins, and sanctify us with His grace. "He saved us through the washing of regeneration and renewal by the Holy Spirit, whom He poured out on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Savior, so that being justified by His grace we might become heirs according to the hope of eternal life" (Titus 3:5-7). By this very fact, through baptism, we are consecrated and devoted to God and dedicated to Him as the object of faith, hope, charity, and generally of supernatural divine worship, which is the order of humans to God. "That He might sanctify her [the Church], having cleansed her by the washing of water with the word, so that He might present the Church to Himself in splendor" (Eph. 5:26-27). "We have been buried with Him through baptism into death... so you also must consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom. 6:3-11). "For you are all sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ... you are all one in Christ Jesus. And if you are Christ's, then you are... heirs according to the promise" (Gal. 3:26-29). "Each one of you says, 'I am of Paul,' or 'I am of Apollos'... Was Paul crucified for you? Or were you baptized in the name of Paul?... Who then is Apollos? What is

> Paul? Servants through whom you believed... All things are yours, whether Paul or Apollos... all are yours, and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's" (1 Cor. 1:12-13; 3:21-23).

From these considerations, it is clear that no one can be consecrated through the baptism of Christ without idolatry unless it is in the name or into the name of the one who is the true God. For we are sanctified only by God, and through the sacrament, we are devoted and consecrated only to God. Therefore, by the very nature of sanctification and consecration in baptism, it is concluded that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, three distinct entities in whose name or into whose name all nations are baptized, are the true God and thus (Thesis I) one in divinity.

b) This unity can further be understood from the very form of the words. The Father, in whose name we are baptized, is without controversy God. Now, the name of God, especially in the solemn formulas of Sacred Scripture, stands for the very reality of the name, for the divine power itself, both insofar as God manifests Himself through special effects, special aid, and protection, and insofar as, on our part, He is the object of the supreme worship of faith, hope, and charity, and we owe Him that service which is due only to God, which in Greek is called *latreia* (Augustine, On the Trinity, Book 1, n. 13, and often elsewhere). "May the name of the God of Jacob protect you... In the name of our God we will be exalted... Some trust in chariots and some in horses, but we will call upon the name of the Lord our God" (Ps. 20:1, 7-8). "In my name His horn will be exalted" (Ps. 89:24). "The place that the Lord your God chooses to put His name there and dwell in it" (Deut. 12:5). "I have built a house for the name of the Lord, the God of Israel... Let your eyes be open over this house... about which you said, 'My name shall be there'" (1 Kings 8:20, 29). To the angel of the Lord who is sent, the Lord who sends says: "My name is in him" (Exod. 23:21; cf. Col. 2:9). Likewise, "Unless you fear His glorious and awesome name, that is, the Lord your God" (Deut. 28:58). "Holy and awesome is His name" (Ps. 111:9); "I will sing a psalm to your name" (Ps. 18:49), and often elsewhere. "Those who know your name; in your name we will give thanks; if we have forgotten the name of our God"; "to those who fear your name" (Ps. 9:10; 44:8, 20; 61:5). "In His holy name we have hoped"; "the name of the Lord is His hope" (Ps. 33:21; 40:4). "Those who love your name" (Ps. 5:11; 69:36; 119:132).

With these things explained, the strength of the argument is understood, which, by the common opinion of theologians and even the holy Fathers, is drawn from the unity of the name in the baptismal formula to demonstrate the unity of essence of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Whether "in the name" (eis to onoma) is taken directly for the reality of the name, insofar as it is the divine authority and divine power from which the efficacy and sanctification of baptism depend, with the signification of the divine majesty to which we are devoted in baptism; or whether, in reverse order, it directly signifies the transcription and consecration into the name of God under the invocation and through the power of that same name, both come to the same conclusion. For by the unity of the name, which is common to the three distinct entities, there is contained one authority of the three, from which comes the power and sanctification of baptism, and one majesty to which we are consecrated as the true God and the object of faith, hope, charity, and the worship of *latreia*. "Their one divinity, one gift, and the name of the Trinity is one God" (Jerome, On Matthew 28:19, and in the addition to the commentary of Hilary transcribed from Jerome). "In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. He signified three persons but asserted one name of the Trinity: therefore, one God, one name, one majesty" (Ambrose, On the Institution of Virgins, c. 10, n. 67-68). "In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. This is one God, because it is not

in the names of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, but in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Where you hear one name, there is one God" (Augustine, On John, Tractate 6, n. 9). "This Trinity is one Lord God, of whom it is said: 'Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one Lord,' and 'You shall worship the Lord your God and serve Him alone' (Deut. 6:4). To this Lord, the prophet Isaiah also says: 'O Lord, we know no other besides you, we call upon your name' (Isa. 26:13, according to the Septuagint). This name the Savior showed, saying to His disciples: 'Go, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit' (Matt. 28:19). This is the name of the Lord, besides whom we know no other... Therefore, in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, we receive the unity of substance, and we dare not confuse the persons. For the blessed apostle John testifies, saying: 'There are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, and these three are one' (1 John 5:7)" (Fulgentius, Response to the Objections of the Arians, Objection 10). See Athanasius, To Serapion, Epistle 3, n. 6, and elsewhere; Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 31, n. 28; Amphilochius, Synodal Epistle (Gallandi, VI, p. 489); Gregory of Nyssa, Epistle 2 to the Sebastenes (ibid., p. 606-607); Theodoret, Heretical Fables, Book 5, § 3; Hilary, On the Trinity, Book 2, n. 1; Ambrose, On the Holy Spirit, Book 2, c. 8, n. 71.

c) This unity is excellently confirmed by the fact that where the distinct profession of faith and the form instituted by Christ Himself were not to be expressed, but only the reality of authority and divinity was to be designated, from which and into which we are consecrated, only one person, Jesus Christ, is named, in whose name the faithful are said to be baptized. "They were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus" (Acts 19:5); "They had been baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus" (Acts 8:16); "Let each one of you be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ" (Acts 2:38); "He commanded them to be baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ" (Acts 10:48). (See Treatise on the Incarnation, Thesis V.)

II. The Words of Christ in John 10:30

In the words of Christ the Lord, "I and the Father are one" (John 10:30), considered in themselves, the unity of nature and the real distinction of the Father and the Son are signified, such that the Father is one and the Son another. This is demonstrated by the same arguments drawn from the consideration of the subject and predicate as we used in explaining the baptismal formula. Moreover, special demonstrations of the unity declared by the words "we are one," and what kind it is, are provided by the context, both from the first discourse, which the Lord concludes with these words, "I and the Father are one," and from the second discourse, in which He sustains the proper sense of the words as understood by the Jews.

In the first discourse:
a) Christ teaches that He Himself is the one who gives eternal life to His sheep, that is, His faithful.
b) He declares that no one can snatch the sheep from His hand, just as no one can snatch them from the Father's hand. Two things are stated here: first, the sheep or faithful are as proper and dedicated to the Son as to the Father; second, the Son preserves the sheep by His power, just as the Father preserves them by His power.

1. c) These three things—that the Son is the giver of eternal life, that the faithful are His people and His possession equally as the Father's, and that they are preserved by His power as by the Father's power—are fitting to the Son "because, He says, what the Father has given me is greater than all" (John 10:29). This is also expressed elsewhere in direct words to the Father: "All mine are yours,

and yours are mine" (John 17:10); "All that the Father has is mine" (John 16:15). Therefore, the "greater than all" that belongs to the Father, by which the Father is God above all (cf. Eph. 4:6), is also the Son's. This "greater than all" and "all that the Father has" are called by the Apostle "the form of God," in which the Son "did not count equality with God something to be grasped" (Phil. 2:6), and therefore the Son is proclaimed "God over all, blessed forever" (Rom. 9:5; see on this passage and the predication of God in the Treatise on the Incarnation). Therefore, the distinction between the two ("I and the Father") is not that the Father is of divine nature and God while the Son is of a lesser nature, but solely that the Father has the divine nature uncommunicated, while the Son has the same nature communicated by the Father. Hence, in this context, the conclusion: "I and the Father are one."

2. The second part of the discourse, or rather a second discourse distinct from the first, was occasioned by the accusation of the Jews. For when they understood Christ's words in their proper and obvious sense, as we have said, they accused Him of blasphemy: "because you, being a man, make yourself God" (John 10:33). Now, what does the Savior respond to this understanding of the Jews? As Chrysostom says, "If they had wrongly understood it, He ought to have corrected them... But now, as they rage against it, He confirms and proves that understanding" (Homily 61, or 60, on John, n. 2). We see in many places the divine Teacher correcting mistaken understandings of His words and explaining their true sense; but on the contrary, where the sense is rightly understood but faith is denied because of the mystery's difficulty, He is accustomed to repeat and emphasize the same thing that was opposed, either with the same words or equivalent ones (see Treatise on the Eucharist, Thesis III). When He had said, "I and the Father are one," and the Jews interpreted this according to its obvious meaning as equivalent to saying, "I am God," and for this reason cried out blasphemy, the Lord responds not by softening His statement but by rebuking the Jews' unbelief, thereby demanding faith in what He had said, and in the sense they had understood.

   a) To the rebuke of their unbelief pertains His statement: "You say of Him whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world, 'You blaspheme,' because I said, 'I am the Son of God'" (John 10:36). Yet these were not His words, but rather, "I and the Father are one," and the Jews had not accused Him of saying, "I am the Son of God," but of saying, "I am God." Therefore, these three statements—"I and the Father are one," "I am the Son of God," "I am God"—the Lord accepts as equivalent propositions (cf. John 5:18), to which He immediately adds a fourth to clarify the same: "The Father is in me, and I in the Father" (John 10:38). Therefore, He calls Himself the Son of God in such a way that the Father and the Son are one, that the Son is God equally with the Father, and that therefore the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, and whoever sees the Son sees the Father (John 14:9-11).

   b) Christ proposes the argument for this unity of nature with the Father, as He often does elsewhere, from the unity of works, which indeed primarily demonstrate the truth of His doctrine, but in connection with the doctrine He had most explicitly declared here, they show the unity of nature and thus also of operation of the Father and the Son. "If I am not doing the works of my Father, do not believe me; but if I do them, even though you do not believe me, believe the works, that you may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in the Father" (John 10:37-38).

> Chrysostom explains: "Do you see how He proves that He is in no way inferior to the Father but entirely equal? Since His essence could not be seen, He brings proof of equal power from the equality and identity of works. And what, tell us, shall we believe? That I am in the Father and the Father in me; for I am nothing other than what the Father is, remaining the Son; and He is nothing other than what I am, remaining the Father; and whoever knows me knows the Father and has learned the Son" (Homily 61, n. 2).

From this identity of meaning and the substitution of one proposition for another in the four indicated statements, it is evident that the proper sonship of God must necessarily be understood as through the communication of nature from the Father to the Son, when Christ says, "I and the Father are one—I am God—I am the Son of God—I do the works of the Father, that you may believe that the Father is in me and I in the Father."

c) From this, it further becomes clear what the sense is, or at least what it cannot be, in the opening of the second discourse (John 10:34-36).
a) When Christ, with the words "whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world," seems to give the reason for His divine sonship, in the second clause, the preexistence of the Son before His temporal birth in human nature is declared, as He often states elsewhere: "I came forth from the Father and have come into the world" (John 16:28); "I had glory with you before the world was" (John 17:5); "Before Abraham was, I am" (John 8:58); "The Son of Man who descended from heaven, who is in heaven" (John 3:13). In the first clause, "whom the Father sanctified," it can only be understood as the sanctification fitting to God the Father in relation to God the Son. However, since the Son, through the assumed nature, is also true man, the sense can be twofold: the Father sanctifies the Son according to His divinity by generating Him holy through the communication of the divine nature; He sanctifies the Son according to His humanity by the same generation of the divine person, to which the human nature is hypostatically united in time, and by this very union, the human nature is sanctified (see Treatise on the Incarnation).

b) It is clear that between the reason for sonship stated in verse 36 and the preceding verse 35, "If He called them gods to whom the word of God came," there is not a comparison of equality but of opposition. It is, namely, a refutation of the accusation of blasphemy by an argument from the lesser to the greater: if Scripture calls men gods (albeit improperly) to whom the word of God came, and it cannot be refuted as blasphemous because Scripture says it, how do you accuse me of blasphemy, who demonstrate in many ways that God is my Father in the proper sense, because I said, "I am the Son of God" (in the proper sense, which Christ Himself had just declared, and which the Jews had reproached)? They rightly understood that Christ, in His response, reaffirmed the very thing they called blasphemy and demanded faith in this mystery; hence, just as after hearing the statement of unity with the Father God, so now after this response of Christ, they attempt to seize Him violently: "They sought to arrest Him" (John 10:39). Therefore, from the entire course of the discourse, it is certain that Christ teaches both the distinction of the Father and the Son according to their formal relation, whereby the Father is one and the Son another, and their unity according to essence and nature, whereby the Father and the Son are one God. In this sense, all the Fathers, both individually and collectively in Councils, understood this testimony of Christ in their disputations with the Arians, and they always used it as the principal refutation of the heresy (see Maldonado on this passage).

III. The Unity Expressed in John 10:30

The unity expressed in John 10:30, "I and the Father are one," is declared in John 1:1 not by the term unity but by the very definition of the reality itself; so it is not unwarranted to say that in the former passage, the definition is given, and in the latter, the definition is contained. Therefore, if any doubt could remain about what unity is to be believed

Continuation of Thesis III: The Distinction of Persons and the Unity of Nature Demonstrated from Specific Testimonies of the New Testament

III. The Unity Expressed in John 10:30 (continued)

The unity expressed in John 10:30, “I and the Father are one,” is declared in John 1:1 not by the term “unity” but by the very definition of the reality itself; thus, it is not unwarranted to say that in the former passage, the definition is given, and in the latter, the definition is contained. Therefore, if any doubt could remain about what unity is to be believed, it ought to be understood from the true sense of the other passage, namely, the definition given by John at the very beginning of his Gospel: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1).

Leaving aside the demonstration given in the *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis IX, where we showed that the phrase “in the beginning” denotes an absolute principle in the order of duration and permanence, not the beginning or start of time, and thus declares the eternity of the Word, we now consider, for the present purpose, only the two subsequent clauses.

1. In the clause “the Word was with God,” the real distinction of the Word from Him with whom it is said to be is evident from the entire first chapter and the whole Gospel. For the Word, about which we wish to teach who and what it is, is “the Only-Begotten from the Father,” “the Only-Begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father” (John 1:14, 18). The Word, having become flesh (man) in time, is Jesus Christ, who throughout the entire Gospel declares Himself to be the Son of God the Father, most certainly distinct from His Father. As Irenaeus says: “John knows one and the same Word of God, that this is the Only-Begotten, and that this One became incarnate for our salvation” (*Against Heresies*, Book III, c. 16, n. 2). This Word is the same Son of God the Father, who, as one distinct from the Father and distinct from the Spirit, is enumerated with them so that there are three: “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit” (Matt. 28:19). Therefore, when it is said, “the Word was with God” (πρὸς τὸν Θεόν), it does not denote some absolute attribute (such as wisdom or omnipotence) of Him with whom it is said to be. For an attribute is not really distinguished from God or from the divine person whose attribute it is, such that it would be one and another. But “the Word with God” is understood in the same sense as when it is said, “the Only-Begotten Son is in the bosom of the Father” (John 1:18), and when the Son says, “I am in the Father, and the Father is in me” (John 14:10), or “I had glory with you before the world was” (παρὰ σοί, John 17:5). Thus, the preposition “with God” retains its significance of distinguishing one from another. Furthermore, this Word, distinguished from Him with whom it was, is not a transient word but a substantial one, as is evident from all that has been said and even from the fact alone that the Word was God. But whoever is God is, by that very fact, a hypostasis and a person; hence, since the One with whom the Word was in the

beginning is God, and the Word itself is another, there are clearly two distinct hypostases or divine persons.

Thus, regarding the Father and the Word of the Father, without yet mentioning the Holy Spirit, the words of John indicate the same distinction: "the Word was with God" (John 1:1), as is expressed by those other words in Matthew 28:19, "in the name of the Father and of the Son," and likewise in John 10:30, "I and the Father are one."

2. Now let us examine the declaration of unity, from which we will also better understand the nature of the distinction. "The Word was with God, and the Word was God" (καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, καὶ Θεός ἦν ὁ Λόγος). In the second clause, without doubt, the Word (ὁ Λόγος) is the subject, and God (Θεός) is the predicate. This is evident not only from the noun Θεός without the article but also from the flow of the discourse. For logically, the subject that John wished to declare and teach what it is, is certainly the Word; thus, this is also the grammatical subject. The transposition of the words may have been prompted by the elegance of the discourse; indeed, in verses 1, 4, 5, 7, 10, and 11, we see that the subsequent clause almost consistently begins with the word with which the preceding clause ended. However, a far weightier reason for such a construction—"was with God, and was God"—was to declare that the Father, with whom the Word was in the beginning, and the Word itself are one and the same God.

a) Indeed, in such a connection, the name "God" clearly retains one and the same proper signification, and it cannot be taken in a proper sense in the first clause and only in an analogous sense in the second. Hence, the meaning is: "The Word was with God, and the Word was God" (not in another sense but in the same sense, and thus one true God). That is, the Word was in the beginning with the Father, who is the one true God, and the Word itself was also the same one true God. Therefore, John 1:1 declares the unity of the Father and the Word such that the Father and the Word are one true God, besides whom there is no other God. Accordingly, what is said in John 10:30, "I and the Father are one," is defined in this sense: I and the Father are one true God. Since God is the divine essence and all absolute perfection, the divine essence with all absolute perfections, which we distinguish by reason, is said to be one in number for the Father and the Son; or, more strictly, the Father and the Son are said to be one divine Being, one divine essence. Although, therefore, both in other passages everywhere and in this very text, the distinction is clear according to the formal relation of the Word from Him whose Word it is and with whom the Word was in the beginning; nevertheless, according to the fact that both He with whom it was and the Word itself are God, an absolute identity and unity is declared: "was with God, and was God." Hence, the real distinction is to be understood solely, as expressed by the names themselves, according to the formal relation of the Father and the formal relation of the Son or Word. These, however, are not absolute but relative to one another. The Father, formally as the Father of the Son, is not the Son, and the Son is not the Father; but the one is the Father of the Son, and the other is the Son of the Father. However, insofar as the Father is God and the Son is the same one God, they are not two but entirely one, just as the divine essence and nature are one. But the relations by which the divine persons are constituted and distinguished will be discussed elsewhere in detail.

b) To avoid difficulties that may arise against the declared one and the same signification of the name "God" in both clauses, a distinction must be made between the signification of the name and its supposition, and furthermore, attention must be paid to the mode of signification of names in the concrete

form when they are used in the predicate. The signification of a name is said to be that for which the name itself is instituted to designate. However, when the signified concept is found in several distinct entities, the name can be applied to one determinate entity among them, and then the name is said to supposit for that determinate entity among the many. Thus, in the proposition "man lives," the signification of the name "man" is not different whether it is stated in general or about Peter; for it always signifies a rational animal, but in the second case, it supposits for one singular person. Furthermore, names of concrete forms designating substance, such as animal, man, angel, or God, signify the nature directly and connote the concept of hypostasis, not this or that determinate hypostasis but indeterminately. Therefore, through an added predicate, they can be determined to supposit for one determinate hypostasis. Finally, it should be noted that such names of nature in the concrete, when predicated of a subject—that is, when what the subject is, is expressed through them in the manner of a predicate—always stand formally, that is, they signify of what form and nature the subject is. However, there is a difference here: when the nature is one only in species and multiplied in individuals, and when the nature is one in number and not multipliable. In the former case, if the nature is predicated of distinct subjects, the predicate also expresses a numerically different nature for one subject and another for another subject; but in the latter case, one nature in number is predicated of several distinct entities. Caius is a man, and Titius is a man, but Caius is one man and Titius another man. But the Father is God, and the Son is God, not one God and another, but entirely one.

From these principles, it is now clear how the name "God" in both clauses under discussion retains the same signification, even though it does not supposit for the same person in both. In the first clause, "the Word was with God," the name "God" has its signification of the subsisting divine nature but is determined to supposit for the Father through the stated relation and distinction between Him with whom the Word was and the Word itself. In the second clause, "and the Word was God," the predicate "God" signifies exactly the same, namely, the subsisting divine nature, which is not twofold but one in number, nor are the Father and the Word one God and another, but entirely one; however, just as in the first clause it supposits for the person of the Father, so in this second clause, it declares, concerning another person, namely the Word (according to the proper mode of signification of predicates), what it is essentially (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι).

(Note in the text): "The form signified by this name 'God,' namely the divine essence, is one and common in reality. Hence, per se, it supposits for the common nature, but through an adjunct, its supposition is determined to a person (one determinate person); hence, when it is said 'God generates,' by reason of the notional act, this name 'God' supposits for the person of the Father" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 39, a. 4, ad 5). According to these principles, what might otherwise seem obscurely stated by a most learned interpreter must be understood: "In those words, 'God was the Word,' he says, the name 'God' cannot signify the divine nature but the person. For whether this name is the subject of the proposition or the predicate, in either case, the sense would be absurd. For… that proposition would signify either that the entire divine nature is the Word or that the Word is the entire divine nature; both are false and absurd and contradict the preceding statements. But if you say that the name 'God' here certainly signifies the divine nature but not universally, you would necessarily err, either by positing several divine natures or one that could be divided into parts and almost distributed." But we say: the name "God" (if taken properly and not analogically) necessarily signifies the divine nature with a per se indeterminate connotation of subsistence, whether in one, another, or three persons. Hence, if in that proposition "God was the Word," the name "God" is the predicate, it declares what the hypostasis posited

in the subject is, namely, that it is of the divine nature, just as the name "man" declares what Caius is if it is said: Caius is a man. If the name "God" were the subject, in the same way, it would signify the divine nature in the manner of subsisting, but it would be determined to supposit for one distinct person through the hypostatic predicate: "was the Word." Moreover, the Word is indeed identically the entire divine nature, and the entire divine nature is the Word, and it can rightly be said that the divine nature "not universally," that is, not insofar as it is absolute and common to the three, is the Word, but insofar as it is a relative substance by the relation of filiation; and indeed, we do not thereby posit multiple natures or one divided into parts, but only one nature in number, common and identified with three mutually distinct persons is taught: "One supreme reality is truly the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the three persons together and each one of them individually… Each of the three persons is that reality, namely, the substance, essence, or divine nature" (Fourth Lateran Council).

Therefore, let it stand, as we have said, that the unity of the Father and the Son or Word, which is declared in John 10:30, is expressly defined at the beginning of the Gospel: "the Word was with God, and the Word was God," as the unity of divinity, such that the Father and the Son are one God. Moreover, since both in the baptismal formula of Matthew 28:19 and in other passages, the Holy Spirit is clearly enumerated in the same manner with the Father and the Son in distinction and unity, it is evident that the same definition of unity in John 1:1, as it pertains to the two, must be understood in the same sense for all three persons of the most holy Trinity. Everything we have said about this divine predication, "the Word was with God, and the Word was God," applies in exactly the same way to the parallel testimony in 1 John 5:20, where the name "Son" is substituted for "Word," and the predicate "God" has the determination added, "true God": "that we may know the true God and be in His true Son (the Word was with God): this (the true Son) is the true God and eternal life" (and the Word was God). We will discuss this testimony in the *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis VI.

IV. Other Testimonies of Christ and the Apostles

With these declarations of Christ and the Apostles established, the distinction of persons and the unity of nature are easily demonstrated in other testimonies, first of Christ the Lord Himself, where the three persons are enumerated together. "When He, the Spirit of Truth, comes, He will teach you all truth—for He will take from what is mine—All that the Father has is mine; therefore, I said that He will take from what is mine" (John 16:13-15). In this passage, besides the unity of all things that the Father has in the three distinct persons, the origin of the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit is also expressly taught, which will be discussed elsewhere. See also John 14:6-11, 16, 17, 23, 26; 15:26; cf. Luke 1:32, 35; Matthew 3:16-17; Mark 1:10-11; Luke 3:22.

The same reasoning applies to the very frequent enumeration of the three persons in the preaching and writings of the Apostles, especially in those passages where baptism and initiation in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are presupposed. "But you were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God" (1 Cor. 6:11). "Now it is God who establishes us with you in Christ (εἰς Χριστόν) and has anointed us, who has sealed us and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts" (2 Cor. 1:21-22). "No one can say 'Jesus is Lord' except in the Holy Spirit. There are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of ministries, but the same Lord; and there are varieties of operations, but the same God who works all in all" (τὸ αὐτὸ Πνεῦμα, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς Κύριος, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς Θεός). "These are all worked by one and the same Spirit, who distributes to

each one as He wills." The body of the Church, from many members according to these varieties of gifts, ministries, and operations, is made and held by Christ as one and as His body; and "God has appointed these in the Church" (1 Cor. 12:3-12, 28). See also Ephesians 3:5; Acts 2:32-35; 5:31-32; 8:37, 39; Romans 15:15-16, 30; 2 Corinthians 13:13; Galatians 4:6; 2 Thessalonians 2:13-14; Titus 3:4-6; Hebrews 2:3-4; 1 Peter 1:2.

St. Athanasius briefly declares: "The Spirit is not outside the Word; but since He is in the Word, through Him He is in God, so that gifts are bestowed in the Trinity. For in their distribution, as Paul writes to the Corinthians, it is the same Spirit, the same Lord, and the same God who works all in all. For the Father Himself works and gives all through the Son in the Spirit" (*To Serapion*, Epistle 3, n. 5).

Corollary 1: Distinction Between Enumeration and Subordination

A clear distinction must be made between enumeration or coordination of several entities and subnumeration or subordination of one under another. Enumeration occurs when, by the force of the words and context, two or more entities are included in the same order under some aspect of being, and thus an identity or equality in that aspect under which they are enumerated is signified. Hence, since creatures at least agree with one another in created being, they can be enumerated together, but not under those aspects in which they differ. However, God surpasses all creatures in the entire aspect of being and is thus entirely of a different order ontologically, so that a creature cannot be enumerated with God without fallacy. Subnumeration, on the other hand, occurs when several entities are named in some connection, not indicating their agreement and identity but only the dependence of one on another or subordination. Thus, subnumeration of a creature under God can rightly occur. In contexts where the propriety of speech must be preserved, enumeration is easily distinguished from subnumeration by internal and external rules of interpretation. Certainly, enumeration occurs when several persons are joined under one and the same explicit aspect of a divine attribute, as in the baptismal formula: "baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit" (Matt. 28:19). Hence, we see a different construction of words when the reality of the name is different: "I will write on him the name of my God, and the name of the city of my God, and my new name" (Rev. 3:12, according to the humanity, the name given to Him which is above every name, Phil. 2:9). Likewise, enumeration in the same order and dignity is understood to be expressed when several persons, one of whom is certainly divine, are expressly said to be "one simply" or are subsumed under a verb in the plural: "I and the Father are one" (John 10:30); "the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one" (1 John 5:7); "I am not alone, but I and the Father who sent me. The testimony of two men is true: I am He who bears witness to myself, and the Father who sent me bears witness to me" (John 8:16-18); "If anyone loves me… my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our dwelling with him" (John 14:23); "Holy Father, keep those you have given me, that they may be one (among themselves) as we are" (John 17:11); "that they may be one, as you, Father, are in me and I in you, that they also may be one in us" (John 17:21-22).

(Note in the text): τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Θεοῦ μου, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τῆς πόλεως… καὶ τὸ ὄνομά μου τὸ καινόν. Here there is one name and another; thus, by comparison with the baptismal formula εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος, in this formula, the enumeration of the three under one aspect and reality of the name further confirms the unity of the Son and the Holy Spirit in the reality of the name or in absolute terms.

In such enumerations, where the Son clearly places Himself with His Father God in the same rank and order, the most effective demonstration of unity is contained when He says of Himself and God the Father: "we are," "they are in us," "our testimony," "we will come," "we will make our dwelling." The efficacy of this demonstration is better felt if this conjunction of the two into one, when the Son speaks of Himself and God the Father, is compared with the distinction He always maintains when speaking of Himself and men in relation to God, even though He deigned to become their brother according to His humanity and to call them His brothers. He taught us to pray, "Our Father!" but never, in relation to God, included Himself and us men in such common pronouns. He said: "I ascend to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God" (John 20:17). But Augustine brilliantly notes: "He did not say 'our Father'; by nature mine, by grace yours… Nor did He say 'our God'; therefore, here too, mine in one way, yours in another; my God under whom I am also man; your God, between whom and you I am the mediator" (*On John*, Tractate 121, n. 3).

Subnumeration is quite different. When it concerns God's efficient causality and the relation of reason to a term outside God, nothing prevents a secondary ministerial or instrumental cause from being named alongside God, the primary cause, which we call subnumeration. This will be evident either from the nature of the thing itself, especially if what is added is not a person but some thing: "unless one is born of water and the Holy Spirit" (John 3:5); or if the ministerial role is expressed in explicit words, e.g., "they believed in the Lord and in Moses His servant" (Exod. 14:31). Hence, in 1 John 5:8, "there are three that bear witness on earth, the Spirit, the water, and the blood," since water and blood are not persons but some created things, the term "Spirit" could be understood as the Holy Spirit if, in the final clause (as the Greek edition has it), the term of the testimony is indicated: "these three are one" or "unto one." Then it would be subnumeration, and it would be said that God the Holy Spirit bears witness both per se and through water and blood as subordinate causes. However, in this explanation, some impropriety of speech always remains; and indeed, the manner of joining the three witnesses, and much more so the final clause, if read with the Vulgate simply as "they are one," suggests that it is an enumeration of three, and thus, just as water and blood are something created, so too the spirit is something created. Therefore, it is not the person of the Holy Spirit but either His effect (such as the testimony and preaching of the Apostles, or grace in the sacrament of baptism) or the spirit commended into the hands of the Father on the cross, i.e., Christ's soul, that is enumerated with water and blood in the unity of testimony. But we will say more about this testimony shortly. On enumeration and subnumeration, see St. Basil, *Against Eunomius*, Book V, pp. 308-309, and *On the Holy Spirit*, nn. 29, 31, rightly understood for his purpose against the Arians.

Corollary 2: John 17:3

What Christ says, "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent" (John 17:3), poses no difficulty against the Trinity of persons, each of whom individually and all together are the only true God. The particle "only" is not joined to the pronoun "you" to exclude the plurality of persons who are one God, but is joined to the name "true God" to affirm the unity of God, as elsewhere this foundation of revealed doctrine is frequently emphasized: "I am the Lord, and there is no other" (cf. Thesis I). This is evident: a) from the entire demonstrated doctrine, whereby the three distinct persons—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—are taught to be one God; b) from the very grammatical form of this passage. For it is not said, "that they may know you, who alone are the true God," but "that they may know you, the true God," who is the one and only true God (ἵνα γινώσκωσιν σε τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεόν), not ἵνα γινώσκωσιν μόνον σε ἀληθινὸν Θεόν. This is what the Fathers,

Athanasius, Chrysostom, and others say: the opposition is not between the Father, who alone is the true God, and the Son, who is not the true God, but between the only true God and false gods. c) Indeed, the very enumeration of the Father and the Son, Jesus Christ, under one and the same aspect as the object of faith and life-giving knowledge shows the one divinity of the Father and the Son. As Athanasius says: "Although the Father is called the only true God, this was not said to deny Him who said, 'I am the truth' (John 14:6); but to reject those who are not true by nature, such as the Father and His Word. For thus the Lord Himself immediately added: 'and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.' If He were a creature, He would not have joined and enumerated Himself with His Creator. For what fellowship is there between the true and the non-true? But now, by joining Himself with the Father, He showed that He is of the Father's nature, and taught us that He is the true offspring of the true Father. This John also learned and taught, writing in his epistle (1 John 5:20): 'we are in the true One, in His Son Jesus Christ; this is the true God and eternal life'" (*Against the Arians*, Oration III, n. 9; see *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis VI).

Corollary 3: John 17:21

Nor does the comparison instituted by Christ the Lord in John 17:21 pose any greater difficulty against what has been demonstrated in the thesis: "that they may all be one… I in them and you in me, that they may be perfected in one" (τετελειωμένοι εἰς ἕν). For: a) The unity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is undoubtedly the supreme exemplar of the holy union of the faithful among themselves, which the Lord requests from the Father. But through such comparisons of analogous perfection in creatures with perfection in God, the identity or same aspect of divine and created perfection is certainly not expressed; unless perhaps you say that we are instructed to be equal with God when Christ exhorts: "Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48; cf. Lev. 21:8; Luke 6:36; Eph. 5:1). Athanasius discusses this comparison of unity through the particle "as" at length (*Against the Arians*, Oration III, nn. 17-25), saying that it does not indicate identity but an image and exemplar. b) Although the unity that the Lord requests for the faithful is a unity not of nature but of charity, this very unity presupposes a unity of nature, namely, the specific unity among humans. As Augustine says: "If they did not love one another, they would be one by nature, not by love; but if they were not one by nature, they could not be said to be one by love… Nor did He say, 'that they may be one with us,' or 'that they and we may be one,' but 'that they may be one in us.' For men, who are one by nature, cannot be one most perfectly according to their mode in the fullness of justice unless they are perfected in God, that they may be one in the Father and the Son; that is, one in them, not one with them" (*Against Maximinus*, Book II, c. 22, n. 1). c) Sometimes the Fathers turn these very testimonies against the Arians. For the principle of the unity that the Lord requests for the faithful is in many numerically distinct entities, namely, the Holy Spirit who "has been given to us," and Christ who, through the assumed nature, is the head of the Church, "from whom the whole body, joined and knit together by every joint of supply… makes the body's growth for the building up of itself in charity" (Eph. 4:16), and who, through His body, which is one in number, in the sacrament of the Eucharist is the cause and uniting bond of the charity of the faithful. Thus, the supernatural unity of the faithful, considered with its principle, is an image of that exemplar where one divine nature in number is the formal reason for the unity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. As Athanasius says: "When the Savior said, 'as you, Father, are in me, and I in you, that they also may be one in us,' it does not signify that we will have identity with Him… but it is a request to the Father, as John writes, that through Christ Himself He may impart the Spirit to the faithful, through whom we are seen to be in God, and in this way to be united in that Spirit. For since the Word is in the Father, and the Spirit is given from the Word (ἐκ τοῦ Λόγου δίδοται), He wills that we receive the Spirit, so that, having received and possessing the Spirit

of the Word which is in the Father, we may appear to be one in the Word through the Spirit and in the Father through the Word… Hence, just as we become sons and gods through the Word dwelling in us, so we will be in the Son and in the Father, and we will be considered one, made one in the Son and in the Father, because the Spirit who is in the Word is in us, and the Word is in the Father" (*Against the Arians*, n. 25). "I in them and you in me, that they may be perfected in one… It is certain that the Word has been made in us; for He assumed our body (our nature). And you in me, Father; for I am your Word. And since you are in me because I am your Word, and I am in them through my body, and because through you the salvation of men is perfected in me, I pray that they also may be one… that all, as carried by me, may be one body, one spirit, and may attain to the perfect man (Eph. 4:13). For all who partake of His body become one body, having the one Lord in ourselves" (*Against the Arians*, n. 22). St. Hilary brilliantly turns the argument against the Arians: "That they may be one, as we are one; I in them and you in me, that they may be perfected in one. I ask those who assert a unity of will between the Father and the Son, whether Christ is in us today through the unity of nature or through the harmony of will? For if the Word has truly been made flesh, and we truly receive the Word as flesh in the Lord's food, how is He not to be considered as remaining in us naturally? … Since we truly receive the flesh of His body under the mystery, and through this we will be one, because the Father is in Him and He is in us, how is a unity of will asserted?" (*On the Trinity*, Book VIII, nn. 13-17; see *Treatise on the Eucharist*).

(Note in the text): A certain new opinion, hitherto unheard of among Catholics, must absolutely be avoided, whereby Christ the Lord, according to His humanity, is affirmed to be not only naturally present in heaven and sacramentally in the Eucharist through transubstantiation but also really present and dwelling in all the just outside the sacrament. From the manner of speaking of these recent ascetics, otherwise outstanding in piety, one might suspect that they have not sufficiently considered the arguments and foundations used by the ubiquitarians. It must certainly be held, as St. Bonaventure says (*Sentences*, Book III, dist. 22, q. 2): "By reason of His humanity, as far as it is in itself, Christ is in one place only; that He is in several places is under the sacrament, as Innocent says; namely, that Christ is said to be somewhere sacramentally, somewhere personally, somewhere locally. Locally He is in heaven, sacramentally He is on the altar, personally (as a divine person) He is everywhere."

THESIS IV: The Authenticity of 1 John 5:7 Demonstrated from Theological Principles

According to Catholic principles concerning the Church's role, under the assistance of the Holy Spirit, in preserving and discerning the sacred Scriptures as instruments of public revelation, the passage in 1 John 5:7 must be considered authentic. Regarding the manner of preservation, there are sufficient monuments that demonstrate the immemorial antiquity of the reading and provide adequate historical support, so that legitimate judges could determine the apostolic origin of the text. However, the contrary documents that are cited do not demonstrate interpolation; although they show that the omission of the text in the transcription of codices was, to a greater or lesser extent, widespread in antiquity.

I. The Question of Authenticity

Since several critics, even among Catholics, especially after the edition of the New Testament prepared by Augustine Scholz, consider it permissible to call into question the authenticity of the testimony in question, and some even openly reject it as spurious, I deemed it necessary to apply the Catholic principles expounded and demonstrated in the *Treatises on Tradition* and *on Scripture* to the present

question, so that we may understand what must be held. Protestants, who, having rejected the authority of the Church as the guardian and interpreter of the Word of God, are carried about by every wind of doctrine according to their own ingenuity and judgment, can neither understand nor be aided by the Catholic method from the economy instituted by Christ, as long as they persist in their fundamental error. However, the fact that some Catholics have not always followed the safest principles in such questions and, sometimes attributing too much to fallacious erudition, have inverted the order of dependence between authority and scholarship in theological matters, has certainly not benefited the defense of truth and thus of scholarship itself.

In the present question, whether the authenticity of the text in 1 John 5:7 is established from theological principles, the solution depends on a principle of law and a matter of fact.

The principle of law, which no Catholic should call into question, is that fundamental one: it pertains to the Church's role, under the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, to preserve not only the Word of God in general but also the written Word. This, however, is not to be understood as if the promised assistance of the Holy Spirit ensured that no text, part of a divine book, or even an entire book would ever be lost. For although a special providence of God for the preservation of the divine books of both the Old and New Testaments must be acknowledged in time, the promise of the assistance of the Spirit of Truth, leading into all truth, and the Church's infallibility in preserving the deposit of faith dependent on it, do not per se include the indefectible preservation of all inspired books and their parts. The reason is that inspired books are not the only nor absolutely necessary instrument for the preservation of revelation (cf. Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, Book III, c. 4). Hence, the Holy Spirit can preserve the integrity of revealed truth through the Church without it being necessary for Him to prevent, or being unable to permit, the loss of a book or part of an inspired book.

However, just as the promise of the Spirit of Truth, remaining with the Apostles and their successors forever, generally excludes error in the Church's proposal of the doctrine of faith, so too, from the same promised infallibility, it can never happen that the Church, either by formal definition or by equivalent consensus and doctrine, receives and proposes to the faithful a book or text of human origin as a divinely inspired book or text. Thus, from the office instituted by Christ the Lord to preserve the deposit of revelation, and from the promised charism for this purpose

The Church, infallible in exercising its office, is not only infallible in proposing the doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures and which books are inspired, as it were, in the abstract; but its infallible judgment also pertains to the concrete object, namely, whether the books, as they exist in a certain form in a determined edition or version, are and have remained inspired books. That is, under the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the Church not only infallibly teaches, for example, that the Apostle John was inspired to write the Gospel, three epistles, and the Apocalypse; but with the same infallibility, it defines that the books in this form or even in this version, for example, the Latin one, as they have been received for public use for many centuries, are the very inspired books of John. In such a judgment, it is implied that the books, as they exist in public use, are uncorrupted and not interpolated, and in this recension, to which the judgment refers, they are conformable to the original text written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Since there can be degrees of greater or lesser perfection in the integrity and conformity with the original text, and as it is not per se evident, the Church's definition does not create the inspiration and integrity of a book but authentically manifests its existence. Therefore, from the definition of a canonical

book considered universally, the degree of integrity and conformity with the original cannot yet be deduced; nevertheless, in the degree that the Church's judgment defines, the integrity is infallibly certain.

Furthermore, since the Church is not governed by new revelations but by the assistance of the Holy Spirit, so that it never falls into error in its definitions, reasons knowable by human means are indeed required to investigate and discern the truth about which the definition is concerned. However, if a definition is reached, its infallibility is due not to these reasons but solely to the assistance of the Spirit of Truth, and "to the Lord dwelling in the Church, lest it fall into error, no matter how zealous the speculation" (Augustine, *On Psalm 9*, n. 12). Hence, given a definition, it pertains to theological science to show the manner in which the tradition of truth is maintained; however, it is not necessary that such reasons always be available, which, by themselves, apart from the authentic judgment of the infallible Church, would suffice for a full demonstration of the transmitted truth.

Regarding these foundations, which we have called the principle of law, thoroughly demonstrated in both *Treatises on Tradition and Scripture*, no Catholic may doubt. But those who call into question or entirely deny the genuineness and authenticity of any passage of Scripture, as it now exists, thereby deny that the Church has ever declared such a text, either by solemn decree or sufficient consensus, as part of sacred Scripture and thus as the written Word of God.

Therefore, the entire discussion (as we now undertake it) reduces to the question, which we have called a matter of fact, whether the definition and doctrine of the Church, by which it receives and proposes as sacred and canonical all books and "entire with all their parts, as they have been accustomed to be read in the Catholic Church and are contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition," includes the text of 1 John 5:7 in question. Any Catholics who deny its genuineness thereby, as I have said, also deny the truth of this fact; for they neither can nor wish to call into question the principle of law itself, the denial of which constitutes the foundation and proper rationale of Protestantism. We affirm the truth of the fact and, by this very fact, consider it impermissible to call into question the apostolic genuineness of the text.

However, great caution must be exercised here to avoid the error in the method of inquiry into which Johann Jahn fell in a matter, if not identical, certainly very similar to our question. He first investigated critically and historically what should be thought about the authority of the deuterocanonical books of the Old Testament. Since, based on these critical arguments, the books seemed to him of a lower order and dignity than the protocanonical books, he concluded that the Tridentine decree did not define an equal degree of authority for books of both orders. Let us not proceed this way, I beg, but by the contrary and safe path. As in all theological questions, so too here, let the genuine sense of the Church's doctrine and definition be investigated first, and only then should we be concerned with historical and critical confirmation of the truth, which, whether more or less complete, does not determine the certainty established by the higher theological principle.

To ascertain the sense of the Tridentine definition of Session IV and its extension, whether it pertains to declaring the authenticity of the passage in question, we will first consider the words themselves, the context, and the stated purpose of the decree or rather of the two synodal decrees; from there, we will deduce the norm or rule according to which it should be judged to what parts of Scripture the definition extends; finally, we will apply this norm to prove that the Johannine Comma, about which we inquire, is a part of Scripture included in the Council's decrees and thus its genuineness must be held theologically.

1. The Decree on Canonical Scriptures

The decree on canonical Scriptures contains four parts:

a) The Council teaches that there is a twofold divine institution by which all saving truth and moral discipline revealed have reached us, namely, through tradition and written books. Therefore, it receives with equal piety and reverence the divine traditions and "all the books of both the Old and New Testaments," since "one God is the author of both." Then, b) the books of sacred Scripture received by the synod are individually enumerated. c) It is distinctly defined that all parts of these books are to be believed canonical, and at the same time, a norm is provided according to which the Council understood, and all the faithful must understand, the integrity and canonical parts of these books. The norm is the custom of reading in the Catholic Church and their inclusion in the old Latin Vulgate edition: "If anyone does not receive as sacred and canonical these books, entire with all their parts, as they have been accustomed to be read in the Catholic Church and are contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition, let him be anathema." Finally, d) although the Council undoubtedly had the purpose of condemning the errors of the Innovators regarding the books of Scripture and restraining the temerity of some Catholics, as is evident per se and from history (Pallavicini, Book VI, c. 11, n. 8), the direct and immediate purpose of the decree, as the Council itself declares, is to establish the divine authority of the sources from which the holy synod would draw testimonies in confirming dogmas and reforming morals: "Let all understand, therefore, in what order and manner the synod itself, after laying the foundation of the profession of faith, will proceed, and which testimonies and supports it will chiefly use in confirming dogmas and reforming morals in the Church" (Note: The first among the presiding legates at the Council had indicated this same reason in other words: "The legate stated: it seems the best advice that, in the first place, the canonical books of Scripture be established and enumerated, to determine with which weapons we must fight against heretics and on what basis Catholics should found their belief," Pallavicini, Book VI, c. 11, n. 4).

2. The Second Decree on the Authenticity of the Vulgate

The second decree declares the authenticity of the Latin Vulgate edition of the sacred books. As we have shown elsewhere (*Treatise on Scripture*), this ultimately means that the sacred books in this form of the Vulgate edition are declared conformable to the original text as written under divine inspiration, though in another language and with some accidental differences in form. Therefore, we are commanded to acknowledge this Vulgate text as the inspired text, not as regards the words but as regards the realities and meanings. The reason by which this authenticity is manifested and from which the Council concludes is the same already indicated in the definition of the divinity or original authenticity of these books, namely, their ancient use in the Catholic Church. The same dogmatic purpose declared in the first decree is also indicated in this second one: the great utility to the Church of God and that it be established concerning the sincerity of the divine books in this form of the Latin edition, which is commanded to be held as authentic "in public readings, disputations, preachings, and expositions." Indeed, the Council itself would draw the texts and testimonies of Scripture from this Latin edition alone; hence, this decree, like the preceding one, pertained to declaring the divine authority of the testimonies the synod would use in confirming dogmas and reforming morals.

3. The Norm for Judging the Extension of the Definition

In the described context, the norm is clearly handed down according to which the extension of the definition must be understood and judged concerning the parts of the books to be received as sacred and canonical:

a) It must be conceded and can be demonstrated from the very purpose of both decrees and from other most evident reasons, which we discussed in their place, that the conformity of the Vulgate edition was not declared as pertaining to supreme perfection in every single detail. By the same reasoning, the term "parts of the books, as they are contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition," does not mean every word or clause, whatever its nature. But conversely, b) from the purpose that the Council itself teaches was prefixed to both decrees, it is most evident that all parts, as they are contained in the old Vulgate edition, which directly and per se express some dogma or moral rule, are declared canonical, and in the same sense, the Vulgate edition is declared authentic. Unless this were so, the decree would not fulfill its purpose. For if, as opponents claim, the term "parts" declared canonical referred only to the deuterocanonical parts of Daniel, Esther, etc., and if the authenticity of the Vulgate were declared only in a general sense without being authentic in specific dogmatic texts, the force of this decree would provide no security either for the Fathers of the Council themselves or for the faithful, that the testimonies by which the synod professed to confirm dogmas and reform morals in the Church, drawn from all the books and parts of the books as contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition, are texts of inspired Scripture and not human texts introduced from elsewhere or by the translator. Yet the synod itself professes that this decree pertains above all to this security concerning the divinity of the instrument from which testimonies were to be sought in confirming dogmas. Therefore, it must be said that the canonical authority of the books is declared in all their parts that are per se dogmatic, as they are contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition. c) Those who measure the extension of the decree based on the Council's polemical purpose against the Innovators, which we certainly admit (Pallavicini, Book VI, c. 11, n. 4, 8), must also acknowledge that a dogmatic text, most frequently used in the Church for many centuries and well-known to all, which, however, around the time of the Council, began to be eliminated by some and specifically by the Innovators, must necessarily be understood as included in the words by which we are commanded to receive "the books entire with all their parts, as they have been accustomed to be read in the Catholic Church." d) It cannot be asserted without absurdity that the sense of both decrees is that the canonical authority of the books and the authenticity of the Vulgate are to be believed only in those parts where critical and historical examination can demonstrate the genuineness of the text. For this would establish what the Council intended to exclude by its decrees, namely, that Scripture, at least in controversial passages, be subject to the examination of individuals. But the canonical authority of the parts and the authenticity of the Vulgate are decreed in the state of the edition as it has been accustomed to be read in the Catholic Church and approved by the long use of so many centuries in the Church itself, and used by the Council itself as a divine instrument in matters of faith and morals.

What we have just said is clear from the very nature and character of the conciliar definition. The reason manifesting the authenticity, whether of the books and their parts per se or of the old Vulgate edition, was for the Council the dogmatic principle that the Holy Spirit, assisting the Church, would not have permitted a human text to be used in the universal Church with common consent and public use for many centuries as the written Word of God (Note: The historian of the Council writes about the declaration of the Vulgate's authenticity: "Since the Council had to proceed with human diligence, it thought that, according to such diligence, it was not fitting to approve any other translation at that time except the Vulgate, as it surpassed all in authority and, having been used universally in the Church from the time of

St. Gregory to this age, it was for divine providence to keep it free from errors in matters of faith and morals, so that the Church that used it might be free from such errors. And it saw that if this reason were not sufficient, all new inquiries would not suffice to avoid the same doubt," Pallavicini, Book VI, c. 17, n. 5). Hence, it is not by critical examination that it must be determined whether such a dogmatic text existed in the original primitive edition or at least in the primitive Latin version, so as to decide on its genuineness or interpolation. But if a text is of such a nature that the Church's definition pertains to it, and if at the time of the Council it was, as we have said, accustomed to be read in the Catholic Church and contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition, i.e., for a long time, it must be considered a text conformable in meaning to the primitive meaning written under divine inspiration. This would be true even if it were established by certain demonstration that the text was received into the Latin edition subsequently; for this would only prove that the true reading was preserved for us, not indeed by the first author of the Latin version, but in another way. These conclusions follow necessarily from the principle of the assistance of the Spirit of Truth, leading into all truth, and from the dependent infallibility of the Church in preserving the Word of God, whether written or handed down. Nor is it thereby denied that Catholic scholars who expend their efforts in exploring variant readings, whether of the original text or the Vulgate edition, are most deserving and worthy of praise; for since truth cannot contradict truth, such studies contribute to confirming or at least illustrating the reason for the genuine reading. Although in parts that are per se dogmatic, this can be established from the dogmatic principle, to which critical scholarship must be subservient, there are many other matters that can be established almost solely by critical and historical aids, and even in those parts that are per se dogmatic, at least the manner of preservation is illuminated by these same aids.

Therefore, when the question is not about an entire book or larger parts that could almost constitute a book in themselves, or without which the book to which they pertain would be deficient in substantial matters and become, as it were, another book; but if the question concerns individual testimonies and clauses, from what has been said thus far, two things are required and suffice for them to be considered canonical parts of the books of Scripture included in the decrees of the Council of Session IV. First, that the texts are certainly per se dogmatic, directly pertaining to confirming dogmas and establishing the rule of Christian morals; second, that the same texts have been received by the Church itself through the long use of centuries as the written Word of God and have been accustomed to be read in the old Latin Vulgate edition (which, at least for the Latin Church, which the Council primarily had in view in these decrees, almost coincides with the long use of centuries). This inclusion in the synodal definition will be all the more certain if the texts in question, though marked by this twofold character, were nevertheless, at the time of the Council, attacked or rejected by the Innovators as spurious.

4. Application of the Norm to 1 John 5:7

If we now apply these principles and this norm to what we are inquiring about, no one can deny that the text of 1 John 5:7 is included in both Tridentine decrees and is declared a canonical part of sacred Scripture:

a) Without entering into a critical and historical examination of the primitive state of the Latin version, certainly no one can deny that, at the time of the Council, for many centuries in public and private use, with the conviction of all Pastors, Doctors, and faithful, this text was held as a part of sacred Scripture in the Vulgate edition, which was proper to the entire Western Church. All acknowledge that, at least since

the ninth century, this passage is found in countless codices of the Vulgate edition with such constant consensus that, if it is absent in some codices, it must be considered an exception to the rule and common reading (see Bengel's *Critical Apparatus* on this passage, § 19, 21). The text has been recited from time immemorial in the sacred liturgy (Note: "From the epistle of Blessed John, today's reading has been recited to us, in which we learn that there is a threefold testimony in heaven, a threefold testimony on earth," St. Bernard, *Sermon II on the Octave of Easter*). The testimony was used without any indication of doubt as a testimony of sacred Scripture in the Fourth Lateran Council; in the same way, it is used in the decretals inserted into the body of law to prove dogmas (Note: *On the Supreme Trinity*, cap. *Damnamus*, Book I, tit. 1, c. 1; *On the Celebration of the Mass*, cap. *In quadam*, Book III, tit. 41, c. 8). At the time of the compilation of the false decretals (ninth century), it was cited as a most well-known part of sacred Scripture in the letters attributed to Hyginus and John II; it was commended, and its omission was ascribed to dangerous error in the Prologue to the Catholic Epistles, which, under the name of St. Jerome, was prefixed from the most ancient times in codices of the Bible and widely in older editions (Note: The author of the Prologue speaks thus: "In that chief passage where we read in the epistle of 1 John about the unity of the Trinity, we find that even by unfaithful translators much error has been made from the truth of faith… omitting the testimony of the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, in which the Catholic faith is especially strengthened, and the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are proved to be one with the substance of divinity"). It was commented on in this passage without any trace of doubt about its genuineness by interpreters, notably in the ordinary gloss of Walafrid Strabo and the interlinear gloss of Anselm of Laon, whose authority among all Doctors was considered magisterial (as they used to say). As the written Word of God, the testimony was used with the same confidence, and proof of faith was derived from it by all theologians in all schools and by Pastors in the instruction of the Christian people. There is no need to name Rupert, St. Bernard, Hugh of St. Victor, the Master of the Sentences, St. Thomas, or St. Bonaventure. Therefore, it is evident that the passage in question, for at least seven centuries up to the Council of Trent, constituted a part of the canonical epistle, as it was accustomed to be read in the Catholic Church and was contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition.

b) Furthermore, that the text pertains to matters of faith revealed per se and is eminently dogmatic requires no proof. Some respond that the dogma of the most holy Trinity is expressed in other passages of Scripture; hence, they say, even if the genuineness of the testimony in this context of 1 John 5:7 is denied, the same reality and meaning are not denied as being contained in the Scriptures. This response, I say, will satisfy no one. Without doubt, according to Catholic principles, the preservation and sufficient proposition of revelation do not depend uniquely or primarily on any particular text or even on Scripture as a whole. It is also most true that the doctrine of the most holy Trinity is contained in other passages of Scripture and can be demonstrated from them, as we have seen in the previous theses. But the text of 1 John 5:7 constitutes a part of a special context, and in this form and with these words explicitly declaring the profession of the Church and "the substance of the New Testament, that from this the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, three believed to be one God" (Tertullian, *Against Praxeas*, c. 31), no other passage in Scripture is found. Catholics with whom we are dealing ought to consider the manner of argumentation of Protestants, who, attacking its genuineness, contend that such an explicit proposition of this mystery is foreign to all Scriptures. Socinians and Rationalists would not so vehemently and at every opportunity proclaim this text to be spurious unless they were averse to the truth so clearly stated in it. Others who profess to believe in the dogma of the most holy Trinity nevertheless deny that it pertains to fundamental articles because they do not acknowledge this passage, in which alone the mystery is said to be explicitly

proposed, as genuine (Note: Listen to Neander, a Berlin professor from the Pietist camp: "The doctrine of one God in three persons does not pertain to the fundamental articles of the Christian faith, as is already evident from the fact that it is nowhere expressly proposed in the New Testament; for the one passage in which it is expressly contained, about the three witnesses in 1 John 5, is undoubtedly spurious, and by its spurious origin, it demonstrates how foreign such an enumeration ('these three are one') is to the Scriptures of the New Testament," Neander, *Ecclesiastical History*, Vol. II, p. 305).

c) Finally, just as the Innovators and some bolder Catholics (among whom, at the Council of Trent, Cajetan was named) attacked the authority of the deuterocanonical books and certain parts of the books, so too, around the same time, shortly before the Council, they rejected this very verse 7 about the witnesses in heaven, not without offense to Catholics. Luther, in a public disputation in 1522, attacked its genuineness and eliminated the passage in his German version of the Bible (Michaelis, *Introduction to the New Testament*, Book I, sect. 7). "Bugenhagen, Luther's colleague, with great protestation deterred all from henceforth inserting the passage" (Bengel, *Critical Apparatus* on this passage, § 9). It was not admitted into Lutheran Bibles until 1574, after Luther's death. Erasmus, in his first two editions of the New Testament, omitted the passage, and only in the third edition of 1522, moved by the indignation of Catholics, did he include it from a British codex: "A single Greek codex was found among the English, in which it is written 'for there are three,' etc. Therefore, from this British codex, we restored what was said to be missing in ours, so that no one might have cause for calumny" (see Michaelis, *loc. cit.*, sect. 6). Cajetan, in his commentaries on this passage, also insinuated doubt about its genuineness.

Therefore, resuming the proper reasons for this passage that we have set forth, it cannot be denied that both decrees of the ecumenical Council, concerning the canonical parts of the books and the authenticity of the Vulgate, include this text, which is most certainly a part of a canonical book, "as it has been accustomed to be read in the Catholic Church and is contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition"; which eminently pertains to the parts that are per se dogmatic, which the decree particularly considered for its purpose; and which, in much the same way as the deuterocanonical books, was, at that time, called into question by the Innovators with offense to Catholics and was to be held in the same regard as the deuterocanonical books by the Council, based on the very reason of the most ancient use in the Catholic Church, on which the Fathers of Trent relied in defining the canon of sacred books with all their parts.

II. The Historical and Patristic Evidence

Since the Church, as I have said, in preserving the Word of God and thus in its authentic judgments, is not governed by perpetually succeeding new revelations but is preserved from error by the assistance of the Spirit of Truth, it is necessary that the truth to be defined be manifested by indications knowable by human means, and in the present matter, the divine origin of the book or text to which the Church's judgment refers. The reason to which the Fathers of the Council, in issuing the definition under the assistance of the Holy Spirit, looked as a sufficient manifestation of the truth is indicated in the decree itself: the public, long-standing, and constant use of the Church, by which it was clear, without further examination, that these books with all their parts had been received for at least many centuries as the written Word of God. This reason itself has as its foundation the principle that the Spirit of Truth, assisting the Church and leading it into all truth, could not have permitted the universal Church, in its public acts, in decrees of faith, in the liturgy, in the instruction of the Christian people, and in the explanation and defense of doctrine, to hold and venerate for many centuries as the written Word of God

that which in reality was not such. Therefore, not only is the assistance of the Holy Spirit, as it pertains to the Council at the time, the active principle from which the infallibility of the definition is derived, but also the assistance of the same Spirit, as it pertains perpetually to the Church, was for the Council the objective reason for the definition (cf. *Treatise on Scripture*, Thesis XVIII, n. III).

Although the infallibility of the definition depends on the assistance of the Holy Spirit under which it is issued, and our certainty of the truth of the definition rests on this promised assistance, it pertains to the office of theology to inquire and declare the very manner in which the preaching and preservation of the truth have been maintained through the course of ages. Therefore, in the present question, we can inquire into the use of this text of 1 John 5:7 in the Church in ancient times and the manner in which it has been preserved to us.

From at least the ninth century, it is certain from what has been said that the text in question was held in public use throughout the Western Church as a part of sacred Scripture. But not only by the argument of prescription, which, especially considering the constitution and principles of the Church, such use can only be explained by derivation from antiquity; but also directly from the surviving monuments, it is clear that the text was acknowledged as genuine in the Church even in the early age, as far back as we can trace the Latin version. The text, I say, existed and was used by the Fathers in Africa, Italy, France, and Spain as a most well-known and weighty part of sacred Scripture, demonstrated from the eighth century back to the second century.

In the conference ordered by King Huneric, held in Carthage in February 484, the Catholic bishops "not only of all Africa but also of many islands" (Victor of Vita, *On the Vandal Persecution*, Book II, n. 18) presented a profession of faith, which they then sent on April 20 through four bishops of the provinces of Numidia and Byzacena to King Huneric. From the testimonies of Scripture, they prove against the Arian bishops, in the first part (nn. 1-8), the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, and in the second part (nn. 9-23), the consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son, and thus one nature of the three distinct persons. In this second part of the written profession, in the name of all Catholic bishops against the Arian bishops, the most powerful and implacable enemies, this very testimony about the three witnesses in heaven is presented as a testimony no less well-known and certain than clear and irrefutable: "And that we may teach even more clearly that the Holy Spirit is of one divinity with the Father and the Son, it is proved by the testimony of John the Evangelist. For he says: 'There are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one'" (in the *Book of Faith*, n. 11, which is Book III of Victor of Vita's *History of the Vandal Persecution*).

Several points here are most worthy of note: a) Whoever was entrusted with drafting this book of faith, whether Eugene of Carthage or others or several among the bishops, certainly no one would have dared, in such a profession to be approved by all bishops and proposed in their common name to the Arians, to insert a text as if from John the Evangelist, nor would all the other more than 461 bishops, with none objecting, have admitted the text unless it was commonly read in the Churches of Africa and the islands. b) If the bishops had sensed that the Arians did not acknowledge this text as genuine or did not have it in their codices, much less if the passage existed only in rare copies and was not most well-known and beyond controversy among Catholics themselves, they would never, in the common name of Catholics, have offered such a testimony as "more clearly than light" for the refutation of the Arian heresy to be read and examined by their most hostile enemies. Further evidence of this conviction of the bishops, that the

Arians could not call the genuineness of the text into question, is provided by Vigilius of Thapsus, one of the bishops who presented the profession (named last among the bishops of the province of Byzacena). For Vigilius explicitly appeals to the reading of this testimony in the Arians' own codices: "Why do you read that John the Evangelist said, 'these three are one,' if you accept that there are different natures in the persons?" (Vigilius of Thapsus, *On the Trinity*, Book VII, *Bibliotheca Maxima Patrum*, Vol. VIII, p. 789). Therefore, what Michaelis (*Introduction to the New Testament*, c. 31, sect. 3, Vol. IV) and others would reduce the entire authority of this profession of faith to almost solely Eugene of Carthage is absurd (Note: Michaelis compares the consensus of all the African bishops in the written profession and defense of the faith presented to the Arians with the subscriptions that Protestant ministers append or were once required to append to symbolic books, as if it could be concluded that they approve everything written in those books. Can you restrain your laughter, friends?). c) It should be noted that in the first part of the profession, as long as it remains in demonstrating the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, the most holy confessors connect a very long series of testimonies from all books, especially of the New Testament, and even from 1 John, yet they do not touch on this passage of 1 John 5:7. Similarly, the author of the book *Against Pinta* the Arian, in the first part of the treatise, St. Fulgentius in the entire Book II *To Thrasimund*, among countless testimonies of Scripture by which they demonstrate the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, do not use this text, which they nevertheless certainly acknowledged and cited in other places where they treated the three divine persons together. Hence, it is clear that the conclusion, which many opponents too generally draw from a negative argument, is hasty and fallacious. They say: "The Fathers disputing with the Arians did not cite this most opportune passage, therefore they did not have it in their codices." In this way, it was easy for Scholz, following rationalist critics, to cite a series of Fathers, all of whom he presents as undoubted witnesses of interpolation, for no other reason than that they do not use John's testimony. As long as the refutation of heretics was directed against the person of the Son, whether denying His distinction from the Father or His divinity, although all those heretics were convicted of erring also concerning the person of the Holy Spirit based on their principles, we see that the defense of the Fathers in the earlier centuries was largely confined within the limits of the dogma directly attacked (Note: St. Basil on the Nicene definition: "Here, other matters were fully and accurately defined, partly to correct what had been harmed, partly to prevent what was foreseen to arise; but the doctrine about the Holy Spirit was set forth in passing, nor did it seem to require any discussion, because the question had not yet been raised, but the belief about Him was held without guile by the faithful," Basil, *Epistle 125*, n. 3. "The Fathers did not speak fully about the Holy Spirit, because the question had not yet been raised," Gregory Nazianzen, *Epistle 202*, n. 1). In this disputation about the person of the Son, it was not necessary to cite from John's epistle, since very clear testimonies were available from the Gospel, which declare the distinction and consubstantiality of the Father and the Son. Nevertheless, we do not deny that from certain contexts of the Fathers, it can be shown that they either did not have our verse 7 in their codices or did not have it as certain beyond controversy; we only say that for the negative argument to have any force, it is not sufficient to make the general assertion, with which critics too readily conclude, that the Fathers did not know the text because they do not use it where it seems to us its citation would have been opportune.

If in the fifth century the testimony was received by the use of the entire African Church, it is not surprising that we see Vigilius of Thapsus, and not long afterward Fulgentius and the author of the book *Against Pinta*, appealing to it in their disputations against the Arians without any suspicion that it might be rejected by anyone. "The one name of divinity was clearly declared, with John the Evangelist saying in

his epistle: ‘There are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, and in Jesus Christ they are one. See, because in deity and in the substance of fullness they are entirely one, and in the names of the persons they are three’” (Vigilius of Thapsus, *On the Trinity*, Book I, *Bibliotheca Maxima Patrum*, Vol. VIII, p. 775; Book X, p. 793). The same form of citation as in Vigilius is found in a fragment of a dialogue between an orthodox and a heretic in the *New Library of the Fathers* by Cardinal Mai, Vol. I, p. 496. Similarly, St. Fulgentius explicitly appeals to John’s text in *Responses to the Objections of the Arians*, objection 10, and *On the Trinity*, c. 4; also the author of *Against Pinta*, n. 8 (*Works of St. Fulgentius*, Paris ed. 1684, pp. 68, 331, 640). But in the former place (response to objection 10 of the Arians), Fulgentius connects his citation with one used already in the third century by St. Cyprian. Fulgentius’ words are: “Therefore, we accept the unity of substance in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but we do not dare to confuse the persons. For the blessed Apostle John testifies, saying: ‘There are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, and these three are one.’ Which also the blessed martyr Cyprian confesses in his epistle *On the Unity of the Church*… and he immediately inserted these testimonies from the Scriptures: ‘The Lord says, I and the Father are one’; and again, of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, it is written: ‘and these three are one.’” Therefore, for Fulgentius, as for other African bishops, there was absolutely no doubt that in the third century, the passage about the three witnesses in heaven was read and cited by Cyprian in the Churches of Africa.

However, critical scholars have tried to weave subtleties about this citation of Cyprian, lest their confidence be disturbed, with which, along with Scholz and others, they pronounce that it first appears with Vigilius of Thapsus who cited this verse, and further, “deservedly, the interpolated verse is rejected not only from the text but also from the margin.” They claim, namely, that Cyprian in this place (*On the Unity of the Church*, ed. Baluz, Paris 1726, p. 195), where Fulgentius thought he appealed to the witnesses in heaven, does not refer to verse 7 but to the spirit, water, and blood of verse 8, according to a mystical interpretation by which these three were understood to signify the three persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as is clear from Augustine (*Against Maximinus the Arian*, Book II, c. 22, n. 3). But in truth: a) Before Augustine, such an interpretation of the meaning signified by the spirit, water, and blood had never been heard (Note: What Friedrich Matthaei says in his edition of the New Testament, that even Athanasius, Vol. II, p. 180, explains verse 8 as referring to the divine persons, is entirely false and fabricated. I examined several different editions of Athanasius, and neither on that page nor anywhere else is such a thing found. In a disputation against Arius attributed to Athanasius, n. 44, Vol. II, p. 229, ed. Maurin, it is cited not from verse 8 but certainly from our verse 7: “these three are one”). b) Augustine resorted to that mystical interpretation solely to support what he had universally affirmed, that never in Scripture are several things said to be one unless they are consubstantial. However, Augustine himself did not propose that mystical interpretation as certain and to be held; but as if conjecturing, he inquired whether the objection against his hermeneutical canon could not be resolved in this way. Certainly, therefore, Augustine himself would never have used verse 8 as a convincing and per se clear demonstration of the unity of nature in three distinct persons (Note: Augustine’s words: “Lest you say that the spirit, water, and blood are different substances, and yet it is said: ‘these three are one’; for this reason, I warned you not to be deceived. For these are sacraments, in which what they are is not considered, but what they signify… We know three things came forth from the Lord’s body when He hung on the cross… But if we wish to inquire into what is signified, it is not absurd to think of the Trinity itself, which is one, the only, true, supreme God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit… and by the name of spirit, we understand God the Father… by the name of blood, the Son… and by the name of water, the Holy

Spirit… But if the profound depth of this great sacrament, which is read in John's epistle, can be explained and understood in any other way according to the Catholic faith… it must not be rejected by any means"). c) Therefore, since this interpretation, as it was unknown to anyone before Augustine, so after him was adopted by only a very few, moved by the authority of the holy Doctor; and indeed, considered in itself, it seems far-fetched and improbable (cf. de Rubeis, *Dissertation on the Three Witnesses in Heaven*, c. 7). Therefore, when Cyprian and other Fathers, especially those before Augustine, and even later ones who do not depend on his authority (such as Pseudo-Athanasius in *Disputation Against Arius*, n. 44), to demonstrate the dogma of the most holy Trinity simply say, "of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit it is written: 'these three are one,'" it is entirely certain that they refer not to verse 8 but to our verse 7.

Facundus of Hermiana, who, while living among the Greeks in Constantinople, wrote books in defense of the Three Chapters to Emperor Justinian, refers the citation of St. Cyprian (*Book I*, p. 7) to verse 8. But in truth, first, Facundus seems to have confused the Greek codices, in which verse 7 was missing, with the Latin codices, in which, at least in Facundus' time and in the Churches of Africa, the verse existed, as after what we have said, it could only be shamelessly denied. This confusion is apparent from the manner of citation itself; for on the one hand, he speaks as if he were entirely ignorant of verse 7, but on the other hand, he retains from the Latin codices the words "in earth": "there are three that bear witness in earth," etc.; but these require a corresponding testimony of the witnesses in heaven. Hence, in the Greek codices, where the omission of verse 7 had already occurred, the words "in earth" were also removed from verse 8. Furthermore, since Facundus, writing among the Greeks and to the Greek Emperor, either concealed verse 7 or did not accept it at that time due to the reading of the Greek codices, he, an African, to whom the argumentation from 1 John 5 for the mystery of the most holy Trinity, so often repeated by the bishops of his homeland, must have been most well-known, preferred to follow and almost transcribe Augustine's mystical interpretation of verse 8, so as not to be entirely deprived of the argument so often emphasized in Africa against the Arians from the words "these three are one." By adopting this method, it was easy to refer Cyprian's citation to the same verse 8. But the reality itself and the history of this mystical interpretation protest; and if authority is considered, that of St. Fulgentius is certainly greater than that of Facundus.

Let it stand, therefore, that in the third century, the reading of verse 7 was in use in the African Church, which we have shown was common in the same Church in the fifth century and thereafter. This being established, there can be no doubt that also in Tertullian's time, the same passage was commonly read in Africa; and unless one's mind is hardened by prejudice, anyone will easily concede the reference in the book *Against Praxeas*, c. 25. In the preceding chapters, Tertullian had demonstrated the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, where, among many other things, he used that testimony of Christ in John 10: "I and the Father are one": "Blind are those who do not see, first, that 'I and the Father' signifies two; then, in the last part, 'we are,' not from one person, because it is said in the plural; and that 'we are one,' not 'we are one person,'" etc. (*ibid.*, c. 22). Now in c. 25, he proceeds to the demonstration of the entire Trinity, that is, not only, as previously stated by Tertullian, the Father and the Son, but in the same way three, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, of one substance. To prove this very point, these words pertain: "Thus, the connection of the Father in the Son and of the Son in the Paraclete makes three coherent, one from another, who are three, one, not one person; as it is said: 'I and the Father are one,' for the unity of substance, not the singularity of number" (*ibid.*, c. 25). The words "I and the Father are one," cited earlier to prove the consubstantiality of the two, are here brought forward only to persuade that the

other saying, “these three are one,” must be understood in the same sense. But this saying is posited to prove the consubstantiality of the three, which proof would be nothing unless the words were cited from Scripture. Thus, the citations of the disciple and the master are entirely parallel:

- Cyprian: “Of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit it is written, ‘these three are one.’”
- Tertullian: “The connection of the Father in the Son and of the Son in the Paraclete, and these three are one.”

From these, we can now conclude that in the most ancient Latin version, “in the first times of the faith” (Augustine, *Christian Doctrine*, Book II, n. 16), which, at the beginning of the third century in Africa, had already “come into use” (cf. Tertullian, *On Monogamy*, c. 11; *Against Marcion*, Book II, c. 9; *Against Praxeas*, c. 5), our verse 7 existed, contrary to what Millius thought, who improbably conjectured that the citation of Tertullian and Cyprian was derived not from the Latin version but only from Greek codices.

This reading in the old version is confirmed by the *Mirror* of Augustine, edited by Cardinal Mai (*New Library of the Fathers*, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 6, 10), and the *Exposition on the Creed* attributed to Pseudo-Athanasius, edited by Joseph Blanchini (p. 40). Blanchini believes this exposition was written in Latin in Africa before the rise of the Pelagian heresy. The reasons by which Cardinals Bessarion and Mai asserted that the *Mirror* belongs to Augustine over the Maurist edition can be read in Cardinal Mai’s preface (*loc. cit.*). It is certain that in both works, the old Latin version is used, as it was before the translation of the Old Testament and the correction of the New by St. Jerome. Yet in the *Mirror*, twice, and in the *Exposition on the Creed*, once, the passage about the three witnesses in heaven is explicitly cited. In the *Mirror*, under chapter II on the distinction of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit: “Likewise there: ‘For there are three that bear witness in earth, the spirit, the water, and the blood, and these three are one in Christ Jesus; and there are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, and these three are one.

Again, under Chapter III on the Holy Spirit, the same citation recurs, omitting the witnesses on earth. In the *Exposition of the Creed*, it is most effectively stated: “Let John, who, reclining familiarly on the breast of our Lord, was able to know the mysteries of all doctrine, answer for all. ‘There are three,’ he says, ‘who bear witness in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, and these three are one.’ After this, is it not death for us to lose such faith and salvation to preserve it?” (*ibid.*, p. 40).

Regarding Augustine, even if it is permissible to doubt whether he himself authored this *Speculum*, it is certainly impossible that a holy Father in Africa in the 5th century was unaware of our *Comma*. Indeed, anyone who would persuade themselves that in the year 430, when Augustine died, the text was still unknown, and that by the time of the profession of faith offered in 484, it was already in the common lectionary of the African churches as a text of such importance, would have to disregard not only all principles but also the constancy and vigilance with which the Church has always governed the preservation of sacred Scriptures. How could such a significant universal change have occurred in Africa within those fifty years, unnoticed by anyone, when a far lesser change in translation caused such a great uproar that the bishop was compelled to return to the old and customary reading, “wishing, after great peril, not to remain without a congregation” (Augustine, *Epistle* 71, n. 5)? Nevertheless, since by Augustine’s time the *Comma* was already absent in many Greek manuscripts, and thus undoubtedly crept into some Latin copies as a kind of correction, Augustine, in his polemical writings, particularly against

Maximinus, could have chosen to pass over this testimony in accordance with his economic principle that things called into doubt in some places "are not brought forward against opponents with such firmness" (see *Treatise on Sacred Scripture*). At least, he nowhere explicitly cites the passage in his surviving works; for fairly clear allusions, see de Rubeis' cited dissertation, ch. 6, and Cardinal Mai's Preface to Augustine's *Speculum*, p. VII; cf. Bengel, *Apparatus Criticus*, on this passage, § 20.

Now, from the reading in the African churches, it would follow that the same reading did not fail in other Western churches, even if we lacked explicit testimonies to prove it. Yet such testimonies are not lacking. For Spain, there is the *Collection of Testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers*, which F. A. Zaccaria considered older than St. Isidore, while Maffei and Arevalus thought it could be attributed to Isidore himself (*Works of St. Isidore*, ed. Arevalo, vol. II, p. 27 ff.; *Isidoriana*, ch. 83); then the famous *Codex Toletanus*, no later than the 8th century (cf. P. Vercellone, *Apparatus Biblicus*, vol. I, *Variant Readings of the Vulgate*, p. 84); Etherius and Beatus against Elipandus; and before them, Idacius, if he is the author of the disputation against Varimadus (cf. Ruinart, *Commentary on the History of the Vandal Persecution*, ch. 4, n. 7, p. 442). In these monuments, verse 7, with the witnesses in heaven, is explicitly present alongside verse 8, concerning the witnesses on earth, as a genuine text of John's epistle (*Works of St. Isidore*, vol. VII, p. 291; *Variant Readings from the Codex Toletanus* in Blanchini's *Vindiciae Vulgatae*, p. CCIII; *Against Elipandus*, book I, n. 26, Galland, vol. XIII, p. 296; *Against Varimadus*, *Bibliotheca Maxima Patrum*, vol. V, p. 729).

In Gaul, in the 4th century, Phoebadius (or Soebadius) of Agen cited the passage in nearly the same manner as Tertullian and Cyprian (*Against the Arians*, *Bibliotheca Maxima Patrum*, vol. IV, p. 305); explicitly, before the middle of the 5th century, Eucherius of Lyon (unless another is the author) transcribes both verses in his *Book of Spiritual Formulas*, ch. 11, where he discusses numbers "which the mystical reasoning of examples renders more celebrated among the sacred" (*Bibliotheca Maxima*, vol. VI, p. 838). "The Trinity," it is said, "is referred to in John's epistle: there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and there are three who bear witness on earth, the spirit, the water, and the blood."

In Italy, in the mid-6th century, Cassiodorus not only collected manuscripts of the Scriptures, both Latin and Greek (or, as he says, a Greek *Pandect*), but also took pains to ensure that those he left to his Vivarium monastery were most accurate, through careful comparison with ancient Latin and Greek manuscripts. [Note (1): What Griesbach, in his dissertation aimed at eliminating this Scripture text by all means, brought forward to prove Eucherius' passage is an interpolation renders it neither probable nor certain. Remarkably, this man, most eager to remove all authority for the text's genuineness, first denies Eucherius' citation, but then, a few pages later, tries to argue that Cassiodorus drew his citation of the same passage from Eucherius! Note (2): "First, let the novices of Christ meditate on divine authority in corrected manuscripts with constant practice… lest the errors of scribes take root in unpolished minds." "Although all divine Scripture shines with heavenly light… I have expended the greatest effort on the Psalter, the Prophets, and the Apostles' epistles… which I have collected in nine codices of divine authority, as I was able, carefully reviewing them with friends reading before me," Cassiodorus, *Preface to the Institutes of Divine Letters*.]

Now, indeed, Cassiodorus cites both verses 7 and 8 in his *Complexiones* (ed. Maffei, after *Theological History*, in *Opuscula*, p. 145). To this passage, Maffei rightly notes: "We learn from our author that the

better and more ancient Roman books also spoke thus; for when he so zealously instructed his monks in the *Institutes of Divine Letters* to use the most excellent manuscripts, purified by comparison with the Greek text as well, and to seek the authority of two or three ancient and corrected manuscripts in ambiguous places, who would doubt that he himself did the same?" See the rest there. To this also pertains the *Codex Cavensis*, attributed by Cardinal Mai to the 7th or 8th century, and Ambrose Ansbert in the mid-8th century in his commentary on the Apocalypse, book I (*Bibliotheca Maxima*, vol. XIII, p. 415), in both of which monuments our *Comma* is present.

Thus, in the Western Church, it is not only evident that from the 9th century onward, the public and common use of this testimony as canonical Scripture was established, but its derivation from the earliest times of the faith and its reading in the old Latin version can also be shown by positive documents, as the version was received both before and after Alcuin's revision.

Since God established the visible head of His entire Church in the Latin Church, He willed to preserve, through it and in it, not only the integrity of the faith universally but also the integrity of the written word by special providence, as is clearly evident from the history of the deuterocanonical books. Their authenticity, amidst many fluctuations among Eastern scholars, was primarily vindicated into clear light by the constant tradition, use, vigilance, and definitions of the Latin Church. Hence, to the Fathers of Trent, by the marvelous providence of the Holy Spirit, the use of the Latin Church in the old Vulgate edition shone forth and provided the safest norm for both decrees, concerning both the canonical books and the authenticity of the Vulgate.

In contrast, in the East, just as there was greater disagreement regarding the deuterocanonical books generally, so too there is considerable obscurity concerning this text of John. If one were to appeal to passages in the Greek Fathers where they speak of the Trinity, of the three hypostases and the unity of essence (as I see was done by a recent defender of its authenticity, the Englishman Charles Forster), innumerable testimonies would indeed be available. But such arguments certainly do not hit the mark. Nor do those commonly brought forward from the dialogue *Philopatris* seem more convincing; on this, see, if you have time, Cave, *Literary History*, vol. I, p. 17. Valid positive documents are almost limited to these: Origen appeals to the words "these three are one" as an unassailable authority to demonstrate the unity of nature in three distinct persons (on Psalm 122, v. 2, *Works*, vol. II, p. 821). Similarly, to demonstrate the unity of the divine nature in three persons, the words of John, "these three are one," are explicitly cited in a disputation attributed to Athanasius against an Arian, n. 44 (*Works of Athanasius*, vol. II, p. 229). Euthymius Zigabenus (*Panoplia*, *Bibliotheca Maxima Patrum*, vol. XIX, p. 47) cites it thus: "It is said to be one in those things that are of the same essence, where there is identity of nature and distinction of persons; hence the phrase: 'and the three are one'" [Greek text included in the original]. Further, the entire verse is cited and preserved in Greek and Latin in the acts of the Fourth Lateran Council, attended by several Greek bishops (Hardouin, vol. VII, p. 18); subsequently, it is cited by Emmanuel Caleca, a Greek writing for Greeks in the 14th century (Combefis, *Auctuarium*, vol. II, part II, p. 219), and by Joseph Bryennios, a schismatic Byzantine monk at the beginning of the 15th century (Griesbach, cited dissertation, p. 11). The same verse is now found in the ecclesiastical reading of the Greeks and Russians and in the modern Greek version (Bengel, *loc. cit.*, § 22). For its existence in ancient manuscripts, direct evidence can be adduced from the Prologue to the Catholic Epistles under Jerome's name, and indirectly from the comparison of manuscripts undertaken by Cassiodorus. Among surviving Greek manuscripts, three are named in which the verse is present: the Dublinensis (Montfortianus), the

Ottobonianus (in the Vatican), and the Neapolitanus (11th century). It was also included in the Complutensian edition, Erasmus' third edition, and thereafter in all editions until the rise of Rationalism among Protestants.

Finally, if we examine the context of John's epistle, it certainly seems incomplete without this *Comma*, but with it, it is so harmonious and coherent that if the verse is found in suitable sources, we should rejoice at the most fitting filling of the gap. Moved by this consideration of the context, the Protestant Bengel exclaims: "The adamantine coherence of the verses compensates for any scarcity of manuscripts…. This passage (v. 7) can be recognized more certainly than a page missing from a book, sought everywhere, found somewhere, and fitting perfectly with the rest of the structure" (*loc. cit.*, § 28). Indeed, the expression in verse 8, in the masculine gender, "these three are one," without verse 7, is quite remarkable, and no satisfactory explanation seems possible (cf. Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration* 31, alias 5, n. 19), which becomes perfectly clear with the coherence of verse 7. Moreover, even more significantly, in the following verse 9, the phrase "the testimony of God, because He has testified concerning His Son" entirely requires verse 7, and without it, it has no referent. Finally, the congruence of this verse with John's Gospel, both in content and manner of expression, is most evident if you compare John 5:31–37, 8:14–18, 15:26.

I am not now asking whether this entire demonstration would be sufficient if it concerned a book left to private effort or negligence. But if it were a matter of a code of fundamental laws of a state entrusted to public authority, such public use reaching back to the earliest origins would certainly be sufficient proof of authenticity, leaving no legitimate doubt; and if a dispute arose, its authenticity could and should be legally declared. Now, here we are dealing with the integrity of Scripture in a matter of great importance, and thus with a code of faith entrusted by divine institution not to private effort but to the public custody of the Church under the assistance of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, such public and constant use by the Church, as we have shown, in a text dogmatic in itself, is sufficient proof that the text was legitimately admitted into the canon of Scriptures; but it would not have been legitimately admitted unless it had first been written by the Apostle John. Hence, even setting aside the decrees of Trent and considering only the use in the Church by itself, no doubt about its authenticity could be admitted. Yet the Church itself had humanly knowable reasons that were more than sufficient to render a judgment on its authenticity.

Assuming its authenticity, we see that the mode of preservation was such that the text undoubtedly passed from Greek manuscripts into the version established in the earliest times of the faith and received by the Latin Church, and through this ecclesiastical version, it was always preserved in public use. Nor is it necessary to assert that this use was equally universal at all times and in all regions; for after a lacuna was introduced in many Greek manuscripts, perhaps in the 4th century, and spread more widely, it could hardly have been otherwise that some Latin books were conformed to them, as some Latin manuscripts even now show, though written no earlier than the 6th century, by which time it is most clearly established that our reading was recognized and used by the Latin Fathers. However, with this variation introduced among the Easterners and some hesitation arising in the West, as often happened with the deuterocanonical books, it is not surprising that some Latin Fathers (like Augustine) preferred to abstain from using this testimony, especially in polemical contexts.

III. Since among Protestants there is not only no true Church of Christ, but by their fundamental principles, there is no visible, legal religious society governed by authority, but only individual persons

guided by their private judgment, Scripture is not an instrument entrusted to the custody and authentic interpretation of public authority for the society itself, but a book destined and permitted for the examination and knowledge of individuals. Therefore, just as there is no authentic interpretation of its true meaning, so too there is no recognized authentic declaration of the genuineness of either an entire book or individual texts; rather, the genuineness and thus the authenticity of Scriptures must be explored and known solely by individuals through historical and critical examination (see *Treatise on Scripture*). From these principles, it follows that since the foundations of faith and religion are placed in human knowledge and erudition, for the vast majority of people, the authority of Scriptures cannot be established, and even among the learned, to whose school the revealed doctrine of faith is referred, according to the diversity of minds and the imperfection of knowledge, sometimes more, sometimes fewer, and sometimes all sacred books are rejected—not rightly, but without deviating from the fundamental principles of the sect—as spurious or interpolated.

Thus, we do not now contend that critical and historical evidence is available such that, even on the false Protestant principle that treats Scripture like a profane and private book, its genuineness could be demonstrated as certain and beyond doubt; but since from our Catholic principles its genuineness is fully proven, we also affirm that Protestants, based on their principles and critical evidence, cannot demonstrate interpolation.

If you concede that our verse 7 was absent in many Greek manuscripts as early as the 4th century, and perhaps even in some in the 3rd century—whether this occurred due to the error of hasty scribes because of the similarity of words in both clauses, as many suspect, confirmed by examples of similar lacunae; or whether it was done deliberately to observe the *disciplina arcani*, as Bengel thought (*loc. cit.*, § 25); or whether the spread of the omission should be attributed to the work of Eusebius, to whom Constantine entrusted the preparation of many manuscripts for the Church of Constantinople (Eusebius, *Life of Constantine*, book IV, ch. 36), as the most recent author Lehir suggests (cf. *Introduction to the New Testament*, compiled by H. Vairoger, vol. II, p. 566); or whether you admit that the excision could have occurred in many ways, though you do not know how—if you concede, I say, this absence in many Greek manuscripts of the 4th century and in some Latin ones thereafter conformed to them, opponents have nothing further that they can demonstrate with certainty by critical evidence. Yet from such an absence, it cannot be concluded that the dogmatic testimony, which positive documents prove existed in the reading of the Latin Church from the most remote antiquity, was not present in the original edition of the epistle. Therefore, they cannot demonstrate interpolation by critical evidence.

All arguments that can be raised against its genuineness, which John's adversaries are accustomed to bring forward with great fanfare, are drawn from Scripture manuscripts, the writings of the Fathers, and ancient versions.

1. **Manuscripts**: There are no Greek manuscripts older than the 5th century, or at most the 4th century. Two or three are considered of the highest antiquity: the Vaticanus (B) with its twin, the Sinaiticus of Tischendorf, and the Alexandrinus (A); then one, Codex G (Cardinal Passionei, now in the Angelica Library), from the 9th or 10th century; all others are of a later age, from the 10th to the 15th century. Thus, except for the three Greek manuscripts containing the Catholic epistles, none older than the time of Charlemagne survive, but all were written at a time when no one can deny that the reading of our *Comma* 7 was common in the entire Latin Church. These are

certainly manuscripts derived from older ones, and the considerable number of those lacking the *Comma* would, by itself, show that the omission is older than the time when the manuscripts were copied. But if you compare these two series of documents—one showing the text in public and universal use in the entire Latin Church from the 9th to the 15th century, the other consisting of Greek manuscripts mostly written by private effort and authority, which generally lack it during the same period—no art can ever deduce a certain argument from such a computation of manuscripts to demonstrate that the text written by John was interpolated in these private Greek manuscripts, while it was received without contradiction in the public use of the entire Western Church in a matter of such importance, and that this interpolation, despite your manuscript authority, also prevailed among the schismatic Greeks.

2. **The Fathers' Writings**: The scarcity of older manuscripts can be amply compensated by the writings of the Fathers, provided they are such that it can be certainly established from the contexts that the Fathers did not read the text in question in their manuscripts. However, for this purpose, it is not sufficient: a) that the Fathers do not cite our *Comma* where they prove the divinity of the Word and the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, or where they prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit. This, I say, is most clear, as shown above, from the manner of citation by those very Fathers who use our testimony. Tertullian (*Against Praxeas*), the African bishops in their *Confession of Faith to Hunneric*, St. Fulgentius (*Book II to Thrasamund* and *Against Fastidiosus*, compared with the *Book on the Trinity to Felix the Notary*), and the same Fulgentius (or another author) *Against Pintanus the Arian* collect many testimonies for each point of doctrine individually, among which they do not include this one; but when they treat the Trinity in general, then they also bring forward these words of John. b) It is not sufficient to show that some Fathers immediately connect verse 6 with our verse 8 to conclude that verse 7 was absent. For Idacius (or another) *Against Varimadus*, Cassiodorus, Augustine's *Speculum*, the *Book of Testimonies* (among the *Works of St. Isidore*), Etherius and Beatus, the *Codex Toletanus*, and the *Codex Cavensis*, as well as many other manuscripts, all place our verse 8 after verse 6 and then verse 7 in reverse order. c) It is not sufficient that the Fathers cite verse 8 without verse 7 if the purpose is not to demonstrate the Holy Trinity but something else to which verse 8, not verse 7, is relevant.

With these conditions observed, without which nothing is concluded from the silence of the Fathers regarding the absence of the verse in their manuscripts, it cannot be demonstrated that our *Comma* was absent in the manuscripts of the 3rd-century Fathers. The passages of the Fathers were diligently collected by Mill in his annotations to this passage, who, although he believed that all those Fathers were unaware of our testimony and that it was even absent from the Old Latin version, sincerely defended its genuineness. From Mill, Wetstein, Griesbach, Scholz, and others transcribed the passages of the Fathers, and what he proposed as a difficulty to be resolved, they took up as certain proof of interpolation.

Regarding the 3rd-century Fathers, Griesbach and his allies state: "The seventh verse was not read by Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, neither in the Latin *Adumbrations* nor in his other works, Hippolytus *Against Noetus*, or Dionysius of Alexandria in his letter to Paul of Samosata." They further add: "It is not cited by the Latin Fathers where it would most pertain and could be entirely expected; to this belong the author of *On the Baptism of Heretics* among Cyprian's works and Novatian."

Let us examine each in turn. Mill judges that Irenaeus should have cited verse 7 in *Book III, ch. 18* (which in Massuet's edition is ch. 16). But in that chapter, Irenaeus deals with the Incarnation, that Jesus Christ is

one person, not another Jesus and another Christ according to the delusions of the Gnostics; hence, neither Matthew 28:19, "baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit," nor John 10:30, "I and the Father are one," are cited there; nor was 1 John 5:7 relevant. Indeed, in his surviving works, Irenaeus never cites John 10:30, and he cites Matthew 28:19 only once (*Book III, ch. 19*, alias 17) to show that the Holy Spirit, who is given to the faithful, descended upon Jesus Christ at His baptism. Where, then, was there a greater necessity to cite 1 John 5:7 than John 10:30? Could it be that Irenaeus also lacked the text of the Gospel?

Clement of Alexandria, in his undisputed works, never cites Matthew 28:19 or John 10:30; what greater necessity, then, was there for John's *Comma*? Only in the *Excerpts from Theodotus*, at the end of Clement's *Works* in Potter's edition, n. 61, is John 10:30 cited to demonstrate the divinity of the person assuming flesh; but there is no mention of the Trinity.

Further, if Catholic theologians produced the Latin *Adumbrations* under Clement's name, and perhaps also Hippolytus' *Against Noetus* and Dionysius' letter, with such confidence for their cause, I have no doubt that these critical scholars would cry out against the introduction of suspect evidence. Meanwhile, from those *Adumbrations* (*Bibliotheca Maxima Patrum*, vol. III, p. 233), we will never know what the author or translator read in John's epistle, for they consist of a few sentences excerpted from the epistle. Hippolytus does not deal with the Trinity of persons but with the distinction of the Father and the Son and the Incarnation of the Word. He mentions the Trinity only in passing in n. 14, using no other text than the baptismal formula. But they say: "Dionysius often cites verse 8, not verse 7, although he deals almost entirely with the divinity of Christ and the Trinity in his letter." We respond:

[Dionysius] often [cites it], but only in the fourth question, where he declares that we are redeemed by the blood of Christ and reborn through water and the Holy Spirit; in this same context, Dionysius twice cites the words of verse 8: "and these three are one, water, blood, and spirit" (*Works*, ed. de Magistris, pp. 230, 231). Therefore, the discussion there was not about the Trinity but about another matter to which verse 7 was irrelevant, while verse 8 could be most fittingly applied. Indeed, in this entire epistle and other works published under his name, neither Matthew 28:19 nor John 10:30 is ever cited; so, I ask again, what greater necessity can be shown for using this text of 1 John 5:7?

Two Latin writers of the 3rd century remain. First, they say, the author of *On the Baptism of Heretics* "connects verse 6 with verse 8, omitting the seventh." But if we assume that this author, like other Fathers, had the reversed order of verses 7 and 8 in his manuscript, they can provide no argument to prove this false. By this very fact, neither will it be demonstrated from that connection of verses, much less suggested by the context, that verse 7 was absent for the author. For he is not dealing with the Holy Trinity but with an entirely different matter. He distinguishes "three kinds of baptism: the baptism of the spirit, which is usually connected with the baptism of water," the baptism of water, and the baptism of blood. Thus, if it is asked how there is one baptism, "it is clearly," he says, "by this reason: because there are different kinds of one and the same baptism proceeding from one wound into water and blood… And since we seem to have divided all spiritual baptism into three parts, let us also come to the proof of the proposed explanation. For John says in his epistle, teaching us about our Lord: 'This is He who came by water and blood,' etc. (v. 6). 'For there are three that bear witness: the spirit, the water, and the blood, and these three are one' (v. 8); so that we may gather from them that water is accustomed to provide the spirit, and blood (martyrdom) is accustomed to provide the spirit, and the spirit itself (desire with charity) is

accustomed to provide the spirit" (*Works of Cyprian*, ed. Baluze, p. 364). Now, I ask, what need was there for our verse 7 to explain this distinction of baptisms? We assume, not without reason, that it was not inserted between verses 6 and 8, as it is now, but that the author had it in his manuscript after those cited, though we do not even need this assumption. Moreover, we have shown above that in Africa, where this author was writing, in the 3rd century, the *Comma* was customarily read.

The other Latin writer cited is Novatian, "who, in his *On the Trinity*, while proving with many scriptural testimonies that Christ and the Holy Spirit are God, certainly passes over this most opportune passage." The response is the same. Novatian indeed deals extensively with the divinity of Christ and the distinction between the Father and the Son, and briefly in chapter 29 with the Holy Spirit, but he does not undertake a proof from Scriptures about the three persons collectively; hence, although (in ch. 12) he cites Matthew 28:20 about Christ, "Behold, I am with you always, until the end of the age," he never uses verse 19, which explicitly mentions all three persons: "baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." Why, then, should it be surprising that he also omits this testimony of 1 John 5:7?

Thus, from the Fathers of the 3rd century, no witness can be produced for the absence of the verse in manuscripts of that time; but witnesses for its presence can be cited: Origen, Tertullian, and Cyprian. Among the Fathers of the 4th and 5th centuries, there are certainly some, such as Cyril of Alexandria (*Thesaurus*, vol. V, part I, p. 463), whose contexts provide positive evidence that this verse was either absent in their manuscripts or deliberately omitted by them, because it was already missing in several or fewer manuscripts at that time. But such contexts are very rare, so that the long list of names, which Griesbach largely transcribed from Mill, and Scholz from him (with additional errors), must be restricted to very few Fathers. Most certainly, they are wrongly cited as witnesses of omission: Alexander of Alexandria in his letter to Alexander of Constantinople, the Council of Sardica in its synodal letter to all churches (Hardouin, vol. I, pp. 296, 661), and (either by fraud or manifest ignorance) the Council of Nicaea itself. For in those letters, the discussion is not about the three persons collectively, and therefore Matthew 28:19 is not cited; indeed, in the Sardican letter, scriptural texts are used very sparingly for the divinity of the Son. The disputations about the Holy Spirit, reported by Gelasius of Cyzicus in the late 5th century as having taken place at the Council of Nicaea with pagan philosophers, are undoubtedly spurious, regardless of the omission of John's *Comma* in these Gelasian disputations (Hardouin, vol. I, pp. 407 ff.). Although individual Fathers, considered separately, provide positive evidence for the absence of the *Comma* in only a very few cases, I will not deny what I conceded at the outset: from the common silence among the Greek Fathers during the time when not only the person of the Son but also the Holy Spirit and the three divine persons were disputed against heretics, and from which time sufficient demonstrations of the Catholic dogma survive—thus, from the late 4th century onward—it can be inferred that the verse was already absent in many Greek manuscripts and, consequently, in some Latin ones.

I do not wish to pass over in silence what opponents boast about concerning St. Leo the Great. "Leo the Great," says Griesbach (p. 13), "transcribes the entire context but skips this verse in the famous letter to Flavian, translated into Greek and read at the Council of Chalcedon." If this were so, it would necessarily mean that the Pontiff, writing to the Greeks, deliberately omitted the verse; for it would be absurd to suspect that the verse was absent in Latin manuscripts in the mid-5th century. Three decades after the letter to Flavian was written, we see the text in the common reading of the African churches; the same testimony was read in Spain and Gaul; two generations after Leo, Cassiodorus had it in Italy in certainly ancient and most accurate manuscripts; thereafter, it appears in the common reading of the entire Latin

Church. How, then, could the testimony have been unknown to Pope Leo? But indeed, from the letter to Flavian, nothing else can be concluded except that the order of verses 7 and 8 in Leo's manuscripts, as with other Fathers, was reversed. The Pontiff cites verse 6 and connects it with verse 8; he did not proceed to verse 7, which followed our verse 8, because it was irrelevant to his purpose. His aim was to demonstrate against the Eutychians the truth of Christ's human nature, which is expressed in verses 6 and 8 together, but not in the subsequent verse 7 (*Letter of Leo* 28, alias 24, to Flavian, ch. 5).

3. Opponents gain no more from ancient versions than from Greek manuscripts and the authority of the Fathers. They particularly set aside the Ethiopic, Armenian, Philoxenian Syriac, and other later Syriac recensions, Arabic, and Slavic versions; for whatever may be said about their original readings, they were all made from the Greek text between the 4th and 9th centuries, a period when we concede that our *Comma* was already absent in many Greek manuscripts. Scholars infer from certain facts of ecclesiastical history that the Copts had the sacred Scriptures translated into their language in the 3rd century or early 4th century; but I think no one would claim a certain judgment about its original state. If verse 7 is absent in one or two manuscripts known to our critics, such a lacuna could easily have been introduced later from Greek manuscripts. The same reasoning applies to the simple Syriac version. In its manuscripts known to our scholars, the deuterocanonical books of the Old and New Testaments (2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, Jude, Revelation) are also missing, though it is established that in the 4th century, during the time of St. Ephrem, they were still present in it (cf. *Treatise on Scripture*, thesis XV). It is therefore not surprising if some disturbance regarding this reading of 1 John 5:7 also passed from the Greeks to the Syrians. We cannot certainly demonstrate that this is so; but we have not undertaken that task. The opponents promise such a demonstration and are indeed bound to it, as they accuse the reading of the entire Church—one that has long been common even among schismatics and Protestants—of being an interpolation and would have it removed from editions of the sacred books. It is more than sufficient for us to have shown that, from Catholic principles, its genuineness is demonstrated, and from all critical evidence, even if the false theological principles of Protestants are temporarily granted, interpolation cannot be demonstrated.

It is indeed noteworthy how Protestant opinions vary, as in other matters, so too in their judgment about this apostolic testimony. Nothing entirely new has been discovered against the genuineness of the reading that was not fully known to Mill, Bengel, and others at the beginning of the 18th century, except for a few Greek manuscripts recently collated, which add no new weight to the opposing arguments. Nevertheless, as long as the dogma itself expressed by the testimony was not called into question, those learned Protestants, though lacking the Catholic principle of tradition and authority, guided by some obscure Christian sense derived, as it were, from the remnants of the Catholic Church, understood that the universal and constant use of the ecclesiastical reading carries greater weight for the genuineness of a dogmatic text than those arguments, most of which are merely negative, could undermine. Hence, from the end of the 16th century until the last decades of the past century, almost only the Socinians, along with rejecting the doctrine itself, also rejected the testimony; other Protestants, still holding to the dogma of the Trinity, strenuously defended the genuineness of the testimony by the authority of the Latin version, so that sometimes they even accused its deniers of heresy, as Michaelis complains happened to him (*loc. cit.*, sect. 1). But after the dogma itself began first to be undermined covertly and then, with the rise of Rationalism, openly rejected by most Protestant scholars, they began not to bring forward new arguments—which, as I said, they entirely lack—but to exaggerate those long-known difficulties, by

which they first declared the testimony doubtful and then entirely spurious. This history of the controversy shows that they were led to this opinion far more by prejudices and dogmatic error than by critical arguments.

What is even more surprising is that some learned Catholics have either agreed with them in denying it or, at least in some cases, hardly dare to openly affirm and defend its genuineness.

[Note on Bengel]: The Protestant Bengel speaks thus about this testimony: "The divine dispensation is marvelous not only in the whole word but also in individual passages, which, like stars, have various risings and settings. This is especially to be observed in this most weighty passage, where you might believe that the clearest testimony about the Holy Trinity was given as the apex of apostolic testimony in the last age of John. Yet, shortly after it was published, it was somewhat hidden. Thus, it was not equally read by the Greeks… but, propagated in Latin, it especially strengthened the martyrs in Africa… Thus, John refutes Socinianism, Antichristianism, etc., with this verse—not, we will say, originally written in Latin, but certainly preserved thus far especially by the efforts of the Latins" (*Apparatus Criticus*, on this passage, § 28).

[Note on Catholic Critics]: Among Catholics, in the late 17th century, Richard Simon was the first after the Council of Trent to directly propose arguments against the genuineness of the verse (*Critique of the New Testament*, vol. II, ch. 18). At that time, he found no supporters but rather very severe critics (cf. Bossuet, *Second Instruction on the New Testament*, Trevoux, vol. IV, p. 609). Yet even Simon did not dare to explicitly deny the authenticity of the verse; indeed, he admits that it is confirmed by the authority of the Church and must be accepted: "It is only the authority of the Church that makes us today receive this passage as authentic. Even the Greeks, who are opposed to the Latins, agree with them on this" (*ibid.*, p. 217).

THESIS V: Demonstration of the Holy Trinity from 1 John 5:7

In the doctrine of St. John in 1 John 5:6–9, the connection is declared between the testimony of the Spirit for Christ as God and man (v. 6), the testimony of the three on earth for the true humanity of Christ (v. 8), and the testimony of the three in heaven—the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, who are one (v. 7). From this very passage, the unity of the three truly distinct persons according to the divine essence is demonstrated.

We will first discuss the connection of verse 6 with verses 7 and 8. However, it is necessary to examine the purpose that John had in mind in the epistle and further to determine the meaning both of the testimony and of the words "water," "blood," and "spirit" discussed in verse 6. From this, the significance of the witnesses in verse 8 must also be understood, since there, too, three witnesses are named: the spirit, water, and blood.

The primary purpose of the Apostle John, as in his Gospel, so too in this epistle, which serves as an introduction to the Gospel, is to teach and proclaim "that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God" (John 20:31). This is most clearly declared at the beginning of both the epistle and the Gospel, and it is repeated

and emphasized throughout both writings (cf. the excellent work of Fr. Patritius on the Gospels, book I, ch. 4, nn. 46 ff.). St. Irenaeus explains John's purpose more distinctly in *Book III, ch. 11*. The heretics, inventors of false knowledge (1 Timothy 6:20, cf. Colossians 2), from whom the Gnostic sects arose, introduced a multitude of Aeons (for the present purpose), calling one the Word, another Christ, another the Savior, and another the visible Jesus, whom some considered a mere man, while others denied that he was truly born of the Virgin Mary. But all conspired in denying that Jesus Himself is the Son of God or the Christ; some claimed that the Aeon Christ or Savior descended into Jesus in the form of a dove at baptism and flew back to the celestial pleroma at the time of His passion and death. "Proclaiming this faith, John, the disciple of the Lord, wished through the proclamation of the Gospel to remove the error sown among men by Cerinthus and, much earlier, by those called Nicolaitans, who are an offshoot of that falsely named knowledge, to confound them and persuade them that there is one God who made all things through His Word; and not, as they say, one who is the maker (demiurge), another the Father of the Lord, one the son of the maker, and another Christ from above, who remained impassible, descending into Jesus, the son of the maker, and flying back to his pleroma… Wishing to curtail all such things, the Lord's disciple… began in the doctrine according to the Gospel: 'In the beginning was the Word…' According to them, neither the Word nor Christ nor the Savior (formed, as it were, by a contribution from all Aeons) was made flesh. For they hold that neither the Word nor Christ came into this world; the Savior was neither incarnate nor suffered but descended like a dove into the Jesus who was made by the dispensation, and after proclaiming the unknown Father, ascended again to the pleroma… Others say that Jesus was born of Joseph and Mary, and into him descended Christ, who is from above, without flesh and impassible. But according to none of the heretics' opinions was the Word of God made flesh" (Irenaeus, *loc. cit.*, nn. 1–3). Although these monstrosities were variously arranged and developed in the roughly forty years from the writing of John's Gospel and epistles to Valentinus the Gnostic, it is both probable in itself and confirmed by the testimony of the most ancient Fathers, as well as by the form and manner of the Apostle's writing, that the principles and seeds of this falsely named knowledge were already scattered in Asia Minor during John's time (cf. Patritius, *loc. cit.*, nn. 11 ff.).

Now, it is clear from the plain reading that this final chapter of the epistle (vv. 4–13, 20) aims to teach that the very Jesus who appeared visibly is both true man and true Christ, the Son of God. "This is the victory that overcomes the world, our faith. Who is it that overcomes the world except the one who believes that Jesus is the Son of God?" There follows the introduction of the real testimony and the formal testimony concerning Jesus as true man and true Christ, the Son of God. "This is He who came by water and blood, Jesus Christ; not in water only, but in water and blood. And the Spirit is the one who testifies, because Christ is the truth." The passage is obscure because it admits multiple interpretations, among which it is difficult for us, who do not know all the circumstances of the error being refuted, to determine the uniquely true meaning; the Fathers and interpreters also diverge in their opinions.

If it could be certainly proven that the Apostle was addressing the condemnation of the heresy that imagined Christ descended into the baptized Jesus in the form of a dove and, after completing the ministry of preaching, flew back impassible to his celestial pleroma during Jesus' passion and death, then, in this hypothesis, the passage would most fittingly be understood in this sense: this one person, who is Jesus, true man and Christ, the Son of God, came and was manifested both in baptism, by which He wished to begin His public life and the completion of our redemption, and in His passion and death; not only did Christ, the Son of God, come in baptism upon Jesus the man, to depart from him at the time of death, but the one person, Jesus Christ, came and was manifested not in water (baptism) only, but in water

and blood (the shedding of blood and death). This sense is indicated by Tertullian (*On Baptism*, ch. 16), Bede, Oecumenius, and Anselm of Laon (interlinear gloss) on this passage. However, a more probable and simpler interpretation seems to be that not only the shedding of blood but also the effusion of water on the cross, not baptism, is meant by the term "water." This was the view of Athanasius (*Against Apollinaris*, book I, n. 18), Augustine (*Against Maximinus the Arian*, book II, ch. 22, n. 3), Eucherius of Lyon (*Questions on the Old and New Testament*, *Bibliotheca Maxima Patrum*, vol. VI, p. 853), Walafrid Strabo (in the ordinary gloss), Innocent III (*On the Celebration of Masses*, ch. *In quadam*, book III, tit. 41, ch. 8), and others. Indeed, this very conjunction of water and blood seems entirely consistent with the testimony of John 19:34–35, especially if it is noted that in both the epistle and the Gospel, this matter is emphasized with equal care: that from the pierced side of Christ came blood and water: "immediately blood and water came out; and he who saw it bore witness, and his testimony is true; and he knows that he speaks the truth, so that you may believe."

Furthermore, there is doubt about the meaning of the final clause: "the spirit is the one who testifies, because Christ is the truth." First, there can be doubt about the true reading. For the current published Greek text has: "because the Spirit is the truth." But both in Greek and Latin manuscripts and among the Fathers, the reading varies: some have "Christ," others "Spirit." In the Latin Vulgate reading, the object of the testimony is that Christ is the truth: not merely appearing as a man, as the Docetists claimed, nor merely a man into whom Christ descended, but the same true man and true Son of God. "Although He suffered as a man," says Anselm of Laon (interlinear gloss), "yet the Spirit seen above Him at baptism in the form of a dove, or the spirit, i.e., every spiritual teacher, testifies that Christ is the truth, the true Son of God, not a phantom."

Moreover, regarding the term "spirit," whose testimony is introduced in this verse 6 along with water and blood, there are again various opinions about what it properly means. Since the testimony of these three—water, blood, and spirit—is conjoined, it seems required that water, blood, and spirit be understood in the same sense as in verse 8, where it says, "there are three that bear witness on earth: the spirit, the water, and the blood." There, Athanasius, Augustine, Eucherius of Lyon, Walafrid Strabo, and Innocent III, in the places indicated above, understand the spirit as that which Christ emitted on the cross. "Let you not be deceived in the epistle of John the Apostle, where he says: there are three witnesses, the spirit, water, and blood, and these three are one… We know that three things came from the body of the Lord when He hung on the cross: first, the spirit, whence it is written, 'and bowing His head, He gave up the spirit'; then, when His side was pierced with a lance, blood and water" (Augustine, *Against Maximinus*, book II, ch. 22, n. 3). Just as water and blood flowed from Christ's pierced side, so too this interpretation of the spirit emitted on the cross can be supported, with Eucherius, because John in the Gospel (John 19:30, 34–35) connects the water and blood poured out with the spirit emitted as a real testimony of Christ's humanity. For there, after it is said, "bowing His head, He gave up the spirit," the account of the piercing of Christ's side immediately follows in one continuous narrative: "and immediately blood and water came out."

But although these points are probable regarding the spirit named in our epistle's verse 8, the words of verse 6, as they now stand—"and the spirit is the one who testifies, because Christ is the truth"—are very difficult to interpret; and in the alternative reading, "because the Spirit is the truth," they cannot at all be understood as referring to Christ's soul but must entirely be connected with the formal testimony of the

Holy Spirit alongside the real testimony of water and blood. In such a conjunction with water and blood, the testifying Spirit can be understood as the Holy Spirit

speaking through the Apostles and through men bearing witness (1). In this way, John in his Gospel also connects the real testimony of the blood and water flowing from Christ's pierced side with the testimony of the Spirit, namely his own apostolic testimony, and he emphasizes the truth of this testimony with special and unusual care: "Immediately blood and water came out; and he who saw it bore witness, and his testimony is true; and he knows that he speaks the truth, so that you also may believe" (John 19:34–35). Thus, by the term "spirit" in verse 6, and perhaps also in verse 8, the gift and effect of the Holy Spirit in the Apostles or generally in the Church can be understood, which elsewhere is metonymically called "Spirit." "The Spirit, i.e., every spiritual teacher, testifies that Christ is the truth" (Interlinear Gloss) (2). Therefore, even if it were conceded that the Holy Spirit is named in all three verses (6, 7, and 8), He would not be understood as testifying in the same way in verses 6 and 8 as in verse 7. Thus, a distinction is made between the Holy Spirit testifying in heaven personally and immediately by Himself, and testifying on earth through His gifts in the Apostles and in the Church.

From this, it is already clear that the connection of verses 7 and 8 with the preceding verses 5 and 6 is very close. For, regarding the fact that Jesus is the Son of God and that He came by water and blood, and the Spirit testifies that Christ is the truth, there follows in verses 7 and 8 a further explanation of the testimony. The object of the testimony is indicated as twofold: that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that He is true man. For each, the testimony of three is distinctly brought forward; just as the Lord Christ, speaking to the Jews, introduced two witnesses—the Father and Himself—appealing to the principle: "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand" (Deuteronomy 19:15), and later, in further instructing His disciples, added the Holy Spirit as a witness (John 5:31–39; 8:14–18; 15:26). Therefore, what the Apostle said somewhat obscurely in verse 6—"This is He who came by water and blood, Jesus Christ… and the Spirit is the one who testifies, because Christ (or the Spirit) is the truth"—is distributed in verses 7 and 8 into the testimony in heaven for His divinity and the testimony on earth for His humanity (1), noting the number three in both cases. "The Apostle John in his epistle speaks, saying: There are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one, intending by this to show that Christ is true God. And there are three who bear witness on earth, the spirit, water, and blood, intending by this to show that Christ is true man" (Innocent III; Walafrid Strabo, cited works).

II. What we have said thus far pertains only to determining the context and meaning of verses 6 and 8. Now, finally, we must come to the demonstration from verse 7, which is our present concern. The distinction of persons, which is shown in the baptismal formula by the significance of the names and the enumeration of three, is here clearly stated: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit are three witnesses. Likewise, the unity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit according to deity and absolute perfection, which we showed is expressed in the baptismal formula, is here explicitly declared by the term of unity:

Baptismal Formula	**1 John 5:7**
Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit	There are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit

And these three are one

1. The matter to be testified is stated in verses 5–6: that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God. The testimony is twofold: first, formal. For immediately it is added in verse 9: "God (namely the Father, for the name 'God' is specified by the addition 'concerning His Son,' so as to stand for the person) has testified concerning His Son." This testimony of the Father concerning His Son, and the testimony of the Son Himself and of the Holy Spirit, has been given in many ways, and the Son frequently appealed to it, sometimes naming two, sometimes all three persons together in testifying. "And He saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove and coming upon Him, and behold, a voice from heaven saying: 'This is My beloved Son'" (Matthew 3:16–17); "When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father, He will bear witness of Me" (John 15:26; cf. 16:14–15); "I am the one who bears witness of Myself, and the Father who sent Me bears witness of Me" (John 8:18; cf. 10:25 ff.).

In another way, the real testimony of this truth, that "Jesus is the Son of God," is contained in this very fact: that the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit are three who are one. This argument or real testimony operates in two ways:
a) Through the unity of the three, the formal testimony is shown to be divine, not only insofar as it is from the Father, but also insofar as it is from the Son and the Holy Spirit, because the Son and the Spirit are one with the Father: there are three who bear witness, and these three are one; hence, it is immediately inferred from this testimony of the three: "the testimony of God is greater."

b) This unity of the three by itself demonstrates and thus not only in words but in reality testifies to the true and proper divine sonship of Jesus Christ. For the Word made flesh is Jesus Christ Himself, as John showed at the beginning of the Gospel to which this epistle is connected ("The Word was made flesh, and we saw His glory, the glory as of the Only Begotten of the Father"); but the Word is the proper Son of God through the unity of nature received from the Father, and which the Word itself communicates to the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the unity of the three demonstrates and by itself really testifies that "Jesus is the Son of God"; namely, the proper Son by one nature with the Father; "Jesus is the Son of God (the truth to be testified): because there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit (the testifying persons); and these three are one (the formal reason by which they testify)."

Thus, just as the spirit, water, and blood on earth are in themselves a real testimony for the true humanity of Jesus Christ, so the three in heaven, insofar as they are one, are said to be a real testimony for the true divine sonship, i.e., for the divine nature of Jesus Christ. Therefore, when John declared as the formal reason for this real testimony the phrase "these three are one," he could not have meant any other unity of the three than that of nature. The doctrine of John, therefore, is reduced to this enthymeme: The three persons in heaven—the Father, the Word (not yet considered as incarnate), and the Holy Spirit—are one in nature; therefore, the Word incarnate, Jesus Christ, is the true Son of God by nature one with the Father and the Holy Spirit.

2. Although the words of the Apostle, who by excellence bears the name of theologian, are in themselves very clear, nevertheless, the Socinians and, what is truly surprising, even some Catholics (Placidus Stürmer, Dobmayr, etc.) have found difficulty against the probative force of

> this text. They say that the clause "these three are one" in verse 8 indicates only a moral unity, namely the agreement of testimony; therefore, no other unity can be demonstrated from verse 7 with the same words.

First, in the clause "these three are one," there is neither an indisputable verbal parallelism between verses 7 and 8, nor certainly a real parallelism. For in Greek editions (except the Complutensian), verse 7 has "ἓν εἰσι" (they are one); verse 8, however, has "εἰς τὸ ἕν εἰσι" (they are in one). In the Complutensian edition, verse 7 reads "εἰς τὸ ἕν εἰσι"; in verse 8, this clause is entirely absent. Likewise, in many Latin manuscripts, only of the witnesses in heaven is it said: "and these three are one"; but of the witnesses on earth, it is omitted. Besides the manuscripts themselves, we have as a witness the Fourth Lateran Council (Hardouin, vol. VII, p. 18). Likewise, St. Thomas (commentary on the *Decretals* against the error of Abbot Joachim, ed. de Rubeis, vol. VIII, p. 94) says of verse 8: "In some books it is added: 'and these three are one'; but this is not found in true copies, and in some books, it is said to have been added by Arian heretics to undermine the sound understanding of the preceding authority (verse 7) concerning the essential unity of the three persons." Elsewhere, verse 8 reads: "and these three are in us," as in the author of the book *Against Varimadus* (*Bibliotheca Maxima*, vol. V, p. 729); the author of *On the Baptism of Heretics* in the 3rd century reads in Latin, as in Greek: "and these three are in one"; elsewhere, it is added as an explanation: "these three are one in Christ Jesus," as in Augustine's *Speculum* (ed. Mai); cf. Cassiodorus or the interpreter of Clement of Alexandria's commentary on 1 John (*Bibliotheca Maxima*, vol. III, p. 234). Cassiodorus himself in his *Complexiones* (ed. Maffei, p. 145) omits the clause in verse 8 and for verse 7 provides the interpretation: "and these three are one God." These show that a great distinction, at least in sense, has always been recognized regarding the words "they are one" between verses 7 and 8. Moreover, the reading of verse 8, "εἰς τὸ ἕν εἰσι," seems sufficiently certain from both the Greek Fathers and manuscripts. In verse 7, however, according to the Latin Fathers and manuscripts by which this text has been preserved for us, and by comparison with John 10:30 ("ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν"), the reading "ἕν εἰσι" is to be considered true, as cited by the Fourth Lateran Council even in its Greek version (Hardouin, *loc. cit.*), and it is found in the Greek Codex Dublinensis of Trinity College (1) (which seems to be the same as Erasmus' British codex), and also in editions used even among schismatic Greeks (see *Profession of Orthodox Faith* approved by the four Patriarchs and other schismatic bishops, ed. Leipzig, part I, q. 9, p. 25).

Given this, it is clear in the words themselves that a different unity is declared for the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit than for the spirit, water, and blood. The Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit are said to be three who are one simply; the spirit, water, and blood are said to be in one, namely to pertain to one and the same truth to be demonstrated and testified, or to be one in testimony.

Let us concede, however, a verbal parallelism, as certainly exists in our Vulgate, where it is said in both places: "and these three are one"; nevertheless, a real parallelism must certainly be denied. The subject in each clause is entirely different: in the former, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; in the latter, the spirit, water, and blood. But according to the diversity of subjects, the meaning of the predicate is also modified, especially if the subject in one proposition is God and in the other something created; for who would say that the predicate of wisdom, for example, means the same in the two propositions: "God is wise" and "man is wise"? Now, the meaning of the subject in verse 7 is evident at least insofar as the Father is true God, and the Word and the Holy Spirit are not divine attributes but are really distinct both from the Father and from each other; for they are said to be "these three." Therefore, they are per se

subsistent, and since by their very names, Word and Holy Spirit (without now appealing to the universal doctrine of Scripture), they are shown to be of an intellectual nature, they are three persons. Thus, three persons, one of whom not even a heretic would deny is certainly God, are predicated to be one; and this not by subnumeration but by clearly enumerating three persons: "these three are one" (see Corollary I to Thesis III). Regarding such a principle, St. Augustine's statement is most certain as a hermeneutical and dogmatic principle: "one" is never predicated simply in Scripture of things whose substance is diverse (1). St. Thomas restricts this to the sense that God and a creature are never said to be one simply (*In John 10:30*, lect. V). Bellarmine (*On Christ*, book I, ch. 6) considered this principle less firm in this sense; for as it is said, "He who adheres to the Lord is one spirit" (1 Corinthians 6:17), so it could also be said: he is one with God; "for one spirit is one thing, and one thing and one are the same." But first (with all due respect to so great a man), "spirit" there is not a substance but a supernatural gift of faith, hope, and charity derived from Christ, a Christian understanding, a Christian will, which Paul elsewhere called: "we have the mind of Christ" and again: "Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus" (1 Corinthians 2:16; Philippians 2:5). In this sense, "one spirit" with Christ certainly does not mean the same as "one thing with Christ, and one simply." But if "Spirit" were understood as a cause, then indeed the Spirit of the Lord dwelling in the just and the Lord, or the Spirit of the Son and the Son, are simply one. Thus Pseudo-Ambrose explained in his commentary on this passage: in the just, he says, "the Spirit of God is common to God and men." With this interpretation, all passages concerning the communication and indwelling of the Holy Spirit can be compared, such as: "Those who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God" (Romans 8:14). Moreover, there is a great difference between "one" said simply and expressions that specify in what respect several things are one, in that "one" said without addition, having the simplest notion, does not admit multiple meanings; but if it has some addition, this can be such that it may be taken in a sense where the kind of unity is determined not as substantial but as accidental, such as the term in 1 Corinthians 6:17, "one spirit." Read St. Augustine on this in *Against Maximinus*, book II, ch. 20, n. 1.

Furthermore, although in a very improper sense it might perhaps be said that man is one with God, Augustine's principle remains most true when it comes to the biblical manner of speaking and the enumeration of persons, one of whom is God; namely, that in Scripture, no person other than the Son of God and the Spirit of God is enumerated with God the Father or with God in such a way that God and that person are said to be one. Indeed, even apart from the universal biblical manner of speaking, it is evident that persons, one of whom is certainly true God, cannot be enumerated in the same line of dignity unless the predicate "they are one" is taken ontologically as unity of being, i.e., divine being; as it is said here: "There are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit."

What we say about the biblical manner of speaking is established by induction and consideration of Scripture passages such as John 17:11, 20–21 (cf. Augustine, *Against Maximinus*, *loc. cit.*); 1 Corinthians 6:17; 1 John 5:8, which are the primary ones typically cited by Arians and Unitarians to obscure this testimony of 1 John 5:7.

The reason for the principle, which we said is universally evident, is easily clear, because such an enumeration of persons declares their equality in some line of perfection or dignity; but equality with God (for one of the enumerated persons is supposed to be God) cannot be declared by the predicate "they are one" unless this is taken in its proper sense, signifying one being (1). For no unity of equality with God can be conceived that is not really a unity of essence; but according to our distinctions of reason, the unity

of essence is the first and fundamental unity, which underlies every unity distinguished by reason, and every other unity, e.g., of absolute attributes or external actions, is identified with it. Hence, one who, to the statement "the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, three are one," adds the explanation: they are one in power, will, or authority of testimony, either speaks absurdly about divine things if intending to exclude the unity of essence, or really says the same as the unity of essence, while considering unity in attributes and external actions, which are distinguished from the essence only by our way of thinking and by reason. Thus, just as in the proposition "the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit bear witness in heaven," the distinction is already taught by the names themselves and their enumeration in the plural number, and then explicitly declared by the phrase "there are three"; so by the enumeration of the Word and the Holy Spirit with God the Father in the same order of dignity, the unity of the divinity of the three distinct persons is already contained, and this unity is explicitly and clearly declared by the statement: "these three are one."

In contrast, the subject of verse 8—"spirit, water, and blood"—is clearly of a different nature. Water and blood are certainly not persons, much less divine persons, but are created things. Therefore, however the other subject, "spirit," is understood, the predicate "they are one" cannot have the same meaning as in verse 7 in the enumeration of the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit. If the Greek text is then consulted: "εἰς τὸ ἕν εἰσι" (they are in one), it appears that the unity is declared not so much among those three as of the thing testified; hence, even in the Latin text, those three must be understood as one in testimony. But this unity of testimony in divine things presupposes unity, and indeed numerical unity, of nature, while in created things it requires neither numerical nor specific unity.

To the proposed difficulty, therefore, in which it was said: by "these three are one" in verse 8, a moral unity in testifying is indicated; therefore, no other unity is indicated in verse 7 with the same words; the response is:
a) The consequence is denied. For the subjects in each clause are entirely different, and therefore the meaning of the predicate "they are one" is also different.
b) Insofar as the three in heaven—the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit—present a real testimony and demonstration that the incarnate Word is the true Son of God, they present this testimony only by the unity of nature, because the Word is God of one nature with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, by the words "these three are one," which contain why and how the three persons present testimony for the true divine sonship of Jesus Christ, nothing else can be signified than the unity of the three according to the divine nature.

c) Insofar as the three persons in heaven give formal testimony for the divine sonship of Jesus Christ, the authority of this testimony is one, because the nature of the three is one. "My Father is working until now, and I am working… the Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He sees the Father doing; for whatever He does, the Son does likewise" (John 5:17–23). "The words that I speak to you, I do not speak of Myself; but the Father who dwells in Me does the works" (John 14:10). "When the Spirit of truth comes, He will teach you all truth, for He will not speak of Himself, but whatever He hears He will speak… He will glorify Me, for He will take of Mine and declare it to you. All things that the Father has are Mine. Therefore I said that He will take of Mine and declare it to you" (John 16:13–15). Thus, what is said—"these three are one"—contains the reason why, just as every external operation of the three is one, so the testimony by which the three—the Father, the Word of the Father, and the Spirit of the Father and the Son—bear witness is one; namely, the reason is one Being or the unity of essence (1).

3. The genuine sense defended thus far is confirmed by comparison with what follows. For verse 7 is closely connected with verse 9: "If we receive the testimony of men, the testimony of God is greater (cf. John 5:32 ff.; 8:17–18); for this is the testimony of God, which is greater (2), because He has testified concerning His Son. He who believes in the Son of God has the testimony of God in himself." Regarding Jesus, the true Son of God, he had appealed to the testimony of three distinct persons—the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; but at the same time, he had declared: "these three are one." Now he calls this testimony of the three the testimony of one God; and thus, "these three are one" is equivalent to the other proposition: "these three are one God." Hence Cassiodorus, who in his *Complexiones*, along with many manuscripts and Fathers, places verse 7 after our verse 8, and thus even in the material arrangement of the words preserves the connection, rightly circumscribes the clause "they are one" with this other: "and these three are one God." Therefore, the Apostle himself declares the reason why the three are one: that the three distinct persons—the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit—are one God, and thus are one by the unity of the divine nature, which admits no multiplication.

We have explained the testimony of God in verse 9 as the testimony of one God considered absolutely; against this explanation, a difficulty might arise for someone from what John adds: "the testimony of God, because He has testified concerning His Son," where the testimony of God the Father is clearly understood. But the name "God" by itself is not a relative name (for it does not express a relation to another) but an absolute one, signifying the divine nature in the mode of a concrete term and thus in the mode of a hypostasis, but without determination to this or that distinct person. Since, therefore, the three are one God both individually and all together, the name "God" without added determination does not stand for one person distinct from the others but signifies the deity subsisting in three persons. However, since each person is God, through an added personal property, the name "God" is determined to stand for one person whose property is expressed (see above, pp. 31 ff.). Thus, in the proposition "God generates God," the subject is determined to stand for the person of the Father alone through the added property of active generation, and the predicate stands for the Son alone because of the included property of passive generation (τὸ γεννητόν). Hence it is clear that, without any confusion or obscurity, in the same context the name "God" can be taken now absolutely for God who is one and triune, now with a determined supposition for one person; for the signification of the name, which always remains the same, namely the divine nature in the mode of subsistence, is not changed, but there is only a transition from an indeterminate supposition to a distinct supposition, which is clearly expressed by the added personal reason. So too in created things, no one would say that this statement is obscure: "Man needs grace for the confession of faith; therefore, the man confessing: 'You are the Christ, the Son of the living God,' was enlightened and strengthened by grace," even though the name

"man" shifts from a confused supposition to a determined supposition for Peter. Given this, no one would deny that in the first clause of verse 9, "the testimony of God is greater," the name "God" is taken absolutely, namely as the testimony of God the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, who are three yet one; but in the second clause, "because (God) has testified concerning His Son," the subject "God" stands for the person of the Father alone.

From this, it is clear:
a) That the testimony, or the act of testifying (ἡ μαρτυρία), is entirely one and the same, whether it is said to be of the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit, or simultaneously of the Father, the Son, and the Holy

Spirit; and therefore, the external act is one and really common to the three persons, because they do not act insofar as they are distinct persons through their mutual relations, but insofar as they are one God.
b) Since the act or operation in God is the divine nature itself with a connotation of an external term, it follows that through the unity of the testimony, which is entirely one and the same whether attributed to one, another, or all three persons, the unity of nature in the three persons is most clearly expressed as a consequence.

c) Incidentally, you will note again what we said in the preceding thesis: the context scarcely, or not even scarcely, holds together if the clause of verse 7, concerning the testimony of the three in heaven, is absent. For when, for example, it is said, "the testimony of God (concerning the divine sonship of Jesus Christ) is greater," it presupposes that a narrative of the existence of this testimony of God has preceded; but this narrative is found nowhere except in the clause of verse 7.

As a conclusion, it seems fitting to present to the eyes the parallelism of this passage, now explained, 1 John 5:5–13, with the texts of John 1:1–18 and John 10:25–38, as declared in Thesis III.

1 John 5	**John 1**	**John 10**
Who is he who overcomes the world, but he who believes that Jesus is the Son of God? (v. 5)	In the beginning was the Word… And the Word was made flesh, and we saw His glory, the glory as of the Only Begotten of the Father (v. 1, 14)	My Father, who has given them to Me, is greater than all… I and the Father are one (v. 29–30)
And this is the testimony: that God has given us eternal life, and this life is in His Son (v. 11)	In Him was life, and the life was the light of men (v. 4)	I give them eternal life, and they shall never perish (v. 28)
He who has the Son has life; he who does not have the Son does not have life. These things I write to you so that you may know that you have eternal life, you who believe in the name of the Son of God (v. 12–13)	He came to His own, and His own did not receive Him; but to as many as received Him, He gave the power to become children of God, to those who believe in His name (v. 11–12)	You do not believe because you are not of My sheep. My sheep hear My voice, and I know them, and they follow Me, and I give them eternal life, and they shall never perish (v. 26–28)

No one has ever seen God; the Only Begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He has made Him known… I saw the Spirit descending like a dove from heaven, and it remained upon Him… He who sent me to baptize with water said to me: "He upon whom you see the Spirit descending and remaining, this is He who baptizes with the Holy Spirit" (v. 18, 32–33)	The works that I do in My Father's name, these bear witness of Me… If I do not do the works of My Father, do not believe Me. But if I do, though you do not believe Me, believe the works, so that you may know and believe that the Father is in Me, and I in the Father (v. 25, 37–38)	
For there are three who bear witness in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one (v. 7)	In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God (v. 1)	And no one can snatch them out of My hand, and no one can snatch them out of My Father's hand: I and the Father are one (v. 28–30)

Thesis VI: The Doctrine of the Old Testament on Distinct Divine Persons

The revelation of the unity of God in the Old Testament is such that it not only excludes [polytheism], but also, in the ways of speaking about the one God, in describing theophanies, and in the promises of the future Messiah, it variously indicates and regards the distinction of persons who are one God.

The questions of whether the doctrine of the distinction of divine persons is contained in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and whether the same doctrine was sufficiently proposed in the Old Testament so as to pertain to the common faith of the people of Israel, are quite different. The latter must certainly be denied; nevertheless, it is equally certain that the doctrine of the distinction of persons is found in the books of the Old Testament, expressed sometimes more clearly, sometimes more obscurely foreshadowed. It would not be permissible for any Christian to deny this universally, both because Christ the Lord Himself and the Apostles in the New Testament confirm the doctrine they preached about the Son of God, and thus about the Father and the Son as distinct persons who are one God, as well as the doctrine about the Holy Spirit, from the books of the Old Testament (Matthew 22:44; Mark 1:2–3, cf. Malachi 3:1; Luke 4:18 ff.; Hebrews 1:5–13; Acts 2:17 ff.), and because some things in the Old Testament are so clearly expressed that, after the manifest revelation of the New Testament, they cannot be understood in any other sense without distortion, and because the Catholic understanding and the fullest consensus of the Fathers have always recognized this doctrine in the books of the Old Testament (cf. Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book II, ch. 7).

I. The manner in which God speaks in the Old Testament about external operations expresses the enumeration of several who are one God. "And God said: Let us make man in our image and likeness… And God created man in His image" (Genesis 1:26–27). The word "let us make" and the pronoun "our" clearly include the designation of several in a kind of deliberative communication, and these cannot be reduced merely to the so-called plural of majesty (1). Still less can the words be taken as an address of

God to angels, since there is a clear enumeration of those equal in dignity in the same exemplary creative operation (see above, p. 45). Furthermore, the exemplary cause or archetypal image to which man is created is said to be one in those several, and the efficient cause of creation is one God: "God created man… in our image and likeness." If these are compared with New Testament passages where both the distinction of persons and the unity of nature are declared from the unity of operation, the parallelism will appear evident, such that the testimony of the Old Testament cannot be understood in any other sense.

(1) Neither the rationalist Gesenius (*Grammar*, §216, n. 5) nor the Rabbis cited by Buxtorf (*Thesaurus*, Book II, ch. 10, p. 107) could find examples of the plural of majesty; Numbers 22:6, 2 Kings 16:20, Job 18:1, Song of Songs 1:4, and Daniel 2:36 are irrelevant to the matter.

The unanimous interpretation of the Fathers and, as Epiphanius says (*Haereses*, 23, n. 5), "the common understanding of the faithful proceeding from the truth" does not allow doubt about the truth of the sense that the words clearly present. "It was not said in vain, 'Let us make man in your image,' as if the Father were speaking to the Son; nor 'in my image,' but it was said: 'in our image.' This is most rightly understood as spoken from the person of the Trinity itself" (Augustine, *Against the Sermon of the Arians*, ch. 16). Faustinus, a Roman presbyter, after demonstrating the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son from New Testament testimonies, teaches that the same can now be understood as revealed in the Old Testament. "But let us see if Moses also taught the same thing that the Apostles proclaimed, namely that all things were made by God through the Son… And God said: Let us make man in our image and likeness. It is not the speech of one person saying, 'Let us make in our image and likeness,' nor of a different deity. For the plurality of these words, 'let us make' and 'our,' signifies the persons of the Father and the Son. But the fact that it says 'image' in the singular shows one deity, one power of both persons. If Christ is a creature, how is He included as a partner in the work of God? For it is said to Him: 'Let us make.' If He is not the true Son, how is there one image for Him with the Father?… For it did not say: 'Let us make in our images,' but 'in our image'… It suffices for now that in this one chapter Moses agreed with the Gospels and the Apostles… No one said there are two Gods, even though he said God and God; no one denied that there is one image of the Father and the Son, and therefore acknowledged one God in the confession of the Catholic faith; not, however, so that by confessing one God, the Son, who is God, is denied. For if the Son is not God as the Father is God, how is there one image for them according to Moses, or how is Christ, according to Paul (Philippians 2:6), in the form of God, being equal to God?" (Faustinus, *On the Trinity*, n. 8–9, Gailand, vol. VII, p. 442). See the common interpretation of the Fathers in Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book II, ch. 7, n. 4 ff.

II. In the theophanies of the Old Testament, God is frequently presented as the true God sent by the true God; thus, there is one sent and another sending, yet both are one true God. For He who appears, or who is manifested as present through sensible signs (a human form, a flame of fire, a sensible voice, etc.), is called the Angel of the Lord (מַלְאַךְ יְהוָה), that is, the messenger of God; yet at the same time, the same one appearing and speaking is revealed as the true God, both by explicit name and by the description of attributes. Thus, in the story of Hagar: "When the Angel of the Lord found her… the Angel of the Lord said to her: 'Return to your mistress…' and again: 'Multiplying,' He said, 'I will multiply your offspring…' And she called the name of the Lord (יְהוָה) who spoke to her: 'You are the God who sees me'" (Genesis 16:7–14; cf. 21:17–18). The Angel of God speaking to Jacob in a dream declares Himself: "I am the God of Bethel" (Genesis 31:11, 13). But the God of Bethel is "the Lord (יְהוָה), the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac" (Genesis 28:12, 19). He who appeared to Moses in the burning bush is

called (in the Hebrew text) the Angel of the Lord, and the same defines Himself: “I am who I am… the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob” (Exodus 3:2 ff.). The Angel of the Covenant is Himself the Lord (אָדוֹן) and God, whose temple was in Jerusalem (Malachi 3:1, Hebrew 3:3). Thus, there is God (אֱלֹהִים) who sends the Angel, and the Angel sent by God is Himself God (יְהוָה). This is also explicitly declared in the story of the destruction of Sodom: “The Lord (יְהוָה) appeared to him (Abraham) in Mamre… And the Lord said: ‘Can I hide from Abraham what I am about to do…’ And the Lord said: ‘The outcry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great. I will go down and see…’ And the Lord went His way after He had finished speaking with Abraham. And two Angels came to Sodom in the evening… Therefore the Lord (יְהוָה) rained on Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire from the Lord (יְהוָה) out of heaven” (Genesis 18:1–19, 24). Here, the Lord appearing on earth, elsewhere called the Angel of the Lord, is clearly distinguished from another who is presented as the Lord in heaven; thus, there are two distinct, but each is the one Lord (יְהוָה), besides whom there is no God.

(1) “But when three men were seen, and none of them was said to be greater than the others in form, age, or power, why should we not understand here the equality of the Trinity visibly insinuated through a visible creature? But which two persons do we understand here? Perhaps the Son and the Holy Spirit? This is perhaps more fitting; for they said they were sent, which we say of the Son and the Holy Spirit; for we nowhere find in Scripture that the Father was sent” (Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Book II, ch. 20, 22).

This doctrine about the Angel of God, who is Himself God sent by God, is widely evident in the Old Testament and has been proposed by the holy Fathers with great consensus as a most clear argument for demonstrating the distinction of divine persons. Thus taught Justin, Irenaeus, Theophilus of Antioch, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, Novatian, the Antiochene Fathers against Samosatenus, Cyprian, Eusebius, Athanasius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Basil, Hilary, Ambrose, the bishops gathered at Sirmium against Photinus, Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, Leo the Great, Cassian, and Isidore. See Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book VIII, ch. 2, n. 3 ff.; Hengstenberg, *Christology*, vol. I, ch. 3, p. 219 ff.; and P. Patrizi, *On the Interpretation of Oracles Pertaining to Christ*, p. 70 ff.

Nor does St. Augustine contradict this common interpretation of the other Fathers; rather, he illustrates it and excellently explains how the visible apparitions of God are to be understood.
a) The primary aim of Augustine in Books II, III, and IV of *On the Trinity* is to demonstrate against the Arians that the Son and the Holy Spirit, in their proper divine substance, are as invisible to bodily eyes as the Father.
b) However, through a subjected creature, i.e., through visible signs and species (as Augustine teaches there), the Father can appear, i.e., be signified as present, no less than the Son or the Holy Spirit, so that either individual persons distinctly, or the three persons together, or even God insofar as He is one, without signifying distinct persons, may be manifested. Augustine holds that the divine persons manifested themselves in all these different ways in the Old Testament; but which person is distinctly exhibited in each theophany must be inferred from the context of the narrative (1).

c) Augustine explains the mode of manifestation thus: sensible signs, whether visible species or sensible voices, are efficiently produced by the one and triune God, as are all external works; for the divine persons do not operate externally insofar as they are distinct, but insofar as they are one God and one divine nature. But in signifying (σημαίνω), those sensible signs can refer to one or another person distinctly exhibited (1). Furthermore, if those sensible species and voices were immediately produced by

God Himself, in those places where the Angel of the Lord and the Lord Himself are said to have appeared, it must be understood that the person of the Son was manifested, who is called "the Angel of Great Counsel" (Isaiah 9:6, according to the Septuagint). But if those species and voices were formed by the ministry of angels, then Augustine holds that the signification certainly refers to demonstrating the presence of God, but which person was distinctly demonstrated must be inferred not from the title "Angel" but from other circumstances (2). In fact, such manifestations in the Old Testament were thought by Augustine to have been effected by the ministry of angels, as he infers from Hebrews 1:14, 2:2, Acts 7:53, and Galatians 3:19 (*On the Trinity*, Book III, n. 1 ff.).

(1) "The modest and cautious consideration of the divine mysteries in the passages of Holy Scripture persuades, as far as I judge, nothing else than that we should not rashly say which person of the Trinity appeared to any of the patriarchs or prophets in some body or likeness of a body, unless the context of the narrative provides some probable indications. For that nature or substance or essence, or whatever name that which God is should be called, whatever it is, cannot be seen bodily; but it must be believed that through a subjected creature, not only the Son or the Holy Spirit but also the Father could give a signification of Himself to human bodily senses through a bodily species or likeness" (Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Book II, n. 35).

(2) "And here (Exodus 3:2 ff.) it is first said to be the Angel of the Lord, then God. Is the Angel, therefore, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? Thus, it can rightly be understood as the Savior Himself, of whom the Apostle says, 'of whom are the fathers, and from whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is God over all, blessed forever.' Therefore, He who is God over all, blessed forever, is not absurdly understood here as the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. But why was He first called the Angel of the Lord when He appeared from the bush in a flame of fire? Was it because He was one of many angels, but by dispensation bore the person of His Lord? Or was some creature assumed for the present purpose, which would appear visibly and from which voices would be sensibly produced, so that the presence of the Lord would be exhibited through the subjected creature to human bodily senses, as was necessary? If He was one of the angels, who can easily affirm whether the person of the Son, the Holy Spirit, the Father, or the Trinity itself, which is the one and only God, was imposed on him to announce, so that he would say: 'I am the God of Abraham'?… But if a creature was assumed for the present purpose to appear to human eyes and sound in human ears, and was called the Angel of the Lord and the Lord and God, here God cannot be understood as the Father but either the Son or the Holy Spirit. Although I do not recall the Holy Spirit being called an Angel anywhere… but of the Lord Jesus Christ, we read most clearly in the Prophet that He was called the Angel of Great Counsel, since both the Holy Spirit and the Son of God are God and Lord of angels" (Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Book II, n. 29).

Augustine thus agrees with the earlier Fathers in what is primarily sought, namely that in the theophanies of the Old Testament, the distinction of persons was frequently exhibited. The difference, however, is that some of the most ancient Fathers thought that the entire Old Testament economy was administered through the Son, as if prefiguring the Incarnation, and thus all Old Testament apparitions should be referred to the Son; Augustine, however, does not admit this exclusion of the apparition of other persons. Furthermore, what other Fathers teach—that the Angel of the Lord is the Lord Himself sent by the Lord and thus the Son—Augustine considers less certain, because he thinks it possible to understand a created angel through whom God spoke; and therefore, the words spoken, "I am the God of Abraham," etc.,

certainly refer to God, but the title "Angel" is not attributed to God Himself but to a created spirit through whose ministry God used in His manifestation. This is also the opinion of St. Jerome on Galatians 3:19 (*Works*, vol. VII, p. 441) and St. Gregory the Great in *Morals on Job*, Book XXVIII, ch. 1: "They are expressed by the name of angels who ministered externally, and by the title of Lord, He who ruled internally is shown" (Gregory, *ibid.*, n. 7). Indeed, Gregory holds that even the sensible voices of the Father to the Son, "I have glorified and will glorify again" and "This is My beloved Son," were formed by the ministry of angels; yet no one doubts that their signification refers to the person of God the Father. Thus, even the visible species, e.g., of the burning bush, and the voices, "I am the God of Abraham," etc., although said to be effected by the ministry of angels, are referred to signifying the presence of God. In the contexts, however, such as those we cited above from the Old Testament, not only the presence of the one God but also the distinction of divine persons is usually signified.

It seemed fitting to expound Augustine's doctrine at greater length so that it may be understood to what extent he agrees with the earlier Fathers. From this, it further appears what should be thought of a certain singular theory and objection of a recent theologian against Augustine's opinion. "It cannot be understood," he says, "that God (τὸν Θεόν) appears, i.e., God considered as one person (perhaps he meant to say, God considered absolutely), because then He would have to appear according to His essence and in His essence, which is contradictory. Nor can God the Father appear, not indeed because of some attribute unique to Him, for there is none such; but because the Father is the principle in the deity, and because it would be necessary for all persons to appear with the Father, and thus the divine person Himself. Therefore, when Augustine expressly refers a theophany even to God the Father and denies that a theophany can be exclusively referred to the Son or the Holy Spirit, affirming that it is rash to say that God the Father never appeared to the patriarchs through some visible forms (*On the Trinity*, Book II, ch. 17), this is tantamount to teaching that in those scriptural narratives, no proper personal apparition of God is to be understood universally, but only a mere manifestation of God." Hence, what Augustine says—that it is not sufficiently clear whether one person or all three appeared to Abraham—this theologian dismisses with the surprising observation that the apparition of "three persons" is the apparition of "no person." He further continues: from Augustine's opinion, it could also be said that the angels themselves do not appear personally on earth, but carry out their ministry among men through subjected creatures. "In this opinion," he says, "no Father of any note follows Augustine, as far as I know; no one calls into question the apparitions of angels narrated in the Old Testament as true and personal apparitions of these supernatural spirits" (Dr. Kuhn, *On the Trinity*, Section I, §2).

I confess that all these seem to me difficult and scarcely reconcilable with certain principles in theology. For:

a) What, I ask, is the difference between the manifestation of God, now as the Father, now as the Son, now as the Holy Spirit, now as three persons through sensible species, as Augustine describes, and a personal apparition of God? Setting aside the hypostatic union, where a divine person makes a visible nature, namely human, His own, so that the divine person through this nature is man, it follows that what the cited theologian brings forward from Irenaeus is not very apt: "The Word

naturally (in His divine nature) indeed invisible, but made palpable and visible among men (in the assumed human nature)" (Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, Book IV, ch. 24 [also cited as 41]; cf. Book I, ch. 10, n. 1). Setting aside this hypostatic union, which Augustine also distinguishes (*On the Trinity*, Book IV,

nn. 30–31), a theophany or sensible apparition of the immense and omnipresent God cannot be understood except through a manifestation in sensible species, as Augustine describes (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 43, a. 7).

Further:

b) What, I ask, does the theologian mean when he says that God considered absolutely cannot appear, but individual persons can appear, yet not the person of the Father, because with the Father all three persons, and thus the divine nature, would necessarily appear, and further, that the apparition of the three persons would be equivalent to the apparition of no person? Certainly, a divine person cannot be perceived by the senses any more than the divine nature can. However, sensible species, as signs of God's presence, cannot be produced by one person as distinct from the others, but are produced by the one and triune God; yet in their signification, they can refer either to God without indicating the distinction of persons, or to the Father as distinguished from the Son and the Holy Spirit, or to another person, or simultaneously to the three persons as distinct from one another. "Although the entire Trinity produced those visible creatures, they were made to demonstrate specially this or that person. For just as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are signified by different names, so too they could be signified by different things, even though there is no separation or diversity among them" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *ibid.*, ad 3). Moreover, from the very notion of the Holy Trinity, it must be most certain that, just as with the Father, so with any other divine person, all three are present, and just as in the three, so in the individual persons appearing, the nature in some sense appears and in another sense does not appear. How, then, can the apparition of the three persons, for example, at Christ's baptism, or, as Augustine and many others not unreasonably hold, the apparition of the three divine persons to Abraham (Genesis 18), be said to be the apparition of no person? I leave it to others to explain.

Finally:

c) No one will concede that the explanation of the apparition of angels proposed by Augustine is unique to this holy Doctor. Augustine does not deny that angels can be personally present on earth; for since they are not omnipresent, they can certainly become present where they were not before. But as pure spirits, they cannot render their presence visible except either less properly through operation on our senses, or more properly through a subjected sensible creature or through formed sensible species, as Augustine teaches. In this explanation, all must agree with the holy Doctor, since it is now certain that angels are pure spirits, a doctrine Augustine already perceived, even though in his time the question had not yet been fully clarified (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 41, a. 2).

We return from this digression to the doctrine of the Old Testament concerning the distinction of persons.

III. The Promised Messiah in the Old Testament

The promised Messiah is taught in the Old Testament to be the true God, but in such a way that He is the Son of God; this is indeed the doctrine more distinctly exhibited in the New Testament by the Messiah Himself, the Son of God already sent, and by His Apostles, and confirmed also from the prophets of the Old Testament. He who is to be born of a Virgin is Emmanuel (God with us), whose land and people Israel already were in the Old Testament (Isaiah 7:14; 8:8; cf. Matthew 1:23). This name "God with us" is

explained: “God Himself will come and save you; then the eyes of the blind will be opened,” etc. (Isaiah 35:4; cf. Matthew 11:5). “The voice of one crying in the wilderness: Prepare the way of the Lord (יְהוָה)… Say to the cities of Judah: Behold your God, behold the Lord God comes with strength, and His arm will rule… like a shepherd He will feed His flock” (Isaiah 40:3–11; 12:2; 45:15; cf. Mark 1:3). “This is our God, and no other will be compared to Him; He found the whole way of knowledge and gave it to Jacob His servant and to Israel His beloved (which is the administration of the Old Testament); after this, He (the same our God) was seen on earth and dwelt among men” (Baruch 3:38). He who is born a little child and a son of man, “His name will be called Wonderful, Counselor, God, Mighty, Father of the future age (eternity), Prince of Peace” (Isaiah 9:6). (1) The ruler in Israel has a twofold going forth or twofold birth: one going forth in time from Bethlehem Ephrathah, another “going forth from the beginning, from the days of eternity” (Micah 5:2; cf. Matthew 2:6). The Lord (יְהוָה) was valued by the wicked Jews at thirty pieces of silver (Zechariah 11:13; cf. Matthew 27:9). Likewise, God, who will pour out upon the house of David and the inhabitants of Jerusalem the spirit of grace and supplication, says of Himself: “And they will look upon Me whom they have pierced, and they will mourn for Him as one mourns for an only son, and they will grieve over Him as one grieves over a firstborn” (Zechariah 12:10; cf. John 19:37). Thus, God is foretold to become man and to suffer death. In these and similar passages, it is immediately declared only that God Himself will become man and Messiah; but since it is established that the Messiah is foretold as sent by God, a distinction is included with the unity, insofar as God is said to be the sender and God the sent.

(1) Gesenius admits that the name עוֹלָם signifies perpetual duration; but as a rationalist, he devises a ridiculous evasion for this passage: “father of the perpetual nation” (*Thesaurus*, s.v.).

But frequently, both the deity and thus the unity, and the distinction of persons, are simultaneously proclaimed. The Messiah is God, and God Himself has anointed Him, or “God has made Him Christ” (Acts 2:36). “You are fairer than the sons of men… Your throne, O God, is forever and ever; therefore, God, your God, has anointed you with the oil of gladness above your companions… the peoples will praise you forever and ever” (Psalm 45:7–8; cf. Hebrews 1:8–9). “The Lord said to my Lord: Sit at My right hand… from the womb before the morning star I have begotten you” (Psalm 110:1, 3; cf. Matthew 22:42–45). “I have been established as king by Him over Sion His holy mountain, proclaiming His precept. The Lord said to me: You are My Son, this day I have begotten you” (Psalm 2:7; cf. Hebrews 1:5). Just as the prophets at any time, in the greatest calamities of the people, expected and promised deliverance through the coming Messiah, so in a later age, in public and private afflictions, Ecclesiasticus distinctly testifies: “I called upon the Lord, the Father of my Lord (κύριον πατέρα κυρίου μου), that He may not forsake me in the day of tribulation, without help” (Ecclesiasticus 51:14).

IV. The Second Divine Person in the Old Testament

Thus, without doubt, the second divine person is revealed in the Scriptures of the Old Testament. But the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of God, the Spirit of the mouth of God, is also very frequently mentioned in the Old Testament; for the Holy Spirit is proclaimed as creator, bestower of charisms, illuminator of prophets; a more abundant communication of the Holy Spirit with greater gifts is promised for the future New Testament; the Holy Spirit is said to be the initiator of the coming Messiah Himself. “His Spirit adorned the heavens” (Job 26:13); “You will send forth Your Spirit, and they will be created” (Psalm 104:30); “Take not Your Holy Spirit from me” (Psalm 51:13); “Would that all the people might prophesy, and that

the Lord would give them His Spirit" (Numbers 11:29); "The words which the Lord of hosts sent by His Spirit through the hand of the prophets" (Zechariah 7:12); "And it will come to pass afterward that I will pour out My Spirit on all flesh, and they will prophesy" (Joel 2:28–29); "The Spirit of the Lord will rest upon Him, the Spirit of wisdom and understanding" (Isaiah 11:2–3; 61:1). The point is not to demonstrate hermeneutically from these passages alone that the Holy Spirit is a distinct person; but when in the New Testament the Holy Spirit is revealed with the Father and the Son as the third person, and this by appealing to Old Testament testimonies, it is shown that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as a hypostasis of the Holy Trinity, is also contained there, such that the doctrine of the New Testament on this point is not to be regarded simply as a new revelation of a truth never spoken, but as an explanation and clearer determination of a preceding revelation.

Moreover, given the already sufficiently clear distinction of persons in the Old Testament, either in a confused manner or of the Father and the Word, the personal distinction of the Holy Spirit, though more obscurely indicated, could be understood, especially in those passages where there is some enumeration of three. To this can be referred the vision of Isaiah 6:1 ff., where one Lord God of hosts is celebrated by the Seraphim: "Holy, Holy, Holy." This triplication of the name cannot signify merely intensity, for which the same name is usually repeated twice, not three times (1). Therefore, although we do not say that the Trinity of persons can be demonstrated from this passage alone, with the distinction assumed from other passages, it becomes probable in itself that in this unusual form of expression, the same predication in repetition refers to one person and another. Indeed, this is confirmed by the appeals of the Apostles to this vision. Isaiah "saw the Lord (κύριον) upon a throne," and "heard the voice of the Lord saying: Go and say to this people: Hear indeed, but do not understand." Now, according to John (John 12:41), Isaiah then saw the glory of the Son of God; according to Paul (Acts 28:25–26), those words were spoken by the Holy Spirit sending Isaiah to the people of Israel; from this distinction of persons, the person of the Father as the principle is understood per se. "When the Seraphim glorify God, saying three times: Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of hosts, they glorify the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, just as we are baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son, so also in the name of the Holy Spirit, and we become sons of God, not of gods. For the Lord of hosts is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Hence, what the Father says in Isaiah, John says the Son spoke; but in the Acts of the Apostles, Paul says the Holy Spirit spoke the same" (St. Athanasius, *On the Incarnation Against the Arians*, n. 10). St. Gregory of Nyssa holds similarly: "When Isaiah saw Him seated on a high throne, the older tradition says it was the Father who was seen, but the Evangelist John refers the prophecy to the Lord (Christ), and the great Paul testifies that the same discourse was of the Holy Spirit, showing, I think, through this sacred Scripture that every divine vision and every apparition of God and every word spoken from the person of God is understood of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" (*Against Eunomius*, Book I, vol. II, p. 60; cf. Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book II, ch. 7, n. 14; Book VIII, ch. 2, n. 13; Maranus, *On the Divine Name of Jesus Christ*, Book I, Part II, ch. 17, n. 3). With this distinction established, it is clear, as the holy Fathers noted, how excellently the unity of the three is exhibited, not only because the subject of the threefold predication is one Lord God of hosts, but also because the predicate itself, the glory of holiness, is one, and the celebration is repeated three times as the same.

(1) The repetition of substantives for emphasis or threat, as in Jeremiah 7:4; 22:29; Ezekiel 21:27 (Hebrew 21:32), which Gesenius wrongly connects as of the same kind as our text Isaiah 6:3 (*Grammar*, §173, f.), is not of the same type.

The distinction is also indicated in that enumeration: "By the Word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the Spirit of His mouth all their power" (Psalm 33:6), which many Fathers interpret of the Holy Trinity (see Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book II, ch. 7, n. 14). More explicit is the prayer of Wisdom: "God of my fathers and Lord of mercy, who made all things by Your Word, and by Your Wisdom (ἐν τῷ λόγῳ σου) You formed man… give me the Wisdom that sits by Your throne… and who will know Your mind unless You give Wisdom and send Your Holy Spirit from on high" (τὸ ἅγιον σου πνεῦμα ἀπὸ ὑψίστων) (Wisdom 9:1–17; cf. 1 Corinthians 2:10–11).

Therefore, without doubt, the Israelites of the Old Testament, endowed with greater light for understanding the intimate sense of the Scriptures, believed that the Messiah was the true God to be sent by God, and according to their degree of illumination, they had a more or less clear knowledge of the distinction of persons and the mystery of the Holy Trinity. This is to be thought even more of the holy patriarchs and prophets (cf. Matthew 13:17; John 8:56; 1 Peter 1:8–12) and of other saints of the Old Testament specially enlightened by God. From what has been said, it is clear how, at the time of the coming of the Son of God, even before He had distinctly explained this mystery by His teaching, and even setting aside extraordinary illuminations and considering only the revelation in the sacred Scriptures, the words and deeds of the New Testament presuppose in some a clear knowledge, in others at least an obscure foreknowledge, of the distinction of persons in God. To this can be referred the words of the angel to the Blessed Virgin (Luke 1:35), the preaching of the Baptist (John 1:32–34), the profession of Nathanael (John 1:49; cf. *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis III, n. III), and the manner of understanding the name "Son of God" as soon as it was heard (John 9:35–38).

Thesis VII: The Distinction of Divine Persons Exhibited in the Old Testament Descriptions of Begotten Wisdom

Given the distinction that we have shown to be indicated in the Old Testament, especially through comparison with the clearer revelation of the New Testament concerning the Word begotten by the Father, it cannot be denied that the mystery of the internal procession and personal distinction is contained specifically in the descriptions of divine Wisdom, as they are presented in the Old Testament books of Proverbs 8, Wisdom 7 ff., and Ecclesiasticus 24.

In these passages, three things must be distinguished:

a) The discourse there is also about created wisdom as a gift and effect and manifestation of uncreated Wisdom, whether created wisdom is metonymically called the disposition, order, and beauty of all God's works, or the wisdom of the divine law, or formally the virtue of the intellect and soul of a created being (1).

(1) "Solomon, before heaven and earth… says that Wisdom was begotten by the Almighty, participation in which, according to its power, not its essence, makes man knowing of things divine and human" (Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, VI, p. 683).

b) Wisdom is described as creative and eternal, which is God Himself under the formal aspect of substantial and absolute Wisdom.

c) That it cannot be understood solely as Wisdom under the aspect of an absolute attribute is persuaded by the personal distinction often expressed in these very passages. For although, without the clear revelation of the New Testament, it might not have been sufficiently clear in these passages whether there is a distinction between the person of whom Wisdom is said and the person who is called Wisdom; nevertheless, with this mystery now known—that the Word and hypostatic Wisdom is begotten as a distinct person by the Father—no one who considers that the author of the sacred books is not men but the Holy Spirit, "who searches the depths of God," will deny that the same truth is proclaimed there. With these preliminary remarks, let us examine the descriptions themselves of this creative, omnipotent, omniscient Wisdom, which is undoubtedly God, to understand to what extent the distinction of persons is indicated.

I. Proverbs 8

In the Book of Proverbs, Wisdom speaks thus: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything, from the beginning. From eternity I was appointed (Hebrew: anointed, i.e., as if consecrated to rule, cf. Psalm 2:6), and from ancient times, before the earth was made" (Proverbs 8:22–23). The eternity and divinity of Wisdom are manifest; nevertheless, a distinction is already indicated from "Him who is called the Lord: 'The Lord possessed me'" (יְהוָה קָנָנִי). The same verb is used when Eve, having borne her firstborn son, said: "I have acquired (or possessed, by generation) a man through God" (Genesis 4:1). If the meaning could be doubtful, it is clarified by what follows: "When there were no depths (תְּהוֹמוֹת, the same word as in Genesis 1:2), I was already conceived… before the hills, I was brought forth" (Proverbs 8:24–25). In the Hebrew, the same verb חוֹלָלְתִּי is used in both places, expressing generation in its proper sense. Lest the words "possessed me," "I was conceived," "I was brought forth" seem to be understood only as a distinction of reason, and Wisdom conceived be taken as a divine counsel or absolute attribute in the divine mind, a still clearer declaration of distinct personality is added: "When (the Lord) prepared the heavens, I was there… when I was with Him forming all things, I delighted every day, playing before Him at all times, playing in the world, and my delights were to be with the sons of men" (Proverbs 8:24–31). The phrase "when I was with Him" in the Hebrew text reads: "I was beside Him" (אֶצְלוֹ), and so the Septuagint: ἤμην παρ᾽ αὐτῷ; and the ancient Latin Fathers: "beside Him" or "with Him." "Forming all things" (Hebrew: אָמוֹן) is rendered in the Chaldean paraphrase: "I was nourished beside Him"; Aquila: τιθηνουμένη, nurtured. The verb "I delighted" can be taken actively, as it occurs elsewhere meaning to delight someone (Forcellini); for in Hebrew it is: "I was His delights"; the Greeks have: ἐγὼ ἤμην ᾗ προσεχαίρην; the ancient Latin Fathers: "I was she in whom He delighted" (see Sabatier's *Itala*). Thus, it can be rendered literally: "I was beside Him as an artisan or nursling, and I was His delights every day (always)." When these are compared with what is said of the Word in the New Testament: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God, all things were made through Him" (John 1:1–3); "the Only Begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father" (John 1:18); "to which of the angels did He ever say: You are My Son, this day I have begotten you" (Hebrews 1:5); "this is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased" (Matthew 3:17)—all things agree so well that no other difference can be shown except that in the New Testament, since the Word has now become flesh and visible in His human nature, the distinct hypostasis is exhibited still more clearly and urgently proclaimed, while in the Old Testament the transition from Wisdom considered absolutely to Wisdom subsisting as a hypostasis distinct from the Father is less explicit.

The truth of this interpretation must be held all the more certainly because a great number of Fathers agreed in it; for both the Doctors prior to the Arian heresy understood it thus, except that some, like Irenaeus (*Against Heresies*, Book IV, ch. 20) and perhaps Tertullian (*Against Hermogenes*, ch. 18), thought that the name Wisdom signified the third hypostasis, the Holy Spirit; and in the very dispute against the Arians, it was admitted without controversy that Wisdom is described here as hypostatic and the Word distinct in person from the Father (1).

(1) The consensus of the Fathers is unjustly called into question by what Gregory Nazianzen (*Oration 30* [also cited as 36], n. 2) and Augustine (*Sermon 58 on the Words of the Lord*) say, to which Petavius appeals (*De Trinitate*, Book II, ch. 1, nn. 9–10). Gregory indeed says that some before his time understood the words "The Lord created me" not of the Son but of the wisdom shining in created things; but a) he himself rejects this opinion; b) it is not clear that those he indicates, the earlier ones, referred the entire passage and not only the words "The Lord created me" to created wisdom; c) it is not clear who these men were or what authority they had, for Gregory mentions this opinion along with another nefarious one of those refusing to admit the divine authority of Solomon's words, an error later reproached to Theodore of Mopsuestia, a contemporary of Gregory's time. But Augustine (*loc. cit.*) testifies that "many most learned men" understood the passage as referring to created wisdom, "which Solomon received to judge and rule the people." We respond: that sermon is not Augustine's but of an unknown author (Maurist edition, Appendix 246). Then, let those most learned men among the orthodox Fathers be produced, for none can be shown to have understood the entire text in this way. But you will reply, do not Athanasius, Epiphanius, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory Nazianzen, in the passages cited by Petavius (*loc. cit.*, n. 11), warn that in the Book of Proverbs many things must be taken not in a straightforward but in a figurative sense? Indeed, they warn this, but in such a way that they refer the words themselves "The Lord created me" to the Son of God and teach that the word "created" here cannot be taken as creation in the proper sense of the Son of God.

(1) The reading κύριος ἔκτισεν με (The Lord created me) was in the Greek version and, as is clear from the Fathers, in the old Latin version (see Sabatier); the Arians understood this as creation of the Son in the proper sense. The Fathers readily conceded to them that this passage speaks of the Son of God but denied that the Word is said to be created in the proper sense. Either they showed from other interpreters that instead of ἔκτισεν, one should read ἐκτήσατο, "possessed me" (cf. Basil, *Against Eunomius*, Book II, n. 20); or they said that the word "created" is used to signify the generation of the Word from the Father, to exclude any suspicion of passion or imperfection in the Father (St. Hilary, *On the Synods*, anathema 5; cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Against the Gentiles*, Book IV, ch. 8); or, more frequently, they responded that the Son is called created by reason of the assumed humanity. See the Fathers in Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book II, ch. 1, although that most learned man then proposes another interpretation of this entire passage that is less fitting and not probable from what has been said.

II. Wisdom 7 and Ecclesiasticus 24

Since it is now established that Proverbs 8 describes the distinct hypostasis of begotten Wisdom or the Word, the same doctrine must also be recognized in the parallel passages of Wisdom 7:21 ff. and Ecclesiasticus 24:5 ff. However, it should be noted here even more than in Proverbs that there is a distinction between when the hypostasis of Wisdom is described in itself and when it is considered as dwelling in the people of God, in Solomon, in the saints and prophets through the law, and through

wisdom and charisms, which are effects of hypostatic Wisdom, lest the descriptions of the effects seem to contradict those pertaining to the hypostasis of divine Wisdom in itself. It will greatly aid the understanding of these passages to keep in mind the way in which the Fathers, such as Justin and others (cf. *Treatise on God*), proceed from the hypostatic Word, who is the Logos simply, to the λόγον σπερματικόν (seminal word), which is a certain participation, both natural and supernatural, of the Word Himself in created minds, or even His effect in the wise disposition and magnificence of the entire created universe.

As for hypostatic Wisdom in itself, it is described, as in Proverbs, so also in Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus, primarily as eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, the creator and governor of all things. "Being one, it can do all things, and remaining in itself, it renews all things" (Wisdom 7:27); "it reaches from end to end mightily and orders all things sweetly" (Wisdom 8:1); "it is the artisan of all things that are" (τῶν ὄντων τεχνίτης) (Wisdom 7:21); "it knows and understands all things" (Wisdom 9:11); the same Wisdom guarded and governed all the patriarchs—Adam, Noah, Abraham, Lot, Jacob, Joseph, Moses; it led the people of Israel out of Egypt, "and it was their covering by day and their light of stars by night; it brought them through the Red Sea, but drowned their enemies in the sea" (Wisdom 10:1–19). In this chapter 10, Wisdom coincides with the Angel of the Lord or the Lord who appeared and was sent in the Old Testament, distinct from the sender. But setting this aside, the personal distinction is also expressly and immediately indicated.

Wisdom is said to assist at the throne of God, to have created the heavens with God: "(Your holy tabernacle) You prepared from the beginning, and with You (μετά σου) was Your Wisdom, which knows Your works, which was present when You made the world (παροῦσα, ὅτε ἐποίεις τὸν κόσμον), and knew what was pleasing in Your eyes" (Wisdom 9:4, 8–9). Then the same Wisdom, the artisan of all things, having all power, foreseeing all things, reaching everywhere, is more expressly declared as proceeding and begotten from God: "For it is a vapor of the power of God, and a certain emanation of the pure glory of the almighty God… it is a brightness of eternal light, and a spotless mirror of God's majesty, and an image of His goodness. And being one, it can do all things, and remaining in itself, it renews all things" (Wisdom 7:25–27). All these predicates—"vapor of the power of God, emanation of glory

brightness of eternal light, spotless mirror of God's majesty, image of His goodness" clearly signify the same thing under diverse analogies; but the meaning, when these are said of eternal and omnipotent Wisdom, can only be that of origin; and with this posited, a distinction is understood through the opposition of relation between the principle and that which proceeds from the principle. The clearest argument for the truth of this explanation is drawn from the fact that the unity of nature and distinction of persons in the New Testament are declared in exactly the same way. The Son of God is "the radiance of His glory and the express image of His substance, upholding all things by the word of His power" (Hebrews 1:3) (1). Hence, both before and after the Council of Nicaea, the Fathers very frequently used this analogy of light and its radiance to declare the distinction and consubstantiality of the Father and the Son. Thus, Athanasius, to confirm the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, cites the words of Theognostus, who had presided over the catechetical school of Alexandria from the year 270: "The substance of the Son is not invented externally nor produced from non-existent things, but is from the substance of the Father, as the radiance of light, as the vapor of water (ὡς τοῦ φωτὸς τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, ὡς ὕδατος ἀτμίς); for neither is the radiance or vapor the water itself or the sun itself, nor again is it something foreign, but it is an emanation (ἀπόρροια) of the Father's substance, yet in such a way that the

Father's substance has undergone no division" (Athanasius, *On the Decrees of Nicaea*, n. 25). See St. Pamphilus, *Apology*, ch. 3 and 5 (Gallandi, vol. IV, pp. 16, 24), and other Fathers in Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book V, ch. 8, nn. 11 ff. According to these, what is read in Ecclesiasticus 24 should also be understood, even if the sense there seems less explicit by itself. Wisdom, through which the universe was created, from which all the wisdom of the nations comes, and through which especially the Law, the Covenant, and the ceremonies and wisdom of God's people are derived, this divine Wisdom says of itself: "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, the firstborn before all creation… from the beginning and before the ages I was created, and I shall not cease into the age to come" (Ecclesiasticus 24:5, 14), which are manifestly parallel to the celebration of Wisdom in Proverbs 8:22: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways… before the hills I was brought forth." Therefore, these are to be understood in the same way concerning hypostatic and begotten Wisdom.

(1) In the Greek text, the parallelism is even clearer:
Wisdom 7:25–26: ἀτμὶς γάρ ἐστι τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινής… κὰι γάρ ἐστιν ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς ἀϊδίου καὶ ἔσοπτρον ἀκηλίδωτον τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐνεργείας καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ.

Hebrews 1:3: ὃς ὢν ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, φέρων τε τὰ πάντα τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ.

Chapter II: The Doctrine of Tradition Concerning the Unity of Nature in Really Distinct Persons

Thesis VIII: The Christian Faith in the Early Fourth Century in Distinct Persons of One Divine Nature, Demonstrated from the History of the Arian Heresy and Its Condemnation in the Council of Nicaea

"The common faith handed down by the Fathers before the Council of Nicaea, at the beginning of the fourth century, the Church professed one God and one divine nature in three distinct persons, according to which faith, as a most clear definition against the new heresy, the symbol was established in the Council of Nicaea that the Son is consubstantial with the Father."

I. The Universal and Constant Faith of the Church

What the universal and constant faith of the Church was at the time when Arius first propounded his doctrine is evident both from the manner in which the heresy was denounced to the Church and the denunciation was received, and from the deceitful tactics by which the heretics sought to conceal it.

1°. When Arius first openly revealed his opinion, Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, wrote to Alexander of Constantinople (as it is inscribed in Theodoret) (1), and from a council held in Alexandria to the bishops of the whole world, denouncing the heretic to the universal Church and explaining the novelty of his doctrine against the faith handed down, according to the genuine sense of Arius, so that he and his still few allies could not conceal the heresy with fraud and deceptive words and thus creep into ecclesiastical communion somewhere. For Alexander and his council had no doubt that, once Arius' sense—denying the one nature of the Word with the Father—was known, he would be condemned as impious by all bishops everywhere. "Having much to say," he writes in the letter to Alexander (in Theodoret, *Ecclesiastical History*, Book I, ch. 3), "I refrain, as I think it burdensome to admonish teachers who are

unanimous with many words. For you yourselves, taught by God, are not ignorant that this doctrine, which has recently raised itself against ecclesiastical piety, is the teaching of Ebion and Artemas and an emulation of Paul of Samosata, who was expelled from the Church by a synod and judgment of bishops everywhere." It is lamented that Arius and his few followers, "slandering the whole apostolic glory" by denying the divinity of Christ, "confirm the impious opinion of Jews and Gentiles about Christ" (ibid., p. 525). In another letter to all bishops, Alexander with his council writes: "Many heresies indeed existed even before these, which, too bold, fell into madness. But these, by all their little opinions striving to subvert the divinity of the Word, as being nearer to the Antichrist, have in a way justified those others; therefore, they have been condemned and cut off from the Church. We grieve indeed for these who, having once been imbued with the Church's doctrine, have now deserted it" (*Works of Athanasius*, vol. I, p. 399). "Who has ever heard such things?" he exclaims, "or who, hearing them now, would not be astonished and stop their ears so that the filth of such words does not contaminate their hearing?" (ibid., p. 398).

(1) From the context, it is clear that the letter was sent to several bishops, among whom was certainly Alexander of Byzantium. Cf. Hefele, *History of the Councils*, vol. I, p. 258.

The universal consensus was made manifest by the bishops, even before the Council of Nicaea, in letters written to Alexander, as he himself testifies in his letter to his namesake in Constantinople (1), since only a very few, and those concealing their heresy under ambiguous words, favored Arius; but this consensus was most clearly evident in the Council itself. "The bishops, about three hundred in number," says Athanasius, "gently and courteously requested them to give an account of their doctrine and pious demonstrations. But as soon as they began to speak, they were deemed worthy of condemnation, arguing among themselves, and seeing the inescapable absurdity of their heresy, many remained silent… Having abolished the terms invented by them, the bishops set forth against them the sound and ecclesiastical faith (the symbol), and when all were to subscribe, even the Eusebians subscribed" (Athanasius, *On the Decrees of Nicaea*, n. 3). It is rightly noted with Rufinus that among these condemners of the novelty were especially those not few bishops who, during the time of persecution, had been confessors for the same Christian faith. "When there was a great number of confessors among the priests in that same Council, all opposed the novelties of Arius. But those skilled in disputes and therefore opposed to the simplicity of faith favored him" (Rufinus, *Ecclesiastical History*, Book I, ch. 2).

(1) "These, most beloved brothers and consenting with us in faith, join with us in rejecting their mad temerity, as our other colleagues have done, who, indignant, wrote letters to me against them and subscribed to a document published against them, all of which I have sent to you through my son Apion the deacon, namely the letters of the bishops of all Egypt and the Thebaid, Libya, and Pentapolis, and of Syria, Lycia, Pamphylia, Asia, Cappadocia, and neighboring regions."

2°. Arius himself, and much more so the Arians later, were forced to conceal their heresy with words and expressions that, in their obvious sense, presented the Son as true God and thus by that very fact of one nature with the Father, so that, if their genuine opinion were openly revealed, they would immediately be considered impious by all. Indeed, Arius himself, for example, in his letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia, both perversely distorts Alexander's doctrine, as if by teaching the eternity of the Son he had denied His generation, and presents his own opinion as if, while admitting the Son to be true and eternal God, he only taught that the Father is the principle of the Son. "But we," he says, "have taught and teach that the Son is

not unbegotten, nor part of the unbegotten in any way, nor from any subject (οὐδὲ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινός), but by will and counsel He existed before times and ages as full God (ὅτι θέσει καὶ βουλῇ ὑπέστη πρὸ αἰώνων πλήρης Θεός), only-begotten, unchangeable, and before He was begotten or created or defined or established, He was not; for He was not unbegotten. We are persecuted because we said the Son has a beginning, but God is without beginning (ἀρχὴν ἔχει ὁ Υἱός, ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ἄναρχός ἐστι). For this reason, we are persecuted, and because we said He is from non-existent things (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων); but we said this insofar as He is neither part of God nor from any subject" (in Theodoret, *Ecclesiastical History*, Book I, ch. 5). With the same deceit, Arius "concealed the words of his impiety" in the profession of faith offered to Constantine, as Athanasius relates (*Letter to the Bishops of Egypt*, n. 18; cf. Socrates, *Ecclesiastical History*, Book I, ch. 26). It is evident that all these expressions: "The Son is full God, begotten before the ages, unchangeable, the Father is without beginning and is the beginning of the Son," are taken from the doctrine of the whole Church, which at that time was so universal and established that the heretic himself was forced to speak in the same way and to attach twisted meanings to this public and, by that very fact, obviously understood profession, meanings that could occur to no one except one attempting to distort the clearest words with sophistical tricks to a signification contrary to that which they necessarily have in the common sense of all in any sincere discourse, and much more so in the public daily profession of faith of the entire Christian people.

With the same frauds, the Arians were later forced to act, namely to use words by which the people would think the divinity of the Son was proclaimed, and then attach an alien meaning intelligible only to sophists; but those ecclesiastical expressions that could not be twisted into another sense with any art, they said they rejected not because they denied the true divinity of the Son, but for other contrived reasons, such as that the words were not found in Scripture, that they could be understood in a Sabellian sense, or that they could indicate a division or multiplication of the divine nature, or, as Cyril of Alexandria reports from Eunomius (*Thesaurus*, Book IX, vol. V, part I, p. 68), "a section of the nature into duality." But such frauds clearly show that the faith and profession common to all Churches at the time when this new plague was introduced was that the Son is true God no less than the Father, and by that very fact, the Father, the Son, and (by parity of reason) the Holy Spirit are three, yet one God. St. Athanasius complains of this Arian pretense: "If they trust and believe that this (Arius') faith is ecclesiastical, let them openly declare their opinion. For no one puts a lighted lamp under a bushel but on a lampstand, so that it shines for all who enter. If, therefore, they can defend it, let them write what has been cited above (Arius' genuine words) and display their heresy openly to all as a lamp, let them openly accuse Alexander, bishop of blessed memory, for unjustly expelling Arius for saying these things, let them complain about the Nicene Synod, which, having rejected impiety, sealed and published the pious faith. But I am certain they will not do this; for they are not so ignorant of the evils they have devised and strive to spread, but they know well that, although at first they deceived the simpler with vain artifice, their opinion would immediately be extinguished as the lamp of the impious, and they themselves would be branded everywhere as enemies of the truth with ignominy. Hence, they hide their lamp under a bushel, so that it seems to shine, and lest, if it appeared, it be recognized and rejected as extinguished" (Athanasius, *Letter to the Bishops of Egypt*, n. 18). The Christian people, of course, understood under the words that the Arians were forced to retain the sense hitherto believed and preached by the universal Church. "And this impiety is still accomplished by fraud," says St. Hilary, "so that now, under the priests of the Antichrist, the people of Christ do not perish, since they think that what is of the voice is of the faith. They hear God Christ, they think it is what is said; they hear Son of God, they think the truth of God

is in the birth of God; they hear before times, they think it is the same as what always is. The ears of the people are holier than the hearts of the priests" (Hilary, *Against Auxentius*, n. 6). By these tactics, not only the common people but sometimes even Catholic bishops were induced to accept communion with the Arians, understanding their formulas in the obvious sense of the words, as is clear from the history of the symbols of faith, which the Arians published and rejected again within a few years (see Jerome, *Dialogue with the Luciferians*, nn. 17–19). Cf. Maranus, *On the Divine Name of Jesus Christ*, Book II, ch. 6.

II. The Definition of the Nicene Fathers

According to the common faith, in direct opposition to the Arian heresy, which explicitly taught that the Son (and by necessary consequence the Holy Spirit) is not of the divine substance and nature but of another, different nature, and thus neither true God nor, in the proper sense, the Son begotten by the Father but a creature, the Nicene Fathers defined: "We believe in one God, the Father Almighty… and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father, only-begotten, that is, from the substance of the Father, God from God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten not made, consubstantial with the Father, through whom all things were made… and in the Holy Spirit. But those who say: There was a time when He was not, and before He was begotten He was not, and that He was made from non-existent things, or who say that He is from another substance or essence, or created, or changeable or mutable Son of God, these the Catholic and Apostolic Church anathematizes" (1).

Here, the true generation of the Son from the Father is defined through the communication of nature, in opposition to the production of the Son by free creation asserted by the Arians; and indeed, the nature that is in the Father and through which the Father is God is taught to be communicated in such a way that the same nature is in the Son, and through the same the Son is God; hence, it is taught not as the production of another nature, which is only specifically the same as the Father's nature, as happens in human generations, but as the communication of that very non-multipliable nature by which the Father is God, so that by the same numerically one nature the Son is God; thus, the Father and the Son are not two Gods but one God. These things are manifest from the very words of the symbol and even more from the history of its definition.

a) When the Nicene Fathers, as Athanasius relates (*On the Decrees of Nicaea*, n. 19), first wished to write: "that the Son is not from non-existent things but from God," this expression "the Son is from God" seemed ambiguous. For the Fathers, understanding the Son in the proper sense, excluding an efficient cause, took "from God" as referring to the generating principle, while the Arians, taking this same "from God" as referring to an efficient cause, understood the Son in an improper sense, and therefore thought this statement did not harm their opinion. When this deceit was noticed, the Fathers added the declaration: "The Son is begotten from the Father, that is, from the substance of the Father" (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός). The substance of the Father is none other than the Father, as Athanasius notes (ibid., n. 22), but the mode of signification is different; for it is expressly stated as the principle by which generation occurs, when it is said that the Father begot the Son from His substance, not created Him from non-existent things. In the declaration of generation in the proper sense, such that the Arians could no longer pervert the sense, it was contained that the substance or οὐσία of the Father, the generating principle, is the same communicated to the Son.

Hence, b) the bishops in the Council, to expressly declare the nature communicated in the Son by the Father, "said that it must be written that the Word is the true power and image of the Father, like to the Father in all things without any discrepancy, unchangeable, always, and inseparably in the Father; for the Word was never not, but was always existing eternally with the Father, as the radiance of light." These things indeed seemed to sufficiently signify the divine nature in the Son; nevertheless, the Arians were confident that they could still twist them into an alien sense. "They were found murmuring among themselves again and winking, saying that these words—likeness, always, power, and in Him—are common to us with the Son." Up to this point, the Council had not expressly named the same nature of the Son as that of the Father but had described it in its characteristics and properties with terms that the heretics thought they could attach an improper sense to.

To avert this deceit, the bishops were compelled to express the very one nature of the Father and the Son, in such a way that the real distinction of persons was simultaneously preserved. They had already said that the Son is begotten from the substance of the Father, and by this very fact, it was said that the same substance is communicated from the Father to the Son, but the Father is one and the Son another; this identity of substance in the Son from the Father, together with the distinction of the two who have one divine οὐσία, seemed most excellently expressed by this token: the Son is ὁμοούσιος (consubstantial) with the Father. "When the bishops noticed their pretense in this matter as well, they were compelled again to collect the sense from the Scriptures and to signify more clearly what they had said before, and to write that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, so that it might signify not only that the Son is like, but that He is the same in likeness from the Father" (1) (Athanasius, ibid., n. 20).

(1) Ἠναγκάσθησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ αὖθις συνάγειν ἐκ τῶν γραφῶν τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα ταῦτα πάλιν λευκότερον εἰπεῖν καὶ γράφειν, ὁμοούσιον εἶναι τῷ Πατρὶ τὸν Υἱόν, ἵνα μὴ μόνον ὅμοιον τὸν Υἱὸν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸν τῇ ὁμοιώσει ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς εἶναι σημαίνῃ.

How certainly the Council, through the phrase "from the substance of the Father," intended to express the nature not only as it is in the Father but the same nature as communicable in the Father and communicated in the Son, is also clear from the other declaration, where those are condemned who say the Son is "from another substance or essence." No Arian ever said that the Son is from another substance or essence as from a producing principle other than the Father; indeed, they placed the difference of the Son from other creatures in this, that while others were made with the Son, the Son alone was produced by the Father, but not by true generation and thus not by communication of "the paternal substance or essence," but by a free operation, which they fraudulently called generation (1), so that they might retain the biblical names of Father, Son, and Only-Begotten and more easily deceive Catholics. Therefore, because they denied that the Son is begotten in the proper sense by the Father through the communication of the paternal essence, or is "from the substance or essence of the Father" as the principle by which generation occurs, they said that He is "from another substance or essence," namely from a created essence as a constitutive principle, not from the essence of the Father communicated. Therefore, in the condemnation of this heresy, just as the phrase "from the substance of the Father" immediately designates the nature as it is in the Father, it also signifies the same nature as it is in the begotten Son; so too, the other phrase, that the Son "is not from another substance or essence" (2), immediately signifies that the nature of the Son is not another but the very same nature of the Father. "And He is from the substance of the Father, and the Son Himself is the substance of the Son"; "The Word is from the substance of God (the Father), nor is it itself of a different nature" (ἑτεροούσιος); "unless perhaps the impious dare again to contend that the substance of

the Son is another, and the light that is from the Father in the Son is another, so that the light in the Son is one with the Father, but He Himself according to substance is alien as a creature; but this is manifestly the sense of Caiaphas and Paul of Samosata, which the Church condemned" (Athanasius, ibid., nn. 22–24).

(1) Speaking sincerely, they called the Son's γένεσις in the sense of free efficient causation, but insofar as they admitted γένεσις in dispute with Catholics, they understood it in the same sense (Epiphanius, *Heresies*, 64, n. 8). Cf. Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book II, ch. 1.

(2) I take it as certain that the Nicene Synod in this anathema (ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας φάσκοντας εἶναι… τούτους ἀναθεματίζει ἡ καθολικὴ καὶ ἀποστολικὴ ἐκκλησία) considered οὐσία and ὑπόστασις as equivalent (see Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book IV, ch. 1, nn. 5 ff.; cf. Newman, *Dissertation IV*, Rome 1847, and the authors cited there). St. Basil (*Letter 125*, n. 1), responding to the Sabellians, did not defend the distinction between these two terms of the Council with sufficient precision, as even Maranus, along with Garnier, editor of Basil's works, admits (Preface to vol. III, §1).

Moreover, as to the matter itself, nothing else is said by this declaration, "the Son is ὁμοούσιος with the Father," than if it were said that the Son is God of the Father, begotten by the Father, the Father is God and the Son is God, the Father and the Son are one, provided these are understood in the proper sense: "this is that ὁμοούσιον which the ancient faith brought forth" (Augustine, *Against Maximinus*, Book II, ch. 14, n. 3). But the excellence of this formula lies in this very fact, that it most clearly expresses the notion of sonship, generation, deity, and unity constituted by the communication of the divine essence from the Father to the Son. Hence, the ὁμοούσιον remained the surest token of the Catholic faith against contrary heresies, whether denying the unity of nature in distinct persons or the distinct persons in the unity of nature. (See the Fathers in Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book IV, ch. 5, nn. 4 ff.).

Thesis IX: The Unity of Nature in Distinct Persons, as Understood by the Council of Nicaea and Subsequent Fathers, Is a Unity of Singularity

"It is an absurd calumny that the Nicene Fathers and the holy Doctors following them up to St. Augustine did not recognize a numerical unity or singularity in the divine nature, but, as in the persons, so in the nature taught distinction. For the faith and profession of one numerically single nature in distinct persons is demonstrated both from the common principle that the Nicene Fathers and the Arians themselves assumed as certain beyond controversy, and from the state of the question among Catholics declared in the synod of Alexandria under Athanasius, and from the explicit doctrine of the Fathers who defended the faith defined in the Council of Nicaea against heretics."

The Council of Nicaea and the Fathers who followed the same Council taught not one but three numerically divine natures, only specifically one, and thus introduced tritheism, as Curcellaeus, Cudworth, and Clericus asserted (cf. Maranus, *On the Divine Name of Jesus Christ*, Book IV, ch. 29); the same opinion of specific unity was attributed to the Fathers by Peter Faydit and after him a certain monk in Germany, Placidus Stürmer (cf. Würzburg theologians, vol. II, n. 35); but what surpasses all wonder is that in our age, Anton Günther tells us that St. Gregory Nazianzen (perhaps he meant to say Gregory of Nyssa) and Basil specifically taught a specific unity of the divine nature (*Propaedeutics to Speculative Theology*, vol. II, pp. 365–366).

But although consubstantiality (τὸ ὁμοούσιον) can be predicated analogously even of creatures, and in them does not suppose numerical but specific unity of nature in distinct hypostases, in God, however, it cannot suppose anything other than the numerical unity of the divine nature in distinct persons.

For *consubstantiality* (*τὸ ὁμοούσιον*) in itself signifies the unity of nature in several distinct entities, without determining the mode of unity, whether numerical or specific. But since in creatures this unity can only exist through the multiplication of nature in many, whereas in God the multiplication of nature is repugnant, it follows from the very intrinsic nature of the subject of which it is predicated that *τὸ ὁμοούσιον* is determined to suppose numerical or specific unity. This is the same reasoning applied to all names transferred from creatures to designate divine perfections, such that in this transfer all imperfections that these names connote in creatures must be excluded (*Treatise on God*). Therefore, whoever teaches that the Son is consubstantial with God the Father either retains the fundamental dogma of all revelation—indeed, the concept evident to the light of reason itself—concerning the non-multipliable unity of God, and by the very predication of consubstantiality declares one numerically single nature in distinct persons; or, by subverting the dogma and the rational concept of God's unity, falls into polytheism. But to suppose this latter of the Nicene and subsequent Fathers is utterly absurd; and certainly, no Christian could, with greater justification, suspect polytheism in the words of the Council, "The Son is consubstantial with the Father," than in the words of Christ the Lord Himself: "I and the Father are one" (John 10:30). Therefore, in the very token of consubstantiality, the numerical unity of nature in distinct persons is clearly proclaimed.

I. Evidence from the Arian Arguments Against Consubstantiality

This is demonstrated by the very manner of the Arians' argumentation against the profession of consubstantiality. They presupposed two things as most certain and admitted by all Catholics: first, that God in the proper sense is only one; second, that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three distinct persons. But to these indisputable principles, they added a third, which Catholics denied: that generation in the proper sense, and consequently consubstantiality of distinct entities, can only exist through division and propagation, or, what is the same, multiplication of nature. Hence, they argued that the profession of *τὸ ὁμοούσιον* must fall into one of two errors, both of which Catholics also condemned: either, while retaining the unity of the divine nature, the distinction of Father and Son must be denied with the Sabellians, or, while retaining the distinction of hypostases, a division and multiplication of the divine nature must be affirmed, as happens in human generations. Thus, Arius already argued in his letter to his bishop Alexander, and thus Eunomius and others frequently objected afterward: "If someone contentiously insists, saying the Son is consubstantial, certainly the one deity, admitting division, results in duality" (γέγονεν εἰς διαιρέσει, *apud* St. Cyril, *Thesaurus*, Book IX, vol. V, part I, p. 68).

Now, if this multiplication had been conceded by Catholics, as would be the case if they had specific unity of nature in mind, who does not see how easily they could have been convicted of error from all the documents of revelation and with irrefutable arguments? Therefore, the entire force of the Arians' disputation against Catholics should have rested on this demonstration of the unity of the divine nature, and it should appear in the history of the controversy that the Fathers denied this. But the opposite occurred in every respect. Both Catholics and Arians assume as a common and indisputable principle that God is one, and thus the divine nature is one not in species but in number. And just as the Arians, from this principle, deny the true generation of the Son from the substance of the Father and consubstantiality

because they simultaneously assume the false principle that consubstantiality cannot exist without multiplication of nature, so Catholics first demonstrate from revelation the true generation and true divinity of the Son, and then, assuming the principle of the non-multipliable unity of nature, conclude that generation and consubstantiality in divine things are not as in human things through multiplication but through the communication of one numerically single nature from the Father to the Son. "The Nicene Fathers wrote that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, to signify that the Son is not only like but is one and the same in likeness from the Father (that which the Father is), μὴ μόνον ὅμοιον ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸν τῇ ὁμοιώσει… For in corporeal things that are like one another can differ and be far apart, as is the case among humans between sons and their parents, as it is written that Adam and Seth, begotten from him, was like him according to his species (Genesis 5:3). But since the generation of the Son of God from the Father is entirely different from the nature of humans, and He is not only like but indivisible from the substance of the Father, and He and the Father are one, as He Himself said (John 10:30), and the Word is always in the Father and the Father in the Word, as radiance is to light, for this is what that expression signifies; therefore, the synod, perceiving this, rightly wrote *ὁμοούσιον*… All called the Son the radiance, to declare that He is properly and without division from the substance, and to affirm His unity with the Father… Far be it from us to entertain any thought of corporeal things, but, transcending the imagination of all senses, let us think with pure intelligence and mind alone of the genuine Son of the Father and properly the Word of God and the radiance of light without any discrepancy. For just as He is not begotten in a human way but as befits God and is called and is the Son, so too when we hear the term *ὁμοούσιος*, we must not follow human senses, nor are divisions and separations of divinity to be conceived, but, thinking of incorporeal things, we must not divide the unity of nature and the identity of light" (τὴν ἑνότητα τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὴν ταυτότητα τοῦ φωτός μὴ διαιρῶμεν) (Athanasius, *On the Decrees of Nicaea*, nn. 20, 23, 24). See Petavius, *On the Divine Name of Jesus Christ*, Book IV, ch. 30; *De Trinitate*, Book IV, ch. 3.

II. The Alexandrian Synod and the Use of Terms

The history of the controversy concerning the terms *ὑπόστασις* (hypostasis), *οὐσία* (essence), and *πρόσωπον* (person) in the synod of Alexandria composed by Athanasius is rightly cited by theologians as clear evidence that all Catholics understood the unity of the divine nature in the definition of consubstantiality as numerical unity in three distinct persons.

To understand this controversy, some observations must be made about the philosophical use of these terms and their transfer to theological use for declaring the mystery of the Holy Trinity. Philosophers called *οὐσία* or essence that which is expressed by the definition of a thing (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι). Now, essence can be considered in two ways: either abstractly, as communicable to many individuals and universal, which is the species; or as a determinate singular essence really existing. In the former sense, Aristotle called it *δεύτερα οὐσία* (secondary essence, or in Scholastic terms, of second intention), because universals as universals neither exist nor can exist in reality; in the latter sense, he called it *πρώτη οὐσία* (primary essence, or of first intention), as really existing in the nature of things or at least capable of existing; hence, this primary essence could aptly be called, and in the course of time was called, *ὑπόστασις* or substance, which, according to its etymology, expresses real existence (1).

(1) Since accidents by their nature cannot exist per se but exist by inhering in another, and thus have a less perfect existence, those essences that can exist per se and not by inhering in another exist more perfectly;

therefore, only these more perfect essences were called substances. But since substances themselves can underlie accidents, many derive the etymology of the term substance from this notion of "substanding" (see St. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Book VI, ch. 5; cf. Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book IV, ch. 3).

Now, in transferring these terms to express the one deity common to three distinct entities and to designate the three distinct entities of which the deity is one, the Eastern Fathers, along with Meletius of Antioch, were guided by the consideration that a hypostasis or singular determined substance, if it is integral and exists naturally, is in creatures subsistent in itself, not common to many, but as this one distinct from others having the same common nature; therefore, they called the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who are really distinct and of whom the deity is one, three hypostases, but called the deity common to the three *οὐσία*, although they saw that in divine things this commonality is far different from that in creatures. They taught, therefore, one *οὐσία* and three hypostases. However, they were unwilling to call the three really distinct entities *πρόσωπα* (persons) without additional clarification, lest suspicion arise of the error of Sabellius, who posited three persons in one divine hypostasis according to different manifestations and operations ad extra, saying that the same hypostasis bore the person of the Father in the Old Testament, the person of the Son in the Incarnation, and the person of the Holy Spirit in the sanctification and governance of the Church. Conversely, the Western Fathers, who translated *ὑπόστασις* into Latin as *substantia* (substance), and Paulinus, another bishop of Antioch, agreeing with them, considered that the deity is one singular, determined, non-multipliable essence, and therefore, to express this singularity, called it one hypostasis or substance, but named the three distinct entities *personae* (persons), not in the Sabellian sense but in exactly the same sense as the Easterners called them three hypostases. Hence, it came about that the former, hearing "one hypostasis and three persons," suspected Sabellianism; while the latter, when three hypostases were named, feared the danger of Arianism, namely that three different natures might be numbered, or tritheism from the number of three equal divine natures. "Truly a laughable matter," says Gregory Nazianzen, "or rather lamentable; there seemed to be a diversity of faith, which was a dispute about the sound of a word. Hence, Sabellianism was reproached because of three persons, and Arianism because of three hypostases, which were fictions arising from excessive zeal in disputation" (Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration 21*, n. 35).

Moreover, that the dispute was not about doctrine but only about words, Athanasius made clear to the disputants themselves in this way. First, he asked the assertors of three hypostases whether they said the hypostases were of different essences, like gold, silver, and bronze, which was Arius' opinion; or whether they said the hypostases were separate, as in humans the hypostases of parents and children are, and thus "thought there were three principles and three gods." They responded that they called them three hypostases because they are not only distinct in name but in reality; "yet they said they did not say three gods or three principles, nor did they tolerate those who said or thought so, but they acknowledged the Holy Trinity, yet one deity and one principle, and the Son consubstantial with the Father." Then the others were asked whether, by saying one hypostasis, they denied with Sabellius that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are really distinct; they responded: "We never thought so; but we say hypostasis, meaning it is the same as saying essence; and we believe in one hypostasis because the Son is from the substance of the Father and because of the identity of nature (διὰ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς φύσεως); for we believe in one deity and one nature of it, not one of the Father and another of the Son and Holy Spirit." Athanasius concludes: "Both those who were accused for saying three hypostases agreed with this, and those saying one essence approved their doctrine, as they had interpreted it" (Athanasius, *Synodal Letter to the Antiochenes*, nn.

5–6; cf. Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration 21*, n. 35; *Oration 42* (also numbered 32), n. 16; and others cited in Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book IV, ch. 4, nn. 10 ff.).

Here, the following should be noted:

a) *Hypostasis* always signifies a singular substance (at least individual insofar as individual is opposed to universal), and one hypostasis cannot signify only specific unity. Hence, those who, not content with saying one *οὐσία*, wished to assert one hypostasis of the three persons, by this very term affirmed one numerically singular and non-multipliable substance of the three persons. But with this explanation of the term *hypostasis* given, all Catholics agreed that there is one hypostasis or singular substance of the three persons, not multipliable.

b) Where there is only specific unity of nature in multiple persons, as many numerically distinct natures must necessarily be numbered as there are persons. Because those saying one *οὐσία* and three hypostases came under suspicion, lest perhaps they meant *οὐσία* as specifically one and numbered three numerically distinct singular natures, this manner of speaking seemed suspect of tritheism to those who said one hypostasis to express one singular, non-multiplied nature in three persons (1). But both these [the Easterners] and those [the Westerners] clearly declared that there cannot in any way be three deities or three natures admitted, even though there are three persons of one deity.

(1) It may be asked: "How and in what way do the two formulas 'one *οὐσία*, three hypostases' and 'one substance, three persons' differ?" For a certain modern theologian thought to respond that the latter formula was more perfect for declaring the reality. We respond: The signification of terms is determined by use, and thus theological signification is determined primarily by the dogmatic use of the Church or the common use of theologians, and secondarily, polemically, it can also depend on the misuse of heretics. Therefore, if in the formula both terms *οὐσία* and *hypostasis* or *substance* and *person* are considered in the sense in which they were used by Catholics in that fourth-century controversy, there was no real difference. If the universal use, now consecrated for many centuries, is considered, *essence*, *nature*, and *substance*, like *οὐσία* and *φύσις*, are used without distinction for the deity, for what is absolute and really common to the three distinct entities; in turn, the three distinct entities are called hypostases or persons. The Greek term *ὑπόστασις* is now translated as *subsistence*, while the Latin term *substance* corresponds to the Greek *οὐσία* (cf. Rufinus, *Ecclesiastical History*, Book I, ch. 29). Hence, it is no longer permissible to say one *ὑπόστασις*, nor even to say three substances without clarification, but rather one substance and three hypostases. If, further, the polemical use is considered, in the fourth century, those who named one divine *ὑπόστασις* undoubtedly intended primarily to assert the numerical unity of the divine essence, lest, by saying three hypostases, the Arian separation of three hypostases of different natures might not seem sufficiently excluded; or lest, by simply calling it one *οὐσία*, they leave a way for the Arians to infer the calumny of tritheism, as if Catholics, by the unity of *οὐσία* in three distinct entities, meant only specific unity. But those who said three hypostases primarily intended to exclude the calumny of Sabellianism, if they agreed with these heretics even in name alone by calling it one hypostasis with three persons. Since the signification of these terms has been clear for many centuries, the only distinction in polemical use to be observed is that, when Catholic doctrine is opposed to the Monarchian heresy, we should rather say three hypostases or even physical persons than simply persons; just as in the doctrine of the Incarnation, Nestorianism is more directly opposed by the ecclesiastical formula: "two natures in one hypostasis," than if we say "two natures in one person," since both Sabellians professed three persons of one divine

hypostasis according to a threefold form of manifestation, and Nestorians in Christ professed one person, namely moral and according to relation, of two hypostases.

c) In humans, without doubt, sons are consubstantial with their parents in a specific unity of nature, and therefore there are many humans. But Catholics of both sides universally denied that such a unity of the divine nature and consubstantiality of persons could be admitted without falling into tritheism, and therefore expressly affirmed the identity (*ταυτότης*) of nature in the three persons, such that the three are one God. It is evident, therefore, that among Catholics, even those who differed in their manner of speaking about hypostasis and persons, there was none who did not profess the Nicene faith in this sense: that the essence, nature, substance, or deity of the three distinct persons is one in number, not merely specifically one.

III. Explicit Teaching of the Fathers Defending the Nicene Faith

All the Fathers, defenders of the Nicene faith, taught with clear words and most ample declarations one numerically single nature in the three distinct entities: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. We will briefly cite a few of the many things that could be brought forward.

a) They say that it is a mystery beyond the grasp of human reason that the same supreme reality is both numerable according to the notion of hypostases and one, non-multipliable according to the notion of deity or nature. But there would be no mystery in this if the nature were only specifically one: "For what would be astonishing," says Maximus (*Centuries on Charity*, century II), "if, as with human and human, so the unity and division of the Son with the Father were the same?" Indeed, neither this reason for the mystery nor the exclusion of number in the nature of the three hypostases can be understood in any way except as referring to the unity of singularity. "No discourse can declare the ineffable depth of the mystery, how the same reality is both numerable and escapes number, is seen in distinction and understood in a monad, is distinguished by hypostasis and not divided by the subject (*τὸ ὑποκείμενον*), i.e., the nature conceived as underlying the distinct hypostases or identified with them. There is another who is the source of the Word and the Spirit; but when you conceive distinction in these, in turn, the unity of nature does not admit partition" (Gregory of Nyssa, *Catechetical Oration*, ch. 3, vol. II, p. 481; Basil, *On the Holy Spirit*, ch. 18, etc.). Even more explicitly, if possible, these things are proclaimed when the heresy of tritheism became known. Among others, Sophronius defends this unity in his synodal letter read at the Sixth Council, Action XI: "We proclaim three as one, of which there is deity, or, to speak more accurately and manifestly, which are deity and are known as such; for this very thing is both one and believed to be three, and neither is the one, insofar as it is one, taken as three, nor are the three, insofar as they are three, called one, which is truly marvelous and full of all wonder. For the same reality is both numerable and escapes number: numerable indeed by the three hypostases, escaping number by the uniqueness of deity (*τῷ ἑνικῷ τῆς θεότητος*)… Therefore, the Holy Trinity is numbered not by essences or natures or different deities or three dominions—far be it—as the Arians insanely claim, and as the new tritheists most vainly rage, saying three essences, three natures, three dominions, and three deities… Nor do we know three gods, or three natures, or three essences, or three deities, whether of the same kind or different kinds, nor do we know gods or natures or essences or deities at all, nor do we admit those who know such things; but we strike with anathemas anyone who accepts, thinks, or knows such things" (Hardouin, *Councils*, vol. III, pp. 1262–1263).

b) From the explicit doctrine of these same Fathers, in creatures, where there is specific unity of nature, this is said to be a unity only in the consideration of reason, while in reality there are not one singular but many numerically distinct natures; in contrast, they say, the divine nature is not only in the consideration of reason but really one singular nature in three distinct entities, such that it is the same to say the nature of the Father is identical with the nature of the Son or the Holy Spirit as to say it is identical with itself. "For us, there is one God because there is one deity. But perhaps they will say, is not deity also one among the pagans, as those who philosophize more perfectly among them teach, and among us is not humanity one as a universal genus; yet there are many gods and not one, just as there are many humans? But in these, commonality has unity only in the consideration of reason, while the singulars are greatly divided among themselves… Ours is not so, nor is this a portion of Jacob, says my theologian (Jeremiah 10:16); but each of them (each divine person) has no less unity with another than with itself by the identity of essence and power (*τῷ ταὐτῷ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως*)" (Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration 31* (also numbered 37), nn. 14–16). The same argument is used by Athanasius, *On the Decrees of Nicaea*, n. 20, and elsewhere; Cyril, *Dialogues on the Trinity*, Book VI, vol. V, part I, p. 692; Maximus, *Centuries on Charity*, century II; and most brilliantly by John Damascene, *Orthodox Faith*, Book I, ch. 8.

c) In this sense, Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Cyril, and others frequently commend the *μονάς* (monad) and *ταυτότης* (identity) of nature, by which the three persons are one God, and by denying which monad one falls into polytheism. "One God is the Father, one God is also the Son, and not two gods, because the Son has identity (*ταυτότης*) with the Father; for I do not see one deity in the Father and another in the Son, nor one nature there and another here. Therefore, to make clear the property of the persons, number the Father distinctly and the Son distinctly, but lest you be divided into polytheism, confess one essence in both" (Basil, *Against Sabellius*, n. 3, vol. II, p. 191). "Since by the confession of all, deity is one, it cannot be that the Holy Trinity is not referred to the identity (*ταυτότης*) of nature" (Cyril, *Commentary on John*, vol. IV, p. 20). In the profession of faith attached to the synodal letter of the Council of Sardica (*apud* Theodoret, *Ecclesiastical History*, Book II, ch. 6; cf. Ballerini, *Works of St. Leo*, vol. III, p. XXXIX, on this profession), it is most effectively said: "We have received and learned this Catholic tradition, faith, and profession: that there is one substance (*ὑπόστασις*), which the heretics themselves call *οὐσία*, of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and if they ask what the substance (*ὑπόστασις*) of the Son is, we profess that it is the same which is uniquely predicated of the Father (*αὕτη ἡ τοῦ Πατρὸς μόνη ὁμολογουμένη*)" (*ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἶναι ταύτην, ἥτις τοῦ Πατρὸς μόνη ὁμολογουμένη*).

d) The common declaration of the Fathers is that the Catholic doctrine is the truth in the middle between the opposite errors of the Sabellians and Jews on one side, and the Arians and pagans on the other. For the Catholic faith approves in the Jews and Sabellians that they profess one divine nature; in the Arians and pagans, it does not disapprove the doctrine insofar as they distinguish multiple persons; but it condemns in the former the denial of multiple distinct persons, and in the latter not only the assertion of different natures but also the multiplication of nature, from which follows only a specific unity. But the Sabellians and Jews taught the divine nature to be one in number and non-multipliable; therefore, the Fathers held this same unity as confessed. Indeed, since the Sabellians denied multiple distinct persons because, from a principle common to all heretics erring in the doctrine of either the Holy Trinity or the Incarnation, they thought there are always as many persons as there are singular natures, and thus, with multiple divine persons, the nature would be understood as multiplied, thereby destroying the unity of God; the unity of nature asserted by them should have been no less disapproved than the unity of person if the Fathers had in mind numerical multiplication and only specific unity of nature. But the Fathers entirely agreed with

these heretics and the Jews that the divine nature is absolutely one and singular, but denied that this implies the unity of person or hypostasis as well. “The truth proceeds in the middle between two opinions: let the unity of nature remain from the Jewish persuasion, but from the pagan error only the distinction according to hypostases, and thus let the impious opinion on both sides be healed” (Gregory of Nyssa, *Catechetical Oration*, ch. 3). “One God is the Holy Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; for the nature of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is one, but not one person… It is true that the Sabellians believe one nature of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; but it is false that they do not believe there are three persons. It is also true that the Arians say three persons of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; but it is false that they strive to persuade that there are three natures of these three persons” (Fulgentius, *Letter 8* (or *Book to Donatus*), ch. 11, n. 12). See also Athanasius, *Against the Arians*, Oration III, n. 15; Oration IV, n. 10; Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration 21*, n. 13; Basil, *Against Sabellius*, n. 3; Isidore of Pelusium, *Letters*, Book II, ep. 143, p. 190; Faustinus, *Against the Arians*, ch. 1 (*Bibliotheca Maxima Patrum*, p. 640).

e) Finally, not only Augustine, whom some have dared to say was the first to clearly expound the singularity of nature in three persons, but all the Fathers, defenders of the Nicene synod, about whom we are now speaking, also declared the manner in which the numerical unity of the divine nature in three really distinct entities is to be conceived. For they teach, according to the Scriptures and the Catholic understanding handed down from the Apostles, that the Father is distinguished from the Son, and both from the Holy Spirit, by no other reason or reality than that which is formally signified by the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. These names formally signify relations to one another, not absolutes. Whatever is said of God apart from this formal notion of mutual relations—deity, essence, nature, absolute perfection, etc.—is absolutely one, admitting no multiplication or real distinction. Therefore, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, insofar as they are God, are absolutely one, one supreme reality, one God; but insofar as they are related to one another, the Father formally as the Father of the Son, the Son formally as the Son of the Father, the Holy Spirit formally as spirated or proceeding from the Father and the Son, are one and another, three distinct, yet of one singular essence or nature. The distinction of the three, therefore, consists solely in mutual relations, not in the nature or any absolute perfection. Hence, since they are distinct from one another yet have the same nature and are called persons or hypostases, divine persons are understood to be constituted by relations. But this entire doctrine of the distinction of persons, which exists solely through mutual relations and in no way through the one nature really common to the three, not only most clearly proclaims the numerical unity of the divine nature in three distinct entities, whether it exists; but also explains how it exists, as far as the mystery’s implicit notion in the word of God can be explicated by humans.

To a Pneumatomachist asking: “What, then, is lacking in the Spirit to be the Son? For if something were not lacking, He would be the Son,” Gregory Nazianzen responds: “We do not say that anything is lacking, for God is not deficient in anything, but the difference of emanation (*τῆς ἐκφανσεως*), so to speak, or of relation to one another, has also given them different names. For neither is anything lacking in the Son to be the Father; for sonship is not a defect, nor is He therefore the Father; otherwise, by the same reasoning, something would be lacking in the Father to be the Son, for the Father is not the Son; but indeed, these things in no way indicate a defect or subordination according to essence. These very things—not to be begotten, to be begotten, and to proceed—designate another as the Father, another as the Son, another called by the name Holy Spirit, so that the unconfused distinction of the three hypostases in one nature and dignity of deity is preserved. For the Son is not the Father, for there is one Father, yet the Son is what

the Father is; nor is the Spirit the Son, because He is from God, for there is one Only-Begotten, yet the Spirit is what the Son is: the three are one in deity, the one is three in properties" (1) (Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration 31* (also numbered 37), n. 9). See the abundant declarations of many Fathers in Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book IV, ch. 10.

Scholion

When the same Fathers, who defend the divine nature as one in number in three persons in such manifold ways, explicate

the explanation of the mystery, the Fathers seem to draw repeatedly from the unity of human nature in multiple human beings, but this comparison or declaration is not always employed in the same sense; rather, it is used by them in three distinct ways.

1. Distinction Between Nature and Hypostasis

Most frequently, their immediate purpose is not to declare the nature of the unity of the divine nature but to present the reason and universal concept of *nature* and *hypostasis*, which they then apply analogically to the divine nature and hypostasis, and from which they show why and how one must rationally distinguish between nature and hypostasis. All heretics—whether Monarchians, Arians, or tritheists—failing to distinguish between the concept by which *nature* is defined and that by which *hypostasis* is defined, thereby affirmed that there are always as many distinct natures as there are hypostases. Hence, either, adhering to the revealed truth that there is one God and one divine nature, they also affirmed one hypostasis, which is designated by the three names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit according to different external manifestations; or, conversely, retaining the revealed truth of three distinct hypostases, they also asserted three natures. This latter position they held in two ways: either, wishing to preserve the dogma of God's unity, they admitted one divine hypostasis and nature, namely God the Father, relegating the hypostasis and nature of the Son and Holy Spirit to the order of creatures; or, preserving the dogma of the divinity of the Son and Holy Spirit, they were forced by their common philosophical principle to concede three distinct divine natures, and thus the unity of nature could only be collective or specific. Since, therefore, all mutually opposed heresies proceeded from this one principle, the Fathers saw how crucial it was to declare the distinct concepts of nature and hypostasis, such that the unity of nature does not entail the unity of hypostasis, nor does the trinity of hypostases entail the multiplication of nature.

In this declaration, they primarily kept in view the revealed truth that there is one God, and the three distinct entities—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—are one God. To this dogma, the philosophical notions of nature and hypostasis had to be applied and accommodated; not, as the heretics did, that the revealed mystery should be subjected and accommodated to a philosophical notion derived from the order of creatures. Now, in creatures, from which philosophical notions are first formed, that which is contained in a definition—i.e., essence or nature—is common to many and exists in many according to the same concept; but individuals possessing the same nature are not something common to many but are one and another, distinct as this one from another of the same nature. According to this analogy, therefore, the holy Doctors, considering the one deity of three distinct entities, universally defined *nature* as that which is common to many (*τὸ κοινόν*); and *hypostasis* as that which is distinct, one from another of the same

nature (*τὸ μερικόν*), proper (*τὸ ἴδιον*), not common to many, and in this sense of incommunicability, an individual (*τὸ ἄτομον*). Yet they explicitly teach that, in transferring these concepts from creatures to God, the notions of common and individual must be understood not in the same way but only analogically; for we have seen their frequent declarations that the unity of nature in creatures is formed only by mental abstraction, and thus the commonality of nature is not real but only in reason and mental consideration, whereas in God the nature is singular, really one, and common to the three; therefore, the distinct and individual in God is not, as in creatures, through something absolute (for whatever is absolute in God is entirely one and common to the three), but through mutual relations designated by the personal names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

When, therefore, they teach that, just as in humans there is one human nature common to many and yet there are multiple hypostases mutually distinct, so too in God there is one common nature and three mutually distinct hypostases of one nature; this definition does not pertain to asserting the same unity and distinction in God as exists among multiple humans, but to declaring the distinction in concept between nature and hypostasis. For nature is defined according to what is revealed as one, i.e., according to the absolute; but hypostasis is defined according to what is revealed as really distinct, i.e., according to the relative. Thus, from revelation itself, the fundamental principle of the heretics is refuted, whereby they assert that there are always as many natures as there are hypostases. See the Fathers who explain this definition of nature and hypostasis and their distinction, in Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book IV, ch. 7. Cf. also our *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Section III, ch. 3.

2. Abstract Unity of Nature

Nature taken abstractly, e.g., humanity, as contained in a universal definition or notion, is entirely one and admits no multiplication; for indeed, if humanity is taken in this way, two humanities cannot be conceived. But in this formal sense of universality, it cannot exist objectively; for whatever exists is singular, and singular humanities are as many as there are humans, all of whom share one universal notion and definition. Hence, nothing prevents the unity of a non-multipliable abstract and universal nature from being used to explain the non-multipliable unity of the divine nature, provided that the great difference is not overlooked: that the divine nature is this one determined, singular, and really and necessarily existing nature in three distinct hypostases, whereas the universal notion of a created nature, e.g., humanity, formally under the aspect of universality, under which it has non-multipliable unity, does not exist outside the consideration of the mind and in reality itself. Thus, some Fathers declared the unity of the divine nature in three distinct entities, and indeed, I think a closer analogy cannot be found by the human mind for some explanation of the mystery. St. Cyril proves that, admitting the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, two natures cannot be numbered, because then a distinction would have to be admitted between one nature and another, but a distinction of nature from the divine nature could only be a diversity, and thus the Father and the Son would no longer be consubstantial, just as, admitting a distinction between one universal nature and another in creatures, diversity of natures is thereby posited. For one cannot conceive one universal human nature and another; rather, one human nature and another non-human, e.g., animal, and thus only diverse natures, which have different definitions, are distinguished. “If there is one nature of the Father, and again another nature of the Son besides it, will it not be necessary to devise a reason that divides and separates the two natures as unequal? For it is not permissible, even in humans who have the same concept of consubstantiality, to speak of one essence and another and to assign to each existent some particular definition regarding what is common to many. For

if we do this and introduce some necessary difference between one essence and another (if we number humanity in the abstract as one and another), the universal will vanish into nothing" (Cyril, *Dialogues on the Trinity*, Book I, vol. V, part I, p. 409; cf. *Commentary on John*, vol. IV, p. 798; John Damascene, *Orthodox Faith*, Book III, ch. 6).

3. Platonic Universalism

The Platonists, whom some Scholastics, particularly the Scotists, followed, posited that the universal, as conceived by the mind and expressed in a definition, has objective real existence under the formal aspect of universality. Hence, it followed that human nature, insofar as it is universal—i.e., the essence itself with precision from all particular and individuating notes conceived as affecting or circumscribing it—is numerically one in all humans, really existing no less than it is conceived by the mind under the formal aspect of universality as one, non-multipliable, and common to all humans. Thus, just as the abstract concept of man is not different whether said of Peter or of Paul, and there are not two notions but one universal notion; so too, given that objective existence of universals, Peter and Paul do not have two numerically distinct humanities but one humanity, precisely as it is humanity, and they are not two men but one man, precisely as only the concept of man is considered. Furthermore, that universal essence or precise concept of man is affected by many individuating notes, by which it becomes Peter and becomes Paul; by these notes, hypostases are constituted and differ from one another. Therefore, Peter and Paul are not distinguished from each other insofar as they are man; but insofar as one is the hypostasis Peter, the other the hypostasis Paul. In this philosophy, the difference between the infinite divine essence and finite nature remains intact, in that the most simple divine essence, admitting no composition, is not affected by any accidents or absolute individuating notes, but human nature would be numerically one in multiple hypostases, as is the unity of the divine nature in three persons. Hence, one who, following this philosophy, would say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, just as Peter, Paul, and Barnabas are one man, would not deny the unity of God and the singularity of the divine nature in three distinct persons; rather, he would expressly affirm it. But he would draw the illustration and understanding of the revealed truth from false philosophical principles, and thus the error would not be theological but philosophical.

Now, St. Gregory of Nyssa seems to have followed these philosophical principles in some places. To those objecting that from the consubstantiality of the three persons it follows that there are three gods, just as there are three men, Nyssa responds: three men are said by an abuse of language; according to the principles of science, it should be said three hypostases and one man, because they have one humanity, and therefore, insofar as they are man, they are neither distinguished from one another nor should they be numbered; hence, much more does the most simple divine nature, one in three, not constitute three gods, but one God. We have seen above how clearly Nyssa asserted the numerical unity of the divine nature; therefore, he neither denies this unity nor asserts the unity of God only as it truly exists among three men, but as the unity of human nature is asserted in those philosophical principles, which is a real and numerical unity. "We say, therefore," he says, "that there is a certain abuse of custom, that we name in the plural by the name of nature those who are not distinct in nature, saying 'many men'; this is similar to if someone says 'many human natures.' Many indeed share the same nature, but there is one man in all… But the concept of hypostases, through the properties considered in each, admits division and is considered by number; but the nature is one, itself unified, an utterly indivisible unity (*μονάς*), which is neither increased by addition nor diminished by subtraction; but, being what it is, it remains one, even

though it is seen in many, indivisible, continuous, integral, not divided along with the singulars who participate in it… so that it would be far better to correct the erring custom in us and no longer extend the name of nature to multiplicity, than, following custom, to err… Therefore, one God must be confessed by us according to the testimony of Scripture: 'Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one Lord' (Deuteronomy 6:4), even though the name of deity pertains to the whole Holy Trinity" (Gregory of Nyssa, *To Ablabius*, vol. II, p. 449; *On Common Notions*, vol. I, pp. 915 ff.). Not very dissimilar ideas, derived from Nyssa, are found in the author of the *Dialogue on the Trinity* (among the works of Athanasius) and Theodore of Abucara, *Opuscule 11*.

Thesis X: The Catholic Profession of the Holy Trinity Before the Council of Nicaea is Demonstrated from the Fathers of the Third and Second Centuries

"The same faith that the Council of Nicaea and subsequent Fathers confirmed was handed down from the Apostles in the universal profession and preaching of the Church. For the Fathers and Martyrs of the earlier age, against errors mutually opposed and contrary to the Church's dogma, clearly defended both the distinction of persons and the unity of deity in the same sense, though not always with the same formulas and modes of explanation, as the dogma was later defined by the Nicene and subsequent Fathers. But when those more ancient Fathers, according to the nature of the heresies of their age, insisted primarily on the real distinction of persons, they presupposed the unity of nature as conceded by their adversaries, and cannot be thought to have extended the distinction of hypostases to the nature itself, although they often did not clearly expound the mode of distinction."

In this thesis, we will establish two things: first, we will consider the explicit doctrine of the pre-Nicene Fathers concerning the unity of deity in distinct persons, who are one God; then we will examine the reason why they sometimes more vehemently urged only the distinction, presupposing the unity as conceded and asserted by their adversaries, and we will demonstrate, now still only from certain general principles, that the Fathers had in view not the distinction of natures but of persons, and in these they sought not so much the mode of distinction as its reality against heretics.

I. Apostolic Tradition and the Nicene Faith

St. Athanasius speaks of the apostolic tradition of the Nicene faith against the novelty of the Arians thus: "We demonstrate that this doctrine has been passed down from Fathers to Fathers, but you, O new Jews and disciples of Caiaphas, what Fathers of your sayings can you produce? Surely you will produce no prudent or wise one; for all shrink from you except one, the devil… who even now persuades you to slander the ecumenical synod, because it did not define your doctrines but those which from the beginning were handed down to us by those who from the beginning saw and were ministers of the word; for the faith that the synod confessed in writing is the faith of the Catholic Church" (Athanasius, *On the Decrees of Nicaea*, n. 27). St. Augustine, in his books *On the Trinity*, establishes as it were a bulwark of the consensus of all preceding Fathers: "All those I could read, who wrote before me about the Trinity, which is God, Catholic interpreters of the divine books, both old and new, intended according to the Scriptures to teach that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, by the inseparable equality of one and the same substance, manifest the divine unity, and therefore there are not three gods but one God, although the Father begot

the Son, and thus the Son is not who the Father is—and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son… This is my faith, since this is the Catholic faith" (Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Book I, n. 7).

1. Condemnation of Heresies in the Third Century

Indeed, in the third century, just as the Church condemned the Monarchian heretics who denied the distinction of persons, so too it proscribed the contrary heresy of those who, in any form of doctrine, with the distinction of persons also introduced a distinction of nature in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. For in such a distinction of nature, one of two things is necessarily contained: either that there are three gods, or that the Son and Holy Spirit are not God. But both of these were condemned even in the third century by public and solemn judgment as contrary to the revealed and traditional faith. Therefore, the Church's profession was most clear: that there are three really distinct entities—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—yet these three, and each of the three, are one true God, besides whom there is no other. Athanasius relates that Pope Dionysius, in the mid-third century, first wrote against the Sabellians, and then cites from his letter: "Moreover, it will be just to speak also against those who divide, tear apart, and distribute into some three powers, separated hypostases, and three deities the most august preaching of the Church of God (*τὸ σεμνότατον κήρυγμα τῆς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ Θεοῦ*, the most august mystery preached by the Church of God), the monarchy, I say—those who are, so to speak, diametrically opposed to the opinion of Sabellius. For his impiety consists in saying that the Son is the Father and vice versa; but these preach three gods in some way, since they divide the holy unity (*τὴν ἁγίαν μονάδα*, the holy uniqueness) into three hypostases completely separated from one another. For it is necessary that the divine Word be united to the God of the universe, and that the Holy Spirit abide and live in God, and finally it is altogether necessary that the divine Trinity be gathered and collected into one, as it were into a certain summit, I say, the God of the universe, the Almighty (1). For the insane doctrine of Marcion, which cuts and divides the monarchy into three principles, is diabolical, not that of the true disciples of Christ and those to whom the Savior's teaching is pleasing. For they well know that the Trinity is preached in the divine Scripture, but neither in the Old nor in the New Testament are three gods taught. No less, in turn, are those to be blamed who think the Son is a made thing (*ποίημα*), and that the Lord was created (*γεγονέναι τὸν Κύριον*)… If the Son was made, there was a time when He was not (*ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*); but He always was, if He is in the Father, as He Himself declares, and if Christ is the Word, Wisdom, and Power; for the divine Scriptures teach that these are Christ, as you know; but these are the powers of God, and therefore if the Son was made, there was a time when these were not: there was thus a time when God was without them, which is most absurd (2)… Therefore, neither must the admirable and divine unity (*τὴν θαυμαστὴν καὶ θείαν μονάδα*) be divided into three deities, nor must the dignity and supreme greatness of the Lord be destroyed by the opinion that He was made; but we must believe in God the Father Almighty, in Jesus Christ His Son, and in the Holy Spirit, and that the Word is united to the God of the universe. For He says: 'I and the Father are one' (John 10:30); and 'I am in the Father, and the Father in me' (John 14:10). Thus, indeed, both the divine Trinity and the holy preaching of the monarchy will be preserved intact" (Dionysius, cited in Athanasius, *On the Decrees of Nicaea*, n. 26).

(1) "It is necessary that the divine Trinity be gathered and collected into one, as it were into a certain summit, I say, the God of the universe, the Almighty" (*δεῖ καὶ τὴν θείαν Τριάδα εἰς ἕνα, ὥσπερ εἰς κορυφὴν τινὰ, τὸν Θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω, συγκληροῦσθαι τε καὶ συνάγεσθαι χρὴ ἀνάγκη*).

(2) Namely, these, taken absolutely, are divine attributes; therefore, when Christ is preached as the Son distinct from the Father, Sabellius is refuted; when they preach Him as made, those who say the Son was created are refuted.

Thus, "the most august preaching of the Church of God," i.e., the public and common profession and doctrine, according to the testimony of the Pontiff, was reduced to this: a) that there are three distinct entities—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—and therefore Sabellius was condemned; b) that God is one, and therefore the divine nature, though it is in three mutually distinct entities, is an indivisible and non-multipliable unity (*μονάς*), and thus the three are the God of the universe, who is preached as one God in the Old and New Testaments. Hence, in whatever way three deities or three principles are spoken of—not only as the Marcionites and other Gnostics had long taught, but also as the Monarchians and later the Arians brought calumny against the Church, and as in a later age the tritheists taught—all these errors are excluded by the most august preaching of the Church. c) By this very preaching, the Church confesses the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit as true God, and thus those who said the Word, and consequently also the Holy Spirit, is a creature are condemned (1).

(1) Dionysius clearly has in view a twofold distinct conformation of error. Namely, both those who taught three deities in any way, i.e., deities in the proper sense and thus equal, or calumniated the Church as teaching this, and those who said the Son and Holy Spirit are not God in the true sense but inferior to the Father (*ποίημα*, *γεγονέναι*). Nor is it necessary, to understand this distinction of twofold error in Dionysius, to show that there already existed at that time properly so-called tritheists, as emerged in the sixth century. Against the evident context, we cannot concede to a recent theologian (Dr. Kuhn, *On the Trinity*, pp. 279 ff.) that the same error is attacked by Dionysius when he first refutes those dividing the divine unity into three deities and then refutes "in turn also those who think the Son is a creature."

Before Dionysius, the same faith in one deity in distinct persons at the beginning of the third century is demonstrated by both the deeds and the doctrine of Popes Zephyrinus and Callistus, however distortedly they are reported by their calumniator in the work that the editor Miller inscribed as "Origen's *Philosophumena*." a) Just as Dionysius condemned the Sabellians who confused the persons equally with those who divided the unity of nature, so too Callistus "expelled Sabellius from the Church because he did not think rightly" (*Philosophumena*, p. 288); but on the other hand, he demanded the profession that the Father and the Son are one indivisible spirit, not one thing and another but one and the same. Because the author of that history (*Philosophumena*) and those coalescing with him in a sect refused this profession, Callistus publicly denounced them as enemies of God's unity (*τριθεΐστας πίστιν οὐκ εἶναι λέγων*, *Philosophumena*, pp. 285, 289). b) The doctrine of Saints Zephyrinus and Callistus on the unity of the Father and Son is presented by their adversary thus: Zephyrinus, at the urging of Callistus, who later succeeded him in the pontificate, publicly preached: "I know one God, Christ Jesus, and besides Him no other (namely, no other God), who was born and suffered (Jesus Christ God)." But at the same time

Callistus declared: "It is not the Father who died, but the Son" (*Philosophumena*, p. 285) (1). Thus, the Father is preached as distinct from the Son against Sabellius, but just as Christ the Lord called the Father "the only true God" (see above, Thesis III, Corollary 2; John 17:3), so too the Son is the same one God, besides whom there is no other God. The doctrine of Callistus, now as Pontiff, is further expounded: the Father and the Son "are one indivisible spirit, not one spirit as the Father and another as the Son, but one and the same spirit; and the one who was incarnated in the Virgin is not a different spirit from the Father,

but one and the same spirit; and this is what He meant when He said: 'Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father in me?' (John 14:10). For, he says, I will not say two gods, Father and Son, but one." Indeed, the adversary reporting this concludes that this teaches one person of the Father and Son, because he could not or would not understand the distinction according to persons if there is no distinction according to nature; nevertheless, he himself admits that Callistus was unwilling to say that the Father suffered or that there is one person, "so as, he says, to avoid blasphemy against the Father" (*Philosophumena*, p. 289) (2). He repeats the same calumny, as if Callistus distinguished the Father from the Son only in name, because he taught: "The Father and the Son are one in essence; for neither is God a different spirit from the Word, nor the Word a different spirit from God, and this Word is one God and was incarnated" (*Philosophumena*, p. 329).

Thus, in the third century, just as the distinction of persons was clearly declared against the Sabellians, so too the undivided unity of the divine nature was no less explicitly affirmed by the Roman Pontiffs Zephyrinus, Callistus, and Dionysius as the common and traditional faith of the Church and defended against contrary errors.

(1) "He himself, Zephyrinus, urged by Callistus, publicly preached, saying: 'I know one God, Christ Jesus, and besides Him no other, who was born and suffered,' but saying: 'It is not the Father who died, but the Son'" (*αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν Ζεφύρινον παραινοῦντα (Καλλίστου) δημοσίᾳ λέγειν ἐγὼ οἶδα ἕνα Θεὸν Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ ἕτερον οὐδένα, γενητὸν καὶ παθητόν, πότε δὲ λέγων, οὐχ ὁ Πατὴρ ἀπέθανεν ἀλλὰ ὁ Υἱός*).

(2) "Saying that the Word is His Son, and Himself the Father, called by name; but in reality not one and another, not one Father and another Son, but one and the same; and all things are subject to the divine Spirit above and below; and the spirit incarnated in the Virgin is not different from the Father but one and the same; and this is what was said: 'Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father in me?'… For, he says, I will not say two gods, Father and Son, but one… for he does not wish to say that the Father suffered and that there is one person, to avoid blasphemy against the Father" (*λέγων τὸν Λόγον αὐτὸν εἶναι Υἱόν, αὐτὸν καὶ Πατέρα, ὀνόματι μὲν τὰ δύο καλοῦμενον, ὑπὸ δὲ οὐ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀσύμβατον, οὐκ ἄλλο εἶναι Πατέρα ἄλλο δὲ Υἱόν, ἓν δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντα εἶναι τῷ θείῳ Πνεύματι ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω, καὶ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τῇ Παρθένῳ σαρκωθὲν πνεῦμα οὐχ ἕτερον παρὰ τὸν Πατέρα ἀλλ' ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ εἰρημένον 'οὐ πιστεύεις, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί'... οὐ γὰρ, φησίν, ἐγὼ δύο Θεοὺς Πατέρα καὶ Υἱὸν ἀλλ' ἕνα… οὐ γὰρ θέλει λέγειν τὸν Πατέρα πεπονθέναι καὶ ἓν εἶναι πρόσωπον, φεύγειν τὴν εἰς τὸν Πατέρα βλασφημίαν*).

2. Pre-Nicene Fathers' Defense of Unity and Distinction

Where the dogma of God's unity with the distinction of persons had to be reconciled and explained against the Gnostics, sometimes also against the pagans, or defended against the objections of the Monarchians, the Fathers of the second and third centuries proposed both parts of the dogma—namely, not only the distinction but also the unity—with equal clarity as the common faith.

Irenaeus declares this doctrine most frequently, especially in Books III and IV. The God who revealed Himself in the Old Testament is one God, besides whom there is no other; but this one God is the Father and the Son in distinct persons. "Who is the God of the living, if not He who is God, above whom there is

no other God?… Therefore, the living God who was worshipped by the prophets is the God of the living and His Word, who spoke to Moses, who refuted the Sadducees… Therefore, Christ Himself with the Father is the God of the living, who spoke to Moses and was manifested to the Patriarchs" (Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, Book IV, ch. 5, n. 2). He often repeats that the Creator of the world, or Demiurge, is not some being inferior to the supreme God, as the Gnostics thought, but is the one supreme God Himself. Then, he calls the one supreme Creator God sometimes the Father, sometimes the Word of the Father, sometimes the Father through the Word and through Wisdom, i.e., through the Holy Spirit. The Father is said to have created all things through the Word and Wisdom, not as if these three were one thing and another, but rather the Father, Word, and Wisdom are not distinguished insofar as they are the Creator God, but are entirely one; and thus it is the same to say: "God creates through the Word and Wisdom" as to say: "God creates through Himself." This is the same explanation of the unity of the three that we have heard from other Fathers teaching that one person with another, according to deity, is no less one than with itself. "According to His greatness," says Irenaeus, "it is not possible to know God; for it is impossible to measure the Father… Since He is so great a God, and He is the one who by Himself established, chose, adorned, and contains all things, and among all things this world… Therefore, neither angels made us, nor could angels make the image of God, nor anyone else besides the Word of the Lord, nor any Power far distant from the Father of the universe. For God did not need these to make what He had predetermined to be made, as if He did not have His own hands. For His Word and Wisdom, the Son and the Spirit, are always present with Him, through whom and in whom He freely and spontaneously made all things, to whom He also speaks, saying: 'Let us make man in our image and likeness' (Genesis 1:26), He Himself taking from Himself the substance of creatures (creating by His omnipotence), and the pattern of things made and the form of the world's adornments (archetypal ideas)… And since the Word, that is, the Son, was always with the Father, we have shown this through many proofs. But since Wisdom, which is the Spirit, was with Him before all creation, He says through Solomon: 'By Wisdom God founded the earth' (Proverbs 3:19)… Therefore, there is one God, who by His Word and Wisdom made and ordered all things; this is the Creator" (Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, Book IV, ch. 20, nn. 1–4). "He is the only one God, the Creator, this Father, this God, this Founder, this Maker, this Creator, who made those things through Himself, that is, through His Word and His Wisdom" (Book II, ch. 30, n. 9).

Athenagoras, in the second century, in his apology or *Embassy for the Christians*, addressed to pagans, sets forth no other doctrine of the one God—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—than the common profession of Christians. First, with philosophical arguments and even the confession of philosophers, he shows that God can only be one simple spirit without any composition and the Creator of the world. This one God is taught by the prophetic books: "I am God, the first and the last; and besides me there is no God" (Isaiah 44:6, *Embassy*, nn. 7–9). Then he more distinctly declares what kind of one God Christians believe in; they are not atheists who hold to one unbegotten and eternal God, by whom all things were made through His Word. For we believe also in the Son of God, not as the poets fable sons of gods, "but the Son of God is the Word of the Father in idea and power (*Λόγος Πατρὸς ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ*, i.e., the expression of the Father's intellect and the eternal exemplar according to which all things were created); for by Him and through Him all things were made, since the Father and the Son are one. For the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son by the unity and essence of the spirit (*ἑνότητι καὶ δυνάμει πνεύματος*, i.e., the Father is in the Father and the Son in the Father, because the Father and the Son are one substantive spiritual power). The Son of God is the mind and Word (*νοῦς καὶ Λόγος*) of the Father" (1). Besides the Father and the Son, Christians also believe in the Holy Spirit proceeding from God, as a ray proceeds from the sun,

as splendor from fire. “Who, therefore, would not marvel when he hears those called atheists who teach God the Father, God the Son, and the Holy Spirit, showing both their essence in unity and their distinction in order” (*Embassy*, nn. 10, 12, 24).

(1) Here in Athenagoras, and in Hippolytus, whom we will soon cite, and elsewhere not infrequently, the Greek term *δύναμις* signifies essence, perfection, reality, truth, in opposition to what is merely apparent and not true. See Scholion 2 to Thesis XIV of the *Treatise on the Eucharist*. Further, note that, just as from St. Callistus, so too from Athenagoras, the Father and the Son are said to be one spirit.

The Noetians (in Hippolytus, *Against Noetus*, and Epiphanius, *Heresy 57*), with many testimonies of Scripture, prove these two things: that the true God is one, and that Christ is the true God; whence they infer that the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit signify not one and another but the same, and thus the one who is the Father was incarnated and suffered under the name of the Son (hence called Patripassians). Now, the Catholics (the presbyters of Smyrna and Hippolytus) agreed with the Noetians in both premises, that there is only one God and that Christ is the true God; but at the same time, they taught that not only Christ the Son but the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three distinct persons of one essence, this one true God. The distinction, no less than Dionysius of Alexandria later acting against the same Patripassian heresy (Athanasius, *On the Opinion of Dionysius*, nn. 9 ff.), Hippolytus chiefly demonstrates by considering the incarnate Word, Christ. Hence, all the texts cited by the Noetians to demonstrate the unity of the Father and Son, which they extend to the unity of person, Hippolytus explains with reference to the Son incarnated in human nature, so that the personal distinction between the Father and the Son is more evident. For since this Word-man is one person, and this person is clearly distinguished as the Son sent by the Father who sends (2), it is necessary that the Father be one person and the Word another.

(2) “From the Holy Spirit and the Virgin was this Word, presenting to God (though in a twofold divine and human nature) the only Son… Therefore, the flesh (i.e., the man), which, from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin, was offered by the Word of the Father to the Father as a sacrifice, is shown to be the perfect Son of God. It is thus manifest that He offered Himself to the Father. But before, there was no flesh in heaven. Who, then, was in heaven, if not the Word without flesh, which was sent to show that the one who is on earth is in heaven? For the Word was, was spirit, was Power” (Hippolytus, *Against Noetus*, n. 4).

Then, according to the teaching of Christ, the distinction of the third person, the Holy Spirit, is no less certain. Yet by the very fact that God is one, as the Noetians rightly affirm, the distinction is not in the deity or in the nature of the persons. “It is necessary, therefore, that although unwillingly, Noetus confesses the Father as God Almighty and Christ Jesus as the Son of God, God made man, to whom the Father subjected all things except Himself and the Holy Spirit, and thus these are three. But if he wishes to know how one God is shown, let him know that His essence is one (*ὅτι μία δύναμις τούτου*). And as regards essence, God is one; but as regards the economy (*οἰκονομία*, the origin and distinction of one person from another, cf. Tertullian, *Against Praxeas*, ch. 3), the manifestation is threefold (the same essence is in three, and manifests itself to us). These things, therefore, brothers, are shown by us to be consistently said; for God is one” (Hippolytus, *Against Noetus*, n. 8, in Gallandius, *Library of the Fathers*, vol. II, p. 459). “When God, being alone and having nothing coeternal with Him, willed to create the world… the Word creates, but Wisdom adorns… And thus another stood by Him. When I say another, I do not say two gods, but as light from light, or as water from a fountain, or as a ray from the sun. For the essence is one, which is from the whole; but the whole is the Father, from whom the essence, the Word

(*μία γὰρ δύναμις, ἡ ἐκ τοῦ παντός, τὸ δὲ πᾶν Πατήρ, ἐξ οὗ ἡ δύναμις Λόγος*). This (Word) is the mind that, proceeding (through incarnation) into the world, is shown as the Son of God (*Παῖς Θεοῦ Χριστὸς ἄνθρωπος*)… This economy John hands down to us in the Gospel, and this Word itself confesses God, saying thus: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God' (John 1:1). If the Word was with God and was God, what then, will someone say, does John teach two gods? I will not say two gods but one, but two persons and a third economy, the grace of the Holy Spirit (*δύο μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμι Θεούς, ἀλλὰ ἕνα, πρόσωπα δὲ δύο, οἰκονομίαν δὲ τρίτην, τὴν χάριν τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος*) (1). One, but two persons, because also the Son, and a third, the Holy Spirit… We cannot understand one God otherwise (as He is revealed), unless we truly believe in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit" (ibid., nn. 10–14). Epiphanius summarizes and illustrates the whole doctrine of Hippolytus in *Heresy 67* (vol. I, pp. 480 ff.).

(1) The same words were used by the presbyters of Smyrna responding to Noetus and by St. Callistus, the Pontiff, to the author of the work *Philosophumena*, who seemed to be in the opposite error of ditheism. How, therefore, can we be persuaded that this author of the *Philosophumena*, whose doctrine on the Trinity is no less opposed to Hippolytus' than to Callistus', and who was a most bitter adversary of the holy Pontiffs and a leader of at least a schismatic, if not heretical, sect against the Roman Church, was the same St. Hippolytus, a man celebrated with pious veneration and highest praises in the tradition of that same Roman Church?

Similarly, **Tertullian** agrees with Praxeas in preaching the unity of God, provided that he also confesses the distinction of persons, who by the unity of substance are one God. "We believe in one God indeed," he says, "yet under this dispensation, which we call the economy (*οἰκονομία*)… This heresy thinks it possesses the pure truth, when it supposes that one God must not be believed in any other way than if it says He Himself is both Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as if in this way all things are not also one, since all things are from one, through the unity of substance" (*Against Praxeas*, ch. 2). "The work of the Gospel, namely the substance of the New Testament, establishes one God from then on, that He is believed as one through the Son and the Holy Spirit, so that now God is known in His own names and persons, who even before was preached through the Son and the Holy Spirit but was not known" (ibid., ch. 31).

The orthodox bishops in the Second Council of Antioch, or writing to Paul of Samosata before his deposition (1), with many arguments from the Old and New Testaments first prove that the Son of God is true God; then they profess that the Father and the Son are not two gods, as Paul of Samosata imputed to Catholics, but one God and the same. Since Paul taught that Christ is called God because the Word, a divine power as God's efficiency, dwelt in the man Jesus; and thus, from eternity only in foreknowledge, and in time actually, the Word could be…

(1) There is indeed controversy among critics about the genuineness of this letter, but it is certainly a document ancient enough to be joined with the preceding ones.

called God, but in a sense far different from that in which the Father is God, lest two gods be introduced; the Fathers condemn this doctrine because the Son is that very true God who appeared in the Old Testament and is proclaimed as God in all the Scriptures. Therefore, they say, the universal Church, from the time of the Apostles, professes that the Son is God eternal in essence and hypostasis, and yet the Father and the Son are not two gods but one God. "It seemed good to us," they say, "to set forth in writing

the faith that we received from the beginning and hold as handed down in the holy Catholic Church, up to this day, from the teaching of the Apostles… We profess and preach that the Son is the Wisdom and Power of God existing before the ages, not by foreknowledge but by essence and hypostasis as God, the Son of God. But whoever contradicts this, so as not to believe and profess that the Son of God is God before the creation of the world, saying that two gods are proclaimed if the Son of God is preached as God, we judge him to be alien to the ecclesiastical rule (*τοῦ ἐκκλησιαστικοῦ κανόνος*), and all of the Catholic Church agree with us" (Mansi, *Collection of Councils*, vol. I, p. 1033; *Works of Dionysius of Alexandria*, ed. de Magistris, p. 280 ff.; Routh, *Reliquiae Sacrae*, vol. III, p. 289).

No less clear is the declaration of the divinely handed-down creed by St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, who "stood out most prominently" among the bishops fighting against Paul of Samosata (Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, Book VII, ch. 28). "One God, the Father of the living Word, of subsisting Wisdom (*σοφίας ὑφεστώσης*)… One Lord, alone from the alone, God from God, invisible from invisible… One Holy Spirit, having subsistence from God and shining forth through the Son, namely to men (1); the perfect image of the perfect Son; life, the cause of the living; holy fountain, sanctity, the author of sanctification; in whom (the Holy Spirit) is manifested God the Father, who is above all and in all, and God the Son, who is through all; a perfect Trinity, which is neither divided nor alienated in glory, eternity, and kingdom… an unchangeable and invariable Trinity, always the same" (Gallandius, *Library of the Fathers*, vol. III, pp. 385, 447).

(1) "And shining forth through the Son, namely to men" (*καὶ διὰ Υἱοῦ πέμπη, δηλαδὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*). This final clause seems entirely to be a gloss of some later Greek writer; certainly, it does not appear in Rufinus' translation (see Lequien, *Damascene Dissertation I*, § 3).

3. Common Profession of the Trinity

That this faith in one God, who is a Trinity in persons, pertained not only to a deeper and more hidden theology but to the profession common to all the faithful is evident from the creed declared in catecheses; from the very form of baptism; from the doxology by which, from the apostolic age, one adoration was offered, one "glory to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Spirit," or "glory to the Father and to the Son with the Holy Spirit." That this formula of glorification and public profession originated from apostolic tradition is shown by Basil in many ways: "Those who from the beginning prescribed it and handed it down to posterity, through use advancing with time, have confirmed it in the Churches through long custom" (Basil, *On the Holy Spirit*, n. 71).

Most clearly, however, the common understanding of this mystery in the early Church is evident from the confessions of the martyrs. They confess before tyrants one sole God, who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and while they preach one God, the Creator of all, and His Son Christ, when questioned by judges whether this Christ is another God, their consistent response is that He is one God, besides whom there is no other God. We see this confession of the martyrs to be the same in different Churches, and for this faith, they endured torments and death. "True God, I glorify You with the eternal and heavenly Jesus Christ, Your beloved Son, with whom to You and the Holy Spirit be glory both now and in the ages to come," said St. Polycarp in Smyrna in 166 (Ruinart, *Acts of the Martyrs*, Verona ed., p. 31, n. 12; p. 36, n. 14). "I confess that Christ with the Father and the Holy Spirit is God, and it is fitting that I pour out my soul to Him who is both my Creator and Redeemer," said St. Epipodius in Lyons in 178 (ibid., p. 65, n. 6).

“I confess the Lord Christ, the Son of the Most High Father, the only one from the only one, Him with the Father and the Holy Spirit I confess to be the one sole God… I sacrifice to the one and living God, who is blessed forever,” said St. Vincent in Valencia, Spain, in 304 (ibid., p. 323, n. 5). “I adore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; I adore the holy Trinity, besides which there is no God… I now sacrifice myself to Christ God… I adore the inseparable Trinity, which Trinity is the unity of deity… I sacrifice and offer myself to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit,” said St. Euplus in Catania in 304 (ibid., p. 362). “Lord God Almighty, Jesus Christ… I give thanks to You, Lord Jesus Christ… to You I offer my sacrifice, who with the Father and the Holy Spirit live and reign as God forever and ever,” said St. Afra in Augsburg in 303 or 304 (ibid., p. 401, n. 3). “Tarachus (martyr) said: I serve my God and sacrifice to Him—more and more I desire to trust in the name of God and His Christ. Maximus (governor) said: Unjustly and blasphemously, how do you serve two gods, whom you confess with your voice, and now deny gods? Tarachus said: I confess openly, He who is the true God (*ἐγὼ Θεὸν ὁμολογῶ τὸν ὄντως ὄντα*). Maximus said: Now you have confessed Christ and God (*καὶ νῦν καὶ Χριστὸν τινὰ λέγεις εἶναι Θεόν*). Tarachus said: And rightly so (*οὕτως ἔχει*), for He is the Son of God, the hope of Christians, for whom we suffer and are saved,” said St. Tarachus in Cilicia in 304 (ibid., p. 377). “Polemon (judge) said: Which God do you worship? Pionius (martyr) responded: The Almighty God, who made heaven and earth… whom we have known through His Word, Jesus Christ… Polemon turned to Sabina: Which God do you worship? She responded: The Almighty God, whom we have known through His Word, Jesus Christ. After this, with Asclepiades standing not far off, Polemon said: Which God do you worship? Asclepiades responded: Christ. Polemon: What then, is He another? He responded: No, but the same, whom they also just confessed… The judges again said: Which God do you worship? Pionius responded: Him who made heaven and adorned it with stars, who established the earth… They (the judges) said: Do you mean the one who was crucified? And Pionius said: I mean Him, whom the Father sent for the salvation of the world” (1) St. Pionius with companions in Smyrna in 250 (ibid., p. 122 ff.).

(1) It is most true that these confessions of the martyrs are entirely twin to the declarations of the Pontiffs Zephyrinus and Callistus: “I know one God, Jesus Christ, and besides Him no other (God)” (*Philosophumena*); “the Word is not another spirit than God, nor is God another spirit than the Word (concerning the name ‘spirit’ taken absolutely, not hypostatically, cf. Constant, *Preface to the Works of St. Hilary*, nn. 62, 65), this Word is one God.” These are exactly and perfectly in accordance with the norm of Catholic theology and need no softening, as a recent theologian thought (Tübingen Theological Journal, 1855, p. 161). The martyr’s response, “He is not another,” by no means intends, as that theologian claims, that Christ is that one God, i.e., identical in person with the Father, but is merely an emphatic expression of the consubstantial deity of Christ. Most certainly, it means that He is not another God but the same one God who is the Father; for God is the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, “three persons together and each of them.” There is a great difference between these two, which the theologian seems to treat as synonymous: “The Son is that one same God who is the Father,” and “The Son is the same person as the Father.”

In both the questions of Tarachus and Pionius, the pagans try to convict the holy martyrs of worshipping multiple gods because they called both the Father and Christ the Almighty God; but the Christians confess that the Father and the Son are one and the same God, not one God and another; and thus, although the Father is one and the Son another, they are not distinguished in deity but are one God.

From the expositions of the Fathers and the testimonies of the martyrs, it is evident that the universal faith and understanding of the Church’s dogma from the time of the Apostles was the same as that which was

more diligently and with fixed dogmatic formulas defended in the Council of Nicaea and thereafter, so that the dogma might be preserved intact in direct opposition to new errors.

II. Modern Interpretations and the Pre-Nicene Consensus

If you compare Petavius' *Book I on the Trinity*, chapters 3–5, with his *Prolegomena* to the same books on the Trinity, it will not be entirely obvious to conceive a clear and distinct notion of what, according to Petavius' opinion, many Fathers who flourished before the Nicene definition certainly and definitively believed about the unity of nature and the consubstantiality of the three divine persons; for the opinions of the Fathers, as understood by Petavius in Book I, seem to contradict what he himself demonstrates about their faith in the *Prolegomena*. Many later theologians, including Natalis Alexander, Maranus, Lumper, Moehler (in his work *Athanasius the Great*), and among the Anglicans, George Bull, have interpreted the more difficult expressions of the ancient Fathers not as Petavius does in Book I but in another sense, which agrees with Petavius' *Prolegomena*; and they have demonstrated that their interpretation is true from the very principles of the Fathers, so that among Catholic theologians, the full consensus of the pre-Nicene doctrine with the profession of the Nicene Council and subsequent Fathers, regarding the one deity of three distinct persons, seemed to be a settled matter. Now, however, certain new interpretations are brought forward, in which an evident error in understanding the revealed dogma is attributed to the Fathers under the guise of an imperfect understanding, and this theory is defended by principles of the progress of Catholic understanding, which, in our opinion, are extended beyond just limits.

On the one hand, these theologians admit that the faith and profession of the dogma were the same for the pre-Nicene Fathers as thereafter; but on the other hand, they assert that the mode of conceiving and explaining the dogma itself was "deficient." They find this defect not only in the use of arguments, comparisons, and obscure language but in the fact that most pre-Nicene Fathers thought the nature of the Son to be another, inferior to that of the Father, and consequently held the same about the nature of the Holy Spirit. They say that those ancient Fathers universally believed the Son of God to be God but did not yet understand consubstantiality with the Father in the sense of the Council of Nicaea, and even seemed to tend toward asserting the nature of the Son as a participation in the Father's nature, inferior in "quantity." "For as long as the relation by which one person is related to another is not distinguished from the relation by which the nature in the Son is related to the nature in the Father, so long does personal subordination (that one person has its origin from another) necessarily transfer to the essence, and it does not admit the knowledge of absolute consubstantiality; this is what happened to the apologists and most pre-Nicene Fathers" (Dr. Kuhn, *On the Trinity*, § 12, p. 123). These recent theologians do not approve of our effort to reduce the harsher expressions of the pre-Nicene Fathers, when compared with the declarations and formulas of later Fathers, to the same sense regarding the reality itself, admitting only a difference and progress from a more obscure and confused mode of conception to clearer and more distinct definitions; but they press those harsher expressions of the ancients as expressing a lower degree and thus a diversity of nature in the Son of God compared to the Father, the God of the universe. "The anxious effort," they say, "by which many theologians everywhere defend the more ancient Fathers, and the judgment by which they reduce their opinions to the explanations of later Fathers, is not to be imitated but rather worthy of reproach." However, regarding the doctrine of the pre-Nicene Fathers, they bid us be unconcerned based on a principle frequently repeated in our age, which I confess I do not understand when it concerns not the mind and will of men but the doctrine and opinion considered objectively in itself. For they say, as if it were a sufficient defense of the sound doctrine of those Fathers: "What makes a

heretic is not a deficient or even false theory but a deficient and perverse faith stubbornly held." Yet these same theologians not infrequently speak in such a way as to seem to concede that the pre-Nicene Fathers in question indeed held the reality of the unity of nature in distinct persons but were only unable to express it clearly and distinctly enough, as they conceived it in the understanding of faith. But if this is so, why should we not reconcile the opinions of those ancients with the doctrine of later Fathers and with the Catholic explanation of the mystery? Certainly, the entire explanation of the pre-Nicene Fathers' doctrine proposed by these learned men, to show (as they say) progress in the understanding of the dogma of the Holy Trinity from the imperfect to the more perfect, seems to me to tend toward introducing the opinion that most Fathers, from the Apostles to the fourth century, had nothing certain and fixed regarding in what sense Christ, the Son of God, is called and is God, and in what sense the three—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—are one God; indeed, it seems to follow from these theologians' interpretations that the real unity of God's singularity and thus the consubstantiality of the persons, which are the "substance of the New Testament," were, in the first centuries, at least unknown to most Doctors and even more so to other faithful.

But such a progress, if it concerns the Catholic understanding in general and not merely the error of one or another ancient Doctor, cannot be admitted, as is most certain both from the proper nature of this dogma we are discussing, from the way in which later Fathers testified to their consensus with earlier Fathers, and from the clear and common doctrine of the pre-Nicene Fathers and martyrs.

1. The Nature of the Dogma

It concerns a principal truth explicitly recorded in the Scriptures by the Apostles themselves, necessarily declared to the faithful in the preaching of the Apostles, explicitly believed by all the faithful, and professed in the very initiation of baptism and daily in the creed, sealed even with blood before tyrants. This truth is that there is one God, besides whom there is no other God; the three distinct Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are this one God, not three gods; specifically, the Word of the Father incarnate, Christ, is true God, and thus not another God but one God with the Father and the Holy Spirit. But it contradicts the entire nature of the Church, divinely constituted and fortified by Christ's promises for the custody of the deposit of faith, that a truth comprehended in revelation in the manner we have described, explicitly handed down by the Apostles, and always and everywhere explicitly believed by all the faithful, should at any time not be understood in its genuine sense in the Catholic understanding of the Church. Therefore, in the understanding and explanation of truths of this kind, such progress as these theologians assume cannot be admitted based on the general principles of tradition and the economy of the Christian faith. For the nature of dogmas explicitly handed down by the Apostles to the Churches, always clearly proposed to the faithful by "insistent preaching" as necessarily known and believed by all, is far different from certain other truths that were either revealed only implicitly in others, or proposed by common disciplinary practice and observation rather than clear doctrine, or certainly received by simple faith but not inculcated by insistent preaching. In matters of this latter order, we do not deny that sometimes, through the authentic magisterium under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, progress in explanation can take place in the manner these theologians assert for the dogma of the Holy Trinity (see *Treatise on Tradition*). Therefore, from general principles, it follows that it could in no way have happened that the Catholic Fathers, considered collectively regarding the reality itself, did not understand and teach the same unity of deity and distinction of three persons defined in the Council of Nicaea and thereafter repeatedly defended. However, it does not follow that the mode of speaking, whether about unity or distinction, received in use

was always equally determined, minimally ambiguous, and excluding the very possibility of a false and heretical sense, such as we see in the ecclesiastical formulas later established and declared against heretical errors.

2. Reconciling Pre-Nicene and Nicene Fathers

Therefore, if anything among the earlier Fathers, considered collectively, were ambiguous and admitting multiple senses in itself, it must necessarily be understood according to the explanations of the later Fathers, who proclaim their consensus with their predecessors and profess to teach nothing other, though with stricter words, than what was handed down from the apostolic age. Thus, Athanasius, regarding the doctrine of consubstantiality, compares the third-century Fathers with the Nicene Fathers: "It is not fitting to set them against one another; for all are Fathers, nor would it be holy to distinguish them, as if these taught well and those taught wrongly; for all fell asleep in Christ… Nor did those three hundred write any opinion, nor did they rely on themselves and defend it with words not previously written; but they too, proceeding from the Fathers before them, used their words" (Athanasius, *On the Synods*, n. 43). If, however, the question concerns the opinions of certain individual Fathers, certainly they are neither infallible, nor does the perpetuity and constancy of the universal tradition or its demonstration depend on the integrity of their doctrine. Nevertheless, in a Christian dogma of this nature, such as the profession of one and triune God, dissent from the Catholic understanding and distortion to a perverse sense cannot be admitted in even individual Fathers unless it is evidently demonstrated that their doctrine cannot in any probable way be reconciled with the Catholic opinion. The reason for this lies in the principles of the Fathers themselves, in their union with the Church, in the authority and veneration with which they were regarded as lights by the Church itself, in the connection by which Fathers of different ages, the later with the earlier, cohere; and specifically, regarding the present question, the reason is most clear in the very nature of the dogma, which could not have been unknown to Catholic Doctors and certainly could not have been called into question within the Church's bounds without other Pastors and Doctors immediately objecting. This is most clearly established by the fact itself. When Dionysius of Alexandria, to more effectively express the real distinction of the Father and the Son against the Sabellians, used certain modes of speaking that seemed to signify a distinction and diversity of nature, he was immediately accused before Dionysius, the Roman Pontiff, the successor of Peter, who on this occasion expounded the common faith with the clarity we saw above, both regarding the distinction of persons and the unity of nature, to which definition the Alexandrian fully consented and protested that he had always been in the same faith (see Athanasius, *On the Opinion of Dionysius*, nn. 15, 17, 18, 20; *On the Decrees of Nicaea*, n. 26). But we will speak of Dionysius elsewhere. The same consensus, solicitude, and clarity of understanding in guarding the deposit of faith appear equally clearly in the condemnation of all heretics, however subtly they argued and covered their error with ecclesiastical words.

3. Pre-Nicene Doctrine in Context

If we now examine the doctrine itself as it is presented in the surviving monuments before the time of Nicaea, we should not so much distinguish different Doctors among themselves as compare the twofold series of statements found in all or at least most of those Fathers.

a) **Fundamental Principle of Unity**: All hold as most certain the fundamental principle that there is one God, besides whom there is no other; considered absolutely or in terms of deity and essence, He is one in

such a way as the Jews and Monarchians teach and rightly prove from the Scriptures; further, it is entirely impious to offer divine worship to anyone but the one true God. No less certain is that Christ, the Son of God, and likewise the third, the Holy Spirit, are true God, to be worshipped with divine worship; Christ the Son, distinct from the Father, is that one true God who appeared in the Old Testament and revealed Himself as one God. It is thus clear that all those Fathers consider the multiplication or division of the deity or divine nature to be absurd based on Christian principles. Hence, it is certain that their declarations of the real distinction between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit can never be understood in the sense that the distinction extends to the one most simple and non-multipliable divine essence.

b) **Modes of Discussing Distinction**: There are two different modes of discussion among those Doctors regarding the distinction of persons. When they simultaneously refute opposite errors—on the one hand, those asserting with the unity of nature also the unity of person, and on the other, those dividing the nature in any way along with the distinction of persons, as we saw with the Pontiffs Callistus and Dionysius; or, what amounts to nearly the same, when the Fathers, defending the distinction of persons, simultaneously repel the calumny of their adversaries, as if this itself multiplied the nature, as Irenaeus often does, Tertullian not infrequently, and others—in this discussion, they join and equally clearly defend the unity of nature and the distinction of persons. But frequently, presupposing the unity of deity, they have only the real distinction of the Father and the Son before their eyes, which heretics denied. Since here the Fathers had no intention of declaring how the distinction exists but only its reality, whether it exists, and since they agreed with their Monarchian adversaries without controversy regarding the unity of nature, it is not surprising that they often use modes of speaking which, considered in themselves, could signify not only a distinction of persons but also of natures, and which, in another discussion where the deity of the Son and the unity of nature were to be defended, they themselves would not have used, and still less can we conveniently use in a later age, when formulas and definitions directly opposed to both Monarchian and tritheistic errors are now established and fixed, formulas which the necessity of defending the always-believed dogma of unity and distinction against heretics gradually produced, and by which the frauds by which they concealed their error were uncovered.

This origin of a more distinct and consistent terminology is testified by the history of the Council of Nicaea, described by us above (Thesis IX), and indeed the entire history of the Arians and Pneumatomachi, as they were refuted and condemned both by the Fathers individually and in councils. Therefore, what St. Jerome says about those ancient Doctors (*Apology Against Rufinus*, Book II, n. 17): "It is possible that they either simply erred, or wrote in another sense, or their writings were gradually corrupted by unskilled copyists; or certainly, before Arius, like a noonday demon, arose in Alexandria, they spoke some things innocently and less cautiously, which cannot escape the calumny of perverse men," must be fully conceded if the discussion concerns the possibility of the matter and individual Doctors, not those considered in their consensus. But if the question concerns the fact, the first and third points should not be admitted without great proof; the second and fourth, upon examination of the writings of those Fathers who were always considered orthodox, are found to be most true.

When the holy Fathers, whether before the controversy with the Arians or even after the Council of Nicaea, speak: 1) of the relation of the Son to the Father as of an inferior to a superior; 2) of the voluntary generation of the Son; 3) of the external operation of the Son as ministering to God the Father, and of His generation in relation to the work of creation; 4) of the mission and appearances of the Son, even in the Old Testament, as visible and circumscribed in place compared to the invisible and immense Father: all

these expressions, among the orthodox Fathers, can and, in light of their principles and declarations, must be understood as referring to the real distinction of the Son proceeding from the Father through generation as from His principle, not to a mode of distinction implying diversity of nature. In most cases, they also refer simultaneously to the human nature to be assumed or assumed by the Son, or to His appearance in a place through a subject creature."

It cannot be denied that among the pre-Nicene Fathers, there are modes of speaking about the Son, and either explicitly or by implication about the Holy Spirit, in comparison with the Father, which, taken by themselves and in isolation, could signify, and in their obvious sense would indeed signify, that the Son is distinct from the Father in nature and inferior. Indeed, similar expressions are not infrequently found among the Fathers even after the Council of Nicaea, including those who most zealously defended the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father against the Arians. Hence, among these later Fathers, no prudent person doubts that these harsher formulas must be interpreted in an orthodox sense. This itself is a most weighty prejudice that the same expressions were used by the earlier Fathers solely in this Catholic sense. However, we are not confined to this comparison with later Fathers alone; as we have already indicated among the general principles discussed at the end of the preceding thesis, those pre-Nicene Fathers themselves hand down a most explicit doctrine about the unity of the divine nature, which is not multipliable, and about the Son who, with the Father, is one true God. Therefore, everything they say about the distinction of the Father and the Son cannot have a sense that would subvert this fundamental principle; they cannot, I say, be understood as referring to a distinction, much less a diversity, of nature, but must necessarily be understood as referring only to the distinction of the Father and the Son, formally as the Father is the principle and the Son proceeds from the principle, that is, to the distinction of persons, with the unity of deity or divine nature remaining intact. Nor are these more difficult expressions of such a kind that they do not admit a Catholic sense, provided one considers what the Fathers presuppose as conceded by their adversaries, namely, the unity of deity, and what they seek to establish against those adversaries, namely, the real distinction of the subsisting Son from the subsisting Father.

All these expressions revolve around four heads of Catholic doctrine drawn from the Scriptures themselves: 1) that God the Father is the principle, and God the Son is begotten from the Father; 2) that the Father begot the Son not by material generation, as in brute nature, but by an internal intellectual act, and thus the Father, willing, begot; 3) that God the Father created all things and operates externally through His Word, that is, through the Son; 4) that the Son, sent by the Father in the Incarnation and, as it were, in preludes to the Incarnation in the theophanies of the Old Testament, manifested the Father.

I. The Father as Principle and the Son as Proceeding

To the profession of generation and procession pertains the fact that they say the Father is superior to the Son, namely, according to the personal relation (*ἀξίωμα*); or that they teach the Son is derived from the Father as from His fullness, insofar as the Father is the principle and source of the Trinity.

1. The Father as "God of All" and the Son as "Another God"

Sometimes the Father is proclaimed by them as "the God of all," and the Son is numbered "in the second place" and the Holy Spirit "in the third," and further, besides the "God of all," the Son is called "another God." Thus Justin says: "I will strive to persuade you (Jews) that there is another, called God and Lord,

under the Creator of all, who is also called an Angel because He announces to men whatever the Creator of all, above whom there is no other God, wishes to announce to them… Referring to the Scriptures, I will try to persuade you that this very one who is said to have appeared to Abraham, Jacob, and Moses, and is taught in Scripture to be God, is another from the God who created all things, another, I say, in number, not in mind (*ἀριθμῷ λέγω, οὐχὶ γνώμῃ*)" (Justin, *Dialogue with Trypho*, n. 56). "We are not atheists, who worship the Maker of this universe… But our duty is to know Jesus Christ, the Son of God and the true teacher of these things, holding Him in the second place and the prophetic Spirit in the third order, and we will demonstrate that we worship reasonably" (1) (Justin, *First Apology*, n. 13).

(1) *Πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος Θεοῦ ἀσθῶμεν καὶ ἐν δευτέρᾳ χώρᾳ ἔχοντες, τὸν προφητικόν Πνεῦμα ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει, μετὰ λόγου ποιήσειν, ἀποδείξομεν.*

(2) For our purpose, we neither need nor intend to defend the entirety of Origen's doctrine on the Trinity; meanwhile, what is commonly raised as a serious prejudice against his orthodoxy from *Against Celsus*, Book V, n. 50, where he calls the Son "another God" (*δεύτερον Θεόν*), if nothing else stood in the way, could easily be explained from what has been said. "We believe the Wisdom of God to be the Son… And if we call Him another God, let them know that by another God we do not mean something different from the Power encompassing all powers and the Word (or Reason, *Λόγος*) containing in Himself whatever reason exists in those created according to nature and most excellently."

It would already be incredible in itself that Justin did not understand what is evident in all the Scriptures: that there is one true God who created all things and who manifested Himself to the patriarchs and Moses, and that he sought to persuade the Jew Trypho that there are two gods, one the Creator of all, another distinct in deity who revealed Himself in the Old Testament as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Moreover, Justin explicitly establishes this foundation of the unity of God: "There never will be another God, O Trypho, nor has there been another from eternity except Him who created and ordered this universe. Nor do we think there is one God for us and another for you, but the very same one who led your fathers out of the land of Egypt… Nor do we hope in any other, for there is no other, but in Him in whom you also hope, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob" (*Dialogue with Trypho*, n. 11). Therefore, Justin affirms three things as most certain in the Christian faith: first, that there is only one God who created all things and who, as the same God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, manifested Himself to the patriarchs and Moses; second, that the Father who created all things through His Word is one, and the Son sent to manifest to the patriarchs is another; whence, third, the Father and the Son are one true God, the Creator of all and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

Given these premises, the partitive "another" (*alius*), when the Son is called "another God," cannot be understood as a distinction of one deity from another, but must necessarily be understood as a distinction of person, so that the Father is one and the Son another, yet they are one God. Hence, the phrase "under the God who created all things" and the numbering "in the second place" and "in the third order" can indicate only a subordination of persons by reason of principle and proceeding from the principle, not of nature (*Tractatus de Incarnatione*, Thesis IX, n. 11). See also Tertullian, *Against Praxeas*, ch. 3.

In the same sense, the name "God above all" is sometimes used hypostatically to designate the Father insofar as He is the principle of the Son and, with the Son, the principle of the Holy Spirit, and we see this done not only by those ancient Fathers but also after the Council of Nicaea by those who more insistently

defended the one nature of the three, such as Athanasius (*Apology to Constantine*, n. 17), Basil (*Letter 38*, n. 4), and Gregory of Nyssa (*Against Apollinarius*, n. 77, Gallandius, vol. VI, p. 578). Basil, in the cited passage, describes the personal characteristics thus: "The Son proceeds from the Father alone as the only-begotten (*μόνος μονογενής*); the Holy Spirit depends on the Son (by procession, *τοῦ Υἱοῦ μέν ἠρτηται*), with whom He is inseparably conceived, and has subsistence depending on the Father as principle (*τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς αἰτίας ἠρτημένον ἔχει τὸ εἶναι*); but He who is God above all has the unique characteristic of His hypostasis, that He is Father and subsists from no principle" (1) (Basil, *Works*, vol. III, p. 117; cf. *Tractatus de Incarnatione*, Thesis IX, n. 11).

(1) *Ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸς ἔξαιρετόν τι γνώρισμα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὑποστάσεως ἔχει τὸ Πατὴρ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐκ μηδεμιᾶς αἰτίας ὑφεστάναι.*

The distinction of Origen (*Commentary on John*, Book II, nn. 2–3, *Works*, vol. IV, pp. 50–51) could, in itself, be reduced to the same sense: "The Father, he says, is called God with the article (*ὁ Θεός*), but the Word, which was with God and was God, is called without the article (*Θεός*), and this is to signify that the Father is God without principle (*αὐτοθεός*), from whom He proceeds, while the Son is understood in His personal property as He who has divinity communicated from the Father." He explains this distinction between *ὁ Θεός* and *Θεός* with another example. The Word is called *ὁ Λόγος* with the article, but reason in creatures is *λόγος* without the article, because the Word (*ὁ Λόγος*) is the exemplar and source of all reason in creatures, which is *λόγος* as a kind of participation in Him who is *ὁ Λόγος*, the absolutely perfect reason. "Both, therefore, hold the place of a source: the Father of divinity (insofar as it is communicated to the Son), the Son of reason (participated in creatures)." The comparison is not between the communication of divinity from the Father and of created reason from the Word in terms of mode, as if it were the same in both, but the comparison is only analogous. Origen opposes this doctrine—that the deity in the Father is not communicated from another and thus the Father is called *ὁ Θεός* and *αὐτοθεός*, while in the Son the deity is communicated from the Father through generation and thus He is called *Θεός*—to a twofold or threefold error: first, generally, of those who, proclaiming the Father and the Son as God, think two gods are introduced; then, of those who, to avoid this error of ditheism, either deny the personal distinction of the Son from the Father or, granting the distinction, deny the Son's divinity. "From this," he says, "can now be resolved what disturbs many who, wishing to be lovers of God, fear lest two gods be proclaimed, and thus fall into false and impious dogmas, either by denying the property of the Son as distinct from the property of the Father, confessing as God one whom they call Son only in name (since they do not believe Him to be really distinct from the Father); or by denying the divinity of the Son, granting His property and substance according to circumscription, as distinct from the Father" (1) (*Commentary on John*, loc. cit.).

(1) *Ὁμολογοῦντες τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν ὑφισταμένην ἑτέραν τοῦ Πατρός.* Here, *οὐσία κατὰ περιγραφήν* is the very definition of hypostasis, which is substance or essence defined, as it were, by a hypostatic property, under which aspect it is no longer common to several but incommunicable, and in this sense, in divine things, "an individual substance of a rational nature." So also St. Basil says of hypostasis, where "not the commonality of nature but the circumscription of a thing according to its property is considered" (*πραγματός τινος περιγραφὴ κατὰ τὸ ἰδιάζον*, Basil, *Letter 36* [alias 43], n. 2; cf. *Tractatus de Incarnatione*; Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book IV, ch. 7).

Likewise, it pertains not to a distinction of nature but to indicating the generation of the Son from the Father, and simultaneously to declaring the dominion of the incarnate Son according to His humanity, that not only before the Council of Nicaea, as in Tertullian (*Against Praxeas*, ch. 13), but also later Fathers, from the biblical manner of speaking itself (cf. 1 Cor 8:6; 12:4–6; Eph 4:5–6, etc.), note that in enumeration, the Father is called God, but the Son is called Lord, with a hypostatic signification of these names, although in their absolute signification, the Son is the same God as the Father, and the Father is the same Lord as the Son. "The doctrine of piety is that we know one unbegotten God, the Father, and one begotten Lord, the Son, who is indeed called God when mentioned by Himself and separately, but Lord when named with the Father; the former on account of nature (because of one deity), the latter on account of the unity of principle (*διὰ τὴν μοναρχίαν*)" (Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oration 25* [alias 23], n. 15; cf. Hilary, *On the Trinity*, Book VIII, nn. 35–37; Basil, *Letter 8* [alias 141], n. 3; Chrysostom, *Homily 20 on 1 Corinthians*, n. 3; *On the Incomprehensible*, Homily 5, n. 2; Theodoret, *On 1 Corinthians 8:6*).

2. The Father as "Whole Substance" and the Son as "Derivation"

Another mode of speaking, pertaining to the notion of principle and proceeding from the principle, requires explanation when they use words which, taken by themselves, could signify a division of the divine nature or a communication of a nature not the same as the Father's but another, inferior one. Tertullian calls the Father "the whole substance" and the Son "a derivation of the whole and a portion," and says that the Son, compared to the Father, is "in measure another from another" (*Against Praxeas*, ch. 9). But both the immediate context of this passage and the entire doctrine defended by Tertullian in the whole book *Against Praxeas* and elsewhere—concerning one substance and deity in three substantial persons distinguished only by relations of origin—is so clear that he could not have called the Father "the whole substance" compared to the Son except by reason of principle, nor could he have understood the Son as "a derivation of the whole" in any other sense than that the "whole," namely, the same deity as the Father's, is derived into the Son through generation; or that he said "derivation of the whole" as a derivation from the whole, by which name of the whole the Father must be understood as the primordial principle (*ἀρχὴ πρωτοαρχική*) and source of the Trinity. The term "portion" is an apposite synonym, signifying the same as "derivation of the whole"; for "portion" is the same as a partition, not signifying division but only communication for the perfection of the thing in question (1). Tertullian himself elsewhere (*Against Marcion*, Book III, ch. 6) explains this sense, that the Father is the fullness, and the Son a portion insofar as He is "a sharer in the fullness." Nor does it pose any difficulty that in *Against Praxeas*, ch. 9, he supports this notion of "the whole and the portion" with the words of Christ: "The Father is greater than I" (John 14:28). For many Fathers, even after the Council of Nicaea and in disputations against the Arians, interpreted this saying of Christ as referring to the Son considered according to His divinity, that the Father is said to be greater than the Son not by reason of nature, which those Doctors by their interpretation aimed to defend as one in the Father and the Son, but by reason of origin and according to the dignity (*ἀξίωμα*) of paternity, that the Father is the principle of the Son (see Fathers in Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book II, ch. 2, nn. 1–9). With this interpretation of Christ's words accepted, Tertullian could rightly appeal to them not only to demonstrate, for his principal purpose, the reality of the distinction of the Father and the Son, but also to derive his particular mode of speaking. He himself declares in the cited passage in what sense the Father is said to be greater than the Son: "While one is He who begets, another is He who is begotten; while one is He who sends, another is He who is sent; while one is He who acts, another is He through whom it is done." In a parallel expression, he describes the relation of origin between the Son and the Holy Spirit, calling the Son "the supreme mass"

and the Holy Spirit "a portion" (*Against Marcion*, Book IV, ch. 18). When he then says the Son is "in measure another from the Father," by the term "measure" (*modulus*), he signifies nothing other than the mode of subsisting or the formal reason of the Son, by which the Son, begotten, is another from the Father, begetting. Just as he here calls the formal personal reason "measure" and, insofar as it is considered in the Son, in ch. 14 calls it "the measure of derivation," so earlier in ch. 2 he had said that the Father, Son, and Spirit are three in degree, form, and species, but of one substance, one state, and one power, "because there is one God, from whom these degrees, forms, and species are reckoned under the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit."

We saw a similar manner of speaking above (p. 154) in St. Hippolytus, who, in the context where he most strongly confesses that the Father and the Son are one God and one essential power, to declare the distinction of persons and the notion of principle and proceeding from the principle, calls the Father "the whole" and the Word "the Power from the whole."

3. Clement of Alexandria on the Son's Nature as "Most Near"

To this we will refer the statement of Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata*, Book VII, p. 702, Paris ed. 1641), where it is said that "the nature of the Son is most near (or most closely joined) to the Almighty" (*ἡ τοῦ Υἱοῦ φύσις ἡ τῷ μόνῳ παντοκράτορι προσδεδεμένη*). First, in this very context, the Son of God is described with attributes proper to the one true God. After the cited words, Clement continues, saying that this nature of the Son is the highest excellence (*ἡ μεγίστη ὑπεροχή*), which, with indefatigable and inexhaustible power, operates all things and searches hidden thoughts. "The Son of God is not divided, not separated (from the Father), not passing from place to place, existing everywhere, circumscribed nowhere, wholly mind, wholly paternal light, wholly eye, seeing all, hearing all, knowing all, searching powers with His power," etc. Moreover, throughout his writings, Clement celebrates the one, non-multipliable deity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. "God is the cause of all; therefore, nothing is hated by God, nor by the Word, for both are one, namely God (*ἓν γὰρ ἀμφώ, Θεός*); for He said, 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God (*ἐν τῷ Θεῷ*), and the Word was God… God is both good and just… But there is one God, above the one and above the monad itself. Therefore, the particle 'You' (in the words: 'You, Father, in Me, and I in You,' John 17:21), with demonstrative emphasis, designates God, who alone essentially is, was, and will be' (see *Tractatus de Deo*, Thesis XXII, n. 11)… For He who places these on the right and those on the left (good and just), insofar as the Father is conceived as existing good, is called good alone, that which He is (Matt 19:17); but insofar as the Son, existing as His Word, is in the Father, He is called just, from their relation to one another" (*Paedagogus*, Book I, ch. 8). Thus, God is one and above unity, to which any addition of another unity is intrinsically repugnant (*Tractatus de Deo*, loc. cit.), and the same one God is the Father and the Son, who are distinguished from one another not by deity, as it is one, but by their relation; hence, while goodness is appropriated to the Father and judicial justice to the Son, He who is called good and just is the same one God. See also the doxology drawn from ecclesiastical usage at the end of Book III of Clement's *Paedagogus*: "Be gracious to Your little children, O Son and Father, both one, Lord!" and the praise and thanksgiving expected to be offered in heaven "to the only Father and Son, Son and Father with the Holy Spirit, through all to the one (*πάντα ἑνί*), through all to the good, beautiful, wise, just, to whom be glory both now and forever, Amen."

Given this doctrine, it is clear that in the statement "the nature of the Son is most near to the Almighty," there cannot be a comparison between the nature of the Father and the Son considered absolutely, but it must necessarily be understood as referring to the relation of person to person. Therefore, "the nature of the Son" is understood as the nature formally identified with the Son, so that "the nature of the Son" means the same as the Son or the person of the Son (see *Tractatus de Incarnatione*, Thesis XXXV; cf. Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book IV, chs. 3–4). In this hypostatic signification, "the nature of the Son most near (most closely joined, *προσδεδεμένη*) to the Almighty (Father)" can rightly be said for two reasons:

a) **In Comparison to Creatures (Ad Extra)**: The nature of the Son is most near to the Father in comparison to creatures, because the Son is the consubstantial image of the Father by generation, the splendor of His glory (*ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης*), and the figure of His substance (*χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως*, Heb 1:3); creatures, angels, and humans are images of the Image through creation. The Fathers frequently speak thus (Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book VI, ch. 5), and Clement himself says (*Protrepticus*, p. 62): "The image of God is His Word, and the genuine Son of the mind, the archetypal light of light; but the image of the Word is man." This is the proper sense in which Clement calls the Son the nature most near to the Father; for he compares men, angels, and the Son in terms of nearness to the Father: "On earth, the most excellent is man, of the greatest piety toward God; in heaven, the most excellent is the angel, who is closer in place and already participates more purely in eternal and blessed life." Then he proceeds from creatures to Him who is above heaven and earth, and thus above all creatures: "For the most perfect, most holy, most principal, commanding, royal, and beneficent nature is that of the Son, which is most near to the only Almighty."

b) **In Comparison Within the Trinity (Ad Intra)**: Also, in terms of the origin of the persons, since the Son proceeds from the Father alone, while the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son or from the Father through the Son, the Son can be said to be "most near" (*προσδεδεμένη*) to the Father compared to the Holy Spirit. Thus St. Gregory of Nyssa says: "Confessing the indifference of nature, we do not deny the difference by reason of principle and that which is from the principle, in which alone we understand one to be distinguished from another, because we believe one to be the principle, another from the principle. And in this being from the principle, we again understand another difference: for one (the Son) is immediately from the first, another (the Holy Spirit) is through the immediate from the first (*τὸ μὲν γὰρ προσχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου, τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ προσχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου*), so that the notion of the only-begotten (*τὸ μονογενές*, that is, alone from the Father alone) remains indubitable in the Son, and it is not doubted that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the mediation of the Son (*καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς εἶναι τὸ Πνεῦμα μὴ ἀμφιβάλλειν τῆς τοῦ Υἱοῦ μεσιτείας*), which order of mediation (of the Son between the Father and the Holy Spirit) preserves both the notion of the only-begotten for the Son and does not separate the Holy Spirit from His natural relation to the Father" (Gregory of Nyssa, *That There Are Not Three Gods to Ablabius*, *Works*, vol. II, p. 459; cf. Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book VII, ch. 11).

II. The Voluntary Generation of the Son

Further to be examined here is the doctrine, which recurs not only among the earlier Fathers (e.g., Hippolytus, *Against Noetus*, n. 15) but also frequently in disputations against the Arians. The Fathers concede this proposition: the Father begot the Son by His will. Many of them were led to address this question of voluntary generation by the perpetual sophism of their adversaries. The Arians asked whether the Father begot the Son willingly or unwillingly. If the Catholics affirmed the latter, the Arians claimed it

followed that the Father begot the Son under compulsion or unwillingly, or that the generation is not as befits a spirit but by a mode of natural procession, as in bodies lacking knowledge and will, both of which are repugnant in God. If the former were conceded, that the Son is begotten by the Father's will, they inferred that the Son was made when He was not before and is not consubstantial with the Father.

The Fathers respond differently depending on their purpose; sometimes they concede in one sense, sometimes deny in another, that the Son is begotten by the Father's will. To exclude the absurd calumny that the Son was begotten by an unwilling Father or by a mode of brute nature, they say the Son is indeed begotten by will, where will does not signify the free efficient will the Arians had in mind, but a natural concomitant will, that is, by the very nature of an infinite spirit, the generation of the Word is indeed through the intellect and with the will of the Father; just as God is God by will, not that the will is the efficient cause of God, but that God, existing from His internal perfection, wills to be God and is not God unwillingly (1). "When the Son is said to be, as other things, by will…"

(1) "When something is said to be or to be done by will, it can be understood in two ways. In one way, the ablative designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man by my will, because I will to be a man. In this way, it can be said that the Father begot the Son by will, just as He is God by will, because He wills Himself to be God and wills to beget the Son. In another way, the ablative implies the relation of a principle… and in this sense, God the Father did not beget the Son by will, but by will He produced creatures" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 41, a. 2). This is not entirely approved by Petavius: "Why they call that will concomitant, I do not understand," he says (*De Trinitate*, Book VI, ch. 8, nn. 17, 20). For he thinks the will by which God wills to be God should be called consequent; but the will by which He wills to beget the Son

would be taught to subsist, lest He have His essence not only according to will but also according to nature; it seemed to offer the heretics an opportunity to claim (that is, to falsely allege from the Catholic position) that a necessity of begetting the Son from Himself was ascribed to God the Father, as if, compelled by a law of nature, He had brought forth the Son unwillingly. But there is no such condition of these passions in God the Father. Before all time, the Father, willing impassibly from the essence of His nature, gave to the Son the essence of natural nativity (or, according to another reading, the nativity of the essence). (St. Hilary, *On the Synods*, n. 69). "Is it because the Son is from nature and not from will that He exists contrary to the will of the Father or with the Father unwilling? By no means; rather, the Father wills the Son… For just as He did not begin to be good by will, yet is good not against His intention and will—for He wills to be what He is… so too, since the Son is proper to His nature, He is not apart from His will. Let the Son, therefore, be willed and loved by the Father, and let one piously consider that God wills and does not will." (St. Athanasius, *Against the Arians*, Oration III, n. 66).

In a direct attack on the Arian dogma, which claimed that the Son was made or begotten by the free will of the Father, the holy Doctors deny that the Son was begotten by the Father's will. Yet it does not follow from this that the Father begot the Son unwillingly; for what proceeds from the internal exigency and necessity of a perfect spiritual nature is neither from a free choice of will nor against the will, but from the principle of an intelligent and willing nature, that is, with a concomitant will. "Therefore, I would say neither unwilling nor willing… For just as the Father is good neither by will nor by necessity (unwillingly and coerced) but above both, that is, by nature; so too the Father does not beget by will or necessity." (St.

Ambrose, *On the Faith*, Book IV, ch. 9, n. 103). See also St. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Book XV, ch. 20, n. 38.

[Franzelin's Commentary:] But the most learned man [Petavius] could have noted that here the order of will is not considered, as being antecedent or consequent or concomitant with respect to some term, but the question is whether the ablative "the Father begets by will" is an ablative of efficiency, as the Arians wished, or only an ablative of concomitance. When a concomitant will is distinguished from an efficient or productive will, the order of prior or posterior is not considered, but the existence of volition is affirmed, and the role of cause or principle in that same will is denied; and thus, in this sense, it can be called a concomitant will, which, with respect to order, might be antecedent or consequent.

It must also be rightly understood that the Fathers frequently respond to the Arians, defending the equality of the Son with the Father, in this manner: If the Son is less than the Father, they say, either the Father could not beget an equal to Himself, and thus is not omnipotent, or He would not, and thus is not good but envious (Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine). This presupposes the true notion of the Son and true generation through the communication of nature; hence, the omnipotence and goodness, from which they deduce the fullness of the communicated nature, cannot be understood as efficient, as in the order toward creatures, but must be understood as the intimate perfection of fecundity and communicability of nature, insofar as it is identified with the Father. When the Arians said that the Son was made by the omnipotence and goodness of God, the Fathers redirected omnipotence and goodness as befits not efficient causation but generation; in this sense, paternal omnipotence and goodness, formally as paternal and hypostatic, is the power of fecundity and the goodness of communication of nature by which the Son is begotten. Therefore, the statement, "If the Father could not or would not beget a Son equal to Himself, He is neither omnipotent nor good," is reduced to this alternative: If He could not or would not, there is not in the Father the supreme perfection of the communicability of nature. It is clear, however, that such arguments are not brought by the Fathers to demonstrate the fact of the matter, whether it is so; but, presupposing the revelation of the truth, they are proposed as arguments *ad hominem* or for some clarification of how it is so.

III. The Father Creates and Operates Through the Word

Another head of doctrine, in which we said that sometimes ambiguous and obscure expressions of the ancient Fathers occur, is that the Father creates and operates through the Word. Although external operation in God is really nothing other than the divine essence itself with a relation and connotation of an external term, and by this very fact the operation of the three persons is one without distinction, just as the divine essence is one and indistinct; nevertheless, the essence, and consequently the operation, is communicated from the Father to the Son, and from the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit, in which the communication of nature, as it were, comes to rest and is completed, and no further procession is given beyond that of the Word through the intellect and the Holy Spirit through the will or through love. This order of communication and relations is expressed in the biblical and ecclesiastical manner of speaking, by which it is said that the Father operates through the Son in the Holy Spirit. If, however, the relation of the persons is not considered but the nature, the expression "God made all things through the Word and the Holy Spirit" is convertible with the other: "God made all things through Himself." (See Irenaeus, above, p. 152).

1. This same relation of the Son's origin from the Father is expressed when not only the pre-Nicene Fathers but also very frequently those following call the Son the minister of the Father in the creation of the world and in external operations. Petavius notes among the sayings of the ancients that seem to depart from the rule of faith that Irenaeus (Book IV, ch. 17, or ch. 7, n. 4; Book III, ch. 8, n. 3) said that the Son ministers to the Father (Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book I, ch. 3, n. 7). In this manner also speak Theophilus of Antioch (*To Autolycus*, Book II, n. 10), Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata*, Book VII, p. 703), and others.

But Irenaeus himself, in the cited passage, declares that the ministry of the Word and the Holy Spirit, to whom all angels are subject, is entirely different from the ministry of a creature: "God does not need the ministry (of angels) for the making of what has been made, but He has an abundant and indescribable ministry. For His offspring and His formation, that is, the Son and the Holy Spirit, the Word and Wisdom, minister to Him in all things, to whom all angels serve and are subject." In the same sense, we heard Irenaeus (p. 151) teaching that God did not need ministering angels for creation: for He has His hands, the Word and Wisdom (the Holy Spirit), and thus not through created ministers but through Himself, that is, through the Word and Wisdom, He made all things.

The Fathers after the Council of Nicaea, disputing against the Arians themselves, speak no differently. Thus St. Basil: "The Word is that which was in the beginning with God and was God, and the Spirit of the mouth of God is the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father. Thus you understand three: the commanding Lord, the creating Word, and the confirming Spirit." He declares that this does not exclude but rather includes the unity of action in the three persons: "Let no one think that I posit three original (*ἀρχικάς*, i.e., not proceeding from another as from a principle) hypostases, or that the operation of the Son is imperfect. For the principle of all things is one, creating through the Son and perfecting in the Spirit." Finally, the holy Doctor explains the manner in which, just as there is one nature, so there must be understood one operation of the three, and he shows the reason, in the internal relations themselves, why the Father is distinguished as commanding and the Son as ministering: "The Word, he says, full of the Father's goods, shining forth from the Father (*τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀπολάμψας*), does all things in the likeness of Him who begot Him. For His essence does not differ from the Father, nor does His power differ. And where the power is equal, the operation is also entirely equal; for Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God. And so all things were made through Him, and all things were created through Him and for Him, not that He fulfills an instrumental and servile ministry, but that as Creator (*δημιουργικῶς*) He accomplishes the paternal will… Therefore, what is called a command should not be understood as an imperious word uttered through vocal organs, prescribing to the Son as a subject what He must do; but, as befits God, let us think of a communication of will, like the irradiation of a certain form in a mirror, eternally flowing from the Father to the Son." (1) (Basil, *On the Holy Spirit*, nn. 19, 20, 38).

(1) *Ἀλλὰ θεοπρεπῶς νοοῦμεν θελήσεως οἷον τινὸς μορφῆς ἔκλαμψιν ἐν κατόπτρῳ, ἐκ Πατρὸς εἰς Υἱὸν ἀϊδίως ἀπορρέουσαν.*

The Fathers of the Council of Antioch against Paul of Samosata express this excellently and in the same sense: "We believe that the Son, who is always with the Father, fulfilled the paternal will in the creation of the universe. For He (the Father) spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created. But He who commands, commands another, whom we are persuaded is none other than the only-begotten Son of God, God… who truly is and operates, as the Word and God, through whom the Father makes all

things, not as through an instrument nor as through a knowledge not subsisting by itself. The Father begot the Son as a living act and subsisting by Himself, operating all things in all things (*γεννήσαντος μὲν τοῦ Πατρὸς τὸν Υἱὸν ὡς ζῶσαν ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἐνυπόστατον, ἐνεργοῦντα τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν*)." (Mansi, *Concilia*, Vol. I, p. 1035). So also Athenagoras (*Legation*, n. 10) says that the Son came forth to be the idea and act (*ἰδέα καὶ ἐνέργεια*) of all created things. And Augustine frequently calls the Son Himself "the command not given in time, but the command born"; "for the command of the Father that all things be made, he says, is none other than the Word, through which all things were made." (Augustine, *Sermon 120*, n. 6; *Against the Arian Sermon*, ch. 3; *On the Trinity*, Book I, ch. 12, n. 4, n. 26; *Against Faustus*, Book II, ch. 5; *On John*, Tractate XXI).

2. A certain singular manner of speaking by those ancient Fathers concerning the generation of the Son in relation to the work of creation requires somewhat more careful consideration. For they seem to say that the Word was brought forth or begotten by God the Father for the creation of the world, and this in such a way that this generation of the Word seems to have been free to the Father, and the coeternity of the Word with the Father is not sufficiently understood. Thus speaks Theophilus of Antioch: "Nothing is coeternal with God, but since He is His own place, needs nothing, and is older than the ages, He willed to make man to whom He might be known… Therefore, having His own Word implanted in His own bowels (*τὸν ἑαυτοῦ Λόγον ἐνδιάθετον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις σπλάγχνοις*), He begot it with His own Wisdom, (1) bringing it forth before this universe. This Word He had as the minister of His works, and through it He created all things… There were not yet prophets when the world was created, but the Wisdom of God was in Him and His holy Word, which is always with Him." (*To Autolycus*, Book II, n. 10). A little later, he speaks more clearly, calling it "the Word of God, which is also His Son, not as the poets imagine the sons of the gods, but as the truth declares, the Word always existing, implanted in the heart of God (*τὸν Λόγον τὸν ἀεὶ διαπαντὸς ἐνδιάθετον ἐν καρδίᾳ Θεοῦ*). For before anything was made, He had this Word as a counselor of His counsels (*σύμβουλον*), as it is His mind and intelligence. But when God willed to make what He had determined, He begot this Word as uttered (*προφορικόν*), the firstborn of all creation, not that He became empty of the Word, but begetting the Word and always conversing with His Word (in Himself). The holy Scriptures teach us this, and all those inspired by the Holy Spirit, among whom John says: *In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God.* With these words, he shows that in the beginning there was only God and in Him the Word. Then he adds: *and the Word was God, all things were made through Him.* Therefore, since the Word is God and begotten from God, the Father of all, when it seemed good to Him, sends it into some place, etc." (ibid., n. 22). The same doctrine, and generally with almost the same formulas of expression, is proposed by other Fathers: Justin (*Dialogue with Trypho*, n. 61), Tatian (*Against the Greeks*, n. 5), Athenagoras (*Legation*, n. 10), Hippolytus (*Against Noetus*, n. 10), Tertullian (*Against Praxeas*, chs. 5–6), Novatian (ch. 31).

(1) Just as Irenaeus and some other Fathers (above, pp. 113, 151), so too Theophilus understands by the name Wisdom the Holy Spirit, the third hypostasis; cf. *To Autolycus*, Book I, n. 7; Book II, nn. 15, 18.

Evidently, in these passages, the Word is considered in two ways: a) in its internal relation to the Father, as described in the first two verses of John's Gospel; b) in its relation *ad extra*, that is, insofar as the Word is considered either as the idea and counsel of creation eternally communicated from the Father to the

Son, or as the manifestation and operation *ad extra* and mission from the Father in time, as exhibited in the third verse of the same Gospel.

In the first consideration, the eternity of the Word and the unity of essence with the Father are most clearly described; for it is the Word of which John says: *In the beginning was, and was God*, which is the mind and intelligence of the Father (*νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις*), and therefore necessarily always is the Word implanted in God the Father. Lest, however, it be considered as an absolute attribute of God, the distinction of the Word from Him whose Word it is, is no less clearly expressed. It is the Word which, as John testifies, *was with God*, which is the counselor or sharer of the Father's counsels, which is begotten from the Father by eternal generation; for it is said to be from eternity in the bowels, in the heart of the Father, in such a way that it is the Son of the Father, as John calls Him "the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father." Thus, the Word *ἐνδιάθετον* (implanted) in these Fathers is not an absolute attribute of wisdom, as the Sabellians and later also the Arians interpreted the *Λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* (Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book VI, ch. 3, n. 3; ch. 4, n. 2); but it is the hypostatic Word, the Son distinct from the Father. It is called *ἐνδιάθετον* in comparison to the *Λόγος προφορικός* (uttered Word), not that the Fathers, like the Arians, thought the uttered Word was different from the implanted Word; but the one and same Word, which considered in itself and in relation to the Father is the implanted Word, they called uttered insofar as it operates and is manifested *ad extra*. For in this second consideration, from the way they describe the Word in the heart of the Father and the Word uttered for divine works, it is manifestly clear that it is not one Word and another, but one Word presented under a different aspect. Indeed, they expressly state this unity of the Word: "The Father, who always had this Word implanted in His heart, when He willed, begot it as uttered."

Thus, the Fathers distinguish by the name of generation two very different things: the eternal generation, by which the Son is in Himself a person distinct from the Father, as a counselor in the bowels and heart of the Father, and then the manifestation of the Son *ad extra*, which is neither eternal nor necessary but free, and which, as a mission of the begotten, is called a generation *ad extra*. Hence, Theophilus does not say simply: "when He willed, He begot the Word," but: "He begot the Word as uttered (*προφορικόν*)," that is, what was eternally begotten as the implanted Word, now also became uttered or manifested *ad extra*. Most clearly, Hippolytus, in the cited passage, says that this generation *ad extra* is a showing forth of the Word, so that what was previously visible only to the Father might become knowable to creatures: "When He willed and as He willed, He showed forth His Word (*τὸν Λόγον αὐτοῦ ἔδειξε*), which made all things at appointed times with Him, as the leader, counselor, and effector of what was made, begetting the Word, which He had in Himself and which was invisible to the created world (i.e., to creatures not yet existing), He made visible, emitting a prior voice, and generating light from light, He sent forth the Lord to the creature; His own intellect, previously visible only to Himself, invisible to the created world, this He made visible, so that the world, seeing Him as He appeared, might be saved." (1)

(1) *Τῶν δὲ γενομένων ἡγεμόνα καὶ σύμβουλον καὶ ἐργάτην ἐγέννα Λόγον, ὃν Λόγον ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀόρατον τε ὄντα τῷ κτιζομένῳ κόσμῳ ὁρατὸν ἐποίησεν, φωνὴν πρῶτον ἐκφωνήσας, καὶ φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς γεννῶν, προῆκεν τῇ κτίσει Κύριον, τὸν ἴδιον νοῦν, πρὸ τούτου μόνῳ αὐτῷ ὁρατὸν ὄντα, τῷ δὲ γενομένῳ κόσμῳ ἀόρατον ὄντα, ὁρατὸν ἐποίησεν, ἵνα ὁ κόσμος ἰδὼν αὐτὸν φανέντα σωθῇ.*

No less clearly does Methodius define this notion of generation (*Banquet of the Virgins*, Oration VIII, n. 9; Gallandius, Vol. II, p. 719): "'You are My Son, today I have begotten You.' For it must be noted that

He pronounced Him His Son indefinitely and without determination of time: for He says to Him *You are*, not *You have become*… But as for what He adds, *today I have begotten You*, He means to Himself: I willed to beget in the heavens before the ages and to manifest to the world (*νενόηκα καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ γεννῆσαι*), that is, to make known what was previously unknown (*τοῦτο δὲ ἐστι τὸ πρότερον ἀγνοούμενον γνωρίσαι*)."

So also Tertullian (*Against Praxeas*, chs. 6–7) considers the Word first as eternally generated by God the Father *ad intra*, and thus calls it Reason; then as manifested *ad extra*, and thus names it Speech, both of which, he says, the Greeks comprehend under the name of the *Λόγος* (cf. Augustine, *Questions 83*, q. 63). To the eternal generation, he refers Proverbs 8:22–26: "Before He made anything, before the hills, I was brought forth"; to the generation *ad extra*, he applies the verses that follow (vv. 27ff.): "When He prepared the heavens, I was with Him, ordering all things," etc. Since he is refuting Praxeas, who admitted the Reason or Wisdom as implanted only as an absolute wisdom, and acknowledged the uttered Word only as a transient and vocal word, Tertullian contends that the very Reason of the Father or the implanted Word, begotten in the mind of the Father from eternity, becomes in time the uttered Word or Speech. Further, he calls this generation of the Speech *ad extra* a perfect nativity, not indeed in comparison with the generation *ad intra*, as if he thought the latter imperfect; but with respect to the nativity formally as Speech, that is, as the Word manifested *ad extra*, in which same sense Theophilus speaks of the generation of the Word, formally as uttered. Thus, Tertullian calls this nativity of the Speech perfect, insofar as, in opposition to the transient and vocal Word of the Praxeans, it is the manifestation of a substantial and personal Word: "When God first willed to bring forth into substances and their own species those things which He had arranged within Himself with the Reason and Speech of Wisdom, He first brought forth the Speech itself, so that through it all things might be made, through which they were thought and arranged, indeed already made, as far as in the mind of God… This is the perfect nativity of the Speech, as it proceeds from God, constituted (begotten) by Him first for thought under the name of Wisdom: *The Lord constituted me the beginning of His ways*; then generated (*ad extra*, formally as Speech or as the uttered Word) for effect: *When He prepared the heaven, I was with Him.*" (*Against Praxeas*, ch. 7). (1)

(1) If all the passages of Tertullian and other ancient Fathers are compared, they speak of the generation of the Son in four ways: 1) fundamentally, as Wisdom is always in the heart of the Father as a person distinct from the Father, whose it is and from whom it is; 2) as the Father, as Tertullian says (*Against Praxeas*, ch. 5; *Against Hermogenes*, ch. 18), thinks, plans, and arranges within Himself with His Reason or Wisdom all things to be created; 3) as He brings forth and manifests the Word or Speech *ad extra* in creation; 4) as the incarnate Word is manifested and becomes visible and tangible in His human nature. The latter three modes presuppose the person of the Word as constituted and speak only of the order and relation to an external term. Hence, it is further clear that in that frequent saying of the Fathers, by which the Father is said to have begotten the Son willingly, voluntarily, by will, the will, which we showed above cannot be understood in the generation *ad intra* except as a natural and concomitant will, in the generation *ad extra*, that is, in the manifestation of the Word, is indeed a free will.

Nor are there lacking among the Fathers after the Council of Nicaea those who in the same way distinguish the generation *ad intra* from eternity and the generation *ad extra* in time. Thus, Gregory, who is thought to be of Elvira (*Among the Works of Gregory of Nazianzus*, Oration 49, n. 5): "The Son is from no other source than the Father, because He is always with the Father; and therefore He is called the

Wisdom of God, so that the Father is never believed to be without Wisdom, that is, without His Son. This is that ineffable Wisdom, which at the beginning of God's ways in Solomon (Proverbs 8:22) is described as constituted or begotten or created; yet He says it is constituted in such a way that He shows it was always with God… For God did not constitute His Wisdom as if He were ever without Wisdom; but when He says the beginning of His ways, He shows the beginning of the motion of some work, so that this beginning is of the Wisdom of God, which proceeded from God to create all things, both heavenly and earthly, not in the sense that (perhaps: in the way that) it began to be. Thus, Wisdom was created, indeed begotten, not for itself, because it always was, but for those things that were to be made by it." Zeno of Verona has almost the same in Book II, Tractates IV and V (see Ballerini in *Works of St. Zeno*, Dissertation II, ch. 1).

IV. Visible Appearances of the Word and Manifestation of the Father Through the Son

The final mode of conceiving and speaking, which we said among the pre-Nicene Fathers requires explanation, pertains to the visible appearances of the Word and the manifestation of the Father through the Son. For they seem to have thought that God the Father, by reason of His eminence and immensity, can never appear in Himself, but the Son can appear, and in these appearances is, as it were, circumscribed in place; and thus the Father is invisible by His nature, but the Son either is or can become visible, and so through the Son, in His person and through His person made visible, the invisible Father is manifested to men. From this doctrine, Petavius and now again some recent scholars conclude that those ancient Doctors thought the Son was inferior to the Father in nature, or at least did not yet understand the unity of nature in distinct persons.

The sum of the doctrine is the same in Justin (*First Apology*, n. 63; *Dialogue with Trypho*, nn. 60, 127), Irenaeus (*Against Heresies*, Book IV, ch. 6, nn. 3, 6–7; ch. 20, nn. 4, 5, 11), Theophilus of Antioch (*To Autolycus*, Book II, n. 22), Clement of Alexandria (*Paedagogus*, Book I, ch. 7, pp. 110–111; *Stromata*, Book IV, p. 537; Book V, p. 562; Book VI, pp. 643–644; Book VII, p. 733; Paris ed. 1641), Tertullian (*Against Praxeas*, chs. 14–16), Novatian (*On the Trinity*, chs. 25–26).

1. Now, none of them says that the Son is or can become visible in His own divine nature, as if this were of a lesser order, or that the Son, according to His divine nature, is not equally immense and present everywhere as the Father. They only teach that the Son can become and has become visible, especially in the human nature assumed, by which God the Son is also true man, and also in the Old Testament "through a subject creature," that is, in various visible signs demonstrating the presence of the Son as a person sent by the Father and thus a distinct person.

Irenaeus explains these manifestations of the Word many times and often: "The Word indeed spoke to Moses, appearing in his sight, as if someone were speaking to his friend. But Moses desired to see clearly Him who was speaking with him, and it was said to him: *For no man sees My face and lives*; both signifying that it is impossible (or powerless) for man to see God, and that through the Wisdom of God, in the last times, man will see Him in His coming according to man (i.e., the incarnate Word)… Therefore, the prophets did not see the very face of God manifestly, but the arrangements and mysteries through which man would begin to see God… Thus, if neither Moses saw God, nor Elijah, nor Ezekiel, what they saw were likenesses of the glory of the Lord and prophecies of things to come (the Incarnation); it is clear

that the Father is indeed invisible, as the Lord also said: *No one has ever seen God.* But His Word, as He Himself willed and for the benefit of those who saw, showed the glory of the Father and expounded His arrangements." (*Against Heresies*, Book IV, ch. 20, nn. 9ff.). The doctrine was announced to the Gentiles, "that the Word, naturally invisible, would become palpable and visible among men." (ibid., ch. 24, n. 2).

Likewise, Justin says that the Son of God is called Angel and Apostle because He is sent by the Father; and therefore, He who appeared in the Old Testament is certainly true God, yet not the Father but the Son, "who, since He is the Word, the firstborn of God, is also God, and previously appeared to Moses and the other prophets through the form of fire and through an incorporeal image (i.e., in various signs that were not a true physical body), but now in the times of your (Caesars') empire, He became man from a Virgin according to the will of the Father." (*First Apology*, n. 63; *Dialogue with Trypho*, n. 127).

Tertullian indeed presses against Praxeas that God is said to be invisible and yet God was seen by the patriarchs and prophets, to show from this the distinction of persons, the Father invisible and the Son who became visible. But he especially declares, "God was seen according to the capacity of men, not according to the fullness of His majesty"; then he concedes, "even the Son is invisible in His own name, insofar as He is the Word and Spirit of God by the condition of His substance"; yet he continues, "the Son was visible before the flesh, in the manner in which He says to Aaron and Miriam." This manner is such that to the patriarchs and prophets, and to Moses himself, before He spoke to him "face to face in appearance, that is, in truth," God, that is, the Son of God, was always seen "in a mirror and in an enigma and in vision and dream." Indeed, he thinks that even the vision of Moses face to face is more probably to be explained in nearly the same way, "because the Word and Spirit cannot be seen except in an imaginary form." But the Son, having become flesh, was then properly visible, though not in His divine nature but in His human nature: it is not the Father, but "another whom He was seen before in an enigma, the flesh made fully visible; namely, the Word, who also became flesh, another whom no one has ever seen (in His divine nature) except the Father, namely, whose Word He is." (*Against Praxeas*, chs. 14–15).

2. Hence, when those ancient Doctors seem to exclude immensity from the Son, who appears visible, and attribute circumscription to Him, as Theophilus (loc. cit.), Tertullian (ch. 16), and Novatian (loc. cit.); this circumscription could not have been understood by them according to the divine nature of the Son, but they primarily have in view the human nature, according to which the Son is certainly not everywhere, and while He was on earth, according to the same human nature, He was not in heaven; whence Christ and the Apostles speak of the descent from heaven, and most properly of the ascent into heaven. Furthermore, those ancient Fathers regarded the theophanies of the Old Testament as certain preludes to the Incarnation and to the appearance of God in the flesh; and therefore, both those phenomena of fire, cloud, human form, etc., and the actions of eating, moving from place to place, etc., in the theophanies, they regarded as shadows of the human nature to be assumed; indeed, they often interpreted the anthropomorphic expressions about God in the Old Testament as pre-significations of the future humanity. Therefore, according to this manner of consideration, they denied immensity and affirmed circumscription and local motion of the Son, not in Himself and His divine nature, but insofar as He appeared in those circumscribed phenomena and figures of the humanity to be assumed: "whom the Father

whom the Father willed to be born of a Virgin, who also at one time became fire to converse with Moses in the bush" (Justin, *Dialogue with Trypho*, n. 127). Likewise, Theophilus most clearly states that the Word, as the Wisdom and Power of the Father, always remains "implanted in the heart of God"; but insofar as it is *prolatitium* (προφορικόν, uttered), that is, manifested in visible signs, so it came into paradise and spoke to Adam, and is sent by the Father, when it seemed good, to some place. Tertullian explains this mode of conceiving theophanies most distinctly: "From the beginning, the Word was with God, and the Word was God, to whom all power in heaven and on earth was given by the Father… He always descended to human conversations, from Adam to the patriarchs and prophets, in vision, in dream, in a mirror, in an enigma; always preparing His order (of the Incarnation) from the beginning, which He was to fulfill in the end (in the fullness of time). Thus He was always learning (1); and it could be no other (no other person) than the Word, who was to become flesh, who conversed with men on earth. He was learning, however, to establish faith for us, so that we might more easily believe that the Son of God descended into the world, if we recognized that such a thing had been done before… Thus He also knew human affections even then, He who was to take up the very substances of man, flesh and soul, questioning Adam as if ignorant, *Where are you, Adam?* (Gen 3:9), repenting that He had made man, as if He did not foreknow, who was also to undergo human passions, thirst, hunger, tears, birth itself, and death itself, for this reason *made a little lower than the angels* by the Father (Heb 2:7)" (Tertullian, *Against Praxeas*, ch. 16).

(1) In the same sense, Irenaeus says (*Against Heresies*, Book IV, ch. 12, n. 4): "How is Christ the end of the law, if He was not also its beginning? For He who brought about the end also wrought the beginning, and He is the one who says to Moses: *I have seen the affliction of my people who are in Egypt, and I have come down to deliver them* (Exod 3:7–8); from the beginning, the Word of God was accustomed to ascend and descend for the salvation of those who were afflicted."

3. The reason for the comparison between the Son and the Father must be noted; for in this comparison lies the primary difficulty in finding the orthodox sense in those ancient Fathers. On the one hand, they teach that the Son appeared and administered the entire ancient economy as the God, Creator of the universe, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who names Himself *I am who I am* (Exod 3:14). On the other hand, they say that in the Old Testament, the Son was sent as the Angel of the Lord and as the revealer of the Father who sends Him; indeed, they seem to teach that the Father, by reason of His eminence and immensity, could not appear in Himself and in His own person (1). There are two difficulties here: first, they seem to consider an operation of the Son that is not the Father's, which would imply a dual nature; second, they seem expressly to hold that the Son's nature is inferior, while the Father's nature is more sublime and alone immense.

(1) Justin speaks more difficultly than others: "Do not think that the unbegotten God Himself descended or ascended from some place. For the ineffable Father and Lord of all neither comes to any place, nor walks, nor sleeps, nor rises (cf. Ps 44:23); but in His own place, whatever that may be (cf. Tertullian, *Against Praxeas*, chs. 5, 16), He remains, seeing keenly, hearing keenly, not with eyes or ears but with ineffable power, and He beholds all things and knows all things, and none of us escapes Him, nor is He moved, who cannot be contained by place or the whole world, since He was before the world was made. How, then, could He speak to anyone, or be seen by anyone, or appear in a small part of the earth? For indeed, the people at Sinai could not behold the glory of Him who was sent by Him… Therefore, neither

Abraham, nor Isaac, nor Jacob, nor any other man saw the Father and simply the Lord of all and of Christ Himself, but this one (Christ), who according to His will is both the Son, who is God, and an Angel, because He ministers to His counsel, whom He willed to become man from a Virgin, who also at one time became fire (καὶ πῦρ ποτὲ γενόμενος) to converse with Moses in the bush. For unless we understand the Scriptures thus, it would follow that the Father and Lord of all was not in heaven at the time when it was said through Moses: *And the Lord rained… from the Lord in heaven* (Gen 19:24); and again when it was said through David: *Lift up your gates… and the King of glory shall enter* (Ps 24:7); or when it says again: *The Lord said to my Lord, sit at my right hand* (Ps 110:1)" (Justin, *Dialogue with Trypho*, n. 127).

Compare fittingly Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata*, Book VII, pp. 702–704), where all the predicates that Justin attributes to the Father, Clement repeats of the Son: "The Son of God never departs from His watchtower, never separated or divided (from the Father), not passing from place to place, always present everywhere and nowhere circumscribed, wholly mind, wholly eye, seeing all, hearing all, knowing all." The attributes of the Son of God are the same in Clement as those of the Father in Justin; but unlike Justin regarding the Father, Clement does not deny the Son's appearance in time and place. For the Son, though invisible in Himself, was sent by the Father in an assumed visible creature; but the Father neither can be sent nor has assumed a visible creature. "This Son, by the will of the almighty Father, is the author of all good things, a power not perceptible to the senses. For He was not seen as He was by those unable to receive Him due to the weakness of the flesh; therefore, assuming sensible flesh, He came" (Clement, ibid.).

As to the first point, they do not posit a different operation but the operation and manifestation of the Father through the Son. The foundation, however, for why the Father did not appear in the Old Testament but the Son did and was incarnated to establish the New Testament, they present in the personal characteristics themselves: because the Father is the principle of the Son, the Son, as the perfect image, is from the Father as from a principle. Since the Son *ad intra* and in relation to the Father is the full manifestation of the Father as the consubstantial image of the Father, as the *splendor* (ἀπαύγασμα, radiance) of His glory and the *figure* (χαρακτήρ, express image) of His substance (Heb 1:3), therefore also every manifestation *ad extra* in relation to creatures is through the Son. But since the Son is consubstantial and one with the Father, the Son manifesting Himself in Himself also manifests the Father, as He Himself said: *He who sees Me sees the Father… I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me* (John 14:9–10). Irenaeus explains this: "The Father, indeed invisible and indeterminable as far as we are concerned, is known by His own Word; and though He is ineffable, He Himself narrates Him to us. Again, only the Father knows His own Word… And for this reason, the Son reveals the knowledge of the Father through His own manifestation. For the knowledge of the Father is the manifestation of the Son; for all things are manifested through the Word. Therefore, the Father revealed Himself to all by making His Word visible to all, and again the Word showed the Father and the Son to all; since He was seen by all… The invisible of the Son is the Father, the visible of the Father is the Son" (*Against Heresies*, Book IV, ch. 6, nn. 3–6). In the same sense, Clement of Alexandria says: "The face of God is the Word, through whom God is illuminated (to us as the object of knowledge) and is known" (*Paedagogus*, Book I, ch. 7, p. 110; *Stromata*, Book V, p. 562). More explicitly, Gregory of Nazianzus (*Oration 30* [al. 36], n. 20) among other names listed there, says the Son is called the Word "because He relates to the Father as a word to the mind… Perhaps someone might say that He relates (to the Father) as a definition to the defined (ὡς ὅρος πρὸς τὸ ὁριζόμενον); for a definition is also called a *λόγος*. For Christ says: *He who knows the Son*, which

means *he who sees the Son, knows the Father also*. And the Son is a concise and easy demonstration of the Father's nature. For every begotten thing is a silent definition (σιωπῶν λόγος) of the begetter."

As to the second point, when they say that the Father could not appear by reason of His immensity and eminence, those ancient Fathers were not concerned with the question of what kind of appearance or incarnation of God might be possible in another hypothetical order, but they solely have in view the appearances as they are described in the present order, or at least as they thought they were described in the holy Scriptures. Thus, the one who appears in the Old Testament is understood to be sent or, as they say, sent to some place. The mission of a divine person includes two things: a procession *ad intra* from another person as from a root, and a relation *ad extra* to some effect or a special relationship, such as in hypostatic union. Hence, they easily saw that the mission of the Son to some place does not hinder His divine nature and immensity. For just as the divinity and immensity are revealed, so also this mission is revealed, and therefore both are necessarily true. The generation of the Son from the Father and the personal relationship of the same Son to the circumscribed nature, by which He is man, and thus His mission in the New Testament, consist in revelation; but for the Old Testament, from the title *Angel of the Lord*, who is at the same time the Lord God, and from other indications, they deduced the personal relationship of the Son to those signs in the theophanies, by which the Son of God, who was to become man, prefigured His incarnation. Hence, the circumscription and local motion attributed to the Son are not understood by reason of His divine nature but by reason of the mission, which pertains to the term to which it refers; namely, circumscription and motion in place by reason of the human nature, and with respect to the phenomena through which He was present in the Old Testament. The Father, on the other hand, could not appear in this way as sent, because there is no person from whom He proceeds, and thus no one from whom He is sent. Therefore, from their consistent doctrine, just as Christ the Son is sent by the Father, so also the *Angel of the Lord* and *Lord God* sent by the *Lord God* cannot be the Father.

Thus far, their argumentation is clear enough; but some of the ancients (such as Justin and Tertullian) further pressed the mission as it pertains to a term *ad extra*, and in the heat of disputation against the Monarchians, they seem to affirm that because the Father cannot be sent, He also cannot assume a personal relationship to an external term, so that if the Father appeared in a place, circumscription and local motion would fall upon the divine nature itself, which, as all agree, is evidently repugnant.

Now I say: in this doctrine, a) there is certainly no error of a distinction of nature, which is often charged against those ancient Fathers; for the difference that the Son can appear in a place and the Father cannot, they do not deduce from a diversity of nature and immensity, which they most openly acknowledge as one in the Father and the Son, but from the diverse personal character, by which the Father cannot be sent, while the Son can be sent and was indeed sent. b) This difference, that the first person cannot be sent while the proceeding persons can, is most true, as we will discuss elsewhere. c) If the matter concerns the fact of appearance in the flesh, this is certainly proper to the Son who was sent, not common to the Father who sends; and therefore, if the Old Testament theophanies are conceived as preludes to the Incarnation, they too, with most Fathers (Thesis VI), are to be referred to the Son. d) Not only is this true in fact, but in the personal character itself lies the reason for the fittingness why the Son rather than the Father appeared through an assumed creature, as we mentioned a little earlier. e) Considering the theophanies as they were made in the present order and the intrinsic fittingness of this order, that the Father sends and the Son is sent, those ancient Doctors were not concerned with another possible order, about which revelation does not speak; but they simply teach, according to the present order, that appearances through an assumed

creature are proper to the person sent, who is the Son, the substantial image of the Father, and thus the Father Himself cannot appear visibly. For His appearance would not be through a personal relationship to a creature as an external term, which relationship is reserved to the Son; therefore, the Father would appear in time and space according to His divine nature, which is repugnant to divine eminence and immensity. We readily concede that from the fact and fittingness of the Son's appearance through an assumed creature, those ancient Doctors do not correctly conclude that an appearance of the Father, if it were to occur, would be according to His divine nature itself and thus impossible; but certainly, for this reason, they do not yet introduce a distinction and diversity of nature between the Father and the Son.

From what has been said, it is understood how Justin rejects as absurd that the Father, who cannot be contained by the whole world, appeared in a small part of the earth; and how he said it follows that God would have left heaven and moved in place, if it were thought that the Father was the God who, appearing on earth as Lord, rained fire from the Lord in heaven upon Sodom (Gen 19:24). Likewise, Tertullian's harsher argumentation is understood: "Moreover, how is it that the almighty God, the invisible one… who does not dwell in things made by hands… for whom heaven is a throne and earth a footstool, in whom every place is, not Himself in a place, who is the utmost limit of the universe, the Most High, walked in paradise in the evening seeking Adam, and closed the ark after Noah's entry, and rested under Abraham's oak, and called Moses from the burning bush, and appeared as a fourth in the furnace of the king of Babylon, though called the Son of Man, unless these were in image, mirror, and enigma? Indeed, these things would not have been believable of the Son of God either, if they were not written, and perhaps not believable of the Father even though written" (*Against Praxeas*, ch. 16). These things, of course, are not only not written of the Father, but could not be written of Him, given the principle that only a person who is sent can assume personal relations *ad extra*, and that in a person not sent, such circumscription and local motion would have to be understood according to the divine nature itself.

To this head of expressions, which are referred to the Son insofar as He is considered to have become man, belong those for which Dionysius of Alexandria was accused before the Roman Pontiff of the same name, namely, that to show the distinction of the Father and the Son against the Sabellians, he said that "the Son of God is a work (ποίημα) and a thing made, not proper to the Father's nature but alien from the Father's essence, as a farmer is to a vine, and a craftsman to a boat; and indeed, since He is a thing made, He was not before He was made." Thus, his accusers presented his doctrine, as Athanasius narrates (*On the Opinion of Dionysius*, n. 4), though not all these seem to have been Dionysius' own words; but he himself admits that he used the comparison with the vine and the boat in passing (ibid., n. 18). He could have used this comparison against the Sabellians in two ways: either generally to affirm the reality of the distinction between the Father and the Son, without declaring what kind of distinction and its proper reason; or he could have referred to the assumed human nature, as Athanasius interprets Dionysius. For since the Son Himself said according to His human nature, *I am the true vine, and My Father is the vinedresser* (John 15:1), Dionysius could have demonstrated from this that the Father is one and the Son another. The rest seems to have been deduced by his accusers from this comparison he established, namely, that therefore the Son is a work made, alien from the Father's essence and not consubstantial, made when He was not before. Dionysius himself attests that he never thought or said as they charged, but the contrary in all things (ibid., nn. 15, 18, 20). Moreover, he says, even if I had called the Father the maker of the Word, this term itself, being ambiguous, should have been interpreted from the context in the sense of a begetter: "For as I do not think the Word is a thing made, and I call God not its maker but its Father, even if I had in passing called God the maker (ποιητής) when speaking of the Son, there would

still be room for defense; for the wise among the Greeks call themselves the makers of their own discourses (ποιηταὶ τῶν ἰδίων λόγων), though they are the fathers of their own discourses, and divine Scripture calls us the makers of the motions of the heart, when it says we are makers of the law, judgment, and justice" (ibid., n. 21). Athanasius says that all those expressions which Dionysius' accusers objected to have an easy explanation, because in them the holy Bishop was referring not to the Word considered in itself but to the Word insofar as it became flesh (ibid., nn. 20, 26).

In this entire cause of the great Dionysius, both the consistency and universality of the faith in one nature in distinct persons before the Council of Nicaea are more clearly seen, as well as the necessary caution not to easily interpret the ambiguous expressions of the Fathers of that age in a sinister sense. For just as Dionysius of Rome condemned on one hand the Sabellians who denied the distinction of hypostases, and on the other hand, on the occasion of the accusation brought against the Alexandrian, rejected any distinction of nature in the three hypostases (above, Thesis X); so the Alexandrian first pressed the real distinction of persons against the Sabellians, but when certain explanations of this distinction seemed to indicate also a distinction and inferiority of the Son's nature, immediately other Catholics objected, and the case was referred to the Pontiff as the chief guardian and defender of the faith handed down. Furthermore, the Alexandrian in his apologetic writings showed the fullest agreement with the doctrine and definition of the Roman Pontiff, and he testified that in the expressions called into question, he meant nothing other than the distinction of persons. The very formula later established in the Nicene Creed, that the Son is *homoousios* (ὁμοούσιος, consubstantial) with the Father, which his accusers and the Pontiff himself then demanded, he not only willingly accepted but also testified that he had always held the reality expressed by this term. "In another letter," he says, "I showed the falsehood of the accusation they bring against me, as if I were unwilling to say that Christ is consubstantial with God (ὁμοούσιον εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ); for though I confess that I have nowhere found or read this term in the holy Scriptures, my arguments, which I added and which they omitted, do not differ from this sense" (ibid., n. 18). (1) And indeed, the unity of an indivisible nature in three distinct persons could scarcely have been expressed more clearly by the Fathers after the Council of Nicaea than it was by Dionysius of Alexandria in agreement with Dionysius of Rome already in the third century: "Thus we extend the unity without division (and thus without multiplication) into the Trinity (of persons), and again we contract the Trinity without diminution (with the three persons remaining) into the unity (of nature)" (ibid., n. 17). See the remaining confirmations of the orthodox doctrine in Athanasius himself in the cited book *On the Opinion of Dionysius* and in another, *On the Decrees of Nicaea*, n. 25. Certainly, not only the authority of Athanasius but even more the clear words of Dionysius cited by him persuade us that St. Basil, when he wrote to Maximus (Epistle 9, n. 2) that Dionysius sowed the first seeds of the Arian dogma, spoke rather of some abrupt statements, not having Dionysius' books at hand, and judged more from the abuse by the Arians, who readily appealed to the Alexandrian Bishop, than from the whole context of his doctrine (cf. *On the Holy Spirit*, n. 72).

(1) That the Son was said by Dionysius' teacher Origen to be from the substance of the Father and *homoousios* with the Father is inferred thus far from the *Apology* of St. Pamphilus (*Works of Origen*, Vol. IV, Appendix, p. 33); it will be much more clearly established when Origen's *Commentary on the Gospel of Luke* from the manuscript of the Roman College is published, unless the thefts now rampant prevent it.

Scholion 1: On the Condemnation of Paul of Samosata

Since we have thus far discussed the doctrine of the pre-Nicene Fathers, the context itself seems to require mention of the condemnation said to have been proclaimed in the mid-third century at the Council of Antioch against Paul of Samosata, because he either taught or objected from Catholic doctrine that the Son is *homoousios* (ὁμοούσιος) with the Father. How illustrious this term is for strictly defining the Catholic dogma is evident from the history of dogmas and particularly from the history of the condemned and defeated Arian heresy in the fourth and fifth centuries. Nevertheless, the meaning of the word *homoousios* could be perverted by fraud in two ways: a) so that the imperfection of nature, which the word itself does not signify but which always accompanies consubstantiality in creatures, would be supposed to be formally signified by the term; in which hypothesis it could not be said of the divine persons without denying the perfection and unity of the divine nature. For *ousia* (essence) in distinct created hypostases is one only specifically, but in reality, the singular essences (*οὐσίαι πρῶται*) are as many and distinct as the hypostases distinguished, so that one is not *homoousios* with another unless the essence or singular nature is one in one and another in another, distinct in number though of the same kind; and thus, if said of the Father and the Son, it would imply a nature propagated from the Father to the Son by some division and multiplication. For this reason, the Arians and Semi-Arians frequently used this argument to offer some excuse, without openly confessing their impiety, for why they wished to eliminate this hallmark of the Catholic faith. In this same sense, Athanasius (*On the Synods*, n. 45) and Basil (Epistle 52, n. 2) interpret the condemnation of the word *homoousios*, which the Semi-Arians and later the Arians claimed was made at the aforementioned Council of Antioch against Paul of Samosata, namely, that the divine generation is not by division or multiplication of substance. b) Heretics who did not distinguish between a singular essence and a person could take *ousia* in this term for a person, and thus (against the manifest meaning of the term) interpret the Son as *homoousios* with the Father as if the Son were said to be one person with the Father, a meaning that Epiphanius (*Ancoratus*, n. 6; *Heresies*, 76, n. 7) thought could underlie the terms *synousios* (συνούσιος) and *isousios* (ἰσούσιος). (1) Now, those Semi-Arians who, writing from their synod at Ancyra in 358 to the bishops gathered at Sirmium, are found to have first mentioned the condemned word *homoousios*, report (apud Hilary, *On the Synods*, n. 81) that in this latter sense, the term was used by Samosata and therefore rejected by the Fathers, "because through this designation of one essence, he proclaimed that the Father and the Son are a solitary and single (person)." Therefore, if the history of the condemnation is not fabricated, at least it is clear that the issue against Samosata was not about the term *homoousios* in its proper meaning, but about a distorted sense of the word, and only this sense was proscribed. For in its genuine sense, the term had already been used shortly before this Council of Antioch by Dionysius the Roman Pontiff, by the accusers of Dionysius of Alexandria, by Dionysius of Alexandria himself, and even by his teacher Origen, and shortly after, toward the end of the third century, it was received and defended as an established and common theological term by St. Pamphilus the martyr (*Apology for Origen*, *Works of Origen*, Vol. IV, Appendix, pp. 33–34) for the most apt expression of the unity of nature in distinct persons, so much so that even Eusebius of Caesarea could not deny that it had been used by the Fathers (Socrates, *Ecclesiastical History*, Book I, ch. 8).

(1) Athanasius in *Exposition of the Faith*, n. 2 (*Works*, Vol. I, p. 100) says that the Sabellians called the Son *synousios* with the Father, not *homoousios*.

However, it seems most probable that the entire history of this condemnation was aptly fabricated by the Semi-Arians. For since they were accustomed to readily suppose a Sabellian sense in *homoousios*, they could infer from the points of doctrine established against Samosata that the Antiochene Fathers also did

not accept *homoousios*. Certainly, in admitting the fact of a condemnation never mentioned in the controversy with the Arians, which had been raging over this term for thirty years and more by 358, there are such difficulties that it cannot be made credible without witnesses beyond all exception; but the authority of all witnesses reduces to those Semi-Arians, most hostile to the hallmark of *homoousios* and therefore most eager to oppose another council to the Council of Nicaea. I say their authority rests entirely in them; for Athanasius and Hilary expressly indicate that they received the narrative from them, and Basil, mentioning this matter in passing, is to be considered as having drawn it not from the Acts of Antioch themselves but likewise from the adversaries or perhaps from Athanasius' disputation. Reasons are given by Maranus (*On the Divinity of Our Lord*, Book I, ch. 4, n. 9) and Simon de Magistris (*Preface to the Works of Dionysius of Alexandria*, nn. 18ff.) that render the falsity of the Semi-Arian assertion at least most probable, nor do they seem to me to have been weakened by the opposing arguments of Frohschammer (*Theological Papers, Tübingen*, 1850, fasc. 1) and the illustrious Charles Joseph Hefele (*History of the Councils*, Vol. I, p. 115).

Scholion 2: On Distinguishing Between the Word and the Son

Some one or two of the ancients, namely Hippolytus and perhaps Tertullian, seem to distinguish between the Word and the Son, such that the second person of the Trinity before the manifestation *ad extra*, namely before the Incarnation and birth from the Virgin, was the Word, but not yet the perfect Son; but the perfect Son is understood only insofar as the Word is manifested and incarnated. Thus Hippolytus (*Against Noetus*, n. 15, Gallandius, Vol. II, p. 462): "Someone (a Noetian) will say, you bring me something strange when you call the Word the Son. John indeed calls it the Word; but he introduces another interpretation. For demonstrating this Word of God as that which was from the beginning and is now sent, he later says in the Apocalypse: *And I saw heaven opened… and He was clothed in a robe dipped in blood, and His name was called the Word of God* (Rev 19:11–13). Similarly, the blessed Paul says: *God, sending His Son in the likeness of sinful flesh* (Rom 8:3)… What kind of Son, then, did God send through the flesh if not the Word, which He called Son because He was to be born (as man from the Virgin)? And when He is called Son, He takes up the common name of love for men. For the Word without flesh was not by itself the perfect Son, though it was the perfect Word, the Only-Begotten. Nor could the flesh subsist by itself apart from the Word, because it has its subsistence in the Word. Thus, one perfect Son of God was manifested. And these are the testimonies concerning the Incarnation of the Word… But you inquire about the generation of the Word, that the Father begot it willingly, as He willed. Yet the generation according to the flesh was entrusted to no more than two Evangelists (Matthew and Luke) to narrate, and you dare to scrutinize the generation according to the spirit (according to divinity), which the Father keeps to Himself, to reveal to the saints who will be worthy to see His face?"

This passage must be considered in comparison with the doctrine of the Monarchians (Noetus, Sabellius, Praxeas), which he opposes. According to their doctrine, the Word in God (*Λόγος Ἐνδιάθετος*) is not a person distinct from Him whose Word it is, but an absolute attribute; the uttered Word (*Λόγος Προφορικός*), however, is the sounding word of God, "air struck intelligibly to the hearing" (Tertullian, *Against Praxeas*, ch. 7), or a transient action in creatures. Therefore, the Word did not assume flesh, but the divine person, which is unique as God is one. This person before the Incarnation is called the Father; through the Incarnation, He made Himself His own Son. But when pressed by Catholics that Christ, the Son of God sent, no less evidently distinguishes Himself as another from the Father who sends, they were

forced to resort to a distinction between God and man in Christ, and thus, at least in their manner of speaking, they divided Christ, like Nestorius later, into two persons. "Surrounded on all sides by the distinction of the Father and the Son… they try to interpret it according to their view, so that in one person (admitting only one person in God), they distinguish both, the Father and the Son, saying the Son is the flesh, that is, the man, that is, Jesus; but the Father is the spirit, that is, God, that is, Christ. And those who contend that the Father and the Son are one and the same now begin to divide them rather than unite them… Perhaps they learned such a monarchy from Valentinus, to make two, Jesus and Christ" (Tertullian, *Against Praxeas*, ch. 27; cf. on Valentinus, above, p. 81).

Now, from the nature of the heresy being opposed, it is clear why Hippolytus first proves that the Word is incarnated; then insists so clearly that the incarnated Word is one person, the Son of God, both God the Word and man. Since, however, the adversaries understood the Son insofar as He is the Son of Man born of the Virgin, Hippolytus distinguishes the notion of the Word, Only-Begotten from the Father and ineffably generated according to the spirit (according to divinity) from the Father, from the notion of the Son of Man born in time from the Virgin according to the flesh; that is, he distinguishes the twofold generation of one and the same person from God the Father according to divinity and from the Virgin Mother according to humanity, and from both together, he says, the perfect Son is understood, that is, the notion of the Son of God and Son of Man, which pertains to Christ, God and man. Therefore, when he says that before the Incarnation, He was the perfect Word and Only-Begotten of the Father, but not yet the perfect Son, this cannot be understood, without manifest contradiction, as if He were not yet the perfect Son of God, since he clearly says He was the Only-Begotten and generated from the Father according to the spirit; but it means He was not yet the Son of Man and generated from the Virgin according to the flesh. Hence, also in the Old Testament, in the sense that the adversaries had in view, he says the Word was called Son because He was to be born of the Virgin. He explains this more clearly in n. 4: "He was the Word, He was the Spirit, He was the Power. He took upon Himself from the beginning the common and customary name among men, called the Son of Man because of the future; though He was not yet, as Daniel testifies, saying: *I saw… one like a Son of Man* (Dan 7:13)." Moreover, by the diversity of the name, Hippolytus takes care not to seem to exclude the notion of the true Son of God before the Incarnation; for the Son, insofar as He is made man, is called *ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ μετὰ σαρκός* ("the Son of God with flesh") (see text above, p. 182).

Tertullian also, just as he sometimes calls the manifestation of the Word *ad extra* a generation, which presupposes the generation *ad intra* (above, p. 185), so he seems to have considered the notion of the Son corresponding to generation sometimes in the Word insofar as it is manifested *ad extra*. The Father, he says, thought and arranged all things to be created in the Word (Reason, Wisdom), and at the beginning of time, He brought forth the Word (Speech), and through the Word, He created all things. "This is the perfect nativity of the Speech (substantial, not a transient voice, as above), as it proceeds from God, constituted by Him first for thought under the name of Wisdom: *The Lord constituted me the beginning of His ways* (Prov 8:22); then generated for effect: *When He prepared the heaven, I was with Him* (Prov 8:27). Thenceforth, making Him equal to Himself (1), from whom, by proceeding, He became the Son, the firstborn, as begotten before all things, and the Only-Begotten, as alone begotten from God, properly from the womb of His heart, as the Father Himself testifies: *My heart has uttered a good Word* (Ps 45:1)" (*Against Praxeas*, ch. 7).

(1) The Son makes the Father equal to Himself, from whom He proceeds; not, of course, as the principle of the Father, but He declares the Father equal to Himself when He says: *I was with Him, ordering all things* (Prov 8:30), and also the procession or generation of the Son makes Him the Father, formally as Father, as Tertullian himself says: "The Father makes the Son, and the Son the Father… The Father must have the Son to be Father, and the Son the Father to be Son" (*Against Praxeas*, ch. 10). Note, however, how irresistibly this bolder expression demonstrates the unity of the Father and the Son, since not only does the Father make the Son, but the Son is said to make the Father equal to Himself.

If in the words "by proceeding from the Father, He became the Son," the procession is understood as manifestation, which he called "generation for effect," and Son is taken as a predicate, that is, the one I spoke of, this sense must be accepted. But then it cannot be understood either that the person was made or that the pre-existing eternal person was made Son simply; but it should be understood that the eternal person was made the Son manifested, namely, by reason of the sonship corresponding to this generation *ad extra*, which is nothing other than the manifestation of the Son. I say it cannot be understood, without contradiction with Tertullian's clear doctrine, either that the person was made or made Son simply, because in countless places he teaches that the Word was begotten from eternity and always

was the Son of God. In the following chapter 8, he [Tertullian] says: "The Word was always with God, as it is written: *And the Word was with God* (John 1:1); and never separated from the Father or other (another God) from the Father, because *I and the Father are one* (John 10:30). This is the generation (*probola*) of the Truth, the guardian of unity, whereby we say the Son is brought forth (*prolatum*) from the Father but not separated… Every origin is a parent, and everything that is brought forth from an origin is progeny; much more so the Word of God, which also properly received the name of Son" (*Against Praxeas*, ch. 8). A little further in chapter 21: "Undoubtedly, it is shown that another was from the beginning, another with whom He was (*John 1:1*); the Word is one, God (the Father) is another, although the Word is also God, but as the Son of God, not as the Father… another, however, not as separated, but by disposition (*dispositione*) (1), another not by division."

(1) This is Tertullian's Latin term for the Greek *οἰκονομία* (oikonomia), which he frequently uses to mean the distinction of divine persons by reason of origin.

Certainly, therefore, the procession or mission *ad extra* presupposes this eternal person who is sent, and presupposes Him as the Son of God by His internal procession. Thus, the procession *ad extra* does not make Him to be the Son, but only makes Him to be the manifested Son. However, I do not see why, in the cited text of chapter 7, the procession should be understood as *ad intra*, nor do I see why the name "Son" cannot be the subject, and "firstborn" and "only-begotten" the predicate. Then the sense would be: by proceeding from the Father, the Son, when the heavens were prepared, i.e., when all things were created, in comparison with creatures, assumes the relation of firstborn and only-begotten, because He is from eternity before all creatures and begotten from the Father in a manner entirely different from how creatures are made. Thus, this passage presents no difficulty.

By this distinction of a twofold generation, to which corresponds a different consideration and designation of the Son, the difficulty in Tertullian's words *Against Hermogenes*, chapter 3, can also be resolved. Hermogenes defends eternal and uncreated matter by arguing that just as God was always God, so He was always Lord; hence, he claimed it was necessary that there always be something over which He was Lord,

and this was matter. Tertullian denies that because God is always God, He is also always Lord: for the name "God" signifies God's substance absolutely and in itself, while the name "Lord" denotes a relation *ad extra* and connotes an existing creature of which He is Lord. This he illustrates with the example of two other names, "Father" and "Judge": "For though God is Father and God is Judge, He is not therefore always Father and Judge, because He is always God. For He could not be Father before the Son, nor Judge before sin. There was a time when neither sin nor the Son existed, which would make Him Judge and Father. Thus, He was not Lord before those things of which He would be Lord, but was to become Lord at some time; just as He is Father through the Son, Judge through sin, so also Lord through those things He made to serve Him" (*Against Hermogenes*, ch. 3).

From Tertullian's entire doctrine, both in other books and in this same work *Against Hermogenes*, chapter 18, it is absurd to say: there was a time when the Son, who is the Reason and Wisdom of God, did not yet exist. Therefore, if "Son" is understood in this passage as the second person of the Trinity, it must necessarily be understood not insofar as He is Father and Son and exists, but insofar as the Son and through the Son the Father is manifested. However, since Tertullian here considers God absolutely and without distinction of persons, and considers the relation of God to an external term, and connects the notion of Father with the notion of Judge, and the relation of the Son to God the Father with the relation of a sinner to God the Judge, it seems at least far more probable, as Bellarmine also prefers (*On Christ*, Book I, ch. 10), that "Son" is understood as an adoptive son, a human or angel, that is, a rational creature externally approaching God, which from a certain time designates God as Father.

CHAPTER III: On the Consequences and Connections of the Distinction of Persons with Unity

THESIS XII: On the Real Community of the Nature, Attributes, and All External Operations in the Three Divine Persons

"Since the essence of the three persons is one, therefore all absolute attributes are also common, and any attribute is one in number, not in species, in the three persons. For the same reason, no external operation (*ad extra*) can be proper to one person, but any operation is necessarily common and one in number, indistinguishable in the three persons, just as the nature of the three is one and indistinguishable."

I. Unity of Essence and Attributes

The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God. Therefore, they are in no way distinguished insofar as they are God; thus, the deity or essence or absolute perfection by which God is understood to be and which is God is entirely one and indistinguishable (1). However, the three are distinguished insofar as the Father is formally the one producing the Word or generating the Son, insofar as the Son is formally generated by the Father, and insofar as the Holy Spirit is formally spirated by the Father and the Son. Thus, the real distinction consists solely in the relations of origin of one from another: this relative in relation to another relative, the principle in relation to the principled, are not one, but under this aspect of relation are really distinguished; the one who is the Father of the Son is not the Son, and the one who is the Son of the Father is not the Father, yet the Son is that absolute which is the Father, and vice versa. Hence, it is most true and most useful for promptly explaining many less useful subtleties, that theological axiom: "In God, all things are one where there is no opposition of relations" (2).

(1) In the Bull *Auctorem Fidei*, Pius VI reproves the statement of the Pistoiese, "God is distinguished in three persons." For, the Pontiff says, "God is indeed said to be one in three distinct persons, not distinguished in three persons; by this change of formula, there creeps in the danger of error, that the divine essence is thought to be distinguished in the persons, whereas the Catholic faith confesses it to be so one in distinct persons that it simultaneously professes it to be utterly indistinguishable in itself."

(2) This axiom, in its sense, is as ancient as the profession of faith in one God in essence and three in persons; as to its very words, it was used also in the Council of Florence (decree for the Jacobites) and is usually attributed to St. Anselm: "Nor does unity ever lose its consequence where there is no opposition of relation" (*On the Holy Spirit*, ch. 2). See the first three chapters of this book by Anselm. Cf. Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book VII, ch. 9.

Certainly, what we call an absolute attribute is really nothing other than the most simple divine essence conceived by us under the formal aspect of this or that perfection, such as wisdom, justice, etc.; nor does an attribute have a real origin either from another attribute or from the essence, otherwise it would not be absolute (free from relation), but proceeding would be relative to its principle of procession, and by this very fact, there would be as many relatively distinct realities, i.e., as many persons, as there are attributes enumerated (cf. *Treatise on God*, Theses XIII, XX, XXVI). Therefore, not only because attributes are really the divine essence itself, but because they have no real origin either from the essence or from one another, and thus "no opposition of relations stands in the way," it is necessary that just as the essence in itself, so the same essence considered under the formal aspect of any absolute attribute, is one and not multipliable. Hence, if any absolute attribute were conceived in one person, e.g., in the Father, and denied in another person, by that very fact the most simple divine essence and divinity would be denied to that person; and if an attribute were affirmed to be the same in species but distinct in number in distinct persons, by that very fact distinct essences and multiple gods would be introduced. On the other hand, although the relations of origin, i.e., the formal aspect of Father, Son, and Spirated, are really the divine essence itself, and thus do not proceed from the essence by real origin nor are really distinguished from it, these relations (and, equivalently, their concrete signification as relative) have among themselves the aspect of principle and principled; one really proceeds from another, and thus "there is an opposition of relations," so that the Father of the Son is not the Son, the Son of the Father is not the Father, but under this formal aspect of relatives and under this alone are they really distinguished from one another.

This numerical unity of the essence and attributes in the three distinct persons is not hindered by the fact that the essence in the Father is uncommunicated and communicable, in the Son communicated by the Father, and in the Holy Spirit communicated by the Father and the Son, so that it might seem to exist differently in one person than in another. For this diverse mode does not affect the essence considered absolutely or the absolute Being itself, which is entirely one and indistinguishable; but that mode is in reality the relation of paternity, filiation, and procession. For what does it mean that the essence in the Father is uncommunicated and communicable? Nothing other than that the absolute essence is simultaneously relative, and under this aspect of the relative is not proceeding from another (*ἀγέννητον*, unbegotten) but is the principle producing the Word or generating the Son; further, under this aspect of the relative as principle in relation to the Son, the essence is no longer formally the common absolute essence, but is the Father as hypostasis. Likewise, that the essence in the Son is communicated signifies nothing other than that the absolute essence is simultaneously relative, proceeding by generation as the Word or as the Son from another relative, which is the Father generating; but again, under this aspect of the relative

proceeding as the Word, the essence is not formally the common absolute essence, but is the Son as hypostasis; "each substance, that is, the essence or divine nature of the three persons, is that reality, and that reality is neither generating, generated, nor proceeding, but is the Father who generates, the Son who is generated, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds; so that distinctions are in the persons and unity is in the nature" (Fourth Lateran Council, *Damnamus*). But these things will be better understood when we treat the proper notion of divine hypostasis.

The proof for this unity of the three persons in all absolute perfections requires no other argument than that by which the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and consequently the unity of essence in the three distinct persons, has been demonstrated above in multiple ways. Formally, the communication of attributes is expressed in the passages of Scripture where the Son, in relation to the Father, declares: "My Father has given me something greater than all" (John 10:29); "As the Father has life in Himself, so He has given to the Son to have life in Himself" (John 5:26); "All things that You have given Me are from You" (John 17:7); "All that is Mine is Yours, and Yours is Mine" (John 17:10); "All that the Father has is Mine, therefore I said that He will take from what is Mine" (John 16:15).

II. Unity of External Operations

In the same way, just as the nature of the three persons with all its absolute perfections is one and indistinguishable, so too the external operation (*ad extra*) of the three persons is one and indistinguishable. The truth is evident from the proper notion of divine operation. For it is nothing other than the divine essence itself under the formal aspect of absolute intellect and absolute omnipotent will, with the connotation of an external term to be effected. But the divine essence, under whatever formal aspect of the absolute it is considered for our mode of distinguishing, and thus also under the formal aspect of absolute intellection and volition, is absolutely one in number and the same in the three persons. Such, therefore, is the unity of operation in the three persons.

This is also declared from the very notion of a divine person. Persons in God are distinguished only by relations of origin, insofar as under the formal aspect of the relative, one is the principle in relation to another as the principled; the Father is distinguished from the Son by no other means than by paternity and filiation alone, and the Father and Son are distinguished from the Holy Spirit only in that by spiration they are the principle in relation to the proceeding; therefore, paternity (which is simultaneously *ἀγέννητον*, insofar as this is understood as something positive, i.e., the aspect of principle without principle), filiation, and procession are substantial relations proper to each person, while spiration, common to the Father and the Son, can be said to be proper only in comparison to the principle spirating in relation to the Holy Spirit proceeding, to whom it is not common. Beyond these relations *ad intra*, and if there is any hypostatic relation *ad extra*, all other things that can be conceived of God are absolute and therefore one and indistinguishable in the three, just as the three are one God. Now, the effective operation in God is neither generation, nor nativity, nor spiration, nor procession, nor a hypostatic relation to an external term. Therefore, every operation *ad extra* is one and indistinguishable in the three persons, just as the deity of the three is one, or as God is one.

I said: operation is not a hypostatic relation to an external term (i.e., distinct and different from God). A hypostatic relation, both by faith and, given faith, by the light of reason, can only be understood either as *ad intra*, of a person producing another person or proceeding from another person, or as *ad extra*, of a

person hypostatically united to a created nature. A hypostatic relation *ad intra* certainly cannot be effective of an external term, but pertains to a divine person. The external term, apart from this internal relation, cannot be connoted (prescinding now from hypostatic union) other than as the manifestation of a person *ad extra* through some efficiency; generation and spiration with this connotation is the mission of the Son from the Father, and the mission of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. Therefore, what in the mission is proper to one person and not common to the three, on the part of the person sending, is not an operation but a relation of generating and spirating; on the part of the person sent, it is a relation of filiation or procession; but the efficiency *ad extra* connoted in the mission is necessarily common to the three persons, as they are one God (1).

(1) "Mission is both essential (pertaining to the common essence) and notional (proper to a distinct person), according to different aspects. According to the respect that mission imports to its principle, it is notional; but according to the respect it imports to the effect in the creature, it is essential… A name can connote an effect in a creature in two ways: either according to the aspect of principle alone, and since the operation of the whole Trinity is the same, such a name must be common to the whole Trinity and pertain to the essence; or such that, along with the aspect of principle in relation to the creature, it also imports something else (namely, a personal relation), and then, although according to the respect to the creature it signifies the essence, according to the other thing it signifies, it can pertain to the person, as to assume flesh imports both an operation common to the three persons and the term of the operation in which the assumption is terminated, which is proper to the person of the Son. Similarly, I say that *gift* (as a name of the Holy Spirit) beyond the respect to that to which it is giveable (*ad extra*), imports a respect to the one from whom it is as from a principle, with respect to His authority (of origin, i.e., it imports a respect to the Father and the Son, from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds), and in this respect, it is notional" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, dist. 15, q. 1, a. 2; dist. 18, q. 1, a. 1).

There remains, therefore, only the hypostatic union, which can be proper to one person and not common to the three. For the divine hypostases each have only their proper formal aspect of hypostasis, but what pertains to the nature is common and one to them; the function of the hypostasis, formally as it is a hypostasis distinct in reason from the nature, is known neither by revelation nor by the light of reason to be other than that it is a subject possessing a nature as its own. Hence, a function proper to one hypostasis and not common to the three *ad extra* can only be understood as possessing an assumed created nature as its own, which we know from revelation can be done and has been done. But this possessing of a nature is not an effective operation, but a hypostatic termination, and a certain state understood by analogy to a formal cause, not an efficient cause. Whatever efficiency is involved in that union, however, is entirely of the one and triune God. In sum, the divine persons *ad extra* do not operate formally as three distinct relatives to one another, but as one God. For the principle, or rather the subject that operates, is indeed the hypostasis; but the principle by which the operation occurs is the nature.

Hence, among the holy Fathers and in the Councils, there is an axiom of utmost importance in the doctrine of the Trinity and of Christ: operations are not hypostatic but natural, i.e., the distinction of operation according to species and number does not follow the number of hypostases but the species and number of natures. Therefore, where there is one nature, even if there are multiple hypostases, there is one operation, as in the Holy Trinity; conversely, where there are multiple natures in number, and where the natures are not only multiple in number but also diverse, even if there is one hypostasis, as in Christ, there is also a manifold and diverse order of operations according to the multiplicity and diversity of natures.

This principle the Fathers assume as entirely evident and conceded by all when speaking of God, because divine operation is the divine essence itself, and therefore, if another operation were admitted in the Father and another in the Son, this would assert another essence. From this, indeed, against the Monothelites, they demonstrate that in Christ a twofold order of divine and human operation cannot be denied without thereby admitting only one nature and thus introducing the heresy of the Monophysites. Thus, St. Agatho the Pontiff, in his letter to the Emperors read at the Sixth Council (Hardouin, Vol. III, p. 1083), argues from the unity of operation of the three persons: "…According to the rule of the holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of Christ, it confesses and preaches that there are also two natural wills and two natural operations in Him. For if anyone understands the will as personal (following the number of persons), since three persons are said to be in the Holy Trinity, it would be necessary to say three personal wills and three personal operations, which is utterly absurd and profane. But if, as the truth of the Christian faith holds, the will is natural (as the principle by which, following the number of natures), where one nature is said to be of the holy and inseparable Trinity, consequently one natural will and one natural operation must be understood" (cf. *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis XL).

Now, both in Scripture and in the preaching of the Fathers, the unity of action is proposed as a principle closer and more familiar to our understanding, from which the unity of nature of the three persons is deduced. Thus, the Son of God introduces the unity of power and action of Himself and the Father for preserving the faithful and giving eternal life as a declaration, and generally that He does the works of His Father, as a demonstration of the mystery stated: "I and the Father are one; the Father is in Me, and I am in the Father" (John 10:28ff., cf. above, p. 20ff.). The unity of testimony is joined with the unity of essence, and the testimony of the three is the testimony of one God: "For there are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one… the testimony of God is greater" (1 John 5:7, 9, cf. above, Thesis V). Similarly, the Son affirms that every operation of the Father from the beginning is His operation, and He denies that His power is other than the Father's power: "My Father works until now, and I work… Whatever He does, the Son does likewise (*ταῦτα ὁμοίως ποιεῖ*). As the Father raises the dead and gives life, so the Son gives life to whom He wills" (John 5:17, 19, 21). "The Son can do nothing of Himself, unless He sees the Father doing it" (John 5:19). From this unity of action, the Jews themselves understood that a proper filiation of God and equality with God were asserted: "Because He called God His own Father (*πατέρα ἴδιον*), making Himself equal (*ἴσον*) to God" (John 5:18).

To the same pertains that in the Scriptures, divine operation is sometimes attributed to one God considered absolutely, beside whom there is no other, sometimes to individual persons, sometimes to the persons conjointly: "I am the Lord who makes all things, stretching out the heavens alone, establishing the earth, and there is none with Me" (Isa 44:24). "I confess to You, Father, Lord of heaven and earth" (Matt 11:25). "But to the Son He says: You, Lord, in the beginning founded the earth, and the heavens are the work of Your hands" (Heb 1:8, 10). "You send forth Your Spirit, and they are created" (Ps 104:30). "The Spirit of the Lord has filled the world, and that which contains all things (*πνεῦμα Κυρίου τὸ συνέχον τὰ πάντα*) has knowledge of the voice" (Wis 1:7, cf. Ambrose, *On the Holy Spirit*, Book II, ch. 5; Cyril of Alexandria, *Dialogue VII*, p. 649, and elsewhere). "God made the ages through the Son" (Heb 1:2). "For us, there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things… and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things" (1 Cor 8:6). In such expressions, where the Father is said to create and operate through the Son in the Holy Spirit, both the relation of origin of the persons is indicated, and the unity of operation is clearly declared, namely, that just as there is one nature, so the same power and operation is

communicated from the Father to the Son, and from the Father through the Son (and from the Father and the Son) to the Holy Spirit. Therefore, both in the Scriptures and most frequently among the Fathers, when the internal relations of the persons are expressed along with their relation to works, the Son and the Holy Spirit are called the power of the Father, and the Father is said to operate through the Son and the Holy Spirit as through His power, His arm, His hands; yet, insofar as the power and operation is one, this is declared to be the same as if the Father operates through Himself (cf. above, pp. 136, 163; see Petavius, *De Deo*, Book V, chs. 8–9).

Among the Fathers, the demonstration of one essence from the unity of operation, or vice versa, is frequently found. "The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three hypostases, because the subsistence of each is distinct; but since the persons do not each will and operate in their own way or by their own choice and separately, but as they are one (*ἀλλ' ἑνιαίως*), there are not three gods but one God" (John Damascene, *On the Two Wills*, n. 7). See the clear doctrine of the Fathers in Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book IV, ch. 15.

Hence, it is clear that nothing other than the unity of nature is signified when the three persons are said to be one in will, counsel, power, etc. However, these absolute attributes are often expressed by the Fathers in a way that simultaneously signifies the distinction of persons. Thus, when the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are said to consent with one another, to consult, or one person to cooperate with another, consent, consultation, and cooperation are to be understood in the same way as consubstantiality is understood. For, as Cyril of Alexandria says in another context, "the particle *with* always signifies one with another" (*Anathemas* VIII against Nestorius, cf. *Apology* against the Orientals*); that is, the distinction of persons, but not per se also of nature or, equivalently, of operation (*ad extra*), is expressed by that particle *with*.

Corollary 1: Not only must it be believed, as a revealed fact, that the external operation (*ad extra*) of the three persons is common, as if, absolutely speaking, an operation proper to one person could exist without being that of all three hypostases; but it must be understood

every operation *ad extra* is so necessarily one for the three persons, without any distinction, as the nature of the three is necessarily one, and the three are one God.

Corollary 2: Just as, in the sense explained, no one can confess one common operation of the three persons without thereby affirming one nature, indistinguishable in number; so, conversely, the denial of this unity in operation is a certain argument for either the denial or the improper understanding of the unity of nature. The Güntherians, by asserting that because the divine hypostases are really distinguished, the operation *ad extra* cannot be common to the three and one in number, but that one operation is proper to one person and another to another; by this sole and clearest indication, they are convicted of admitting three substances or divine essences, distinct in number, no less really than the three distinct hypostases. That Günther was in error regarding divine operations, as we have said, is most certain. "The question must be resolved," says Günther, "which of the three divine and personal substances brought the idea of God concerning the universe and the creature to reality, if it was not brought to reality by all three together. Certainly, no one who understands the distinction between the real theogonic process in the absolute life (i.e., between the substantial processions of the persons) and the formal process of the individual hypostases in that life (i.e., the mode by which the individual persons know themselves and understand themselves as distinct from the others)… will affirm this last point. In the manifestation of God *ad extra*, all things are personal, i.e., attributed as an operation and work to one determinate person

and to no other, much less to all three together." He then teaches that creation must be predicated "of no other person than the second, the Son"; but the union of the creature with God is effected by the third person (*Propaedeutica*, Vol. II, pp. 369–372; *Symposion Peregrini*, pp. 388, 396). He acknowledges no other community of operation except that in certain works, one person executes one part, another another part. Thus, he says, in the Incarnation of the Word, the Holy Spirit produced the body, the Father created the soul of Christ, or at least effected the union of the soul with the body (*Propaedeutica*, p. 371; *Symposion*, p. 396). That all these are entirely contrary to Catholic doctrine is abundantly clear from what has been demonstrated in this thesis.

THESIS XIII: On the Reason by Which Certain Attributes and Operations Are Appropriated to One Person Rather Than Another

"Although, from what has been said, absolute attributes and operations *ad extra* are one and common to the three persons without distinction; nevertheless, both in Scripture and in other documents of faith, certain attributes and operations are appropriated to one person rather than the others. The reason for this predication is that, while preserving the community of absolute attributes, the properties of the individual persons are manifested; therefore, the foundation of appropriation is the analogy or affinity of the absolute attribute with the hypostatic character of the person to whom it is appropriated."

I. Nature and Conditions of Appropriation

It is not sufficient for appropriation that an absolute attribute be explicitly predicated of one person; rather, appropriation in the strict sense occurs only when an absolute attribute is predicated of one person rather than another. Therefore, it is not entirely appropriate, or only in a loose sense, to call it appropriation in passages where the Father is said to be "the only mighty King of kings… who alone has immortality" (1 Tim 6:15), or where the Son says, "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6) (1); or where it is promised to the Apostles, "You will receive power when the Holy Spirit comes upon you" (Acts 1:8); all of which Diego Ruiz enumerates among appropriations (*Disputationes*, 82, sect. 2; cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 39, a. 8). For these are not predicated of one person rather than the others by a special and proper reason, but are simply an affirmation of an absolute attribute of one person (2), even considered in itself, as God is, which indeed does not seem to be called appropriation any more than when individual persons are separately predicated as God.

(1) The Son, Wisdom, "was made for us the way temporally through humility (humanity), which is for us an eternal dwelling (truth and life) through divinity" (Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Book VII, ch. 3, n. 5).

(2) In the last example, there is indeed some appropriation, in that an operation *ad extra* is attributed to the Holy Spirit rather than the other persons; but not in the name of *power*, as Ruiz assumes. Moreover, the predicates of power, truth, and power can and often are appropriated to one person; but this is understood only in those contexts where there is a certain enumeration and comparison with the other persons.

Nor is it appropriation in the strict sense when a name that in itself signifies an absolute attribute, having a relation to a personal property, is used in a relative sense to designate the person itself, as when the Word is called Wisdom begotten or subsisting Wisdom, or the Holy Spirit is called proceeding or subsisting love or will. These are not appropriated but proper; for in these names, a common attribute is not ascribed more specially to one person, but the personal relative property itself is expressed.

Thus, appropriation in the strict sense occurs when attributes or operations *ad extra*, common to the three persons, are predicated specially of one person, so that from such an attribute or operation we are led to some understanding of a personal property. For this is the purpose of appropriation. "For this reason, some things are proclaimed under the name of the Father, others under the Son, others under the Holy Spirit, so that the confession of believers in the Trinity does not err. Since it is inseparable, the Trinity would never be understood if it were always spoken of inseparably" (St. Leo the Great, *Sermon 2 on Pentecost*, ch. 3). St. Thomas declares the same purpose: "Just as we use the likeness of a trace or image found in creatures to manifest the divine persons, so too with essential attributes. And this manifestation of the persons through essential attributes is called appropriation" (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 39, a. 7).

Hence, the law or foundation of appropriation is clear. The foundation, namely, is the analogy or likeness of certain absolute attributes with the hypostatic property of one person rather than the others (1). For unless there were some special affinity between the property and these attributes, as conceived by us, the special predication of such attributes of one person would not aid but rather hinder the understanding of the proper personal character. "If we speak of appropriated attributes with respect to the order or origin they connote, they are appropriated in reality because of their agreement with the proper characteristics of the persons. Hence, because the Father is from no one, the Son is from the Father, and the Holy Spirit is from both, and this order is considered in power, wisdom, and goodness; therefore, the reason for appropriating is clear. Hence, those attributes that do not in any way connote order or origin are not appropriable" (St. Bonaventure, *Commentary on the Sentences*, I, dist. 34, q. 3).

(1) Since Dionysius, commonly called the Areopagite, teaches a twofold mode of manifesting mysteries through symbols, "one of which, as is fitting, proceeds through similar images of sacred figures, the other through dissimilar affirmations of figures shaped to complete dissimilarity and discrepancy" (*Celestial Hierarchy*, ch. 2, n. 3); hence, in appropriation, which has some analogy with symbolic theology, some Doctors, such as St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure (*loc. cit.*), Albert the Great (*Commentary on the Sentences*, I, q. 50, m. 1), and Alexander of Hales (*Summa Theologica*, I, q. 67, m. 3, a. 1), besides the likeness we speak of in the text, introduce dissimilarity as another foundation. "The divine persons can be manifested through essential attributes in two ways: one by way of likeness, as those pertaining to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, who proceeds by way of intellect as the Word; the other by way of dissimilarity, as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because among us fathers are often weak due to old age, lest we suspect such a thing in God" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 39, a. 7). "Wisdom has a likeness to the Son in heaven, insofar as He is the Word, which is nothing other than the concept of wisdom; but it sometimes fails in an earthly son due to the shortness of time" (*ibid.*, a. 8). However, Augustine, whom the Angelic Doctor cites, does not speak of this kind of foundation for appropriation, but only says somewhere: "Among men, a father fails by growing old; but it is not so in that (generation of the Son), where the Son does not grow and the Father does not age" (*Against Maximinus*, Book II, ch. 14, n. 6). As for the matter itself, we would rather say: although the foundation of appropriation is always likeness, the direct and principal purpose can be twofold; sometimes, through appropriation, the

manifestation of the distinguishing property is intended, sometimes (presupposing the distinction) the equality of the persons and unity in absolute attributes is declared. For example, wisdom can be appropriated to the Son either to signify procession by way of intellect or to explicitly affirm and vindicate for the Son the same absolute wisdom that is the Father's (cf. St. Bonaventure, *Commentary on the Sentences*, I, dist. 34, q. 3, ad 2).

Since, however, the personal characteristics can be considered under various aspects, according to which different attributes correspond to them, it follows that multiple attributes can be appropriated to one person, and conversely, one attribute can be appropriated not only to one person but, under a different consideration, to the others as well. For example, power is appropriated to the Father according to His personal character, insofar as He is the principle of all processions *ad intra*; to the Son, insofar as He is the Word through whom all things were made, and thus by appropriation is the arm of God the Father; likewise to the Holy Spirit, as proceeding by love, all the effects of sanctifying charisms are appropriated, and thus power.

Hence, in Luke 1:35, "The power of the Most High will overshadow you," some Fathers interpret it of the Holy Spirit, others of the Son, others of the Father, which diversity would have no place if appropriation were always fixed and determined in one way. Nevertheless, the likeness or affinity of absolute attributes and operations with personal properties must be considered according to the mode presented in Scripture and according to the norm of Catholic understanding. For there is in Scripture, in the creeds, and among the holy Fathers a fairly frequent appropriation, from which the foundation and mode of application can easily be understood. Some examples must confirm and further clarify what has been said thus far.

II. Examples of Appropriation in Scripture and Tradition

In Scriptures where two or all three persons are enumerated, they are frequently distinguished by absolute predicates, not as proper, since they are elsewhere shown to be common to the three persons, but to designate the personal character proper to each. Thus: "There are varieties of gifts (*χαρισμάτων*), but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of ministries (*διακονιῶν*), but the same Lord; and there are varieties of operations (*ἐνεργημάτων*), but the same God who works (*ὁ ἐνεργῶν*) all things in all" (1 Cor 12:4–6). Here you see a twofold appropriation: the first is that most well-known one, by which in the enumeration the Father is called God, the Son Lord (cf. above, p. 155). By the second appropriation, to the Father, as principle without principle, are attributed operations of power, i.e., miracles, as elsewhere in the creeds and by the Fathers omnipotence is appropriated to Him; to the Son, as incarnate and head and Lord of the Church, are attributed the ordered ministries in the Church; to the Holy Spirit, as proceeding by love, are attributed sanctifying charisms, which sanctification has such a relation and affinity to the proper personal character of the Holy Spirit, and is so constantly derived in Scripture and by the Fathers particularly from the Holy Spirit, that some theologians have thought sanctification is not merely appropriated but declared as proper to the third person; certainly, the Fathers sometimes call the sanctifying power (*δύναμις ἁγιαστική*) the proper character of the Holy Spirit (Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book VII, ch. 13, nn. 21ff.), and it is common doctrine that the notion of gift or giveable, under a certain special respect, is proper to the third person. But these matters will be treated elsewhere. Meanwhile, it must be held as most certain that the efficiency of created charisms is not proper to the Holy Spirit over the other persons but is appropriated because of the special affinity of these effects with His personal character.

It pertains to appropriation that there is a very frequent distribution, as it were, of the operation *ad extra* through particles indicating the relation of origin among the persons operating with one operation. The Father is said to operate through the Son in the Holy Spirit (cf. above, p. 163), or all created things are said to be from the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Spirit. Regarding what is read in Romans 11:36, Augustine notes: "Since there is one God but yet a Trinity, it must not be understood confusedly: *from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things*" (*On the Trinity*, Book VI, ch. 10, n. 12). St. Thomas adds: "'From Him' is said because of the Father, 'through Him' because of the Son, 'in Him' because of the Holy Spirit" (cf. St. Hilary, *On the Trinity*, Book II, n. 1). The Angelic Doctor comments on this distribution so that it coincides with that solemn appropriation of power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 39, a. 8, ad 4). Richard of St. Victor treats this appropriation of power, wisdom, and goodness at length in chapter 2 of his booklet written to St. Bernard on the three appropriated attributes, and repeats it in *On the Trinity*, Book VI, ch. 15.

A more distinct exposition of this order—*from whom, through whom, in whom are all things*—is contained in an appropriation no less frequent among the Fathers, by which, whether in creation generally or especially in the creation of angels and humans, counsel, will (*βούλησις*), or command of the work is attributed to the Father, execution (*ἐνέργεια* or *δημιουργία*) to the Son, and perfection (*τελείωσις*), which is in sanctification, to the Holy Spirit. "In the creation of angels, consider for me the cause that is principle without principle (*τὴν προηγητικὴν αἰτίαν*), the Father; the creative cause (*τὴν δημιουργικήν*), the Son; the perfecting cause (*τὴν τελειωτικήν*), the Spirit; so that by the will of the Father, the administering spirits exist, by the operation (*ἐνέργεια*) of the Son they are brought into existence, and by the coming of the Spirit they are perfected; moreover, the perfection of angels is sanctification" (St. Basil, *On the Holy Spirit*, ch. 16). The same, as is clear, is the reason for appropriation in the creation of man: "First of all, it must be believed that there is one God who made all things from nothing through His Word and animated them through His Holy Spirit" (Ambrose, *On the Creed*, ch. 6) (1) (cf. Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book VII, ch. 14, nn. 21–23). Recall what we said above (pp. 163ff.).

(1) This treatise *On the Creed* or *On the Trinity*, though the Maurist editors acknowledge its antiquity, they relegated to an appendix as spurious. More recently, August Hahn in *Bibliotheca Symbolorum* (p. 16) vindicated it for Ambrose.

This appropriation is strikingly expressed in a sarcophagus from the Lateran Museum, excavated from a crypt near the tomb of St. Paul, Apostle of the Gentiles, on the Via Ostiensis. The sculpture is thought to be from the fourth century but, as often happens with such works, is probably derived from an older exemplar. This, along with the other carvings on the same monument, has been illustrated by the learned commentaries of distinguished scholars, first Fr. Joseph Marchi, then Fr. Giovanni Battista De Rossi, and finally Fr. Raphael Garrucci, to whom, as an outstanding archaeologist, I express my gratitude (1).

(1) Although there was full agreement among these most learned archaeologists regarding the main point, there was no small diversity of opinions concerning the application and, as it were, the ultimate type of appropriation. It would be foolish for me, a layman, to interpose my opinion on the canons of archaeological discipline. Nevertheless, insofar as the laws of appropriation are treated in theology from the doctrine of Scripture and the Fathers, the following are certain: 1) Where different works are not attributed individually to different persons, e.g., creation, restoration, sanctifying charisms, but one work,

e.g., the creation of man, is distributed according to different aspects or parts among the three persons, the Fathers consistently attribute counsel, as conceived in the mind, to the Father, operation to the Son, perfection to the Holy Spirit (or, if it concerns man, the effecting of the natural image is the Son's, the consummation of the supernatural likeness is the Holy Spirit's). 2) The Father manifests Himself in operations *ad extra* through the Son, who is the "visible of the Father" and the "face of the Father," and through the Holy Spirit. The Father is in Himself the invisible God, the Son in apparitions and manifestations is the visible Lord; "for from the beginning the Word was with God, and the Word was God, to whom all power in heaven and earth was given by the Father… He always descended to human conversations from Adam to the patriarchs and prophets" (Tertullian, cited above, p. 172). 3) The Father speaks, i.e., generates the Word *ad intra*, "full of ideas" with a relation (*ratio*) *ad extra* to all works to be created; the Holy Spirit proceeds as a gift with a relation also to rational creatures to be sanctified. Thus, when "the Father says: Let us make man, etc.," this is immediately the counsel and irradiation of His will in the Son and the Holy Spirit, but in this matter of appropriation, it is not conceived as speech to create things themselves, i.e., as operation; for this is appropriated to the Son and the Holy Spirit as the "hands of the Father." Recall what was said (pp. 163–165). 4) In this very fact that only counsel seems to be attributed to the Father, and operation and perfection to the Son and the Holy Spirit, the unity of both counsel and operation in the three persons is shown; for "one God is the maker… He made them through Himself, that is, through His Word and His Wisdom" (through the Holy Spirit) (Irenaeus, cited above, p. 136).

Other appropriations are referred to and explained, for example, by Augustine: "eternity in the Father, form in the image, use in the gift" (*On the Trinity*, Book VI, ch. 10), which he refers to as from St. Hilary (cf. Ambrose, *On the Apostolic Creed*, ch. 1), although Hilary has them somewhat differently arranged (*On the Trinity*, Book II, n. 1). "One God the Father, from whom are all things, and one only-begotten Lord our Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and one Spirit, the gift in all; one power from whom are all things, one offspring through whom are all things, one gift of perfect hope. Nor will anything be found lacking in such a consummation, within which there is in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, infinity in the eternal, form in the image, use in the gift." Augustine interprets these, and from him St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 39, a. 8), such that eternity corresponds to the property of the Father as principle without principle; form or beauty to the property of the Son, insofar as He is the perfect image of the Father from the very mode of procession by generation; use or "love, delight, and happiness" to the property of the Holy Spirit proceeding by the love of the Father and the Son.

You can now easily explain when Augustine predicates: "in the Father unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the concord of unity and equality; and these three are all one because of the Father, equal because of the Son, connected because of the Holy Spirit" (*On Christian Doctrine*, Book I, ch. 5). See St. Bonaventure (*Commentary on the Sentences*, I, dist. 31, a. 2, q. 3). Likewise, another: "The Father is the true origin to the Son's truth, the Son is the truth arising from the true Father, and the Holy Spirit is the goodness poured forth from the good Father and the good Son" (*Sermon 71*, n. 18). Similarly, in the creeds, there is the distinction of God the Father almighty, creator; then the Son, Lord; the Holy Spirit, life-giver, who spoke through the prophets. Finally, regarding the mode of prayer, Christ the Lord Himself, according to His humanity, directed both obedience and satisfactions for us and prayers explicitly to God the Father, although all these are referred to the one and triune God; and He taught us the same form of prayer, among others, which the Church most frequently follows in the sacred liturgy, where the almighty eternal Father is asked through Jesus Christ our Lord His Son, who reigns with Him

in the unity of the Holy Spirit, God. All these, especially in conjunction with other forms by which prayer is directed to the Son and the Holy Spirit, pertain to expressing the unity of God in the distinction of persons together with the order of processions. See St. Fulgentius (*Fragments*, 29, p. 626); cf. Diego Ruiz, *Disputationes*, 82, sects. 4, 7.

THESIS XIV: On the Mutual Indwelling of the Divine Persons

"What is commonly called the *circumincessio* (*περιχώρησις*, circumincession) of the divine persons is, as to the reality itself, nothing other than the numerical unity of the nature in the three persons distinct by relations of origin; but formally, *circumincessio* is understood as the necessary mutual interpenetration or immanence of the persons in one another arising from this unity and distinction."

I. Definition and Scriptural Foundation

The frequent doctrine among the holy Fathers and theologians concerning this relation, which the Greeks call *περιχώρησις*, older scholastics like St. Bonaventure (*Commentary on the Sentences*, I, dist. 19, p. 1, q. 4) sometimes called *circumincessio* or, as Aureolus (*Commentary on the Sentences*, I, dist. 19, p. 2, a. 1, prop. 2), *circumcessio*, and more recent ones *circuminsessio*, is nothing other than the declaration of the truth expressed by Christ the Lord Himself in these words: "I and the Father are one; know and believe that the Father is in Me and I am in the Father" (John 10:30, 38). "He who sees Me sees the Father… Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in Me?" (John 14:9–10). "That

they may all be one, as You, Father, are in Me and I in You, that they also may be one in Us… And the glory which You gave Me I have given them, that they may be one, as We are one (*ἕν ἐσμέν*)" (John 17:21–22). Although in these passages the Holy Spirit is not explicitly mentioned, given the distinction of the third person and the unity of essence, just as in the Father and the Son, so too in all three persons, the same relation of mutual circumincession of the other persons in the Holy Spirit, and vice versa, must necessarily be admitted. To the foregoing can be added the explicit testimony of the Apostle concerning the Holy Spirit: "God has revealed to us through His Spirit… For who among men knows the things of a man except the spirit of the man which is in him? So also the things of God no one knows except the Spirit of God" (1 Cor 2:10–11).

I. Scriptural and Patristic Foundation (Continued)

In all these passages, the distinction of the persons is declared, formally as they are Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, together with the unity of their nature or essence. Then, whether as a further declaration of this unity and distinction or as a relation necessarily following from it, the mutual indwelling (*inexistentia mutua*) of one person in another is proclaimed. Indeed, if the three, distinct from one another, are one God without any distinction according to essence, the Father, who is God through the divine essence and identified with the divine essence, cannot be nor be conceived with a slightly more adequate notion without having in Himself and being understood to have, just as the divine essence with which He is identified, so also the Son and the Holy Spirit, who are identified with the same essence in number as the Father's. By the same reason, neither can the Son, who is the same one God through the divine essence,

be or be conceived without having in His essence, with which He is identified, the Father and the Holy Spirit; and likewise, the Holy Spirit has the Father and the Son. "I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me. For the Son is in the Father, insofar as it can be understood, since the whole being (*esse*) of the Son is the proper essence of the Father, just as splendor is from light and a river from a fountain (1), so that he who sees the Son sees what is proper to the Father (the essence of the Father) and understands the Son to be in the Father, since the being of the Son is communicated from the Father (the same in number). But the Father is also in the Son, since what is proper to the Father (the essence) and communicated by Him, this the Son is, just as the sun is in the splendor, the mind in the word (internal), and the fountain in the river. Thus, he who contemplates the Son contemplates what is proper to the Father's essence and recognizes the Father to be in the Son. Since, therefore, what is proper to the Father, namely divinity, is the being of the Son, it follows that the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son. Indeed, for this reason, rightly, after He had said, 'I and the Father are one,' He added, 'I am in the Father and the Father in Me,' to show the identity of divinity and the unity of essence" (Athanasius, *Against the Arians*, Oration III, n. 3). "He who has truly received the Son will have Him bringing with Himself, on the one hand, His Father, and on the other, the Holy Spirit… Similarly, he who has received the Father also receives, by power, the Son and the Holy Spirit together. For there can be no way devised, either of separation or division, such that the Son could be understood without the Father or the Spirit separated from the Son, but an ineffable and incomprehensible communion and distinction is observed in them" (Basil, *Epistle 38* [formerly 83], n. 4). The writings of the Fathers against the Arians are full of such declarations of the mutual indwelling of the persons through the unity of nature (see Ruiz, *Disputationes*, 107; Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book IV, ch. 17; Thomassin, ch. 28; Bull, *Defense of the Nicene Faith*, sect. 4, ch. 4, nn. 10ff.).

(1) In images of this kind, some of which are also found in Scripture but especially frequent among the Fathers, both before and after the Council of Nicaea, it is of great importance to understand that the splendor is immanent in the light with the sole distinction that the light is the producing principle, and the splendor (*αὔγασμα*) is the shining light; the fountain and the river are one water, but the fountain as gushing forth from itself, the river as flowing from the fountain.

Although the reason for this mutual indwelling thus far explained is the unity of nature, it is far different to say that in one person, e.g., the Father, there is the essence with which the Son is identified, and that the Son, according to the formal notion of a person distinct from the Father, indwells (*inexistit*) in the Father by *περιχώρησις*. The former is not an indwelling of one in another but only, in our way of understanding, according to the analogy of creatures, we conceive the person as a subject and the nature as a metaphysical form; but in reality, there is complete identity of person and nature, i.e., the same most simple reality, under one aspect, insofar as it is absolute, is called and is the divine nature, and under another aspect, insofar as it is relative, is called and is a divine person. Where there is no real distinction, there cannot be one indwelling in another. But a person is really distinguished from a person, and all three persons are identified with the nature; hence, by reason of distinction, it can rightly be said that one indwells another, and by reason of the identification of all three with one common nature, all three necessarily indwell one another mutually, as has been declared.

Circumincession, therefore, as it has, as it were, the form and containing bond of one nature common in number, so it presupposes and includes really distinct persons as its terms. In commending the unity of nature as the reason for *περιχώρησις*, the holy Fathers no less carefully declare this distinction of persons. "He who received all things from Him who has all things, God from God, spirit from spirit, light from

light, confidently says: 'The Father in Me and I in the Father'; for as the Father is spirit, so also the Son is spirit; as the Father is God, so also the Son is God… What is in the Father is also in the Son… one from another and both one, not two as one, but one in the other, because there is no difference in both" (Hilary, *On the Trinity*, Book III, n. 4; cf. Book VI, n. 19). The whole reason is encapsulated by Damascene: "We know that the hypostases do not exceed one another, are inseparable from one another, and are united; and they interpenetrate (*ἐν ἀλλήλαις κινουμένας*) without confusion; united indeed without confusion, for they are three even if united, but distinct without separation (1). For although each subsists by itself, that is, is a perfect hypostasis and has its own property, that is, a distinct mode of subsisting, they are united by essence and essential attributes, and so they are not separated nor do they go beyond the paternal hypostasis, and they are and are called one God" (Damascene, *Orthodox Faith*, Book III, ch. 5).

(1) Καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλαις κινουμένας ἀσυγχύτως, ἑνώσεως μὲν ἀσυγχύτου, τρεῖς γὰρ εἰσιν καὶ εἰ ἑνοῦνται, διαφορᾶς δὲ ἀχωρίστου.

Thus, the predication of *περιχώρησις*, as contained in Scripture and in the doctrine of the Fathers, is a concise refutation and exclusion of nearly all heresies concerning the mystery of the Holy Trinity. While the unity of nature is understood as the foundation of the mutual indwelling of the persons, the Arians and those who, by admitting different or distinct natures, separate the persons from one another are excluded. While it is understood that one indwells another, the Sabellians and other heretics who deny the real distinction of divine persons are refuted, for by this they also remove the circumincession of one person in another. See St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book IV, ch. 9. In almost the same way, in the mystery of the Incarnation, though in a reverse order, the predication of the circumincession of one nature in another by reason of the unity of the person, to whom both natures are proper, excludes both the Nestorian separation into two hypostases and the Monophysite confusion into one nature (1).

(1) On this other circumincession of distinct natures in the one Christ, we treat as much as necessary in the *Treatise on the Incarnation*. Here, however, note that the reason for the one and the other circumincession is entirely different, and they agree only by a certain analogy. In the mystery of the Trinity, the persons, remaining really distinct from one another, are identified with one most simple divine nature, and this is the proper reason for the necessary and most perfect immanence of each person in the others and of the others in each. In the Incarnation, however, the natures as terms of *περιχώρησις* are not only distinct but infinitely diverse, as the human differs from the divine, and thus not both but only the divine nature is identified with the hypostasis, which is the bond of *περιχώρησις*. The human nature becomes ineffably proper to this divine hypostasis as a part, so that the Word is truly man, and this man is truly God the Word; but the Word is not really the human nature, nor is the human nature the Word. Therefore, *περιχώρησις* there, if we speak in the strictest sense, applies only when concretely considering and predicating God the Word, who is the man Jesus, and the man Jesus, who is God the Word. "Since the Word was made flesh, it is not lawful to think of that God without what is man, nor of the man without what is God… Nothing there is vacant from the other: all humility is in majesty, all majesty in humility" (St. Leo, *Sermon 3 on the Passion of the Lord*). Frequently, however, the Fathers emphasize rather the consequence of this *περιχώρησις*, that from the divine nature, with which it is united in the hypostasis, excellent gifts and adornments naturally flow into the human nature. See Petavius, *On the Incarnation*, Book IV, ch. 14.

As long as we consider *περιχώρησις* only in the manner now declared, insofar as its proper reason is the unity of nature identified with all and each person, the Father is understood to be in the Son and the Son in the Father, both in the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit in both, in exactly the same way. But the reality itself and the frequent doctrine of the Fathers remind us that this consideration is not complete unless the persons themselves, which are in one another, are regarded according to their distinct properties and origins. "In the Father and the Son, there are three things to consider, namely essence, relation, and origin, and according to each of these, the Son is in the Father and vice versa" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 42, a. 5; *Commentary on the Sentences*, I, dist. 19, q. 3, a. 2). Thus, with some distinction, "the Son is in the Father as the originated in the origin, and conversely, the Father is in the Son as the origin in the originated" (St. Thomas, *Commentary on the Sentences*, I, dist. 1, a. ad 1 and 3).

II. Procession and Mutual Immanence

Thus, even when considering the mode of procession of person from person in divine things, there cannot but be a mutual *περιχώρησις* of the persons and, as it were, interpenetration. "The reason (*λόγος*) is always from the mind (*ἐκ νοῦ*) and in the mind (*ἐν νῷ*), and the mind is in the reason (*ἐν λόγῳ*). Or if they deny that these are true, then the mind will be without reason, and reason without mind (*νοῦς μὲν ἄλογος ἔσται, λόγος δὲ ἄνους*), and thus what reveals what both are (namely, the mind and reason) will be empty and reduced to nothing. For the mind is always the root and origin of reason, and reason, in turn, is the fruit and offspring of the mind… Since the mind exists because it has reason, and reason because it is full of the mind, how could the mind ever be thought without reason, or reason bereft of the mind?… How does the power of this image apply to the Father and the Son? I say it is a most fitting and very clear demonstration that the procession of the Word is from the mind and a generation without passion, and the generated certainly is not divided; but rather, it remains in the generating mind and wholly has in itself the generating mind; moreover, it is shown that the Word has consubstantial, immediate, and, in our consideration, simultaneous subsistence" (for we cannot think of the mind without reason, nor the Father without the Son, nor vice versa) (Cyril of Alexandria, *Dialogue II on the Trinity*, *Works*, Vol. V, Part I, pp. 450–462). "For it is called Word and Wisdom because it is from the mind and immediately and indivisibly from the mind, and because of the mutual, so to speak, interpenetration (*ἀντεμβολήν*) of each in the other. For the mind is in the Word (*ἐν λόγῳ*), and Wisdom and the Word, in turn, are understood to be in the mind (*εἰς νοῦν*)" (Cyril, *Commentary on John*, Vol. IV, p. 47). The explanation of St. Fulgentius is similar: "The Word is with God as a word is in the mind, as counsel is in the heart… Just as a word is born from the whole mind, so it remains born within the whole. And since, in a thinking mind, there is nothing of it where the word is not, therefore the word is as great as the mind itself from which it is; and when it is with it, it is in it" (Fulgentius, *To Monimus*, Book III, ch. 7).

The same applies entirely to the Holy Spirit in His proper hypostasis, proceeding by the love of the Father and the Son, in a procession that is certainly immanent. "The Holy Spirit, as a natural and essential act (*ἐνέργεια*) subsisting in itself, proceeds from God and remains in God" (Cyril, *Thesaurus*, Vol. V, Part I, p. 341). Thus, concerning the three persons by reason of immanent processions, what St. Anselm says applies: "The whole Father is in the Son and in their common Spirit, and the Son in the Father and in the same Spirit, and the same Spirit in the Father and the Son; because the memory (1) of the supreme essence is wholly in its intelligence and love, and intelligence in memory and love, and love in memory and intelligence" (*Monologion*, ch. 57). To this pertain all those considerations of the Fathers described

above by us, in which they present the Word and the Holy Spirit as the subsistent Wisdom and Power of the Father, through which and in which God operates *ad extra*.

(1) Other Fathers, especially the Greeks, say *mind* (*νοῦς*), while Augustine and later the Scholastics often say *memory*. In this analogy of the created spirit, Augustine understands *memory* as the faculty of thinking or the mind already informed by a habitual idea or impressed species, as they call it; *intelligence*, however, is taken for the actual thought itself or the expressed species. Hence, in the translation to God, *memory* corresponds to the paternal intellect, *intelligence* is the expressed and immanent Word in the intellect.

From all that has been brought forth from the holy Fathers, it seems to me not undeservedly observed that if the unity of essence is considered precisely, it may be better called *circumincession* or mutual immanence of the persons; but if the procession *ad intra* and, as it were, the divine notional vital act is considered, we express the reality more fully by calling it *circumincession* or mutual interpenetration. To this may also perhaps be referred the mode of signifying the act of procession in St. John (1:18), where it is said in Greek that "the only-begotten Son is in the bosom of the Father" (*εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ Πατρός*). Hence, Cyril of Alexandria, both in *Dialogue II* and in *Commentary on John*, carefully preserves the different mode of speaking about the producing mind, which is in its Word (*ἐν λόγῳ*), and about the proceeding Word, which is in the mind (*εἰς νοῦν*).

III. Relation and Logical Consideration

What St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 42, a. 5) distinguishes, besides the origin of person from person, as *relation*, he considers *circumincession* under this aspect more logically than ontologically, "that one of the opposites relatively is in the other according to understanding." Namely, one relative, e.g., the Father, cannot be understood without simultaneously understanding the other correlative, the Son; for they are relative to each other. The Fathers often indicate this mode, as St. Basil in the cited *Epistle 38*, and most clearly Dionysius of Alexandria, as reported by Damascene (*Eclogues*, ch. 1): "Each of those names is inseparable and cannot be divided from the next: I said 'Father,' and before I add 'Son,' I have signified Him in the Father; I added 'Son,' and even if I had not named the Father before, He would still have been entirely preconceived in the Son; I added 'Holy Spirit,' but by the very name of the Spirated, I included both from whom and through whom (from the Father through the Son) He proceeded." See Ruiz, *Disputationes*, 9, sect. 4.

Although relatives in general and in themselves do not have real immanence, in God they necessarily have it because of the mode of internal origins or immanent processions, from which relations arise in our way of conceiving, or rather, with which relations are entirely really identical. Hence: a) If the ontological immanence of the persons is considered, this reason according to origins and according to relations is not double but one and the same, as St. Thomas also considered it elsewhere (*Commentary on the Sentences*, I, dist. 19, q. 3, a. 2). b) From the origins themselves, the mutual immanence of the persons arises because of the mode of processions, insofar as they are through the communication of one nature in number; and thus, the proper real reason for circumincession remains the unity of nature in distinct persons. "For God is not in a dwelling of a different and alien nature, but remains in His own and begotten from Himself: God in God, because God is from God" (Hilary, *On the Trinity*, Book IV, n. 40; cf. Ambrose, *On the Holy Spirit*, Book III, ch. 1).

II. Formal Concept of Circumincession

After expounding, as far as the matter required, the doctrine of Scripture and the Fathers, it remains to deduce from it the proper reason and notion of this mutual indwelling of the persons, what it properly is, or what is the formal concept of circumincession. For theologians dispute among themselves about this, although all agree that the reason from which it necessarily follows is the unity of nature in distinct persons, as we have discussed thus far.

Petavius (*De Trinitate*, Book IV, ch. 16; *On the Incarnation*, Book IV, ch. 14) seems to have made much progress by noting that *περιχώρησις*, according to the Greek Fathers, is to be understood as a mutual embrace and comprehension of one in another, and thus is not *circumincession* as the later Scholastics commonly taught, but rather a mutual interpenetration or *circumincession*, since both the persons in the Trinity and the two natures in Christ are said not to *περιχωρεῖν ἀλλήλας* (embrace one another) but *περιχωρεῖν εἰς ἀλλήλας* (interpenetrate into one another). But no one can deny, nor does Petavius deny, that *περιχώρησις* is what Christ the Lord expressed in the words: "I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me," and which all the holy Doctors understood as the immanence of the persons in one another. Now, to establish the formal concept of this immanence, it seems to matter little whether you say mutual interpenetration or circumincession or mutual embrace.

Thus, a more subtle concept, as far as it is sought among Catholics, cannot be established by the name, nor from elsewhere, but only by a more diligent consideration of the reality itself as handed down in Scripture and by the Fathers.

1. **Scholastic View Based on Immensity**: Many later Scholastics think that circumincession of the persons (presupposing, of course, the unity of nature) formally consists, according to its formal concept, in "the intimate presence of the persons to one another, which is founded on their immensity," as Suarez teaches (*De Trinitate*, Book IV, ch. 16, nn. 11–12); or as Ruiz puts it: "Circumincession, quidditatively and formally, consists in the intimate, inseparable, and perpetual presence according to immense *ubi* (where), by reason of which it implies a contradiction for one person to be somewhere unless the other person is also there and thus present" (*Disputationes*, 107, sect. 7, nn. 9, 14).

In this matter, we wholeheartedly agree with Petavius (*loc. cit.*) that immensity, as understood by these theologians, does not at all enter the formal concept of circumincession; indeed, we feel that this lighter way of considering *περιχώρησις*, which, as we noted earlier, is a most splendid adumbration of the entire mystery of the Trinity opposed to all heresies, diminishes it from its majesty to a notion at least somewhat unworthy of such a mystery.

First, the very immensity of God is understood very improperly when it is conceived according to an "immense *ubi*" as if it were some diffusion, since it is nothing other than the perfection of divine existence, eminent above all relations of place and space, by virtue of which perfection it is repugnant to conceive a creature existing or possible somewhere where God is not; Augustine splendidly illustrated this concept of perfection by analogy with the notion of truth, free from all relations of place and space (see *Treatise on God*, Thesis XXXIII). Thus, when a creature exists, it is necessarily intimately present to God, which presence adds nothing to God beyond the perfection of immensity. Hence, the presence of

God, in the proper sense, is said in relation to creatures and is a rational relation *ad extra*; namely, the presence of God is God's immensity (in the sense explained) with the signification of an existing creature. Therefore, the divine persons, because they are really distinguished from one another and at the same time all identified with the divine essence are one God, are properly said to be one in another, but the name *presence* in this sense can be used only with an analogical signification, and certainly it expresses less clearly the mode of that divine indwelling through identity of essence. All the faithful say that where one person is present, all three persons are present; but I do not know whether they would patiently bear it if someone said, for example, that the Holy Spirit is present to God the Father and the Son.

Thus, it is not without reason, though rejected by those later Scholastics, what Aureolus, a most subtle theologian, says: "Presence seems to be a relation implying a distinction of those things that are present to each other; for the same is not present to itself; but the whole person is not distinguished from a person according to essence, therefore according to essence one will not be intimately present to another but entirely identical, nor can such intimate presence be considered except according to the relations, which are really distinguished; and yet, according to Hilary and Augustine, circumincession of the persons is considered through the total and perfect identity of essence, which subsists in the three. The whole personality of the Son in the personality of the Holy Spirit must be understood so that one does not slide into the other or is intimately present, lest they be conceived as essentially distinct or not united by identity in some one simple reality; for this would imply a respect of presence" (*Commentary on the Sentences*, I, dist. 19, aa. 1 and 3).

Even setting aside all these considerations, the concept of circumincession through presence according to immensity or immense *ubi* is shown to be entirely false for other reasons. For: a) Such intimate presence of God is in all creatures; yet the concept of this presence has nothing in common with the concept of *περιχώρησις*; but the sense of indwelling is entirely different when the Son says, "I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me," and when Paul says, "In God we live and move and have our being" (Acts 17:28). Lest it be said that there is no *περιχώρησις* there because a creature is not everywhere God is, consider another point. b) In Christ's humanity, the Father and the Holy Spirit are no less present than the Word, yet the holy Fathers acknowledge, and the reason of the Incarnation itself proves, that *περιχώρησις* exists only between the divine nature, insofar as it is the Word's, and the human nature, though not everywhere present, of the same Word, but in no way between the human nature and the other two persons. The sole reason is that *περιχώρησις* can in no way be conceived from intimate presence but only from the substantial union or unity of distinct terms in one substance (i.e., either in nature or in hypostasis). c) In the heretical opinion of the tritheists, i.e., if each distinct person had its own numerically distinct divine nature, as three men have three distinct natures, there would nonetheless be an intimate, necessary, and inseparable presence according to immensity of one person in all and all in each; yet there would be no *περιχώρησις* as taught in Scripture and declared by the Fathers. For this is the mutual indwelling of distinct persons through the identity of nature. Therefore, as we said above, both in Scripture and by the holy Fathers, circumincession is so carefully commended and declared because, with this one doctrine understood, all heresies denying either the singularity of nature or the distinction of persons are excluded. But this depth of the mystery and the weight of the doctrine are no longer preserved in that concept of presence according to immense *ubi*.

Hence, you may see what to think of the annotation of John Clericus, an Arminian, under the pseudonym Theophilus Alethinus, to Petavius's *De Trinitate*, Book IV, ch. 16. There this false Alethinus says: "If the

ancients had conceived one substance in number, they would never have thought of circumincession; for no one would say that one substance indwells itself… But if we understand three eternal spirits perfectly equal, there can be room for *ἐνπεριχώρησις*." Certainly, the ancients would not have thought, nor would Christ have spoken, of mutual indwelling if, as there is one substance, so there were one person; but the distinct persons are taught to be in one another by circumincession because of the very numerical unity of nature or substance. Thus, in a completely reverse order, it should have been said to Alethinus: if three equal spirits are understood, but in distinct natures, there can be no room for *περιχώρησις* as handed down in Scripture and by the Fathers; but because the ancients believed in one substance in number in three distinct persons, they not only thought of circumincession but defended it most extensively and in manifold ways.

2. **Proper Concept of Circumincession**: To conclude what we began, the proper concept of the mutual indwelling of the persons seems to be constituted thus

We say that what pertains to God *ad intra* and *ad extra* does not signify an order or relation of presence; for in this sense, nothing can be or be conceived outside God without absurdity. But we say *ad intra* refers to that which is really the divine Being itself, the divine essence, God Himself; *ad extra*, however, refers to whatever is distinct from the divine essence, and thus whatever is or can be created. Hence, if those things which are *ad extra* are said to remain in God, this is understood insofar as God, as the first being and first cause, is present in all things through His essence, presence, and power by virtue of His immensity (see *Treatise on God*, Thesis XXXIV).

However, concerning those things which are *ad intra*, their immanence can be considered in two ways. First, if we consider the absolute attributes, which we conceive either as attributes or as actions, their immanence presupposes a distinction of reason (i.e., according to our mode of conceiving), and formally it is their identity with God, or with the divine essence, or among the attributes themselves. For attributes can be said to be immanent in God, or in the divine essence, or in one another. For example, we can say that wisdom, the act of creating, etc., are immanent in God. This could not be said unless there were some distinction of reason; for we do not say that what we conceive without any distinction is immanent in itself. Formally, in these absolute attributes, by immanence we signify that inexistence (an analogy drawn from the attributes of creatures), which in God is the identity of the attribute with the divine Being or with the divine essence.

In another way, which properly pertains to the present matter, the divine persons are to be considered, which are indeed really identified with the divine essence and thus with the absolute attributes, but are really distinguished from one another. Hence, when one person is said to be immanent in or to inhere in another, what is presupposed is not now a distinction of reason but a real distinction, and therefore the persons are said to inhere in one another in a different and more proper sense than the attributes inhere in the essence or in one another (1). Formally, through this mutual inexistence of the persons, what is signified is not the identity of the persons among themselves, insofar as they are persons, since a real distinction is presupposed; but what is signified is the identity of the persons, which are said to inhere in one another, with the one essence in number, and on account of this identity, the comprehension of one person in another. If we wish to express the mode of distinction and identity more clearly, we can say: the persons are mutually immanent in one another insofar as one proceeds from another *ad intra*, i.e., in the identity of the one essence in number. Thus, just as the immanence of attributes, which are distinguished

by reason, is their real identity with the essence, so too here circumincession is the mutual comprehension of one person in another, of persons proceeding *ad intra* and really distinguished, on account of their identification with the one nature or essence in number.

(1) If it is asked whether the human nature of Christ is related to the Word *ad intra* or *ad extra*, the response is: if you consider the divine nature (*φύσις θεία*), the human nature is *ad extra*, and only the Eutychians say it is *ad intra*. If you consider the incarnate Word formally as it is a hypostasis, i.e., as this someone (*ὁ τίς*) who has a human nature and through it is truly man, the human nature is *ad intra* to this composite hypostasis, i.e., to this Word who is man, because, although it does not constitute this hypostasis, it is (in the manner of a part) something of this hypostasis, insofar as it is man. We treat these matters in our *Treatise on the Incarnation*.

It might seem to someone, based on what has been said, that circumincession does not differ from the consubstantiality of the persons. We respond: without doubt, just as in the words of Christ in John 10: "I and the Father are one," and "the Father is in Me and I in the Father," so too consubstantiality and circumincession comprehend the same reality, the same twofold truth of the unity of nature and the distinction of persons; but the same reality and the same truth are conceived under two different notions. When we say the persons are consubstantial, we conceive one nature of distinct persons in direct opposition to the heresy that posits diverse natures in the three persons, and consequently also in opposition to tritheism on account of the singularity of the divine, non-multipliable nature. However, when we say circumincession, we conceive one person as mutually in another, insofar as all the persons subsist in one nature in number, such that there is a direct opposition to the heresy that would claim one person subsists separated from another—not indeed according to place (*ubi*) or by the negation of presence (for such an error, given divinity, could not be conceived by anyone), but one apart from another and outside another, insofar as it would have a distinct nature, as, for example, three spirits subsist. Therefore, circumincession is in direct opposition to tritheism and consequently, and *a fortiori*, to Arianism.

Thesis XV: On the Unity of Perfection in the Persons, Whether Considered Together or Singly

From the unity of perfection in the persons, whether considered together as three or singly, by reason of circumincession, the unity of perfection of the divine persons is declared, because: 1) the fullness of perfection of each person, insofar as they are related to one another by relations of origin, requires that one has the others immanent in itself; 2) hence, the entire perfection, even relative, of the three persons is possessed by each, not indeed as constituting but through necessary immanence; 3) which unity of perfection is declared from the real identity of all and each person with the infinite divine essence.

I. The Necessity of Mutual Immanence for Perfection

After declaring the proper reason for the mutual inexistence of the persons, each in all and all in each, we can explain how this very mutual immanence pertains to the perfection of each and all. The divine intellect, from its intimate necessary perfection, by understanding produces a consubstantial Word. Thus considered, the intellect is relative to its Word as the producing mind, and the Word is relative to the producer as proceeding from it: the former is the Father, the latter the Son. Hence, the Father is indeed

formally constituted insofar as He is the intellect producing the Word (which abstractly is said: the Father is constituted by the relation of paternity identified with the essence); but by the same internal necessity by which He produces the Word by understanding, He has His Word as the immanent produced term of His intellection; nor would He be producing by understanding, and thus would not be the Father, without the Word immanent in Him. Most truly, therefore, the holy Fathers say that without His Word, the Father would be without intelligence, without wisdom (*ἄσοφον καὶ ἄλογον*), not as if the Word were formally the intelligence and wisdom by which the Father is wise; for wisdom is absolute, common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and insofar as it is in the Father, it is the principle by which He produces the Word; but the sense of the Fathers is most true, that intelligence and wisdom, as they are in the Father, necessarily have the produced Word as their term, and if this necessarily immanent product were removed, there would be no intelligence. (See the Fathers cited in Ruiz, *Disputationes*, 29, sect. 3; Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book VI, ch. 7; cf. St. Thomas, *Opusculum Contra Graecos*, ch. 7). Thus, without doubt, it pertains to the perfection of the Father, not indeed as a constitutive form but as a necessary term of His paternal intellection, that He has in Himself the Word produced by Himself and immanent.

"For when this Word is posited in God through the fact that God understands Himself by conceiving His intelligible Word, it would have to be that at some time the Word of God did not exist, which would mean that God did not understand Himself then. But whenever God existed, He understood Himself, because His understanding is His being. Therefore, His Word always existed" (St. Thomas, *Compendium Theologiae*, ch. 43). This matter of great importance for some understanding of the divine persons we will express in the words of the eminent theologian Diego Ruiz: "The Father has in Himself the entire Son and His filiation as the perfect term of His vital operation (by which He produces the Word by understanding), i.e., as the Word of the very same substance; and therefore, the Father has within Himself filiation as a perfection due to Him and His own, without which He would be defective (better: without which He would not be at all, because He would not be perfect)… For a tree is perfected by the fruit united to it and remaining in it; a created intellect is perfected by the word of the mind produced by intellection and remaining in that intellect. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the Father is perfected by the Son, who is the fruit vitally produced and essentially requiring to be united with its root or principle, and is the Word produced by the immanent action of the paternal intellect. Therefore, the Father, for His perfection, essentially requires to contain within Himself and in Himself the perfection of filiation, not as constitutive of His person but as the glory and ornament of His person" (better: as the term of His producing or notional intellection) (Ruiz, *Disputationes*, 30, sect. 6, nn. 13–14).

Conversely, the Word, the splendor of glory and the perfect expression of the paternal substance and consubstantial image, proceeding by an internal necessity without beginning and without end and always generated as the term of paternal intellection, in this very perfection embraces and has immanent in itself the mind that speaks, or the Father, its principle, nor would it be a perfect Word without the immanence of its principle.

It is clear, however, that the same must be thought and said about the perfection of the will or love in the Father and the Son, whose necessary produced term is the subsistent love, the Holy Spirit. That love (as it is in the Father and the Son), from its intimate necessary perfection, expresses a subsistent love as its immanent term. Hence, the holy Doctors, just as they say the Father without the Word would be without wisdom, in the same sense say that without the Holy Spirit, God would not be holy. "What deity, if imperfect? But how will it be perfect if it lacks something for perfection? It lacks if it does not have

holiness. But how does it have holiness if it does not have the Holy Spirit?" (Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration 31* [also 37], n. 4). The holiness of love (see *Treatise on God*, Thesis XXIX), as it is in the Father and the Son, has the Holy Spirit as its internally produced term (1), and the divine love of the Father and the Son, without this term, i.e., unless love is spiration, is not in its perfection. Therefore, it pertains to the perfection of the Father and the Son to have their Spirit immanent as the necessary term of their notional love or spiration.

Conversely, for the same reason that the Word has the Father immanent in itself as its principle, and this immanence is required for the very perfection of the Word, so too the perfection of subsistent love is to have immanent in itself its principle, namely, the Father and the Son.

(1) "Just as in divine things the mode by which God is in God as the understood in the understanding is expressed by the fact that we say the Son who is the Word of God; so the mode by which God is in God as the loved in the loving is expressed by the fact that we posit there the Spirit who is the love of God… It is necessary that the love by which the highest good, which is God, is loved, obtains a certain eminent goodness, which is expressed by the name of holiness… Therefore, it is fitting that the Spirit, by which the love by which God loves Himself is signified to us, is called the Holy Spirit" (St. Thomas, *Compendium Theologiae*, ch. 46–47).

II. Unity of Perfection in the Trinity

Anyone can easily see how, from the principles handed down, the most certain truth in the mystery of the Holy Trinity, which Augustine, along with other Fathers, often proclaims, can be conceived and declared, as at the conclusion of Book VI of *De Trinitate*: "Here, in corporeal things (from which Augustine there seeks a trace of the Trinity), one thing is not as much as three together, and two are something more than one; but in that supreme Trinity, one is as much as three together, nor are two anything more than one; yet they are infinite in themselves" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VI, n. 12). He himself explains the reason, continuing: "Thus, each is in each, and all in each, and each in all, and all in all, and all are one. Let him who sees this, whether in part or through a mirror and in an enigma, rejoice in knowing God, and as God, let him honor and give thanks; but let him who does not see strive through piety to see, not through blindness to slander."

Those "each" and "all" that are said to be in each and in all, three distinct among themselves, and all are said to be one, are understood by Augustine not only as the essence and absolute attributes but also the relative attributes, i.e., the personal characteristics and thus the persons themselves; for he had spoken immediately before in the context about these distinguishing characteristics and their mutual distinction. The supreme reason, even for the relative attributes, why "all are in each and all are one," is ultimately their real identity with the infinite and absolute essence. Thus, not only are "each in each," and thus (speaking of the relative attributes) each constitutive characteristic in each person or each person in itself (e.g., the Father by Himself and in Himself as a hypostasis), but also "all in each"; and therefore, in the Father, not only paternity as constitutive but also the Son and the Holy Spirit, though not as formally constituting the Father but as necessary internal terms of paternal intellection and love; and likewise in the Son, the Father and the Holy Spirit, and in the Holy Spirit, the Father and the Son. By this very fact, there are "each in all and all in each," each person in itself and in the other two persons, and all in each. Finally,

“all are one,” the three persons not as one person, nor three as one; but three are one, one essence and one God.

This mutual immanence and identification Augustine connects, as an explanatory reason, with the dogma that “in that supreme Trinity, one is as much as three together.” Given the truth of faith that the three, distinguished only by relations of origin, have one essence or divine nature in number, it is easily understood that one and the same absolute perfection is present, whether one person, who is one God, or three are considered, who are the same one God; for the essence, and thus absolute perfection, is neither increased nor multiplied in multiple persons nor diminished in each: “One supreme reality, which is truly the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the three persons together and each of them” (Fourth Lateran Council). But there is difficulty and great diversity of opinions among theologians when it must be explained how the three persons, formally according to the relative attributes by which they are really distinguished from one another, are not more perfection than one person. Since there are three real persons, though distinguished only insofar as they are three relative attributes to one another, and thus are three relative realities, three relative beings (as most concede), how is it that three relative realities considered together are not more relative perfection than one of the three?

In such questions, above all, the highest reverence due to the adorable mystery must be preserved, and thus the matter must be conceived so that the consideration, without inopportune curiosity, modestly strives for a clearer understanding of God in His infinity, eminent above all created things and especially above all sensible and material things. Then, the proposed difficulty can be explained from the principles of circumincession as follows. The divine intellect in act, or the substantial divine understanding under the formal aspect as producing an immanent consubstantial Word, is God the Father; and thus, the perfect Father is not such unless He includes the Word immanent in Himself as the term of notional intellection. For the same reason, the Father and the Son in their full relative perfection are not such unless they include the Holy Spirit as the term of notional will or love (1). Conversely, the relative perfection of the Word requires the immanence of the Father as its principle, and the relative perfection of the Holy Spirit in the same way requires the immanence of the Father and the Son. Hence, the full relative perfection of the Father comprehends in itself all that is of relative perfection in the other two persons; and thus, the same must be said of each person, that in the fullness of its relative perfection, it comprehends the relative perfection of the other persons. The mode of comprehension corresponds to the property of each person; for in each, one relative perfection is constitutive, while the others are present for the fullness of perfection as internal terms of vital production or as the producing principle. This can be reduced to the formula: each person has formally the relative perfection by which it is constituted; the relative perfections of the other persons it has not formally, i.e., as constitutive, but through immanence or correlatively. Therefore, each person is not only the entire absolute perfection, which is the same as the three persons together, because the divine essence is one; but also each person, in the fullness of its relative perfection, has the relative perfections of all the persons in a manner appropriate to each person (2).

(1) “Nor, because it is a Trinity, should it be thought to be threefold (composed of three as if parts); otherwise, the Father alone or the Son alone would be less than the Father and the Son together. Although it cannot be found how the Father alone or the Son alone can be said, since always and inseparably the Father is with the Son and the Son with the Father, not as if both were the Father or both the Son, but because they are always in one another, neither alone” (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, V, ch. 7). “The Father

could not be perfect unless He had the Son, because He would not be the Father without the Son; nor would God be perfect unless He had the Word, and unless He had the breath of life (the Holy Spirit), as Athanasius says… In which it is clear that the Father would not be a perfect God unless He had the Son and the Holy Spirit" (St. Thomas, *Opusculum I Contra Errores Graecorum*, ch. 7).

(2) Ruiz explains this reason at length, why and how one person comprehends the relative perfections of all persons (*Disputationes*, 29 and 30). "The mutual immanence of all persons in one another is connected with that infinity of perfection, by reason of which one person is as much as three together. And certainly, without circumincession, a sufficient reason cannot be given why one person is of such magnitude and perfection as the whole Trinity, according to the doctrine of the Fathers and Scholastics" (*Disputationes*, 50, sect. 6, n. 10). To the objection that each person taken by itself is an integral and perfect person, the same theologian responds: "Each person can be considered singly and by itself in two ways. First, as it is in itself really distinct from the other two persons, yet containing them within itself vitally immanent and perfecting it. In this way, each person taken by itself is an integral and perfect person, the Father is an integral Father, and likewise the Son and the Holy Spirit. In the second way, each person can be taken singly and by itself by abstracting from the fact that it contains within itself the other persons vitally immanent. And as thus taken, the person is abstracted from its perfection, and therefore it is not yet perfect, nor would the Father be a perfect Father" (unless He had the other persons immanent) (*Disputationes*, sect. 7, n. 11).

III. Unity of Perfection Grounded in the Unity of Essence

Although these things are so and the proposed consideration can be undertaken not without fruit, nevertheless, just as circumincession is ultimately reduced to the numerical unity of the essence in three distinct persons, so too this truth, that individual persons are the entire infinite perfection that can neither be increased nor diminished, as much perfection as the three persons together, must also be explained ultimately from the unity of the essence as its proper foundation, to which the holy Fathers also frequently appeal (see Fathers cited in Ruiz, *Disputationes*, 30, sect. 2; Petavius, *De Deo*, Book VI, ch. 7, nn. 12ff.; *De Trinitate*, Book VIII, ch. 9, n. 16). But the manner of explaining this varies greatly among different theologians. Our explanation is deduced from the principles set forth in the *Treatise on God*. The one infinite Being, one reality (as the Fourth Lateran Council speaks), is simultaneously absolute and relative. As it is absolute, it is and is called one infinite essence; as it is relative, it is not nor can it be one relative (since relation there is *ad intra* of one to another), but from the internal necessity of that essence and nature, there are three relatives—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—distinguished among themselves under the formal aspect of relatives, who, under the formal aspect of the absolute, as has been said, both individually and all together are one essence; "the same essence that in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 42, a. 6, ad 3). Thus, the same reality, existing simultaneously as one absolute essence and as a threefold substantial relation or as three relatives to one another, cannot be understood by us in one concept; but one concept corresponds to that reality as absolute (and this is and is called the formality or formal aspect of the absolute or essence), and another concept corresponds to the same reality as relative, either confusedly or distinctly as Father, Son, or Holy Spirit, or Trinity (under which concept it is and is called the formality or formal aspect of the relative or person). Therefore, there is a distinction of reason with a foundation in reality between the absolute and the relative, between the essence and the person.

This is a distinction with formal abstraction, by which we conceive the essence explicitly without the express notion of the person, although the notion of the person is implicitly included in that reality conceived (1). But the distinction is not with objective precision (as we said in the *Treatise on God*, Theses XIII, XXVI); that is, neither can the formal notion of the person be conceived so as to exclude the notion of the essence (in which most theologians agree); nor is the formal notion of the essence to be conceived so as to exclude the notion of the person. Concerning this latter point, many theologians speak otherwise, but we, convinced by arguments, follow many others, among whom are Gregory of Valencia (*In I*, disp. 2, q. 13, point 1) and Cardinal de Aguirre, who explained this more fully (*Theologia S. Anselmi*, Vol. I, disp. 26; disp. 31, sect. 4ff.; cf. Vol. II, disp. 78). I do not say that the notion of the essence necessarily includes the notion of the person; but I say that the objective reality conceived under the notion of the divine essence (or any absolute attribute) is such that it really includes, and, given revelation and faith, must be judged to include, the relative notion, the persons Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. If, however, it were judged that the reality presented to the concept of the divine essence (or absolute attribute) is abstracted by objective precision so as not to include the persons, this would not be a concept of the divine essence, and this judgment would be entirely false.

(1) What this distinction with formal abstraction is, as distinguished from objective precision, is best explained by the manner in which the formal distinction in transcendental realities, such as being, truth, and goodness, is understood.

From these principles follows the solution to the proposed question. If the notion of the person or substantial relations or personal properties (which all signify the same) were distinguished really from the essence, just as they are mutually distinguished from one another, and thus there were a quaternity (as Abbot Joachim thought followed from the numerical unity of the essence and the Trinity of persons); then indeed the essence together with personality, and *a fortiori* the essence together with the three persons, would comprehend more perfection than the essence alone or individual persons separately; but by this very fact, neither the essence nor individual persons, and consequently nor all the persons together, would be the infinite Being comprehending the entire fullness of the divine Being (1), and thus the very concept of God would be perverted. But the divine essence, one and the same, is, without the addition of any other perfection (for nothing of divine perfection can be or be conceived outside it), simultaneously the absolute and the relative Father, the relative Son, and the relative Holy Spirit: "one supreme reality, which is the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the three persons together and each of them" (Fourth Lateran Council). Therefore, when I conceive the formal notion of the essence or the absolute, I do not indeed explicitly conceive the relative, but I conceive that which, from its intimate nature, is necessarily simultaneously relative by a threefold substantial relation, and thus is all perfection, both that which is conceived under the aspect of the absolute and that which is explicitly conceived under the aspect of the relative; both aspects are distinguished only by our concept, but in reality, they are one, as has been said. Therefore, conversely, under the notion of a person, e.g., the Father, I indeed explicitly conceive the relative, which under the notion of the essence was only implicit; but certainly no more nor less perfection is comprehended under this notion of the Father than under the notion of the essence, which holds equally for the notion of the Son or the Holy Spirit, and thus also for each and all three together.

(1) The reason for this is explained in the *Treatise on God*, Thesis XXVI, where we treated metaphysical composition, which is a certain indication and consequence of limitation.

Therefore, in individual persons, the absolute considered together with the relative, or the essence together with the relation, is not something greater or more perfect than the essence considered alone; nor is the essence considered together with the three relations, which are really one with it, something greater or more perfect than the essence considered alone. Therefore, since individual persons are really the divine essence, the three persons are not something greater than one considered alone.

Indeed, the divine essence is the fullness of the divine being, incapable of diminution as well as of increase, one and the same, identified both with individual and with all three substantial relations or persons, although the persons are not explicitly conceived under the notion of the essence but are implicitly comprehended. Hence, the three persons are the same fullness with the explicit expression of the substantial relations; each person is likewise the same fullness with the explicit expression of one relative and with the comprehension of the other two persons, insofar as they are identified with the essence, and insofar as, therefore, under the formal aspect of relatives, they pertain not indeed as constitutive but as immanent terms to the perfection of each person. In this final reason, as is clear, we return to circumincession.

This was splendidly expressed by St. Cyril of Alexandria: "Simple and uncomposed is that nature preeminent above all, extended by the properties of the hypostases and the differences of persons and names (*διευρυνομένη*, i.e., common to all persons) and tending toward the holy Trinity (*εἰς ἁγίαν τριάδα*); yet by natural unity and complete identity, it converges into one reality, namely, the name and reality of God: so that in each, the entire nature is understood together with its hypostatic property. For each remains what it is in natural union with the others, possessing them in its nature (*κατέχειν τελοῦν ἕν φύσει*); for the Father is in the Son and the Holy Spirit, and likewise the Son and the Spirit in the Father, and in one another mutually" (*Dialogue VII*, Vol. V, Part I, p. 641).

Now, from what has been said, the response to the difficulty proposed at the beginning is given formally, in which it was said: the three relative perfections are really distinguished among themselves; but three perfections together are something better and more perfect than one of them. Therefore, etc. Response: I distinguish the major premise: they are, as opposed relations, really distinguished

Response (continued): I distinguish the major premise: they [the three relative perfections] are distinguished among themselves such that, in one common essence with which they are identified, they are one (i.e., such that the distinction is inadequate), I concede the major; they are distinguished without unity in a common essence (i.e., such that the distinction is adequate), I deny the major. Likewise, I distinguish the minor premise: three relative perfections distinguished both among themselves and from the essence would be something greater (introducing a quaternity and subverting the infinity of the divine Being), I concede the minor; three relative perfections distinguished among themselves by mutual opposition but identified, both individually and all together, with the one and same infinite essence, are something greater and more perfect than one, I deny the minor.

If it is further pressed: the Father does not have the relative perfection that is the property of the Son, etc., therefore, etc., I distinguish the antecedent: the Father does not have that reality, or rather is not that supreme reality, which is identically the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, I deny the antecedent. The Father does not have that reality under the formal relation of filiation, I subdistinguish the antecedent: He does not have it as constituting the Father, I concede the antecedent; He does not have it as befits the Father,

namely, as His Word as the necessary immanent term of His vital intellection, I deny the antecedent. To this pertains what St. Bonaventure says: "There is a unity of nature and a plurality of persons, and there is as much in the unity as in the plurality, but not in as many ways" (*Sentences*, I, dist. 19, Part II, q. 1, ad 3).

Scholion: Some theologians, among whom is Suárez (*De Trinitate*, Book III, ch. 10), distinguish in God absolute perfections and relative perfections such that the former are simply simple and, in their formal notion, common to all persons, like the one divine essence in number; but the latter, they say, are not perfections simply simple, and they are not contained formally but only eminently in the divine essence itself, and thus further, the individual relative perfections are formally in individual persons, but all are eminently in all. Thus, they think it is sufficiently explained how one person is no less all perfection than the three together. This mode of considering and speaking may perhaps be necessary if an objective precision of the divine essence from the personal properties is admitted, and these are conceived as a perfection superadded to the essence; but we cannot follow either that precision or this mode of considering.

"Perfection is that outside of which there is nothing," as the Scholastics, following Aristotle, are wont to define; that is, the perfect is that which lacks nothing of what is fitting to it: therefore, perfection is the fullness of what is fitting (see *Treatise on God*, Theses XXI–XXII). All those things that, in reality or by a distinction of reason, constitute this fullness are called perfections, in creatures indeed as forms perfecting; but in God, those individual things are really the fullness itself. For in creatures, perfections, both all and individual, are only an entity to some degree with the negation of further possible reality, i.e., they are perfections limited, and to that extent, in comparison with unlimited entity and (in this sense absolute) are perfections in a qualified sense. Therefore, because no perfection there includes the entire notion of unlimited being, those perfections can be really distinguished; and those that are not really distinguished can be conceived with objective precision from others. For example, although intellect and will in a created spirit, this nature connaturally subsisting and hypostasis, this real essence and existence, are supposed to be really one reality and one perfection, they are nevertheless conceived as intellect, nature, essence, such that in the formal notion and perfection so conceived, will, subsistence, and existence are not included, i.e., they are conceived with objective precision. But if the notion or reality conceived were a reality unlimited in itself, including the entire perfection of being and thus the perfection of will, subsistence, and existence, such objective precision would be repugnant. Now, in God, it is entirely so. Whatever of divine reality is conceived is absolutely the fullness of infinite reality, including the entire perfection and fullness of unlimited being, to which nothing can be added; for there is nothing outside, i.e., no perfection without imperfection, or (as they say) no simply simple perfection or infinite perfection can be conceived outside or beyond the notion of that most full Being. Therefore, nothing there can be abstracted by objective precision.

I ask, therefore, does that which is said to be abstracted by a precisive concept, e.g., the formal notion of paternity, have the notion of divine being or not? And does the formal notion from which such precision is made, e.g., the essence (not only in reality itself but as it is in the concept), remain divine being? If paternity so abstracted does not have the notion of divine being, this is not divine paternity; for that is God, nor can it be conceived with such precision that it is not God itself, without the concept ceasing to be the concept of divine paternity. "We believe and confess that only God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are eternal, and no things at all, whether called relations, properties, singularities, or unities, or others of this kind, are present in God that are from eternity and are not God" (Symbol presented to Eugene III at

the Council of Reims and approved by the Pontiff against Gilbert of Poitiers, Hardouin, VI, Part II, p. 1299). Thus, just as the essence cannot be abstracted from the relations by precision, as even Suárez concedes, so we say that the internal relations cannot be abstracted by objective precision from the essence, as it is known by faith. That which we conceive with an express notion as the divine essence is simultaneously a threefold substantial relation, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, no less necessarily from its intimate nature than it is immutable eternity, wisdom, goodness, and other absolute attributes. Therefore, just as the divine essence, as we know it even by the light of reason alone, cannot be conceived with the absolute attributes abstracted without perverting the notion of the divine essence; so too the same essence, as we know it by faith, cannot be conceived with the substantial relations abstracted without equally departing from the notion of the essence as it objectively truly exists and is knowable to us through faith. Hence, just as the absolute attributes, so too the substantial relations or personal properties do not add something to the essence, as if they completed it to the fullness of perfection; but they are the divine essence itself under different notions or functions (see *Treatise on God*, Thesis XIII). Hence, conversely, each personal property or substantial relation or person (which all signify the same, though in different ways) is, because it is really the divine essence, also the fullness of divine being and infinite perfection; and because individual persons are the same essence and fullness of being, under the notion of perfection (in the proper sense of this term), they are not opposed to one another, but "the three are one." Thus, therefore, "that supreme reality," which is God, whether under the express notion of the essence, or under the express notion of one person, or under the express notion of the Trinity, is one and the same fullness of infinite Being, and therefore one and the same perfection in the proper sense of this term.

I have said: the persons are not opposed to one another under the notion of perfection properly so-called. For notional understanding producing the Word is indeed a perfection, but not other than absolute understanding, which is common to the three persons and is the essence itself; likewise, the formal notion of the Word as the necessary immanent term of paternal intellection is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection other than absolute wisdom, which is common to the three; the same holds for the expressed term of the love of the Father and the Son, or the Holy Spirit.

You may say: all these show only that absolute perfection is one singular perfection of the three persons together; but they do not yet show how the relative perfections, which are three and distinguished among themselves, are not more perfection than one. I respond: a) These show that to call the three relative perfections distinguished is improper. For perfection in the proper sense of the fullness of divine being is each relation or personal property, insofar as they are really the divine essence itself; but this is not threefold but one for the three, and therefore one perfection in the proper sense. b) If the epithet "relative" restricts the term "perfection" to signify the relative property, there are indeed in this sense three distinguished relative perfections, and three are more than one, but they are not more perfection. For this expression "more perfection" implies an increase of perfection properly so-called through the addition of one to another, which is absurd in divine things, since each is the entire infinite perfection because they are really the infinite essence itself. But when, in the improper sense mentioned, several relative perfections are named, it is not an addition of several to one but a numbering of distinguished properties that is expressed, which, under the notion of perfection taken in the proper sense, are one not by addition but by identity with the essence. c) The three relations, three relative realities, three relative beings, three relative perfections, even if considered in our inadequate concept, not insofar as they are one, and thus properly have the entire notion of perfection, but only formally under the express notion of being distinguished, still, even so, one relation includes all the others, though in different ways. For notional

understanding, formally as producing and relative to the Word, in this its relative perfection includes the Word, not indeed as a constitutive form but as an immanent term: "the fullness of perfection is considered in the speaker through the Word" (St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, IV, ch. 46). The same reasoning applies to the relative perfection of the Word and the Holy Spirit or the One Spirated, as declared in the thesis.

Thesis XVI: On the Equality and Similitude of the Divine Persons

Since equality and similitude presuppose distinction and signify some unity—equality indeed the unity of perfection without excess, similitude either the same unity or a lesser agreement: the divine persons, just as they are identical according to the essence, so too are to be predicated as simply equal; but they can be called similar in one sense, not in another. Hence, the holy Fathers, after the rise of the Arian and Semi-Arian heresy, were accustomed to admit not the profession of similitude simply, but similitude according to the essence and according to equality (*ἀπαραλλάκτως*).

Theologians of the school, with the Master [Peter Lombard] (*Sentences*, I, dist. 19) and with St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 42), connect the question of the equality of the persons as a related member to the doctrine of circumincession. And indeed, although the mode of considering the persons according to each of these notions is distinct, the foundation of both is the same. "Equality in divine things," says Aureolus (*Sentences*, I, dist. 19, Part II, a. 1, prop. 2), "is nothing other than the indistinction of distinguished things, such as supposits, in something entirely indistinct (the essence); but this indistinction is the same as identity, according to which one person is said to be identically immanent in another. According to this, circumincession and equality are the same, for which reason the Master, in the present distinction 19, when he treated equality, immediately moves to circumincession. Hence, whoever conceives the undivided Trinity, or the Trinity distinguished (in persons) in something indistinguishable (the essence) as indistinct, has all that these relations imply" (identity, equality, similitude, circumincession).

I. Identity, Equality, and Similitude

Identity, equality, and similitude generally imply: a) some distinction of terms; b) some unity or agreement of those terms in a formal notion, according to which they are understood as identical, equal, or similar. For, as Aristotle says, "things are the same whose substance is one; similar, whose quality is one; equal, whose quantity is one" (*Metaphysics*, V, ch. 15).

Identity, therefore, simply so-called, does not per se include real distinction but only a distinction of reason, as something is said to be identical with itself, or a divine person identical with the essence; however, a real distinction of terms can be presupposed, especially with the addition of the notion according to which identity consists. The formal notion of identity is the unity of the essence. Thus, the divine persons are identical to one another according to nature or essence.

Equality, as is also true of similitude, includes a real distinction of terms, for nothing is equal or similar to itself. But the formal notion of equality is agreement without the excess of one over another, or unity in quantity, and equality is more perfect the greater the unity of quantity (given the distinction of terms). Quantity is not only of bulk and extension, of which there can be no question in God, but also the nobler quantity of power or perfection: "In those things that are not great by bulk, to be greater is to be better"

(Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VI, 8). In God, the quantity of perfection is the infinite, indivisible essence itself. Since this is one in number in the really distinguished persons, both individually and all together, it is clear that there is the most perfect equality among the persons, of each to another and to all together.

Similitude requires a bit more consideration because the signification of the term is broader and more ambiguous. Given the real distinction of terms, the formal notion of similitude is said to be agreement or unity of quality. Quality in God cannot be understood as a perfection superadded to the essence, but as the quiddity of the essence itself (such that *τὸ ποιόν* is the same as *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*), or the essence considered according to its essential attributes. In this, there appears no difficulty, but similitude, even in the manner of speaking of Scripture and in relation to God, is sometimes taken more broadly. For similitude, unlike equality, does not per se require agreement without excess of one over another, nor even agreement in the same order; hence, even a shadow of God's perfection and spiritual nature in rational creatures, and especially in their elevation through the gifts of grace, is called similitude with God. Therefore, a distinction must first be made between natural similitude and similitude that, in comparison with the natural, is called analogous. Natural similitude, which alone concerns us now, in this distinction is not understood as if one nature and another were the terms and one similar to the other in some quality, but natural similitude here is said because the unity of nature is the formal notion of the similitude of distinguished things, as the Apostle says of the Son of God, from the human nature assumed, "made in the likeness of men" (Philippians 2:7). Thus, the divine persons can, in a Catholic sense, be called similar by a natural similitude, or according to the essence, or in the essence. But when even the ancient Catholic Doctors say the nature of the Son is similar to the nature of the Father, it must be understood as the nature insofar as it is identified with the Son and insofar as it is identified with the Father, i.e., hypostasis similar to hypostasis according to nature; but the nature is not said to be similar to the nature except by Arians and Semi-Arians. From what has been said, it is clear that similitude among the divine persons, as predicated in a Catholic sense, coincides with equality, and both are ultimately the identity of the persons according to the essence (Aureolus, *Sentences*, I, dist. 19, a. 1).

II. Arian and Semi-Arian Misuse of Similitude

From the diverse signification of the term, it is understood how the Arians and Semi-Arians fraudulently substituted the term *ὁμοιούσιος* (of like substance) for the Catholic *ὁμοούσιος* (of the same substance), and how, nevertheless, many holy Fathers could interpret this term in a Catholic sense, especially with the added determination that the Son is similar to the Father in all things and without any discrepancy (*ὅμοῖον τῷ Πατρὶ κατὰ πάντα καὶ ἀπαραλλάκτως*). For the heretics intended to signify an essence similar to an essence, and thus distinct essences as the terms of comparison, whose formal notion of similitude (since one term is the divine essence, which can only be one) necessarily had to be established in some mere shadow and participation; and thus, they understood an analogous similitude, which, in comparison with natural similitude, is rather a dissimilitude.

This was best perceived by those Arians who, with Aetius and Eunomius, professed their impiety openly, and therefore, instead of that fraudulent similitude, plainly said the Son was dissimilar to the Father (*ἀνόμοιος*, hence called Anomoeans). Thus, Eunomius argues (cited in Basil, *Contra Eunomium*, Book I, n. 21, Vol. I, p. 233) with a certainly valid argument against those dissembling Arians who wished to profess the Son as similar but not equal and consubstantial to the Father. Since in God there is neither quality nor bulk or quantity, he says, the (perfect and proper) similitude of the Son to the Father could

only be according to the essence; "but similitude or comparison or communion according to the essence leaves no preeminence or difference but manifestly effects equality." Basil, in response (ibid., p. 234), declares that the true notion of similitude between the Father and the Son is the essence itself, namely, that the essence of the Father and the Son is one, just as the notion of equality is identity not of bulk (which is none in God) but of perfection, and therefore most truly the Son is similar to the Father by a true natural similitude and by this very fact is equal to the Father. "I say similitude not according to the identity of external form (*τοῦ σχήματος*), but according to the essence itself. For in those things surrounded by form and figure, similitude is according to the identity of form (*τοῦ σχήματος*); but in that nature alien to form and figure (the Son of God), it remains that it has similitude in the essence itself, and equality not in the dimension of bulk but in the identity of power (*ἐν τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς δυνάμεως*). Scripture says: Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God, with the entire paternal power residing in Him."

Thus, Catholics asserted against the Anomoeans the similitude of the Son with the Father, but a natural similitude through the identity of nature, and to determine this, they joined equality with similitude (1), and added those epithets of similitude in all things and without any discrepancy. "As for me," says Basil, "concerning similitude according to the essence, provided it has that addition 'without any discrepancy' (*τὸ ἀπαραλλάκτως*), I accept this term, as it amounts to the same as consubstantiality, according to the sound meaning of consubstantial… But if anyone separates from the term 'similar' that other 'without discrepancy,' as they did at Constantinople (2), I regard the term as suspect, as diminishing the glory of the Only-Begotten; for even in obscure assimilations that differ greatly from their exemplars, we are accustomed to conceive as similar" (Basil, *Epistle 9* [also 41], n. 3; see Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book IV, ch. 6).

(1) "We not only say the Son is similar to the Father, to exclude the error of Eunomius; but we also say equal, to exclude the error of Arius" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 2).

(2) Acacius, Eudoxius, and other Arian composers of the formula of faith, by which Ulfilas also infected his Goths with Arianism (Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book I, ch. 9, n. 12).

Although this natural similitude, as is clear from what has been said, is reciprocal among all three persons, nevertheless, similitude, like image, can be taken more particularly for a hypostatic property, and in this particular sense, the notion of similitude and (as Aureolus adds, *Sentences*, I, dist. 19, a. 6) equality pertains only to the Word in relation to the Father. For in this way, the notion of similitude does not suffice by the identity of nature, but further requires origin from a principle and exemplar, and not just any origin but such that the mode of procession, from its proper notion, is to represent the archetype; but in this way, only the Word proceeding through paternal intellection is the image and similitude of the Father. On this, see elsewhere; for now, confer St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 35; Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book VI, ch. 5; Book VII, ch. 14.

Section II: On Our Analogical Concept of the Mystery of the Holy Trinity

Chapter I: On the Suprarational Nature of the Mystery

Thesis XVII: It is taught by revelation itself that the dogma of the Holy Trinity is a mystery properly so-called, exceeding the power of human reason.

God, revealing Himself as triune in persons, also explicitly revealed that, beyond the notion of God knowable through the things that are made, there are the deep things of God, which, being above the power of human understanding, the Spirit of God alone searches, and has revealed to us. That these deep things of God pertain especially to the internal processions and the Trinity of persons is demonstrated both from the written word of God and from the perpetual profession and understanding of the Catholic Church, and follows from the proper notion of this dogma in comparison with our mode of understanding. Therefore, the Holy Trinity is a mystery properly so-called, whose truth cannot be known by the light of human reason alone without revelation, nor, even given revelation, can it be demonstrated from merely rational principles.

To rightly understand the sense of the proposition, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the notion of a mystery properly so-called. First, it is not sufficient to say that the notion of person and consequently of the Trinity of persons in God surpasses our concept, such that, whether before or after receiving revelation, we can apprehend it only by an analogical notion, not a proper one. For although this is indeed most true, it is common to the essence and all divine attributes; yet the existence, omnipotence, wisdom of God, etc., are not simply suprarational mysteries. A mystery in the strict sense, in matters of faith, includes two things: that neither the existence of the truth (whether it is) can be known by the light of reason alone, nor can its internal notion (what it is) be apprehended by us with a proper concept (as proper is distinguished from analogous) even given faith. In briefest terms, we will say: in a mystery

a mystery, both the knowledge of apprehension and the cognition of assent, or both the idea of quiddity and the judgment of truth, is above the powers of reason. In this matter, the Guntherians greatly deceived themselves, claiming, by the light of reason alone, to have acquired an understanding of the Holy Trinity—both that it is (*an sit*) and what it is (*quid sit*), as they said—while nonetheless affirming that the suprarational character of the mystery is sufficiently preserved by admitting that we do not know God *how He is* (*quomodo est*) and as God Himself knows Himself. But if we only do not know properly *how He is*, the Trinity is no more above reason than the existence of the one God; this, however, subverts the character of the mystery as it is asserted in Scripture and by the Fathers, as we shall see. That we do not know God as He knows Himself pertains not at all to the notion of a mystery, for such a mode of knowing is comprehension, which is entirely repugnant to a creature, even in any supernatural elevation to the beatific vision.

2°. Nevertheless, a mystery is not such that, given revelation, we understand nothing of what it is (*quid sit*). Indeed, unless we apprehended it in some way, at least with analogical notions, we could not have explicit faith in such a truth as it is revealed and proposed for belief; for it is not words but the realities or truths signified by the words that are the (material) object of faith. As regards, therefore, the idea of quiddity, or what we have called the knowledge of apprehension, a mystery seems to be in the same condition as the knowledge of even the absolute attributes of God. But although the chief difference lies in the judgment of truth, which, concerning the Holy Trinity, is entirely suprarational, unlike the existence of God and His absolute attributes; nevertheless, there remains a great distinction even in the knowledge of apprehension. To the analogical concept of God's attributes, we attain by the light of reason through the ways of affirmation, negation, and transcendence (*ἐξ ὑπερβολῆς*), and thus, from a lower analogue, we ascend to the concept of the archetype or (as they say) the primary analogue, in which operation of the mind we arrive not only at the analogical notion of quiddity but also simultaneously at the judgment of truth (see *Treatise on God*, Thesis XII). On the contrary, the notion itself of the persons, constituted by

relations and which, under the formal notion of persons, are really distinguished among themselves while simultaneously being one essence in number, we would never apprehend unless positive doctrine and revelation preceded. Once revelation is proposed, we seek analogies in creatures to form some concept; and thus, although reason here acts by its own light or rational ideas, it always relies on positive revelation, and so reason, as it were, descends from the object proposed by revelation to investigate shadows in creatures, not to demonstrate the judgment of truth (*an sit*), for this is established by faith alone, but to form some analogous concept of the truth to be believed.

The root and foundation of this distinction is that God, as Creator and first cause acting outwardly, by understanding and willing, and universally according to His absolute attributes, manifests "His eternal power and divinity" to be "seen by the intellect through the things that are made" (Romans 1:19–20; see *Treatise on God*, Section I). On the contrary, the persons relatively related to one another and really distinguished among themselves are immanent relations, nor are generation and procession referred outwardly; and thus, the persons operate insofar as they are one God, not insofar as they are related to one another and distinguished by relations. Therefore, God, according to His absolute attributes, is knowable from His works as a cause from its effect, both that He is (*an sit*) and, analogically, what He is (*quid sit*); but under the formal notion of internal relations, He is not the cause of external works, and therefore He is not knowable as a cause from its effect, neither that He is (*an sit*) nor what He is (*quid sit*).

After the internal processions and distinguished persons have been revealed, we can indeed find analogies in creatures, especially in the created spirit, to form some concept of what the divine processions and persons are. This is because the created spirit, as an image of God, immediately exhibits an analogy of divine intellection and volition (love); hence, after we know from revelation the processions in God according to intellect and love, we can mediately, through the concept of intellection and love, arrive at forming a concept of the processions. Therefore, it should properly be said: from creatures, we immediately apprehend the absolute attributes analogically, and (given the revelation of relative realities) from the absolute attributes (and thus mediately from creatures), we apprehend the internal processions and relations analogically (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 1). Therefore, when the Fathers, such as Athanasius (*Orations Against the Arians*, I, n. 11–12), seem to interpret the text of the Apostle in Romans 1:20, "His invisible things, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made, His eternal power and divinity," as referring to the distinct persons; this accommodation of the Fathers must be understood as concerning the immediate knowledge of the absolute attributes from creatures and the mediately deduced concept of the persons, given revelation. Thus, St. Cyril, after indicating that the eternal power in that text of Paul can be understood as the Son, who is the power and wisdom of God, immediately adds this commentary: "It is written, 'No one knows the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son reveals Him.' But if the Father is known only to the Son and is revealed to others only through Him, then the Father is not seen through creation nor through the things that are made understood; but creation indeed proclaims its Creator, the Word of God (not as distinct from the Father but as Creator); but the Word (now known through revelation as a distinct person) shows the Father in Himself. Therefore, to Philip saying, 'Show us the Father,' He does not command him to understand by concluding from the beauty of creatures (1), but shows Himself, saying, 'He who has seen Me has seen the Father'" (Cyril, *Thesaurus*, Vol. V, Part I, pp. 20–21).

Having noted these things, to demonstrate the thesis, we inquire first what revelation itself and the Catholic understanding of revelation directly teach us about the suprarationality of the mystery; then,

what must be concluded about the same suprarationality by examining the dogma itself as revealed and comparing it with our rational mode of knowing.

I. The Doctrine of Scripture on the Suprarational Eminence of the Mystery

1°. It is most clearly attested in revelation itself that there are certain supernatural truths necessary for men to know, which nevertheless surpass reason and cannot be known except through faith in this present life and through supernatural vision in the life to come. The Apostle Paul, in 1 Corinthians 2, deliberately declares this matter throughout the chapter.

The Apostle distinguishes a twofold objective wisdom, that is, a twofold series of things and truths to be known. First is "the wisdom that the Apostles speak among the perfect," "the wisdom that none of the rulers of this world knew," "God's wisdom hidden in a mystery"; to this, he then opposes "the wisdom of this world," "the wisdom that the Greeks seek" (1 Cor. 1:22). Certainly, to this objective wisdom corresponds a twofold and entirely different formal or subjective wisdom: one is "the mind of Christ," through which men are "spiritual" (*πνευματικοί*); through the other, a man is "wise" (*σοφός*), but wise according to the flesh, a scribe (*γραμματεύς*, a litterator, as Tertullian translates in *Against Idolaters*, ch. 9), a "searcher of this world" (*ζητητής τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου*) (1 Cor. 1:20, 26); a man through this wisdom remains still "animal" (*ψυχικός*) (2).

(1) The phrase *οὐκ ἐκ τῆς τῶν κτισμάτων καλλονῆς ἀναλογῶς αὐτὸν θεωρεῖν ἐκέλευσε* is taken from Wisdom 13:5: *ἀπὸ γὰρ μεγέθους καλλονῆς κτισμάτων ἀναλόγως ὁ γενεσιουργὸς αὐτῶν θεωρεῖται*. See *Treatise on God*, Thesis II.

(2) "Animal" and "spiritual" are compared as natural and supernatural also in 1 Corinthians 15:44–46; much more frequently, flesh and spirit are opposed in this sense, as here "wise according to the flesh" and "wise according to the spirit" or "spiritual." Thus, the "animal man," although it presupposes a good rational nature, always, in opposition to the spiritual, signifies the privation of a good necessary in the present order. "He calls the animal man the one who is content with his rational thoughts alone (*λογισμοῖς*), and does not admit the doctrine of the Spirit, nor can he understand it" (Theodoret, on 1 Cor. 2). So too, and more extensively, Chrysostom (*Homily VII on 1 Corinthians*, n. 4), along with Oecumenius, Theophylact, and Suidas.

Hence, the efficient principle or immediate source of each wisdom differs. The proximate principle of the wisdom that the Greeks seek is certainly human reason, or rather, God through the light of reason and through the works of creation (Romans 1:19ff.). But the principle of the other, higher wisdom is the Holy Spirit in a far different way, and this in a twofold manner. For: a) internally, He affects the rational soul and renders men "spiritual." This can and does occur even with respect to truths knowable by the light of reason, so that the mode of knowing is not animal or natural but spiritual or supernatural. But b) here, the Apostle deals with truths entirely unknowable by the light of reason. Concerning these truths, he teaches a twofold necessary operation of the Holy Spirit, or rather the operation of the Holy Spirit for a twofold effect: first, that the mystery, entirely hidden and inaccessible to natural human reason, be made knowable, which occurs through internal or external revelation; second, that it be known as it ought, which occurs through internal grace rendering men "spiritual." We are now concerned with the former mode, because in it is contained the suprarational eminence of the truths, which we are investigating.

Thus, the Apostle says: the wisdom we speak among the perfect, that is, the objective wisdom, the truth, the doctrine, that reality which is the object of subjective wisdom, is wisdom in a mystery. This epithet "in a mystery" he explains further: it is a wisdom hidden, and that from eternity; for from eternity, God predestined that reality to be fulfilled (insofar as it is contingent and occurs in time; for Paul has in view the Incarnation and the entire economy of redemption) and to be supernaturally revealed (1 Cor. 2:6–7). Hence, none of the rulers of this world knew this wisdom. The rulers of this world are undoubtedly those who are eminent among men by the prerogatives of this world or natural gifts, and, given the subject matter, those who are eminent in the wisdom he called in verse 6 "the wisdom of the rulers of this world," who are "wise, scribes, searchers of this world" (1 Cor. 1:20, 26) (1). The universality of the negative proposition "none of the rulers of this world knew" is not restricted by the addition: "for if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory"; but it only shows that even Pilate and similar Gentiles, no less than the wise Jews and scribes who rejected the revelation of Christ, are included among all those who did not know the hidden wisdom. Further, how this wisdom is in a mystery, hidden, unknown to any of the rulers of this world, Paul declares with the words of Scripture (Isaiah 64:4): "But as it is written: 'What eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has entered into the heart of man, what God has prepared' (cf. v. 7, 'what God has predestined') for those who love Him" (1 Cor. 2:9). What God has prepared, from the context (with Chrysostom, *Homily VII on 1 Corinthians*, n. 3, and Theodoret on this passage reminding us), is certainly the same as what he previously called the wisdom that God predestined before the ages for our glory; these are undoubtedly the mysteries of redemption, among which the foundation is the Lord of glory, Christ, the Word incarnate; nor, however, are the goods of heavenly beatitude, as the end and completion of redemption, less rightly understood and ought to be included in these. The phrase "entered into the heart of man" is most well-known in biblical speech, meaning the same as to come into the mind, understanding, or intellect. When, therefore, it is said, "it has not entered into the heart of man," the universal expression designates that wisdom as being above the intellect of human nature. "He speaks of the entire human nature… Hence, it is clear that before they were heard, they had not even entered into the heart of man; for after the Spirit was given, the heart of the prophets was not the heart of man (by natural human powers), but a spiritual heart, as he himself says: 'we have the mind (*νοῦς*) of Christ'" (Chrysostom, ibid.). "Since he said the mystery of the economy (of the Incarnation) was hidden, he necessarily added: 'which no one has heard nor seen, nor has the most insatiable mind (*ὁ ἀπλήστος νοῦς*) conceived'" (Theodoret, ibid.).

(1) Chrysostom (*Homily VII on 1 Corinthians*, n. 1–2) and Theodoret (on this passage) say the rulers of this world in verse 6 are "those in dignities, in magistracies, who esteem such a thing as noble, also philosophers, orators, writers." Further, in verse 8, they understand Pilate and Herod, or even the priests and scribes of the Jews.

In what has been said thus far: wisdom in a mystery, hidden, none knew, nor has it entered into the heart of man, the fact of ignorance is indeed stated, but a fact that arises from the very nature of the thing to be known and the mind knowing it. If you still doubt this, proceed to what follows.

The principle of the knowledge of the mystery is uniquely the revelation of God through the Holy Spirit: "But God has revealed them to us through His Spirit" (1 Cor. 2:10). Hence, the animal man, because he lacks the principle of knowledge, namely, the supernatural principle, "does not perceive the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him, and he cannot understand them, because they are spiritually examined" (1). Therefore, such complete ignorance is not only a fact, as it were, by accident, but arises

from the nature of the thing, from the disproportion of the natural intellect, and from the supereminent order of these truths. For these truths pertain to the deep things of God (*τὰ βάθη τοῦ Θεοῦ*), whose knowledge is natural to God alone. For just as elsewhere creation (see *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis IV), so here the knowledge of these deep things of God is presented as an attribute and mark of divinity. "For the Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God. For who among men knows the things of a man except the spirit of the man that is in him? So also the things of God no one has known except the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. 2:10–11). This is the apostolic commentary on the passage he cites from Isaiah. What the Apostle says: "no one has known except the Spirit of God," the prophet says in other words: "from of old they have not heard, nor perceived by ear, eye has not seen, O God, besides You" (1); that is, no one has known except God. In nearly the same way, the same prophet speaks of creation and supreme governance proper to God alone: "I am the Lord, who makes all things, who stretches out the heavens… and there is none with Me" (Isaiah 44:24; 37:16; 45:5ff.).

(1) *πνευματικῶς ἀνακρίνεται*, true judgment about them cannot be except through a supernatural principle; for in this sense, *πνευματικόν* and *ψυχικόν* are opposed, as we said above.

(2) In Isaiah and Paul, there is a diversity in words that corresponds to the diversity of each Testament, as is also found elsewhere in New Testament citations from the Old (e.g., Matthew 2:6; Mark 1:2; cf. *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis VI). What the prophet says of the Messiah and the goods of the future time and the New Testament, expecting You, the Apostle says of the present fulfillment, loving You; what the prophet says more obscurely: no one has known, O God, besides You, the Apostle explains more clearly in what follows about revelation through the Holy Spirit.

Therefore, mysteries are said to be not only above human reason but simply above the natural knowledge of any created intellect. "What he (the Apostle) says is of this kind: before we enjoyed the Spirit and learned the ineffable things, neither we nor any of the prophets conceived them. For how could they, when even the angels did not know them? What, he says, is to be said of the rulers of this world, when no man, nor the heavenly powers, knew them?... Therefore, we needed that teacher who clearly knew these things. For the Spirit, he says, searches all things, even the deep things of God" (Chrysostom, *Homily VII on 1 Corinthians*, n. 3–4).

It is thus established not only that there are reasons in the infinite above the finite intellect, and specifically above the human intellect considered in its entire natural perfection; but that there are certain suprarational truths revealed by the Holy Spirit, who alone naturally knows them.

2°. These realities and truths, which the Apostle calls "the deep things of God" (*τὰ βάθη τοῦ Θεοῦ*) in opposition to "the known of God" (*τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ*) (Romans 1:19), are directly and explicitly said in the context to be the mysteries of redemption, among which, in the first place, is Christ Himself, "the power of God and the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24), as we have already sufficiently shown. Therefore, the deep things of God, which the Spirit alone searches, are not only the free counsels and works of sanctification outwardly; but at the intimate root of these sanctifying counsels, the deep things of God, which "have not entered into the heart of man," which "from of old they have not heard nor perceived, O God, besides You," which "no one has known except the Spirit of God," are indeed, in the first place, the internal relations themselves, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

This very clear doctrine of the Apostle concerning the disproportion of the created intellect to the mysteries must be kept in view, so that the suprarational order may be better understood in those passages where the discourse is directly about the divine relations and persons:

Matthew 11:25–27 (cf. Luke 10:21–22): "I confess to You, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because You have hidden these things from the wise and prudent (*σοφῶν καὶ συνετῶν*) and have revealed them to little ones. Yes, Father, for such was Your good pleasure (*οὕτως εὐδοκία ἐγένετο ἔμπροσθέν σου*). All things have been handed over to Me by My Father. And no one knows the Son except the Father; nor does anyone know the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son wills to reveal Him."

In the same sense, St. John (1:18) concludes the doctrine about the Word of God: "No one has ever seen God; the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He has made Him known" (*ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο*) (cf. 1 Cor. 2:9–10). It is clear that through the phrase "no one knows, except he to whom the Son wills to reveal," just as in the parallel passage in Paul, "no one has known except the Spirit of God; but God has revealed to us through His Spirit," the immediate purpose indeed excludes knowability through the powers of human reason; but through the indication of the natural knowledge proper only to God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and from the universality of the negation and opposition of the divine persons to the entire creature, the natural knowledge of any created intellect is manifestly excluded. In the phrases "no one except the Father," "no one except the Son," "no one except the Spirit of God," it is opposed to creatures, not to the divine persons among themselves, as is clear per se from the unity of the divine essence. "If He had simply said 'no one,' many of His hearers would have thought it was said only of our nature; but now, since after saying 'no one,' He adds 'except the Son,' by this addition of the Only-Begotten, He excluded every creature… The term 'no one' is always posited only for the exclusion of creatures; nor, if it is said of the Father, does it exclude the Son, nor, if of the Son, does it exclude the Holy Spirit" (Chrysostom, *Homily V on the Incomprehensibility of God*, Vol. I, p. 481).

II. The Suprarational Truth of the Distinct Persons as One God

The revealed truth of the distinct persons who are one God being above the natural faculty of any created intellect, and specifically above natural human reason, the holy Fathers in every age either presupposed or explicitly defended as most certain.

1°. The holy Doctors, defenders of the truth against heretics, and the heretics themselves all agreed that the doctrine of the Trinity, as proposed by the Catholic Church, cannot be understood by human reason. But while the Fathers insisted on revelation, saying that we must learn from God alone speaking about Himself, and that the mystery, which is above our reason, must be believed by faith; the heretics, on the contrary, because it could not be understood by reason, condemned it as contrary to reason and thus accommodated the sense of revelation to the norm of merely rational notions. The Fathers agreed that human reason and philosophy must be subjected to the profession of faith, confirmed, handed down, and declared by revelation, according to the doctrine of the Apostle: "destroying arguments (*λογισμούς*) and every lofty thing that exalts itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every intellect to the obedience of Christ" (*αἰχμαλωτίζοντες πᾶν νόημα εἰς τὴν ὑπακοὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ*) (2 Corinthians 10:5). The heretics, if not in words, certainly in deeds, contended in the reverse order, subjecting revelation and faith to reason and philosophy as the supreme norm of interpretation, not only in the negative sense of postulated non-contradiction but also in the positive sense of perceived congruence.

Already in the second and third centuries, the Monarchians' reason for denying the three distinct persons was none other than that the unity of God together with the Trinity of persons could not be understood by reason. But the Fathers, not by reason but uniquely by appealing to the revelation in Scripture, in the symbol handed down by the Apostles, and in the profession and consensus of the entire Church, demonstrated that both truths are equally to be believed because equally revealed by God. They conceded, however, that this truth is known by us only through God's teaching; nor, even given revelation, can it be understood in itself. Thus, for example, the Fathers of the Council of Antioch taught against Paul of Samosata: "We have decreed to set forth in writing the faith that we received from the beginning and hold as handed down and preserved in the holy Catholic Church until this day according to the succession from the Apostles… Since God is unbegotten, one… whom no man has seen nor can see; whose glory or magnitude, as it is, it is impossible for human nature to conceive or express worthily in truth (*ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἀνέφικτον*); but it ought to suffice for us to have some mediocre notion of Him through the revelation of the Son, as He Himself says: 'No one knows the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son reveals Him.' But this Son, begotten… we confess and proclaim as God, not by foreknowledge but by essence and hypostasis, as we have known from the Old and New Testaments. But whoever contradicts, saying that he believes and confesses that the Son of God is not God before the creation of the world and says that two Gods are preached if the Son of God is preached as God, we judge him alien to the ecclesiastical rule" (*Letter to Paul of Samosata*, in *Works of Dionysius of Alexandria*, p. 281).

Especially in the prolonged war of the entire Church against the Arians, and specifically against the Eunomians, the suprarationality of the mystery was handed down and defended by the holy Fathers as a foundation for the defense and genuine explanation of the revealed doctrine of the Holy Trinity. We saw in the *Treatise on God* (Thesis X) how sharply the Eunomians claimed full knowledge and comprehension of the divine essence, and how diligently all the Fathers demonstrated against this error, from the very nature of the thing, that we can only conceive to some extent what God is through analogical notions. It might seem that this dispute pertains not at all to what we are now treating. But in fact, the direct aim of the heretics was the exclusion of the mystery of the Holy Trinity. The heretics, no less than the Catholic Fathers, clearly understood that we cannot understand the divine essence in such a way as to comprehend by reason that three persons, simultaneously distinct among themselves and identified with the same most simple essence, exist. Hence, if we perfectly understood the divine essence as it is in itself, as they claimed, by that very fact nothing else would pertain to the divine essence except what we understood in it. Since we in no way understand by reason one most simple essence in three really distinct persons, it followed that not only was the Trinity denied, but the heretics also drew their arguments from that same principle of the perfect comprehension of the divine nature

to demonstrate that the Trinity of persons, as professed by the Catholic Church, neither is nor can be [comprehended by reason]. Hence, all the Fathers—St. Basil and Gregory of Nyssa in their books *Against Eunomius*, Gregory Nazianzen in his *Theological Orations* (especially the second, Or. 28, also known as Or. 34), Cyril of Jerusalem in *Catechesis VI*, Epiphanius in *Heresy LXXVI*, Chrysostom in his five homilies *On the Incomprehensibility of God's Nature*, and Cyril of Alexandria in his *Thesaurus*—prove that this assertion of comprehending the divine nature is absurd both from the documents of Christian doctrine and from reason itself, thus paving the way for the explanation of the revealed doctrine of the Holy Trinity. For the Fathers agree with the heretics to this extent, as we have said, that they confess and indeed strenuously contend that the Trinity of persons of one essence cannot be understood by the light of reason. Therefore, just as the heretics, from their claim of perfectly understanding the divine essence

according to the entire notion of divine Being, denied the truth of the Trinity as not comprehended in that rational understanding, and reduced the entire dispute not to the doctrine contained in Scripture and explained in the perpetual tradition and profession of the Church, but, as the Fathers complain, "to syllogisms" and philosophy; so the holy Doctors, by overturning that foundation and demonstrating the imperfection of our knowledge with respect to the divine nature and essence, brought it about that the suprarationality of the mystery of the Holy Trinity could no longer be adduced as a cause for its denial, nor could the heretics further conclude that what is above understanding is contrary to reason. Thus, the demonstration that the divine essence is not intelligible to us as it is in itself was simultaneously a demonstration that we must learn from God's revelation alone, with the Church and from the Church, not so much what is to be understood by reason about the divine persons as what is to be believed by faith. For the Fathers, therefore, the suprarationality of the mystery is not only certain but a necessary presupposition, without which the integrity of faith and the sincere explanation of the dogma cannot stand.

2°. To further clarify, I cite a few specific testimonies so that the Fathers' opinion, already most certain from what has been said, may be more distinctly evident:

"Because 'no one knows the Son except the Father, nor the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son reveals Him,' therefore the saints, to whom the Son has revealed, have handed down to us a certain image from visible things, saying: 'the splendor of His glory and the figure of His substance' (Hebrews 1:3); and again: 'with You is the fountain of life, in Your light we shall see light' (Psalm 36:9). But these examples, though slight and very obscure for expressing what we desire, can nevertheless allow us to know something that is above human nature. Nor does Scripture present the generation of the Son as similar to these images. It is absurd and utterly impious to seek knowledge of the Lord from other sources that are neither written nor pertain to piety" (Athanasius, *On the Decrees of Nicaea*, n. 12).

"This truth is the sacrament of God, this is the name of the inscrutable nature in the Father: God invisible, ineffable, infinite, to whom speech falls silent, the mind grows dull in investigating, and understanding is constrained in embracing… Known only to the Son, because 'no one knows the Father except the Son'… And because no one knows the Father except the Son, let us think of the Father together with the Son who reveals Him, who alone is the faithful witness" (Hilary, *On the Trinity*, Book II, nn. 6, 9–10).

"God unbegotten, and the Son begotten from Him, and the Holy Spirit proceeding… He has nothing in common with all things, nor does anyone share in His dignity; for all things (if reason seeks to gather understanding from them) fall short and yield, and for rational arguments, they leave the entire cause to the doctrinal word in divine Scripture, which says: 'no one knows the Son except the Father, nor the Father except the Son, and he to whom He reveals' (Matthew 11:27). He reveals, however, through the Holy Spirit, not to those who wish to understand Him by syllogisms, but to those who sincerely and perfectly believe in Him" (1) (Epiphanius, *Heresy LXXVI*, on Chapter VII of Aetius, Vol. I, p. 943).

(1) The Greek text reads: *πάντα γὰρ παρατίθεται, καὶ καταλείπει πᾶσαν αἰτίαν συλλογιστικὴν τῷ κατὰ τῆς θείας γραφῆς διδασκαλικῷ λόγῳ, τῷ οὐδεὶς οἶδε τὸν Υἱὸν εἰ μὴ ὁ Πατήρ, οὐδὲ τὸν Πατέρα εἰ μὴ ὁ Υἱός, καὶ ᾧ ἂν ἀποκαλύψῃ. Ἀποκαλύπτει δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος, οὐ τοῖς αὐτὸν συλλογιζομένοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς εἰς αὐτὸν γνησίως καὶ τελείως πιστεύουσι.*

“Whenever the weakness of the human condition, about to know itself, strives to some extent to exceed its own littleness and, pregnant with the concept of heavenly illumination (i.e., given revelation and grace), begins to bring forth the inquiry of its Creator and Redeemer, that unchangeable eternity of the Trinity alone, I think, will be found worthy of the miracle of incomprehensibility, which so surpasses all that we can think or know, just as it surpasses all that we are” (Fulgentius, *To Thrasimund*, Book II, c. 1).

“The Trinity alone can reveal itself, because the Trinity alone can fully know itself, and as much as it gives itself to be known, so much it grants to be revealed” (ibid., c. 10).

In summary, if the question is about proper understanding, the sense of the Fathers comes to this: “concerning the mystery of the Trinity, the true confession is the ignorance of knowledge” (Jerome, *Prologue XVIII to Isaiah*). See also Athanasius, *On ‘All Things Are Delivered to Me’*, nn. 5–6 (Vol. I, p. 107); Basil, *Against Eunomius*, Book I, n. 14; Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration 20* (also 29), nn. 10–12; *Oration 29* (also 35), n. 8; *Oration 31* (also 37), n. 33; Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechesis VI*, n. 6; Chrysostom, *On the Incomprehensibility of God*, Homily V, n. 1.

Moreover, lest the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers be deflected into another sense, the consensus of the ancient theologians adds that all, with the Master (*Sentences*, I, dist. 3) and St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 32, a. 1), defend the eminence of this mystery above reason, not as an opinion but as a certain and constant principle. See on this matter Suarez (*De Trinitate*, Book I, cc. 11–12) and Vasquez (*In I Partem*, disp. 133, and the theologians cited there).

III. Theological Foundation Established

With the theological foundation established, we can now show the suprarationality of the mystery from the very mode of our knowledge and the nature of the thing to be known.

We cannot know the divine perfections, or what God is (*quid sit*), by the light of reason except either: a) *a posteriori*, concluding from the imperfections and perfections pre-known in creatures (both material and spiritual) to God as from effect to cause, or b) in some way *a priori* (1), that is, from the pre-known absolute perfection of God in a confused manner, progressing to perfections explicitly and distinctly to be known, or (what amounts nearly to the same) from one pre-known perfection progressing to another (distinct in our reason or knowledge) to be known. “Whatever natural reason shows about God is held either from the notion of a principle (i.e., He is the supreme cause) or from the notion of supreme perfection” (i.e., from the pre-understood supreme perfection of God in a confused manner, progressing to the understanding of singular perfections) (Pallavicini, *Cursus Theologicus, On God*, c. 1, n. 3). This principle is entirely evident for any mediate knowledge of God acquired by the light of reason, and thus it holds for the rational knowledge of the Trinity in every opinion, whatever one follows about the natural knowledge of God, unless perhaps absurdly it is said that our intellect has a natural immediate intuition of God as triune in persons. Excluding this, even those who have persuaded themselves of an innate idea of God in our intellect or an immediate intuition of the divine Being (1) must confess that one must arrive at the knowledge of the Trinity of persons, if it can be reached by the light of reason alone, by one or the other of the two indicated modes: from pre-known creatures or from pre-known absolute perfections of God. Indeed, this principle is universal and equally evident not only before the human intellect but before any intellect to which an immediate intuition of God’s internal relations is not natural. But since such

intuition is natural only to the divine intellect, and to the created intellect, at least to all now existing (angelic and human), as is theologically certain, it does not pertain by its nature; indeed, it seems to be above the nature of any possible creature, as can be deduced from certain principles (see *Treatise on God*, Thesis XIV; cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 12, a. 4; *De Veritate*, q. 8, a. 4; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, c. 52). It follows that, universally, the knowledge of the Trinity of divine persons by the natural light of the created intellect is either unattainable or to be attained by one of the indicated modes.

(1) Since a properly and simply *a priori* argument about divine things is not given, Raymond Lull called this argument one of equivalence or from equals, which Suarez (*De Trinitate*, Book I, c. 11, n. 7) does not seem to have understood in Lull's genuine sense. For Lull did not proceed from similars, as Suarez thinks, but from the perfection of absolute goodness to know and demonstrate the Trinity of persons.

(1) We are persuaded that an immediate intuition of the divine Being in itself cannot exist without being also an intuition of the divine persons, and therefore (among other reasons) we deny that intuition of the divine Being. But those who claim it assert that it is indeed an immediate intuition, but of the divine Being with abstraction from perfections and much more from distinct persons. They agree with us, therefore, that the natural knowledge of the persons, if it were given, could only be mediate; but this being posited, no other way would be open except one of the two we have indicated (cf. *Treatise on God*, Theses X, XXIV).

But: 1°. The internal processions in God and the three distinct persons cannot be known and demonstrated by the light of reason from pre-known creatures, concluding *a posteriori* from effect to cause. From the pre-known contingent existence of creatures, from their perfections and order and direction to an end, reason understands the existence of a necessary, intelligent, wise, willing, good, omnipotent, etc., being, because the existence of contingent creatures without such a necessary being is understood to be repugnant. Hence, to understand God as one in nature and triune in persons in this way from the consideration of creatures, it would be necessary to perceive in creatures—whether spiritual or material, considered individually or all together—something that would be understood to be repugnant unless there are three persons who are one God. But it is evident that there is and can be nothing of this kind in creatures. For creatures exist in act insofar and in the manner that God, omnipotent, infinitely wise, infinitely good, wills them to exist; nor can anything beyond absolute attributes be understood by the light of reason as necessary in God to be the cause of creatures. But absolute attributes pertain to God insofar as He is one, equally full whether one person is considered or three distinct persons are supposed and considered. In other words, it can be said that God operates outwardly insofar as He is one in essence, not insofar as there are internal processions and mutual relations of the generator, the generated, and the proceeding. By this very fact, it is repugnant to understand from creatures as an effect that the cause is three distinct persons, not one, as the essence is one. "Everything in divine things that has causality pertains to the essence, since God is the cause of things through His essence. But the proper characteristics of the persons are relations, by which the persons are related not to creatures but to one another. Hence, by natural knowledge, we cannot arrive at the proper characteristics of the persons" (St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 13; *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 32, a. 1; *Sentences*, I, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 4; *On Boethius' De Trinitate*, Prologue, q. 1, a. 4).

2°. It would remain, then, that from the consideration of absolute attributes, which "are understood through the things that are made" (Romans 1:20), and thus in some way *a priori*, reason could arrive at

the understanding and demonstration of the Trinity of persons. In this way, the necessary being is the foundation for reason to understand and demonstrate the fullness of absolute perfection, and from there, the unity of God and the repugnance of multiplying the divine nature are further inferred, and so other attributes can be deduced and distinctly understood from those pre-understood. But as long as we understand the divine essence only by analogical notions derived from the pre-known perfections of creatures—that is, by abstractive knowledge, not as it is in itself—it is repugnant that from the one most simple essence of God and absolute attributes, which are the same essence apprehended by us under different analogical concepts, one could arrive at knowing and demonstrating three really distinct persons of one essence. Hence, as we said above, the holy Fathers held that by the same reason that it is shown against the Eunomians that the divine essence is not intelligible by the light of reason as it is in itself, the suprarationality of the mystery of the Holy Trinity is simultaneously demonstrated. For these two mutually imply each other: the divine essence is known immediately in itself, and therefore as it is; therefore, the Trinity of persons, which are really the divine essence, is known. Conversely: the divine essence is not known as it is in itself, but by analogical notions derived from pre-understood created perfections; therefore, by the light of reason, neither is it understood nor can it be understood that one absolute essence is simultaneously three relatively distinct persons.

Indeed, the principle and foundation of the knowledge for understanding the three distinct persons would have to be the divine essence pre-known either under the formal notion of the infinite, or under the formal notion of one or more attributes (e.g., wisdom, goodness, etc.), or under the formal notion of acts of internal life (intellection and love), or (lest it be accused of lacking full induction) under any formality intelligible by the light of reason. But it is repugnant that the essence under any or all of these notions be a principle of knowledge demonstrating distinct persons, as long as the essence is known not as it is in itself but from the analogy of creatures.

For the infinite Being and any absolute attributes, or formal notions under which that same Being can be conceived by the light of reason, we understand as one, not multipliable, that is, as most simple and indistinct; but that the same Being, by its internal notion, requires a threefold relative subsistence—that is, the same infinite essence is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, distinguished only by relations—and three relatively subsisting beings, this cannot be deduced in any way from infinity or any absolute perfection as it is knowable by the light of reason from creatures. The reason is that there is no created or creatable perfection, nor can any be understood by us, that exhibits an analogy of an absolute perfection which in itself, being one, requires a relative subsistence and a multiplication of subsistences.

What we say about the infinity of the essence and about attributes holds equally for acts, or rather for the act of intellection and love, which is certainly a divine attribute and, as we said, is nothing other than the divine substance itself or absolute essence apprehended by us under the formal concept of intellect or will. In creatures, actual intellection and volition are indeed necessarily something produced by the spirit that understands and wills, but from this alone, by the light of reason, we could neither infer nor demonstrate in God a produced Word and love with a real distinction of three who are one God. For that intellection and volition in creatures are produced by the spirit follows from the limitation of perfection, because the substance of the spirit is not itself intellection and love; but the spirit is in potency to act, and the act is not the substance of the spirit but a perfecting modification of the substance. But where an infinite and, by virtue of infinity, utterly simple essence is itself intellection and volition without any real distinction of act and essence, there, indeed, we cannot by the light of reason understand the Word and love to be both one

supreme absolute reality—that is, really the essence—and, under the formal notion as terms of intellection and love, to be the generated Word and proceeding love by a real procession, such that there is a real distinction of the generator, the generated, and the proceeding.

3°. Indeed, precisely because the entire created order, from which we ascend to understand divine perfections analogically, provides no foundation, no analogy (without presupposed revelation) for forming a concept of one absolute substance subsisting in three relations such that they are three distinct beings of one essence in number; for this reason, I say, not only is the existence of the reality and its objective truth indemonstrable by natural reason, but we could not even form a concept of the reality as possible. Hence follows a great distinction in the way we conceive absolute attributes and, even given revelation, the persons of one essence relatively related and distinct among themselves. We can conceive God as wise, good, etc., by analogical notions from pre-known perfections of creatures, and thus in the mode of our concept there is indeed imperfection and a kind of composition of the divine essence and the attribute affecting it; but this imperfection adhering to the concept we easily correct by a judgment from principles known even by the light of reason. But when we wish to conceive a divine person by the light of reason alone from pre-known created perfections, the concept will always be as of an absolute person, and thus as one no less than the essence is one, nor is there any purely rational principle by which this mode of conceiving can be corrected by a judgment from the light of reason.

But when, from revelation, we know that there are three really distinct persons of one absolute essence, and thus the persons are relative, distinguished only by relation and not by anything absolute, we necessarily conceive a relative person not under one notion but under a twofold notion, both absolute and relative. Hence, this imperfect mode of conceiving indeed requires correction by a judgment, by which we judge that the absolute itself is simultaneously relative, that is, the essence itself is really the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But just as we have the notion of a relative person from revelation alone, so too this judgment is not from purely rational principles but is a judgment of faith from those things that are made known to us by revelation alone.

From all this, it is sufficiently clear that the dogma of the Holy Trinity, as revealed by God, is above reason both as regards the truth of its existence (*an sit*) and as regards the analogical concept itself (*quid sit*). This holds true not only before the revelation of the mystery but also given the revelation of the mystery, as it is granted in this present life. "Since the ray of divine revelation reaches us according to our mode, hence, although through revelation we are elevated to know something that would otherwise be unknown to us, it is not to know in another way than through sensibles" (or more generally, according to our mode) (St. Thomas, *On Boethius' De Trinitate*, lect. II, q. 2, a. 3).

Thesis XVIII: On the Fallacy and Danger of Attempts at a Purely Rational Demonstration of the Mystery

From the demonstrated property of the mystery, it follows that in all reasonings that are boasted as purely philosophical demonstrations of the mystery, either the demonstrative force is at least lacking, or, moreover, the revealed dogma itself is perverted and distorted into an alien sense, which twofold fault is found in the speculations of certain more recent authors.

From what we demonstrated in the previous thesis, it is certain that the revealed truth of the Holy Trinity is above the power of human understanding, such that neither the knowledge of the truth of whether it is (*an sit*) nor the concept of what it is (*quid sit*) can be drawn from reason alone and rational principles, but both the concept of apprehension and the judgment of assent rely on the revelation of the Spirit of God, who searches the deep things of God (*τὰ βάθη τοῦ Θεοῦ*). Hence, it is easily evident what follows if men, denying or neglecting this methodical principle (if it may be so called), namely, denying the eminence of the mystery above the power of understanding, presume by their reason to search the deep things of God. Either this is done such that, with the true concept of the thing to be demonstrated presupposed from revelation, only the demonstration of existence is claimed, or such that both the concept of the thing and the truth of existence are deduced from principles perceived by reason alone. In the former hypothesis, necessarily either the foundations of the demonstration will be revealed truths known only from revelation, or the inference will at least be illegitimate, because there are no truths, whether about God or creatures, knowable by the light of reason alone, from which it can be legitimately inferred that God is one and triune. In the latter hypothesis, necessarily the very notion of the Trinity, as revealed by God, will be perverted, because one cannot arrive by the light of reason alone at the concept of persons who are really distinguished among themselves by relations alone and identified with one absolute essence in number. This is so because not only in all things we perceive with our intellect, for the number of persons or supposita, essences at least distinct in number are multiplied; but also because there is no rational principle from which we can positively understand the multiplication of persons in one essence in number as possible.

Therefore, that which is claimed as a demonstration is either not purely rational and philosophical but a theological demonstration from revealed principles, of which we will speak below; or it is no demonstration; or, moreover (as always necessarily happens if a purely rational demonstration is presumed, that is, both as regards the concept of what it is (*quid sit*) and the truth of whether it is (*an sit*)), the revealed dogma itself is perverted and distorted into an alien sense. It seemed useful to present both faults to the eyes with some attempts of more recent authors, so that what is universally established from doctrine and theoretical principles may also be shown more visibly in particular facts.

I. The Fault of Inanity in Such Attempts

The lesser but inseparable fault in such experiments, from the nature of the thing, is the inanity of the demonstration. Hence follows what St. Thomas says: "He who strives to prove the Trinity of persons by natural reason detracts from faith in two ways. First, as regards the dignity of faith itself, which (in mysteries properly so-called) is that it concerns invisible things that exceed human reason; hence the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 2:7), 'we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, which is hidden.' Second, as regards the utility of drawing others to faith. For when someone adduces reasons that are not cogent to prove the faith, he falls into the mockery of unbelievers" (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 32, a. 1).

Indeed, it is astonishing how men, even those accustomed to metaphysical meditations, could persuade themselves and offer to others as a "speculative demonstration" of the Holy Trinity the reasons they have adduced. Concerning Raymond Lull, one may read Vasquez (*In I Partem*, disp. 33) and Suarez (*De Trinitate*, Book I, c. 11, nn. 7ff.). The demonstration that Lull thought evident he found in God's immanent act. God is most perfect goodness. Most perfect goodness necessarily has a most perfect internal vital act; this Lull calls the "bonificative" in God. The most perfect "bonificative" necessarily has

a most perfect produced term; this term he calls the "bonificable" in God. The most perfect "bonificative" produces the "bonificable" in the most perfect manner; the most perfect manner of production is generation; therefore, the "bonificative" is the Father, the "bonificable" is the Son. Furthermore, where there is a most perfect "bonificative" and "bonificable," there must necessarily be a most perfect "bonifying." This "bonifying" in the active sense must be an act common to the "bonificative" and "bonificable," and such an act must have as its term an objective or terminating or proceeding "bonifying." Because the most perfect "bonifying" is "loving," this proceeding "bonifying" is proceeding love, that is, the Holy Spirit. (At least this is how Lull should have spoken to avoid a graver error, if, as Vasquez thought, "bonifying" were taken for the production of the "bonificable" or Son, and the same "bonifying" were simultaneously said to be the Holy Spirit.) Therefore, there are necessarily three persons: Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Nor can there be more, because the infinite "bonificative" cannot be but one, and the same holds for the infinite "bonificable" and for what is called the infinite "bonifying." Thus he argues.

Setting aside Lull's inept phraseology, anyone can sense for himself what must be judged of such a demonstration. That the divine act, which is absolute intellection and love and the divine essence itself, under which aspect it certainly has no intrinsically produced and distinct term, is simultaneously a relative intellection by which a distinct Word is produced, cannot be understood or demonstrated by the light of reason but is known only by revelation. The same holds for love. But if Lull's argumentation is not benignly modified and reduced to these terms, what he calls the "bonificative," "bonificable," and "bonifying" would not even be the Trinity as revealed to us; and thus, it would fall into graver errors.

In more recent times (toward the end of the last century and the beginning of this one), Marcus Mastrofini, in his work *On the Trinity*, which he titled *Higher Metaphysics*, presented not one but fully three demonstrations, as he called them, of the Holy Trinity, in Books III, IV, and V. The first is drawn from the necessary existence of God in the following manner: Whatever exists must have a sufficient reason or principle, external or internal, of its existence. Therefore, in God, the necessary being, there must be an internal, not external, principle from which His existence arises. This principle of existence must itself exist; but whatever exists, exists in a determined manner; therefore, the principle of existence in God has its own distinct mode of existing from all others, that is, the principle of God's existence is subsistent and a hypostasis. The existence emanating from the principle is something distinct from its principle, and therefore it also has its own determined mode of existing

or it exists in a determined manner; therefore, the principle of existence in God has its own distinct mode of existing, that is, it subsists and is a hypostasis. Therefore, there are necessarily two hypostases: one the principle (the Father), the other the principled (the Son). Furthermore, in every substance, and especially in a spiritual substance, and much more so in an infinitely perfect substance, there must be a principle of action. "Hence it follows that it is necessary to admit a certain principle of action in God Himself, considered now as having His existence, namely, in that first internal and existing principle, considered simultaneously with the second mode of existence, which has the character of existence or of being principled in relation to that first principle." Thus, this principle of action is common to the Father and the Son. Moreover, a principle of action requires a proportionate term; therefore, an infinite principle of action requires an infinite term. This term, as something principled, is distinguished from the first and second hypostases as from its principle; therefore, it too is a divine hypostasis, the third, proceeding from the first and second as from one principle, namely, the Holy Spirit. Thus, the existing principle of

existence, the existence emanating from it, and the term of internal action are understood by the light of reason to be three divine hypostases. Which was to be demonstrated. So argues Book III of Mastrofini's *Higher Metaphysics*.

If this argumentation is examined logically, it seems to have nothing resembling a demonstration beyond an artificial form. I will not inquire how these claims cohere: that every existence requires a distinct principle, and yet the principle of existence is itself existent without another distinct principle of its own; nor how such a foundation, without leading to an infinite regress, is not absurd when it concerns a being necessary by its very essence and nature. It suffices to consider the matter obviously, to understand that the principle of existence and the existence of God are not distinguished even by reason (that is, by reasoned thought with a foundation in reality), much less really, but are absolutely nothing other than the intrinsically necessary divine essence. Hence, if the demonstration is considered theologically, the principle of God's existence, which can only be absolute existence and essence, is not the Father; nor is that existence something emanating or resulting from another, whether really or even only rationally distinct, and thus it is not the Son. Concerning the "principle of action," what we have already said and demonstrated above suffices: internal production cannot be understood by the light of reason. Many other absurdities in this entire mode of demonstration will easily be evident to anyone considering it.

The second demonstration, which the author did not hesitate to call such, occupies Book IV. He claims to derive it from "the quantity of creative power that God contains in Himself." In reality, however, the foundation on which the entire argumentation rests is an equivocation, whereby the infinity of absolute perfection or the plenitude of absolute Being (cf. *Treatise on God*, Section III, Chapter 2) is inverted into the infinity of mathematical quantity. The discussion, of astonishing absurdity, reduces to this summary: There is in God the power to create substance; this creative power is infinite. Furthermore, there is in God the power to create an infinite series of species; therefore, the creative power is not only simply infinite but infinitely infinite, or it is "infinity of the second order." Moreover, there is the power to create an infinite number of individuals within each species; therefore, the creative power, infinitely infinite, is multiplied by infinity; thus, the creative power is "infinity of the third order." (1) The creative power is the very substance of God. Therefore, "the divine substance in itself is infinity of the third order."

(1) Mastrofini's words: "To produce any substance, an infinite power is required. Therefore, to estimate the divine creative power, the infinitely infinite quantity must be multiplied by infinity, or, what amounts to the same, the creative power of God is infinity of the third order. Now, if we wish to speak mathematically, this creative power will be ∞^3, or $\infty \times \infty \times \infty$." (*Higher Metaphysics*, Book IV, p. 377)

It is not necessary to pursue the delirious dreams in the manner of explaining how the Trinity of persons is understood from this foundation, since the foundation itself is utterly absurd. For absolute Being or the plenitude of absolute perfection admits no degrees, not even in thought, much less in reality and as distinct; and the formal notion of omnipotence is the one absolutely most simple essence, whatever the external term to which it is referred. Nor are the divine persons degrees of diverse infinity; rather, they are, both individually and all together, really the one and same most simple essence, distinguished among themselves not by some degrees of quantity but as three relative beings, as principle and proceeding from a principle. Thus, in that mathematical explanation of the Trinity, not only is there no demonstration, but I do not see how the entire concept proposed in revelation can be preserved if all the consequences are logically deduced from it.

The third and final demonstration, in Book V, is drawn "from the manifestation of divine glory." The manifestation of divine glory is a good; therefore, the infinite manifestation of glory is an infinite good. Therefore, so that God may not lack an infinite good, there necessarily exists an infinite manifestation of glory. An infinite manifestation cannot be external through creatures but only internal. Therefore, there must be something in the divine substance that perfectly manifests God's glory. God, insofar as His glory is manifested, "is subsistent, before we consider that which manifests the accumulated glory of God Himself in the divine substance." Therefore, that which manifests the glory is the second divine person, distinct from the first, proceeding from the first as its image. Thus, there subsist the Father and the Son, who is the splendor of the Father's glory. Furthermore, the manifestation of glory requires a third to whom the glory is manifested, "otherwise the manifestation would not be a manifestation at all, since there would be no one to whom it is manifested." A third is required, distinct; for the Son, as the manifestation of glory, "is a means to an end," which end is the knowledge of glory; but a means is distinguished from the end, and the manifestation must be conceived as prior in order to the knowledge. "Therefore, the Son must differ from that through which this knowledge is primarily effected, or toward which the expression of divine glory is directed." Thus, the third, through which the knowledge of glory is primarily effected, is distinct from the Son as the expression of glory and is also distinct from the Father. "For the Son naturally precedes that through which the knowledge of divine glory, perfectly represented, is primarily effected; but the Father naturally precedes the Son Himself; therefore, much more does the Father naturally precede that through which such knowledge is primarily effected." Therefore, this distinct third is the third person, primarily knowing the manifestation of glory made in the second person. This third person proceeds from the first and second; for "this third person arises from the exigency and natural necessity that there be in God a certain third, who is referred to acknowledging how and to what extent the Father has excelled in His subsistent glory, that is, in producing the Son." Therefore, the first and second persons are the principle "why there is a third person." This third person is the Holy Spirit, who searches all things, even the deep things of God.

These and similar things are found there in Book V. There is no shadow of a demonstration; and what is said especially about the third person is theologically false. The internal glory of God is the infinite excellence of the divine essence, sufficient to itself; the manifestation of this glory internally (at least as far as it is knowable by reason) is the infinite comprehension of this infinite excellence through the divine intellect, and in this comprehension lies the infinite beatitude of God (cf. *Treatise on God*, Theses XXVIII–XXIX). That through the intellect, from its intimate nature, the Word is produced, and thus there is the Father and the Word, the figure, the consubstantial image, and the splendor of the Father's glory, and so it can rightly be said that the Son is the expression of the Father's glory, that is, one glory in the Father and the Son, but communicated from the Father to the Son through generation—these things are indeed most true, but in no way knowable by the light of reason. Therefore, what I have cited from the author about the first and second persons can indeed have a sound sense, but in this sense, they are known and believed only from revelation, not demonstrated by reason. But whatever the author says about the third person proceeding so that there may be one to whom God's glory is manifested—not only can this not be demonstrated, but, even given revelation, it is shown to be false.

Finally, I will mention the "speculative knowledge" of the Holy Trinity, which in our time the Güntherians boasted of having discovered from the principles of their philosophy. The Güntherians universally teach that all revealed truths, at least those that are necessary in themselves, are demonstrable by the light of reason, both as to whether they are (*an sit*) and what they are (*quid sit*). (1) They

specifically affirm this about the Holy Trinity. The term from which one must proceed, and from which they derive what they call a "cogent argument," that is, an evident demonstration for the existence of three divine persons, is, for them, the philosophically known human spirit. Since these things pertain to the very principles and core of their doctrine, they recur repeatedly and are explained in many ways in their books. For example, Günther, in the philosophical annals entitled *Lydia* (1852, pp. 441–442), first expounds his "speculative" concept of the Trinity, namely, "the process of life in the absolute being (in God) and the manifestation of God internally is so perfected that the Being of God, as an absolute principle, is doubled"; then he further states, "from the two members of the opposition (Father and Son) bursts forth a Being that is equal to both, in no way unequal to either" (the Holy Spirit). He then indicates the source from which this demonstration is derived: "The cogent argument for admitting these three moments (three persons) in the internal manifestation of God is found in the thought of one's own Ego, or in the personality of our spirit."

(1) Günther writes: "The theoretical necessity of revelation is only hypothetical; that is, this necessity depends on the degree of corruption of Adam's posterity… Our age knows that it has not come from faith to knowledge, but through new knowledge to the understanding of the objects of ancient faith, and therefore it does not allow its knowledge to be called into question by that old accusation that through knowledge the merit of faith perishes… If St. Thomas were to ask us where obedience and thus merit can find a place in such a faith cultivated by philosophy, when it is no longer in man's free power to accept or not accept what is demonstrated as necessary from its intimate root, we would respond that the essence of the obedience required for merit consists in the free submission of one's own will to the divine will." St. Thomas is introduced there, marveling at the new knowledge, exclaiming: "Such faith, such knowledge I did not find in Israel in my time; it is understood by reason that what is contained in revelation is believed as a historical fact" (*Iani Capita*, Part II, pp. 272–279; cf. pp. 334–340). Elsewhere he writes: "In my philosophy, I have found what elevates the hitherto imperfect understanding to the height destined for the sons of faith by those words: 'To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom, but to others in parables'" (*ibid.*, p. 412). And again: "After science and philosophy were attacked by the Reformers under the pretext of God's revealed word, and in turn revelation was attacked by science, now 'the time will come when faith and science, as grown daughters of one Father, will extend friendly hands to each other, so that all truth in heaven and on earth may be affirmed by both'" (*Euristeus et Heracles*, p. 587; cf. pp. 251–252, 267–269, 276–278, 283, 287, 342, 348). "A great task is imposed on the theologians of our age, to transform the ancient cross of the intellect (he was speaking immediately before about the understanding of the dogma of the Trinity) into a badge of honor for the free spirit, which also has from God the right and autonomy to investigate and understand all truth that is proposed" (*Propaedeutica*, I, p. 122; cf. pp. 304, 347, 348, 393, 394, etc.; *Thomas a Scrupulis*, pp. 188, 193–197, 215–220; *Lydia* 1849, pp. 331–333; *Lydia* 1851, p. 310; *Aurora Australis et Borealis*, pp. 131–135, etc.).

Without doubt, in the created spirit, some analogy can be found by which, given and proposed revelation, we may to some extent understand what we are to believe. The Scriptures themselves indicate this, and the holy Fathers, especially St. Augustine, and after him St. Anselm, Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, Lombard, St. Thomas, and all other theologians have illustrated this analogy. But it is so far from being a means of demonstration that the analogy itself can only be discovered and understood through revelation; and even given revelation, it serves not for demonstrating the existence of the Trinity but only for forming a somewhat clearer concept of the truth believed. The Güntherians wished to demonstrate both whether the Trinity is (*an sit*) and what it is (*quid sit*), independently of revelation, from purely rational ideas

alone, and therefore they erred in both respects. Their "speculative demonstration" of the Trinity's existence is of no value, and in their concept of what the Trinity is, there are far graver errors.

As regards the demonstration, it is almost nothing other than an effort to conceive clearly (as they thought) the Trinity of persons and the analogy of created personality, and they presented this clarity of concept as a demonstration of existence, in much the same way, though far more absurdly, as others have given the concept of a necessary being as a demonstration of its existence. Their "cogent argument," drawn "from the thought of one's own Ego, or the personality of our spirit," and thus their entire demonstration, reduces to this summary: The created spirit is an image of God, and from the image, the archetype can be known. Therefore, from the personality of the created spirit, it can be known what and what kind of divine personality is. The form of personality, or that which formally constitutes a substance as a person in act, is self-consciousness (the thought of one's own Ego). Therefore, primarily, if the elements of self-consciousness in the created spirit are rightly understood, the elements of self-consciousness in the absolute spirit can also be understood, excluding, of course, the imperfections that follow from the nature of a finite being and applying the perfections according to the exigency and nature of the absolute being. By this very fact, it is understood what and what kind of divine personality is.

With these premises established, they proceed thus: The created spirit, because it is not from itself, cannot proceed to self-consciousness by itself but only insofar as it is excited by another. Therefore, the same spirit immediately perceives only phenomena in itself, that is, the impression it receives and the action it elicits; it cannot immediately intuit its own substance but becomes conscious of its substance mediately as the subject of those phenomena. Because this is due to the limitation of the created spirit, this imperfection must be denied in the absolute spirit. Hence, the absolute spirit, because it is Being from itself and therefore also absolute knowledge from and of itself, not excited by another but by itself, renders not phenomena but its very substance immediately the object of its intuition.

All these things contain nothing that was not long known and conceded and taught by all ancient theologians (except for Günther's notion that the created spirit cannot go into act unless excited by another spirit already conscious of itself; but this axiom, derived from traditionalists, neither helps nor hinders the present argumentation and can safely be passed over). Now, let us hear how, from the most well-known and evident truth that God intuits His own substance, Günther, with a tremendous speculative leap, takes a "cogent argument" to demonstrate that not one but necessarily two divine persons are understood by the light of reason. He proceeds thus: "That in the absolute Being excitation by another is excluded does not prevent the absolute Being from opposing itself to itself and, in this opposition, entering into a relation with itself. Hence it follows that when God immediately comprehends Himself in His substance, that is, becomes conscious of Himself, He opposes His own Being to Himself, that is, posits it again. In other words: we can only conceive God rendering Himself the object of immediate intuition in His essence by opposing Himself in Himself as a real substance, or through emanation He doubles." To this astonishing "cogent argument," he adds a confirmation from analogy: "So too the human mind can make its (direct) thought the object of reflection, not without (a new) thought, but through a second equally living thought. Here too, the (reflexive) thought about the (direct) thought is not merely a shadow but light from light, life from life."

If this argumentation were accepted with closed eyes and it were conceded that two divine persons are demonstrated by the light of reason, it would seem obvious that a deduction of the same form would be made from the will, by which God wills and loves Himself, and thus a third person would be demonstrated. Yet Günther, in his "speculative theology," thought he saw that to complete self-consciousness or the intellection of His substance in God, a third person proceeding from the first and second necessarily follows and is understood. Hence it is not clear why, after completing self-consciousness in this way, which he calls "composed of three moments or elements," that is, from the self-consciousnesses of the individual persons (*Propaedeutica*, II, p. 292; *Symposion Peregrini*, p. 565; *Euristeus et Heracles*, p. 450; *Lydia* 1849, p. 240), God, now conscious of Himself by willing Himself or, in Günther's phraseology, rendering Himself the object of volition, would not again oppose Himself to Himself; and thus we would have not only a "tripled substance" but at least a quadrupled one, and at minimum we would "speculatively" understand another fourth person proceeding from the three. But, of course, although the author claims his "speculation" is from reason alone and not from presupposed revelation, he wished to find only the three persons he knew from revelation, which without revelation he would certainly not have found, neither two nor three. Meanwhile, setting these aside, let us see how from divine self-consciousness one arrives at understanding the third person.

In every intellection (so Günther teaches), three things are distinct: the understanding subject, the understood object, and the intellection as the unity or equation of the understanding and the understood. Hence, in self-consciousness, the first "moment" is that the spirit makes itself the object of intellection, that is, it posits or opposes itself as understandable to itself as understanding, distinguishing itself as understanding from itself as understood. By analogy with this first moment in self-consciousness, the first and second persons of the Trinity are demonstrated in the manner described above. But through this opposition, self-consciousness is not yet completed; for completion, an affirmation of identity between the understanding subject and the understood object is required: "I am I." This is the second "moment" by which self-consciousness is completed. Hence, also in the self-consciousness of the absolute spirit or God, to the first "moment," by which the subject opposes the object through "emanation" and "doubling of the substance," there must be added a second "moment," by which the subject and object affirm and exhibit their equality. This affirmation of equality (while the subject affirms itself equal to the object, and the object to the subject), "posits, beyond the subject and object, a third element in absolute self-consciousness, which, like the two prior, is absolute substance, and, proceeding from the subject and object, exhibits the equality of the two members of the opposition. Thus, self-consciousness in God, as in a creature, is an essential form, there of absolute, here of finite Being, with the only difference being the quality of the Being itself, that in the consciousness of the absolute, the elements of the form or moments of the acts of the absolute principle are not mere phenomena (as the intellections of a creature) but real moments, that is, *nooumena* or substances" (*Propaedeutica*, I, pp. 104ff.).

You have the entire "cogent demonstration" of the Holy Trinity from the light of reason alone, which Günther repeats, essentially the same, in nearly all his works, and which his disciples approved and commended with astonishing praise (*Propaedeutica*, I, pp. 114ff.; *Propaedeutica*, II, pp. 291ff., 535–539, 553ff.; *Symposion Peregrini*, pp. 149, 565; *Euristeus et Heracles*, pp. 449ff., 508ff., 512ff.; *Thomas a Scrupulis*, pp. 177–181; *Viae Mediae in Philosophia Germanica*, pp. 358ff.; *Lydia* 1849, pp. 245ff.; *Lydia* 1851, pp. 166ff.; *Lydia* 1852, pp. 260ff., etc.). But not only is there no evident demonstration; it is evident from every angle that there is no demonstration at all.

Already in the deduction of the distinction between the first and second persons, things are assumed as certain that are either not understood by reason or are manifestly false. a) From the fact that opposition in the absolute Being is not excluded, that is, that no repugnance of opposition (he should have said relation) is understood, it is absurdly inferred that such opposition exists. b) It is utterly false that the intuition by which God comprehends His essence is understood by us by the light of reason as involving some real distinction. This comprehension, as far as reason understands, is infinite intellection, which is really the divine substance itself without any real distinction; and of all things, a distinction or multiplication of the divine substance or essence is least introduced, which is evident both by faith and by reason. Hence, c) it is both false by faith and absurd by reason that "the absolute Being enters into a relation with itself, and the divine substance is doubled through emanation." There is no opposition or relation between absolute Being or between essence and essence, absolute substance and substance; for this is one most simple, non-multipliable "highest reality, which neither generates, nor is generated, nor proceeds," insofar as it is absolute essence or substance; yet the same has the character of the relative, and thus that one highest reality "is the Father who generates, the Son who is generated, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds, three persons together and each of them" (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 28, a. 2). Neither we nor the Güntherians understand this by reason; but we, by seeking notions in revelation itself and accommodating to them analogous concepts pre-known by reason, know what is to be believed; they err in this very thing, as long as they do not see that in revelation the distinction and thus the formal notion of a divine person, as one is distinguished from another, consists not in something absolute but in the relative.

But when they see this, they will no longer think of a "cogent demonstration" from the light of reason. If that entire demonstration of "opposition between subject and object" is fallacious and false, there can be no talk of a rational deduction of the third person or "third element," as he calls it, because this second deduction is entirely founded on the prior and presupposes it as a necessary foundation. But let us suppose the distinction of two persons demonstrated, and let us further, without examination, accept what the author says about the "second moment in self-consciousness," and thus inspect the deduction of the third person in itself. What is that "affirmation or objective exhibition of equality," which he also calls "equiposition of the two opposed members"? Equality is contained in the distinction of the persons and the numerical unity of the essence or nature; thus, if that "affirmation of equality" or equiposition of the two persons is taken in a genetic or real active sense, the equiposition is nothing other than the generation of the Son through the communication of the one and same nature, not the production of a third person. If that "affirmation" is taken in an ideal sense for the intellection of an equality already posited, this is absolute intellection, or the divine essence, one in two distinct persons, understanding equality, by no means conceivable as the production of some third person.

Günther says: "In opposition as such, perfect identity is not yet contained, because the emanation could be only partial, that is, not necessarily total; and therefore, the opposition still remains to be exhibited or affirmed as equiposition, and this is uniquely accomplished by both factors through emanation positing a product in which each of them finds itself wholly again, 'neither being subordinated to the other in producing it'" (*Propaedeutica*, II, p. 536). And: "The Holy Spirit is, to that extent, the objective attestation of the paternal generation (as a total emanation), insofar as the opposition between the Father and the Son becomes in the Holy Spirit an objective real equiposition" (*Thomas a Scrupulis*, p. 177). But these are empty and absurd words. Of what opposition and emanation, pray tell, is there talk when it concerns the divine persons? The Son cannot proceed from God the Father except through the communication of the entire essence; for the divine essence can neither be produced nor divided. Hence,

the relation of opposition, that the Father who generates is one and the Son who is generated is another, yet not something else, includes consubstantiality and most perfect equality; nor can it be said, except most absurdly, that through generation equality or (as Günther speaks) equiposition is not yet constituted, but that in the relation of opposition arising from divine generation there is still inequality, which must be supplemented and brought to equality through the production of a third person. (1)

(1) Indeed, Günther did not even think that through the production of the Holy Spirit the opposition was sufficiently reduced to equality between the "members of the opposition." He teaches, among other errors, this one: that creation, like the procession of the persons, "is founded in the very nature of the absolute, and both have one and the same intrinsic necessity, with the only difference that creation presupposes the emanation (procession of the persons), not vice versa" (*Lydia* 1852, pp. 260ff., and often elsewhere). Now, he did not always explain this necessity of creating intrinsic to God in the same way. One of his explanations is this: The Son does not generate as the Father does, and the Holy Spirit produces no other person; to equalize this inequality between the persons in the internal manifestation, creation is necessary: "Creation equalizes the inequalities in emanation, because through creation an equal knowledge of their absolute Being is induced for each of the coefficients of the divine Triad (i.e., the persons)." One might think, therefore, that at least the external operation is common to the three persons. But not even this is admitted. For since the three persons are not one substance in number but three substances, the operation of one is abundantly sufficient, and there can be no place for the other persons in one and the same operation. Which person, then, is the creator? Günther responds: Because "that defect of paternity in the Son is the first negative moment," therefore the Son alone creates to remove that negation, and thus through creation, consciousness of equality among the three persons is induced in God (*Thomas a Scrupulis*, pp. 177–181; *Viae Mediae in Philosophia*, pp. 358–362). The Catechism teaches how many and how great these errors are. But since we are still speaking of the force of the rational demonstration that is boasted, note that these fictions, which are evidently absurd both from revelation and reason, are adduced as philosophical proofs of the mystery of the Holy Trinity!

And such fictions are presented as truths clearly seen and demonstrated by "cogent arguments"! Just as, therefore, the very foundation, namely the rational demonstration of the generation of the Son from the Father, does not hold, so too this second demonstration of the procession of the third person, considered in itself, is utterly null. Who, now, looking at this "speculative theology," which sought to reverse the principle of the holy Fathers and theologians, "I believe that I may understand," "faith seeks understanding," into its opposite: "I understand the truth that I may believe the historical fact of revelation" (*Lydia* 1852, pp. 348–350; *Iani Capita*, Part II, pp. 272–279), who, I say, taught by the very experiment, would not feel the truth of St. Thomas's statement: "He who strives to prove the Trinity by natural reason detracts from faith… For when someone adduces reasons that are not cogent (much more if absurd reasons are given as cogent), he falls into the mockery of unbelievers" (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 32, a. 1).

II. The Greater Detraction from Faith

The other detraction from faith, mentioned by us at the beginning, is even graver: that if the concept of the thing itself is constituted by the light of reason alone, independently of revelation, the truth itself and the genuine sense of the dogma are necessarily perverted, because the concept of persons who are three relative subsistents, distinct among themselves, and yet both individually and all together one absolute

essence, is suprarational and can only be derived from revelation. Hence, we have seen that in all attempts at demonstration, the departure from the genuine sense of the dogma is in direct proportion to the abstraction from positive revelation; for the more strictly the independence of the demonstration from positive revelation is maintained, as is claimed, the more it deviates from the true concept.

This unfortunate independence is greater in Günther than in the others we have discussed; therefore, his concept or explanation of what the Trinity is, is correspondingly further from the truth.

1°. He affirms that a divine person, insofar as the persons are formally distinct, must be conceived not as relative but as absolute. Hence, he teaches that "the unity of the divine nature is by no means to be understood in a numerically real sense but only in a formal sense, that is, as the absolute mutual relation of three real principles" (*Propaedeutica*, II, p. 298). Indeed, he who posits a person in God, as in creatures, as absolute, by admitting three distinct persons admits "three absolute principles" (*ibid.*, p. 299). Similarly, he who, by a partly false and partly inadequate concept (cf. *Treatise on the Incarnation*), posits the form by which a complete singular substance is constituted a person as "self-consciousness," such that as many persons as there are, so many distinct absolute substances and distinct "self-consciousnesses" (or intelligences and wills) are introduced; he, by admitting three divine persons, thereby admits three absolute substances and, in each, a distinct intellect and distinct will. But of these three "real principles," excluding the numerical unity of nature, a formal unity is affirmed, insofar as through the form of personality, that is, through self-consciousness, the individual persons are mutually related. Through this mutual relation, it is then said that "from three self-consciousnesses, as individual moments, one absolute self-consciousness is composed" (*Propaedeutica*, II, p. 292; *Lydia* 1849, p. 240), and the individual divine persons are called "individual moments of one absolute personality" (*Propaedeutica*, II, p. 557).

You have what is meant by "the absolute mutual relation of three real principles" and what arises from it, the "formal unity" as opposed to the "numerically real unity" of the divine nature. That such a concept of unity is utterly false has been proven throughout our treatment from the documents of revelation; yet Günther, after the rise of the light of "speculative theology," professes that it is most dear to him. He says: "Let the passage from Leibniz's theological system be recalled: there are, therefore, three singular substances, one absolute relation that embraces them. This passage, if I had come across it earlier, I confess, would have caused me difficulty; but now it is most dear and acceptable to me, because it illustrates a certain passage of Augustine (*On the Trinity*, Book VII, Chapter 4), where he asks why we do not say three Gods as we say three divine persons, and finds the reason in the pedagogical motive of the Church, which, compelled by necessity, introduced and retains this manner of speaking" (*Propaedeutica*, I, p. 119).

Indeed, if the concept of the Trinity were such that there are three divine substances whose unity consists in mutual relation, there appears no reason why three Gods should not be said as much as three such persons. But according to the revealed doctrine, the concept is entirely reversed: the divine relations are the entire reason for distinction, not unity; the unity of the persons is in the one and really singular absolute substance. Thus, what Günther calls distinct is entirely one and singular; and in what he places unity, in that very thing real distinction is constituted.

If Leibniz had said what is attributed to him, he would have erred before Günther; yet he never said such a thing, nor could he have said it without insanity. For according to the manner of speaking of the ancient theologians, which Leibniz uses, especially in his "theological system," an absolute relation would be a contradiction in terms.

As for Augustine, nothing could be more false and contrary to the sense of the holy Doctor than what Günther indicates: that, by the truth of the thing itself, three Gods could be said, except that usage, introduced and retained for external pedagogical reasons, stands in the way. On the contrary, in that passage, which must be read in its entirety to be understood (*On the Trinity*, Book VII, nn. 7–12, where n. 12 contains the true solution to the difficulty), he explicitly teaches that what is absolute in God is entirely one, and therefore there can in no way be or be said three Gods or three essences, but one God who is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Hence it follows, and Augustine teaches, that these three are distinct among themselves not insofar as they are one absolute and one God, but insofar as they are relative.

The entire difficulty for Augustine is only about the name "person" and "hypostasis." The final solution comes to this: if the name "person" were taken as in creatures, as something absolute, it could not be said in the plural in divine things; but by a certain necessity, so that there might be one common name by which the three distinct beings are designated, the Latins used "person" and the Greeks "hypostasis" to signify what is relative in God; and thus, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are called three persons or hypostases. (2)

(2) If we believe Günther, it is by no means clear from revelation what the unity of God is: "In the New Testament, God revealed Himself as one in three persons, without simultaneously declaring whether that unity is to be understood in a formal or real sense, and here again whether mathematically or dynamically" (*Propaedeutica*, II, p. 390).

2°. Because Günther did not know, nor could he know from a merely rational concept, the numerical real unity of the divine nature together with the Trinity of persons, he could admit no other foundation for unity beyond that mutual relation of three absolute substances, as mentioned above, than an identity of reason and equality in three distinct essences, which ultimately is specific unity. This Günther calls

an identity of essence, and he opposes this to unity, affirming identity and expressly denying the (numerical) unity of essence. For he says that what must be affirmed is the "equality, not unity, in the essence or in the divine Being (*Einerleiheit, Identität nicht Einheit, in dem Wesen, Sein*)" (*Propaedeutica*, II, p. 557). To this sense, he absurdly applies the words of the liturgical Preface: "not in the singularity of one person but in the Trinity of one substance," where, according to Günther, "the word *one* in the second instance is not to be taken in the same sense as in the first instance, but is said for euphony's sake as *one substance* instead of *the same substance*; for here the discourse is about a ternary or tripled substance" (*ibid.*, p. 539). Günther's disciple, Dr. Knoodt, adds a commentary (in his published letters, Vol. I, p. 143): "In the Preface, it is not said *in the singularity of one substance*, but *in the Trinity of one substance*, by which words the singularity of the essence is denied, because Trinity and thus plurality (of substance) is affirmed." But when *substance* is not taken for *person* but for absolute substance, as in this liturgical profession of faith where substance is opposed to persons and not one person but one substance is predicated, it is most certain from the Catholic faith that the divine substance is one, singular, and not multipliable (see Theses I, VII, IX, X). Thus, in this very opposition, it is entirely evident that in the same

numerical real sense in which the unity of person is denied, the unity of substance is affirmed. Therefore, the name *Trinity* does not enumerate substances, as the Güntherians thought, but persons. "One God, one Lord, not in the singularity of one person but in the Trinity of one substance" is the same as saying: One God is not in the Sabellian sense, that there is only one person; nor in the Arian sense, that only the Father is the supreme God, with the Son and the Holy Spirit being inferior substances; nor in the tritheistic sense, that just as there is not one person, so too there is not one substance but three equal substances. Rather, to exclude all these heresies, it is predicated that "one God is not in the singularity of one person, but in the Trinity of persons, who are of one substance."

What we have brought forward is sufficient to understand what the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX declared in his letter to Cardinal de Geissel, Archbishop of Cologne (June 15, 1857): "We know that in those same (Güntherian) books, not a few things are read that depart not a little from the Catholic faith and the sincere explanation of the unity of the divine substance in three distinct and eternal persons" (*Acta Pii IX*, Part I, Vol. II, p. 587). At the same time, however, from all that has been said, it is clearly shown what we have chiefly aimed at in this entire exposition, namely, that the sincerity of the dogma itself cannot be preserved if, denying its suprarationality, one undertakes to form a concept and demonstration of the truth from notions and principles of reason alone, independently of revelation. And from this, it further becomes clear why it is of such great importance that the suprarational character of mysteries be sincerely and practically acknowledged by Christian philosophers and theologians.

Scholion: It is often asked about Plato and the Platonists whether they attained any notion of the Trinity in their philosophy, and if so, what kind and from what source. First, it must be distinguished that the doctrine of Plato himself is separate from the commentaries of later Platonists; likewise, in judging Plato's own doctrine, books falsely attributed to him or at least suspected as such by the Neoplatonists must be set aside, such as the letters of Plato, particularly the second to Dionysius and the sixth to Coriscus, which are commonly regarded by recent critics as spurious.

As for the master himself, the interpretation of his theology depends on the interpretation of his doctrine of ideas. His view on ideas, and thus on God, was perhaps not clear even to Plato himself in many respects, and it is certainly most obscure to all other learned men, as can be seen from the vast diversity of interpretations among both ancient Peripatetics and Platonists themselves, as well as among modern commentators up to our own time. What pertains to the present matter in Plato is roughly as follows: Every unchangeable truth, which is the object of the intellect, is called and is an *idea* or *intelligible essence* (ἰδέα νοητή οὐσία) in opposition to sensible, mutable things, and even to mutable souls and minds. Therefore, both of all sensible or material things and of spiritual substances contained in this universe, there are their own ideas and intelligible essences. The entire complex of ideas or the entire metaphysical order of essences is what is called the *intelligible world* (κόσμος νοητός) in opposition to this concrete world, which is the *sensible world* (κόσμος αἰσθητός). In that metaphysical order of truths and intelligible world, there is certainly a mutual connection, harmony, and unity, which constitutes a certain supreme beauty and goodness. The more universal and higher the intelligible essences and ideas are, the more they encompass and unite under themselves the orders of lower ideas. Just as in this sensible world only minds understand and comprehend ideas, so in the intelligible world, the *mind* itself (ὁ νοῦς), of which the minds in the sensible world are participations, encompasses all ideas and unites them in itself, and therefore that mind is the pinnacle of the entire intelligible world, the father and cause of all ideas. However, above the mind itself is the *idea of the Good* (ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τἀγαθόν), in which both

the idea of the mind and thus all other ideas are comprehended. The Good is God, God is also the mind, and God is also the intelligible world.

Further, regarding the sensible world, it is necessary to distinguish in it what is intelligible by the mind and what is matter. All intelligible things are ideas and unchangeable intelligible essences. When all these are abstracted, there remains the principle of mutability, which has neither form nor quality nor is intelligible in itself, and this is called *matter* (ἄμορφον καὶ ἄποιον). Therefore, when ideas are added and joined with matter, this sensible world arises. Thus, this world, considered as a whole, encompassing all singular things, is a participation and expressed image of the intelligible world, and all singular things are participations of specific ideas or essences; for example, individual humans are participations of the ideal human, who is *ὁ ἄνθρωπος*. Hence, the sensible world is also God, the Son of God, and the Only-Begotten (μονογενής).

This entire Platonic theory is undoubtedly quite uncertain and obscure, admitting multiple interpretations; however, it is most clear that it has absolutely nothing in common with the Christian doctrine of revelation concerning the Holy Trinity. Many recent scholars, even eminently Catholic ones, incline toward an interpretation in a pantheistic sense. It can hardly be denied that many elements of pantheism underlie it; yet it should not be conceded that for Plato, the Good and the Mind, as well as the entire intelligible world, were merely abstract ideas lacking concrete consistency and actual existence outside the sensible world. If the supreme Good is understood in a theistic sense (in opposition to pantheism) as God, a substantial intelligent and willing spirit, which sense the holy Fathers seem to have admitted whenever they mention Plato, then there remains room for a twofold or even threefold interpretation.

First, the supreme mind (ὁ νοῦς) can be understood as the divine mind, such that the Good, without real distinction, is an attribute of God, and the ideas of things are understood as ideas in the divine mind, so that there is only a distinction of reason and consideration regarding the one God, the supreme exemplary, efficient, and final cause. In this sense, most Fathers, and especially the renowned Dionysius, interpreted or corrected Plato. In this sense, there is certainly no trace of a distinction of persons, except that, given and known revelation, one might proceed from the consideration of the divine mind to some analogous illustration of the paternal Word, as known from revelation, in the manner we have already mentioned in Thesis XVII and will discuss more distinctly below in Thesis XXVII. This still holds even if, according to Aristotle's explanation—whether true or false—it is supposed that Plato held the ideas or ideal and universal essences of things as existing per se outside the divine mind, provided that the Good and the Mind (τἀγαθόν and ὁ νοῦς) are distinguished not really but only by consideration.

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From all that has been said, it is entirely certain that Plato's doctrine of ideas and the divine mind has nothing to do with the mystery of God, who is one in essence and triune in persons. If anything about the

distinction of persons is found in Philo and, after the Gospel had been widely propagated, among the Neoplatonists, these things came to these philosophers from revelation and were still distorted by them through interpretation based on purely philosophical principles.

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an identity of essence, and he opposes this to unity, affirming identity and expressly denying the (numerical) unity of essence. For he says that what must be affirmed is the "equality, not unity, in the essence or in the divine Being (*Einerleiheit, Identität nicht Einheit, in dem Wesen, Sein*)" (*Propaedeutica*, II, p. 557). To this sense, he absurdly applies the words of the liturgical Preface: "not in the singularity of one person but in the Trinity of one substance," where, according to Günther, "the word *one* in the second instance is not to be taken in the same sense as in the first instance, but is said for euphony's sake as *one substance* instead of *the same substance*; for here the discourse is about a ternary or tripled substance" (*ibid.*, p. 539). Günther's disciple, Dr. Knoodt, adds a commentary (in his published letters, Vol. I, p. 143): "In the Preface, it is not said *in the singularity of one substance*, but *in the Trinity of one substance*, by which words the singularity of the essence is denied, because Trinity and thus plurality (of substance) is affirmed." But when *substance* is not taken for *person* but for absolute substance, as in this liturgical profession of faith where substance is opposed to persons and not one person but one substance is predicated, it is most certain from the Catholic faith that the divine substance is one, singular, and not multipliable (see Theses I, VII, IX, X). Thus, in this very opposition, it is entirely evident that in the same numerical real sense in which the unity of person is denied, the unity of substance is affirmed. Therefore, the name *Trinity* does not enumerate substances, as the Güntherians thought, but persons. "One God, one Lord, not in the singularity of one person but in the Trinity of one substance" is the same as saying: One God is not in the Sabellian sense, that there is only one person; nor in the Arian sense, that only the Father is the supreme God, with the Son and the Holy Spirit being inferior substances; nor in the tritheistic sense, that just as there is not one person, so too there is not one substance but three equal substances. Rather, to exclude all these heresies, it is predicated that "one God is not in the singularity of one person, but in the Trinity of persons, who are of one substance."

What we have brought forward is sufficient to understand what the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX declared in his letter to Cardinal de Geissel, Archbishop of Cologne (June 15, 1857): "We know that in those same (Güntherian) books, not a few things are read that depart not a little from the Catholic faith and the sincere explanation of the unity of the divine substance in three distinct and eternal persons" (*Acta Pii IX*, Part I, Vol. II, p. 587). At the same time, however, from all that has been said, it is clearly shown what we have chiefly aimed at in this entire exposition, namely, that the sincerity of the dogma itself cannot be preserved if, denying its suprarationality, one undertakes to form a concept and demonstration of the truth from notions and principles of reason alone, independently of revelation. And from this, it further becomes clear why it is of such great importance that the suprarational character of mysteries be sincerely and practically acknowledged by Christian philosophers and theologians.

Scholion: It is often asked about Plato and the Platonists whether they attained any notion of the Trinity in their philosophy, and if so, what kind and from what source. First, it must be distinguished that the doctrine of Plato himself is separate from the commentaries of later Platonists; likewise, in judging Plato's own doctrine, books falsely attributed to him or at least suspected as such by the Neoplatonists must be set aside, such as the letters of Plato, particularly the second to Dionysius and the sixth to Coriscus, which are commonly regarded by recent critics as spurious.

As for the master himself, the interpretation of his theology depends on the interpretation of his doctrine of ideas. His view on ideas, and thus on God, was perhaps not clear even to Plato himself in many respects, and it is certainly most obscure to all other learned men, as can be seen from the vast diversity of interpretations among both ancient Peripatetics and Platonists themselves, as well as among modern commentators up to our own time. What pertains to the present matter in Plato is roughly as follows: Every unchangeable truth, which is the object of the intellect, is called and is an *idea* or *intelligible essence* (ἰδέα νοητή οὐσία) in opposition to sensible, mutable things, and even to mutable souls and minds. Therefore, both of all sensible or material things and of spiritual substances contained in this universe, there are their own ideas and intelligible essences. The entire complex of ideas or the entire metaphysical order of essences is what is called the *intelligible world* (κόσμος νοητός) in opposition to this concrete world, which is the *sensible world* (κόσμος αἰσθητός). In that metaphysical order of truths and intelligible world, there is certainly a mutual connection, harmony, and unity, which constitutes a certain supreme beauty and goodness. The more universal and higher the intelligible essences and ideas are, the more they encompass and unite under themselves the orders of lower ideas. Just as in this sensible world only minds understand and comprehend ideas, so in the intelligible world, the *mind* itself (ὁ νοῦς), of which the minds in the sensible world are participations, encompasses all ideas and unites them in itself, and therefore that mind is the pinnacle of the entire intelligible world, the father and cause of all ideas. However, above the mind itself is the *idea of the Good* (ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τἀγαθόν), in which both the idea of the mind and thus all other ideas are comprehended. The Good is God, God is also the mind, and God is also the intelligible world.

Further, regarding the sensible world, it is necessary to distinguish in it what is intelligible by the mind and what is matter. All intelligible things are ideas and unchangeable intelligible essences. When all these are abstracted, there remains the principle of mutability, which has neither form nor quality nor is intelligible in itself, and this is called *matter* (ἄμορφον καὶ ἄποιον). Therefore, when ideas are added and joined with matter, this sensible world arises. Thus, this world, considered as a whole, encompassing all singular things, is a participation and expressed image of the intelligible world, and all singular things are participations of specific ideas or essences; for example, individual humans are participations of the ideal human, who is *ὁ ἄνθρωπος*. Hence, the sensible world is also God, the Son of God, and the Only-Begotten (μονογενής).

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Chapter II: On the Non-Repugnance of the Mystery of the Holy Trinity

Thesis XIX: The supernatural eminence of the mystery does not prevent it from being apprehended by an analogous concept, given revelation.

“Although both the truth of existence (*an sit*, whether it is) and the truth of essence (*quid sit*, what it is) in the mystery of the Holy Trinity must be considered above human reason, nevertheless: 1) given the presupposition of faith, some understanding and a clearer analogous concept of the essence of the mystery, *what it is*, can be sought; and likewise, 2) from the root of the revealed and believed truth, some understanding of the existence of the mystery, *why it is so*, can be attained. Hence, this understanding and theological demonstration proceed from principles believed by faith and are entirely based on them, not philosophically from principles discerned by the light of reason.”

I. In order that we may explicitly believe by faith what God reveals to us, it is not indeed required that we have a proper notion of the things to be believed as they are in themselves; nevertheless, it is absolutely necessary—or rather, it is contained in the very act of explicitly believing—that we conceive some notion, at least analogous, of the thing believed. This, however (setting aside the manifestation of the thing by immediate intuition and in itself, where it would no longer be faith but vision), is accomplished in three ways: namely, either by the supernatural light of the intellect alone through infused ideas and understandings; or through prophetic vision by presenting signs of things (whether real, verbal, perceived externally by the senses, or only internally by the imagination), from which the intellect, under divine illumination, is led to conceive notions of the things signified and to form a judgment about the truth; or finally, by the Word of God Himself incarnate, who…

[Here the text provided ends abruptly, quoting Gregory of Nazianzus (*Poemata*, Sect. II, carm. VII, v. 245 sq., p. 1084, or carm. 62) and referencing Petavius (*De Trinitate*, I, c. 2) and Gallandi (*Bibliotheca*, Vol. I, Prolegomena, and cited authors).]

what the Father sees, this He testifies (John 1:18; 3:11), or at least through God’s ambassadors among men (with the necessary and appropriate demonstration of their mission and authority), things and truths to be believed are proposed externally by word and doctrine, and internally grace illuminates, stirs, and elevates to conceiving supernatural faith (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, qq. 173 and 174; *De Veritate*, q. 12, a. 7 ff.). Although, regarding the first and second modes of revelation, which are prophetic modes, as far as the present matter is concerned, nearly the same holds with due proportion as what we will say about the third mode; nevertheless, we now deal only with this third mode of revelation, which in the present providence of God is the ordinary mode. Therefore, we will first consider how the understanding sought relates to revelation and faith; then, following the holy Doctors, we will illustrate this with some examples.

1. In the mode of revelation we have mentioned, the internal light of grace does not per se pertain to the concepts to be infused into the mind, but presupposes an external proposition of the things to be believed, congruent with the nature of the human mind: “Faith comes from hearing, and hearing through the word of Christ” (Romans 10:14 ff.). But the word is not heard by us, or the doctrine is not intelligible to us, nor could we conceive any ideas of the things proposed from it, and thus could not give explicit assent to the proposed truth, unless the revelation were in some way connected with notions we already possess and with pre-known truths. Here too applies what Augustine says (*Epistle* 120, n. 3): “We could not even believe unless we had rational souls.” Therefore, regarding this connection of ideas, so that we may proceed from the known to the unknown, our mind operates in conceiving ideas about revealed suprarational things in a manner similar to how it attains knowledge of God through the light of reason.

Namely, we first form notions of perfections—wisdom, goodness, etc.—from creatures, and from these, by concluding from effects to the cause, we know God's perfections through the way of negation and supereminence (τῆς ὑπεροχῆς), removing the imperfection by which perfections are limited in creatures; and only by this way of conclusion, and thus through likeness (ἀναλόγως, Wisdom 13:5), as in a mirror and an enigma, can we attain an idea and knowledge of divine perfections by the light of reason. By this, we clearly know God, if the question is whether He exists (*an sit*); but we conceive what God is (*quid sit*) only through ideas derived from elsewhere and by comparison, thus through analogous notions, not through ideas formed from intuition of the object in itself, and therefore not through proper notions (*Tractatus de Deo*, Sect. II, c. 1). Likewise, when it is no longer a matter of beholding God's invisible things, understood through His visible works, but of believing things proposed through God's word, these words of God must be signs of ideas, some analogous notions of which we have already preconceived from creatures; otherwise, the words would not be signs for conceiving the ideas they signify but merely the sound of words. In the present matter, when it is taught that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, one deity, and three distinct from one another, each individually and all three together being one God, there are presupposed in our mind multiple, at least confused, notions of perfections without which God cannot be conceived; then notions of essence, person, generation or origin of one from another, identity, distinction, etc., without which the mind could not, but with which it can, form some, at least confused, concept of the thing proposed for belief, by removing (as was said of rational concepts) through the way of negation and supereminence the imperfections that adhere to these absolute perfections or relations in creatures.

Therefore, the difference between rational and suprarational concepts of God, as already indicated above (Thesis XVII), is not that suprarational truths are conceived in no way, or that rational truths are conceived with proper ideas and suprarational with analogous ones; for in both cases, the concepts are analogous, formed from pre-understood perfections as they are in creatures. But the difference is twofold. For:

a) In rational truths about God, regarding the concepts themselves, we proceed through the way of causality, by which we understand that God exists (*quia est*); then through the way of negation and supereminence, by which we conceive somewhat more distinctly what He is (*quid est*), though only analogically and not properly as God is in Himself. But in suprarational truths, there is no place for a conclusion from effects to cause, and therefore, in place of the way of causality, positive revelation through God's word is necessary, without which we could never arrive at those concepts. Since, however, revelation does not change the mode of knowing connatural to us, it presents the suprarational perfections and internal relations of God according to analogy and from the analogy of rational notions we have preconceived from creatures. Therefore, given revelation (just as in rational truths, given the way of causality), we can and necessarily do use the way of negation and supereminence to arrive at some clearer analogous concept of the suprarational truth or revealed object, what it is (*quid sit*).

b) As is already clear from what has been said, the difference lies in the judgment of assent (*an sit*). For this judgment, insofar as God is understood by reason, arises from the perceived connection of effects with their supreme cause; but in revealed suprarational truths, it relies solely on the authority of God revealing. Nevertheless, just as in rational notions of God, the mode of conceiving analogically what He is (*quid est*) refers to perfections not abstracted from their existence but formally as understood in necessary existence, so in suprarational objects of faith, the mode of conceiving concerns them insofar as their existence is most certainly established by faith. Hence, the movement and effort to conceive things more

distinctly through analogies aim not at understanding things as possible but as existing, and thus also at understanding to some extent the intrinsic reason for their necessary existence.

In a word, we can say: What is known of God (rational truth, Romans 1:19) can be understood by reason from created perfections, that it is (*quia est*), and analogically, what it is (*quid est*); the deep things of God (suprarational truths, 1 Corinthians 2:10) are revealed by the Spirit of God, that they are (*quia sunt*), and in this very revelation, an analogy from created perfections is presented to our spirit, so that we may analogically apprehend what they are (*quid sunt*) and by what intrinsic necessary reason they are.

Thus, in these truths, the principle of the holy Fathers is entirely certain: "Unless you believe, you will not understand" (Isaiah 7:9, according to the Septuagint). For although explicit faith itself could not exist without some prior understanding, not only of the motives of credibility (about which we now inquire nothing), but of the very thing to be believed; nevertheless, the object of this prior understanding is provided by revelation itself, and (in suprarational truths) only revelation can provide it. Moreover, with faith already presupposed, faith itself, insofar as it includes the highest religious veneration and intimate love of the thing believed, seeks a further understanding, as a middle ground between faith and vision, the root and seeds of which are already contained in the mode of revelation itself and in faith.

Consentius had asked St. Augustine that, "in cautiously and prudently discussing the question of the Trinity, that is, the unity of the divinity and the distinction of persons, he might so clear away the cloud of the mind that what he could not previously think, he might in some way see with the eyes of understanding, illuminated by the light of intelligence." On the other hand, Consentius had stated: "It is not so much reason that should be sought as the authority of the saints that should be followed; for if the faith of the holy Church were apprehended by the reasoning of disputation and not by the piety of belief, no one except philosophers and orators would possess beatitude." Now Augustine, in his response, shows that these two things posited by Consentius, if taken absolutely, would mutually exclude each other. Therefore, he says, since both are most true—that faith must be followed from authority and yet the understanding of things believed must be sought—they must be understood in such a way that faith precedes, and from faith, one strives for some understanding of the thing believed. This understanding, however, will not be perfect until we attain to vision face to face. "If you reasonably demand reason from me or any teacher, so that you may understand what you believe, correct your definition, not to reject faith, but so that what you already hold by the firmness of faith, you may also behold by the light of reason. For it is far from the case that God would hate in us that by which He created us more excellent than other living beings. Far be it, I say, that we believe so as not to accept or seek reason, since we could not even believe unless we had rational souls. Therefore, in certain matters pertaining to salutary doctrine, which we cannot yet grasp by reason but will one day be able to, let faith precede reason, by which the heart is purified to receive and bear the light of great reason; this is surely a matter of reason. And therefore, it was reasonably said by the prophet: *Unless you believe, you will not understand.* Here he undoubtedly distinguished these two and gave the advice that we first believe so that we may be able to understand what we believe. Thus, it was reasonably seen that faith should precede reason… If a believer now demands reason to understand what he believes, his capacity must be considered, so that, with reason given according to it, he may take as much understanding of his faith as he can: more if he can grasp more, less if less, provided that, until he reaches the fullness of knowledge and perfection, he does not depart from the path of faith… Now, therefore, if we are faithful, we have come to the path of faith, which, if we do not abandon, we will without doubt arrive not only at such understanding of incorporeal

and unchangeable things as is not attainable by all in this life, but also at the summit of contemplation, which the Apostle calls *face to face*" (Augustine, *To Consentius*, *Epistle* 120, nn. 2–4).

The same principles are often theoretically stated and practically applied elsewhere by Augustine and other Fathers. Indeed, these principles underpin all genuine theology insofar as it is speculative, and its development rests upon them. Therefore, just as with the Fathers—Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Basil, Cyril of Alexandria, Augustine, etc.—so too with Anselm, the Victorines, Peter Lombard, Alexander, Albert, Thomas, Bonaventure, and all other masters of the School, the treatment of other dogmas, and especially the doctrine of the Trinity (which is our present concern), consists in no small part in the inquiry into understanding from faith. Thus, Anselm says that the mystery of the Trinity is not to be proved by reason for a Christian but believed by faith; yet from faith and in faith, one must progress, as far as possible, to understanding. "I hear that Roscelin the cleric says that in God the three persons are three things separated from each other, as three angels are, yet in such a way that there is one will and power… Whoever asserts as true the blasphemy I mentioned hearing from Roscelin, whether man or angel, is anathema… for he is by no means a Christian. But if he is baptized and raised among Christians, he must in no way be listened to; nor should any reason for his error be demanded from him, nor should our truth be presented to him (because the proposition of faith is most clear). For it is most foolish and futile, on account of anyone who does not understand what is most solidly founded upon the firm rock, to call it into the wavering doubt of questions… For a Christian ought to progress through faith to understanding, not reach faith through understanding, or, if he cannot understand, depart from faith. But when he can attain to understanding, he delights; when he cannot, he venerates what he cannot grasp" (Anselm, *Epistle* 41, to Fulco, Bishop of Beauvais, Book II). "I do not try, O Lord, to penetrate Your depth, for I by no means compare my intellect to it, but I desire to understand to some extent Your truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand in order to believe, but I believe in order to understand. For this too I believe: that unless I believe, I will not understand" (Anselm, *Proslogion*, c. 1).

2. The analogies under which the mystery of the Holy Trinity is presented to us for conception in the Scriptures themselves and thereafter in the universal preaching of the Church are chiefly three:

a) When it is taught that God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit—who is the Spirit of the Father and the Son, proceeding from the Father and (because all that belongs to the Father belongs also to the Son) receiving from the Son—here is included the fundamental analogy, without which we could form no concept, and under which, according to notions preconceived from creatures, we conceive three distinct persons and the unity of nature. Then we conceive the origin of the second person from the first, indeed the mode of origin through generation, or procession in the likeness of nature, or communication of the divine nature from an internal vital principle, so that the resulting second person, by the mode of procession, is the substantial image of the first person; for by the names Father, Son, generation, image, figure, or character of the Father's substance, under which the mystery is revealed, we understand it expressly. Likewise, we conceive the procession of the third distinct person from the first and second, insofar as they have all things in common or are one principle, and at least negatively understand that the mode of procession is different from generation, because the third person is not the Son. Further, we learn to correct the notion of the unity of nature and distinction of persons, as preconceived from creatures, by the other dogma that the three are one God, not three distinct gods. For from this we understand that the unity of nature and of all absolute perfection is not specific, as in creatures, but numerical; and the

distinction of persons is not according to absolute substance but according to formal relative reasons, expressed by the names Father, Son, and Spirated. God is spirit, and therefore all imperfections that adhere to the notions of father, son, and generation in creatures must be denied. "Neither Son nor generation is proper to the deity, but is assumed from human likeness; similarly, the name Spirit. Divine Scripture used this in the divine Spirit to show that He is from God in a different way (than the Son); for, as said before, it was not fitting that this too be signified by the same likeness. But you (heretic), despising (καταφρονῶν, or περιφρονῶν in some texts) human examples (παραδείγματα), subvert the divine truths understood through them… God generates not as man; yet He truly generates, and He brings forth from Himself the Word (ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐκφέρει, Λόγον), not a human word; He brings forth (ἐκπέμπει) the Word truly, not from Himself. And He sends forth the Spirit through the mouth, as if in a human manner, though God's mouth is not corporeal; yet the Spirit is from Him, not from elsewhere" (Basil, *Against Eunomius*, Book V, p. 306). Thus, the mode of positively conceiving these things is presented in another analogy drawn from the spiritual and intellectual order.

b) The same who is the Son is the Word, God, the Λόγος. When this analogy is joined with the prior one, they mutually complete each other, as it were, and what is lacking in one is supplied by the other. In the first, the substantiality and real distinction of the persons from one another are more distinctly presented; in the second, the mode of intellectual, immanent, necessary, and eternal generation, as well as the unity of essence and mutual immanence of the persons (περιχώρησις), are more clearly conceived. "John himself, when he was to teach that this Word is the Only-Begotten Son of God, lest anyone suspect a passible generation, by premising the name Word removes all unjust suspicion, declaring that the Son is from the Father Himself and is impassibly. … But if these representations (παραδείγματα) are not sufficient to fully present the matter, do not marvel; for the discourse is about God, whom we can neither express nor think according to His dignity" (Chrysostom, *Homily on John* II, n. 4). So too the other Fathers with common consent. "When he spoke of the Only-Begotten, he called Him the Word… Why the Word? To make it clear that He proceeded from the mind. Why the Word? Because He is begotten without passion. Why the Word? Because He is the image of the Begetter, showing the whole Begetter in Himself, separating nothing from Him, and existing perfect in Himself; just as our word reflects the image of our entire thought… He called Him the Word, to show you that the Father's generation is not subject to passion, and to teach you the Son's perfect existence (subsistence), who is indeed God, and to demonstrate through this the eternal conjunction of the Son with the Father. For our word, the offspring of the mind, is generated without passion; it is neither cut nor divided nor flows, but the mind, remaining whole in its own substance, produces a whole and perfect word; and the word proceeding embraces all the power of the generating mind. Therefore, after you have drawn as much as is pious for the theology of the Only-Begotten from the name Word, avoid and diligently pass over whatever you find foreign or dissonant" (Basil, *Homily on 'In the beginning was…'*, n. 3, Vol. II, p. 136). From this concept of origin and relation between the first and second persons, according to the analogy of mind and proceeding word, it is easy to proceed to the notion of the third person as the term or love produced through affection, insofar as affection is one and common to the Father and the Son.

c) The third analogy can be said to be in some way a middle ground between the preceding two, drawn namely from the material procession of splendor from light or light from light, which is itself a sensible image of intellectual procession. This is presented in the Scriptures: Hebrews 1:3 (ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, radiance of the glory); Wisdom 7:25 (ἀτμὶς τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως, καὶ ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ Παντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινής, a vapor of the power of God and a pure emanation of the glory of the

Almighty). This is developed in many ways by the holy Fathers. See Athanasius, *On the Decrees of Nicaea*, nn. 23, 25 (Theognostus' doctrine); Gregory Nazianzen, *Epistle* 143 to Evagrius (also known as *Oration* 45, Vol. II, p. 199); Basil, *Against Eunomius*, Book II, n. 16; Book IV, n. 1; Cyril, *Thesaurus*, Vol. V, Part I, p. 47; *Dialogue* II, p. 453; Damascene, *Orthodox Faith*, Book I, c. 8, pp. 134, 136. Whoever considers both the matter itself and the testimonies of the Fathers will easily see the great difference between this analogy and the preceding ones. Just as in man, and particularly in the spirit, there is an image of God, but in material things only a more distant adumbration and trace of God (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 93), so Father, Son, Word, and Holy Spirit, names which have analogy in man and in an intelligent and willing spirit, are and are said properly in divine things if the perfection signified is considered in itself; but light, splendor, etc., drawn from material things, can never be said properly of divine things but only metaphorically. Hence, in this last analogy, nothing is presented but a comparison and metaphor to aid our understanding with something sensible, to which the metaphor is subordinated, a per se closer and far more expressive (because spiritual) image of the Holy Trinity, the supreme spirit, drawn from the created spirit, so that we may ascend to some clearer concept of the ineffable mystery. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book IV, c. 12.

Thus, the speculative theology of the Holy Trinity, as developed by the other Fathers, but especially by St. Augustine, and from Augustine by subsequent theologians such as St. Anselm, the Victorines, Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and others, rests almost entirely on the revealed intellectual procession of the Word and Love. This concept of the deep things of God, proposed by the Holy Spirit revealing, can be apprehended by us through the analogy of the created spirit. According to this same analogy, and within the limits of analogical knowledge, keeping before our eyes the revealed principles, the understanding of the internal relations, distinctions, and unity has progressed and continues to progress, insofar as God deigns to illuminate the holy Doctors of the Church, and through their teaching, each of us, with external and internal light.

Thesis XX: The Mystery of the Holy Trinity, Which Is Above Reason, Cannot Be Proven to Be Against Reason

It is indeed evident that the mystery of the Holy Trinity, though it is above reason and the power of human understanding, is not against reason, given divine revelation. Against those who deny revelation, it can be shown in two ways that there is no evident contradiction with reason:

1. Indirectly, from the very fact that the intimate reason of the divine essence and divine person (as it is in itself) surpasses our power of understanding.
2. Directly, by showing that there is no evident truth clearly understood to be repugnant to this dogma, as it is revealed and proposed for belief by faith.

When it must be shown that the revealed doctrine—that one God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, three really distinct from one another—does not contradict reason, this can be understood in three ways:
a) It might be demanded that reason perceive and demonstrate the very truth of the matter, namely, that the divine nature, from its infinite perfection, necessarily subsists in three distinct persons, as the Güntherians claimed, asserting not a lack of contradiction but a congruence with reason; thus, the latter cannot be shown without simultaneously demonstrating the former, such that the internal truth of the matter is perceived (cf. Günther, *Propaedeutics*, I, p. 547 ff.; Thomas a Scrupulis, p. 215 ff.; *Lydia*). This

rational demonstration of the mystery cannot be done, and in this sense, the truth is above reason, as we proved earlier (Thesis XVII).
b) It might be demanded that the demonstration of non-contradiction be such that reason positively perceives and clearly understands the internal possibility of the matter. But it cannot be demonstrated, by comparison with rational ideas and truths preconceived from creatures, that one most simple, indistinct essence can simultaneously be three relatively distinct subsistents; such a possibility could only be understood by immediately knowing that essence and those hypostases as they are in themselves. But then, not only the possibility but the very truth and necessary existence would be understood.

c) It is one thing to positively demonstrate non-contradiction from internal reasons, and another to understand by reason, negatively, that contradiction cannot be demonstrated. For the former, it would be required to have intrinsically perceived the truth, which is impossible in suprarational mysteries; for the latter, it suffices to show that the reasons opposed as demonstrating contradiction are either not evident truths or do not evidently contradict the true sense of the mystery.

This latter can always be shown. For a revealed truth cannot objectively and in itself contradict a rational truth; otherwise, the same thing would be simultaneously true and false. Hence, it is impossible for reason to understand something as an evident truth and evidently opposed to revelation understood in its genuine sense; otherwise, reason would understand as an evident truth that which is false, and thus the very light of reason, made for truth, would by its nature incline to it, and consequently, God Himself, the author of reason, would lead to judging as true that which is false. But these are evidently contradictory. Therefore, from the very fact that the truth of the mystery is certain to us by infallible faith, it is no less certain that what is said to contradict it is either not a truth, or does not truly contradict, or contradicts only a foreign sense of the dogma, in which the mystery is neither revealed nor true. "The gifts of grace are added to nature in such a way that they do not destroy it but rather perfect it. Hence, the light of faith, which is freely infused in us, does not destroy the light of natural knowledge naturally given to us. Although the natural light of the human mind is insufficient to manifest those things revealed by faith, it is impossible that those things divinely handed down to us by faith be contrary to those naturally given to us; for one or the other would have to be false, and since both are from God, God would be the author of falsehood, which is impossible… Just as sacred doctrine is founded on the light of faith, so philosophy is founded on the light of natural reason. Hence, it is impossible that those things belonging to philosophy be contrary to those of faith; but they fall short of them. They contain, however, certain likenesses of them and certain preliminaries to them, as nature is a preliminary to grace. If anything in the sayings of the philosophers is found contrary to faith, this is not of philosophy but rather an abuse of philosophy due to a defect of reason. And therefore, it is possible to refute such error from the principles of philosophy, either by showing it to be altogether impossible or not necessary. For just as those things of faith cannot be demonstratively proven, so certain things contrary to them cannot be shown to be false, but it can be shown that they are not demonstratively necessary. Thus, in sacred doctrine, we can use philosophy in three ways: first, to demonstrate those things that are preliminaries to faith… second, to make known through certain likenesses those things that are of faith… third, to resist those things said against faith, either by showing them to be false or by showing them not to be necessary" (St. Thomas, *In Boetium de Trinitate*, Prooemium, q. 2, a. 3; cf. *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 1, a. 8).

Now, to show that the opposed reasons are false or not necessary, it is not per se and absolutely necessary to compare those reasons individually with the revealed dogma; it suffices to make a general comparison

of the divine eminence and infinite perfection with the imperfection and limitation of our intellect. This general solution of difficulties will be only indirect; yet it is no less valid per se for that reason. For from this very general comparison, it is entirely evident that many things can exist in the infinite essence which cannot be understood by the finite light of reason, restricted within certain limits of truths. We understand many things in God by the light of reason, that they are (*quia sunt*); yet we do not understand how they are (*quomodo sint*) or how they do not contradict each other in their operations—for example, that the essence itself is one unchangeable will and yet free in its external actions, and many other things. If, therefore, because of the infinity of the essence, such predicates do not contradict each other, which in finite natures would involve an evident contradiction, it cannot be asserted without absurdity that such a communication of an infinite nature, so that there are several numerically distinct in one essence, evidently contradicts, because such distinction and unity would contradict in finite natures and hypostases. For although someone might claim to have so clearly perceived the intimate reason of finite essence and hypostasis that they evidently understand a metaphysical contradiction in the unity of nature in distinct persons, no one can, without immense arrogance and ignorance, claim such evident understanding of the divine essence and hypostasis. Since the divine essence is above the entire reason of created and finite being, and we do not understand it as it is in itself, it cannot be evident to the light of reason whether there is or is not another formal reason of that infinite spiritual nature and another of divine hypostasis, such that the nature, remaining one, requires its communication through internal vital acts, and thus under the formal reason of nature there is unity, but under the formal reason of hypostasis there is plurality.

In this sense, we can understand what Suarez says (*De Trinitate*, I, c. 12, n. 20): "That principle, 'things that are the same as a third are the same as each other,' although universally true in finite things, cannot be demonstrated by natural reason in an infinite thing; and therefore, in the way it is evident, it is not contrary to this mystery." Namely, in finite things, there are never two things really distinct from each other under one aspect and really and numerically one under another aspect, but they are only one in species. But it is a revealed truth that the infinite essence is so identified with one relative that, by its infinite eminence and communicability, it is simultaneously identified with another relative, and thus they are two really distinct under the aspect of relatives, and yet they are the same one under the aspect of absolute essence (which, as is clear, applies equally to the third person). To assert an evident contradiction in such communicability of the infinite essence, whose intimate reason we do not understand as it is in itself, is evidently absurd. "If, because he does not see this in other things, he cannot understand it in God, let him bear for a while that there is something in God that his intellect cannot penetrate" (Anselm, *De Fide Trinitatis*, c. 7). Moreover, that principle, "things that are the same as a third, etc.," has metaphysical truth, and thus holds in every order, for infinite things no less than for finite, provided it is understood in its true sense, as we will soon explain.

This indirect solution of difficulties, by which adversaries of the faith might wish to demonstrate a contradiction, is not an appeal to the suprarationality of the mystery to avoid demonstrations of evident contradiction, as Bayle with cunning but sufficiently clear words in his *Dictionary* (Vol. III, under "Pyrrhonism," and Vol. IV, "Clarification on Pyrrhonism"; cf. Leibniz, *Dissertation on the Conformity of Faith with Reason*, nn. 39 ff., 72 ff.), and others after him, unbelievers, have said. Rather, it is a demonstration drawn from the very natures of things, showing the impossibility of demonstrating an evident contradiction between the Trinity of relative hypostases and the unity of essence or absolute perfection, when the proper internal reason of both divine hypostasis and essence surpasses our

understanding and cannot be understood by us as it is in itself. For if there were an evident contradiction between the Trinity of hypostases and the unity of essence, as you conceive hypostases and essence, by that very fact it would not be, nor could it be, evident that your concept is genuine and as proposed in revelation; indeed, for Christians, it would be evident, if not immediately, certainly mediately from the revealed truth, that such a concept of yours, whether one or the other or both, is foreign to revelation and false. Conversely, if the concept is genuine as contained in revelation, it is evident, at least mediately from infallible faith, that the proof by which a contradiction is pretended to be shown is necessarily fallacious, and therefore it can be shown by the light of reason to be either false or not evident, and thus entirely futile for the purpose for which it is adduced. "Since faith rests on infallible truth, and it is impossible to demonstrate the contrary of the true, it is clear that the proofs brought against it are not demonstrations but soluble arguments" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 1, a. 8).

Indirect solutions of this kind sufficiently show that objections are not valid, but they do not show from internal reason why they are not valid. They occur frequently among the Fathers, because they are most apt both in themselves and for preparing minds for direct solutions, and because most people are not suited to grasp the latter. "Sometimes we offer them a reason, not the one they seek when they inquire about God, because neither can they grasp it, nor perhaps can we apprehend or express it; but one that demonstrates how unfit and least suited they are to perceive what they demand" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, I, n. 3).

Direct Solutions in Theology

However, in theology, where faith seeks understanding, we must strive, as Augustine continues, "to render a reason, as far as we can, that the Trinity is one and only true God." This very reason rendered, as Augustine says, provides a clearer, though only analogous, concept of the Holy Trinity, deduced from revelation, and supplies a direct solution to all difficulties by which adversaries might wish to demonstrate a contradiction in the concept of the mystery. A fuller direct solution of such objections will follow below from the very explanation of the genuine concept. Here, only a general consideration will suffice.

1. It cannot be demonstrated that there is an evident contradiction in the fact that in God, the infinite spirit, a Word proceeds really through intellection, or is truly and eternally produced as immanent. For such a contradiction is not evident from the nature of intellection considered universally; indeed, we find it more difficult to conceive intellection in act without an immanent word than with a word as an immanent term. There is no evident contradiction from intellection insofar as it is divine and infinite; for from this, it is only evident that the Word cannot be an accident; but if it exists, it is necessarily substantial, because divine intellection is substance. Finally, there is no evident contradiction by reason of the non-multipliable unity of the divine essence; for from this, it is only evident that the principle producing the Word by intellection and the Word as the immanent term of this intellection are one absolute essence. The production of the divine essence itself would indeed contradict, for this would involve both a multiplication of the essence and its production from nothing; but it cannot be shown that there is an evident contradiction in the fact that, from the inherent perfection of the divine intellect, an eternal necessary procession of an immanent Word is required, which, under the formal reason of the Word or relative, is distinguished from the producing principle, likewise considered under the formal reason of

producer and relative, but such that the formal reason of deity and absolute essence is one common to the generator of His Word and the Word of its generator.

Thus, the truth of the production of the divine Word is indeed above reason, because reason cannot understand or demonstrate that in the divine intellect, as an immanent term, there is and necessarily is a produced Word (Thesis XVII); but it is not a doctrine against reason, because there is no, nor can there be, any notion of reason evidently true and evidently contradicting this doctrine. But when the Spirit of God, who searches the deep things of God, has revealed to us, and "the Only-Begotten who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared this mystery: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (John 1:1, 18); when, I say, it is established by divine revelation concerning the immanent procession of the Word, from this posited principle and from this "root of truth" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 32, a. 1), as said in the previous thesis, we understand the remaining consequences through "necessary reasons"; namely, that the generated Word is distinct from the generator, is substantial, and thus (according to the analogy of a person in creatures compared with the common nature) is a subsistent person distinct from the Father, but the distinction is not according to essence but according to the formal reason of the relative. For all these (given the real procession of the Word) are necessarily connected with the infinity, unity, and simplicity of God, attributes which are also understood by the light of reason. Moreover, these same things apply to the real production of an immanent term through the act of will or love, and thus to the third person, whose notion is shown in the same way to be above reason but not against reason.

2. Now let a judgment be made concerning the Socinian error, which Rationalists of our age continue to rehash (Christian Baur, Friedrich Strauss, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and others; cf. Johann Kuhn, *De Trinitate*, p. 522 ff.). They say: One is not equal to three; we evidently understand that 1 = 3 is contradictory. The mathematical axiom is evident: "Things that are not distinguished from a third are not distinguished from each other; A = B, B = C, therefore A = C." According to the Christian dogma, the divine persons are not distinguished from the essence; therefore, they are not distinguished from each other.

We respond: These mathematical axioms are evident, and their absolutely necessary truth does not at all contradict the revealed mystery of God, one in nature and three in persons; rather, unless the truth of these axioms were absolutely certain to us, we could neither understand the revelation of the mystery nor know what is to be believed. "For unless we had rational souls, we could not even believe" (Augustine, *Epistle* 120, n. 3). Revelation itself presupposes, and we in believing do not presuppose, that one is three as evidently true; otherwise, the revelation and faith of the Trinity, proposing one essence and three persons, would not make us certain whether there are not three essences and one person. Generally, just as we could not be certain of any truth, so too we could not be certain of a revealed truth, because we would not have rational souls.

Likewise, the revelation and faith of God, one in nature and three in persons, presuppose the evidently true axiom: Wherever two are said to be not distinct from a third, under that formal reason under which they are not distinct from that third, they are neither really two nor a third but altogether one indistinct. Without this evident principle, we would not understand one indistinct divinity when it is revealed and believed that the Father is God, the Son is God, and yet there is one God. For when it is revealed that the Father is God and the Son is the same God, two are said to be one or not distinct from a third (as it is

objected), namely, from the deity; and therefore, from that evident principle, we understand that the two are not distinguished from each other but are altogether one in deity, although they are simultaneously revealed to be distinct from each other under another formal reason (namely, under the formal reason of relatives, or of Father and Son): "I and the Father are one" (John 10:30); "There are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one" (1 John 5:7). Therefore, the evident truth expressed in both those mathematical principles is in no way opposed to the mystery of the Catholic faith, but rather is presupposed in it; those axioms contradict only a heresy which neither ever existed nor can be conceived in the mind, if it were said that one God is three gods; and that three persons, which are one and indistinct under the aspect of deity, are nevertheless really distinguished from each other under the same aspect, namely, deity.

We fully concede to Leibniz what he says about that metaphysical principle; but we do not equally agree with his manner of speaking about the Holy Trinity. "All theologians of all parties, I believe, except fanatics, at least agree that no article of faith can involve a contradiction… Hence, it follows that there is excessive facility in certain writers who concede that the Holy Trinity contradicts that great principle which states that things that are the same as a third are also the same as each other, i.e., if A = B and C = B, it is necessary that A and C are also the same as each other. For this principle immediately follows from the principle of contradiction and is the basis and foundation of all logic; if it fails, no way remains for reasoning with certainty (cf. the doubts of certain Scholastics about this, in Ruiz, *De Trinitate*, disp. XV, sect. 4, and elsewhere). Thus, when it is said that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and yet there is only one God, although these three persons are diverse from each other, it must be judged that the word 'God' does not have the same signification everywhere, both at the beginning and at the end; and certainly it sometimes signifies the divine substance, sometimes one person of the Deity" (Leibniz, *Dissertation on the Conformity of Faith with Reason*, n. 22, Vol. I, p. 81; *Remarks on the Book of an English Antitrinitarian*, ibid., pp. 24–25). But we, with St. Thomas, distinguishing the signification and supposition of the name, say that the word 'God' everywhere signifies exactly the same, namely, the subsistent divine nature; but when predicated of one determinate person, it co-signifies that determinate

three gods; and conversely, three persons are not one person, one Father is not three Fathers, one Son is not three Sons, etc. Likewise, things that are really one under some aspect are evidently not many under that aspect, or, as it is less appropriately stated in the objection: things that are the same as a third under some aspect are the same as each other under that aspect. Therefore, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, because they are one under the aspect of deity or insofar as they are God, are not three gods but one God, or because they are the same as the deity and are one deity, they are not distinguished from each other under the aspect of deity. A doctrine contrary to the mystery of faith would be entirely different, one that is by no means evident, nor can it be demonstrated to be true; indeed, generally stated, it is evidently false. For it would have to be said: things that are many and really distinct from each other under one aspect cannot be one under another aspect; and things that are one under some aspect (or, less properly speaking, things that are the same as a third under some aspect) are the same under every aspect, or are not distinguished from each other under any aspect. But who does not see that, where there are multiple diverse aspects and functions in one thing, it is absurd to say that what is verified in it according to one aspect is necessarily also true according to another, diverse aspect? In a human being, life is rational, animal, and vegetative; does it therefore follow that under the same aspect by which it digests food and grows, it also thinks and wills and chooses freely? Regarding the matter at hand, St. Thomas responds

thus: “That argument holds, that whatever is the same as one and the same thing is the same as each other, in those things that are the same in reality and in concept, such as a tunic and a garment, but not in those things that differ in concept… Although paternity is the same in reality as the divine essence, and likewise filiation, these two imply opposite relations; hence, they are distinguished from each other” (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1). Namely, they are not distinguished from each other really because they are distinguished from the essence in concept; for in this way, even the absolute attributes are distinguished both from the essence and from each other only in concept. But the fact that the infinite divine nature has diverse aspects of the absolute and the relative, or that nature and hypostasis in God are distinguished in concept with a foundation in reality, is a condition without which there could not be a real distinction of hypostases among themselves. However, the formal reason for the actual existence of this distinction is that the divine hypostases are relative by relations of origin, and therefore they are mutually opposed as principle and as really proceeding from a principle.

Mathematical formulas do not apply here; for in them, terms cannot be the same as a third under one aspect and not the same as each other under another aspect, because abstract quantities have only one aspect after another. In the physical and metaphysical order of finite substances, there is a distinction under the aspect of hypostasis (one is distinct from another), and some unity under the aspect of nature (not something distinct from another), though only a specific unity. Peter, formally as this one, is distinct from Paul; if the nature contained in the definition is formally considered, Peter has a greater unity with Paul than with an animal (in genus), and with an animal greater than with a substance in genus (e.g., with a stone); but the greatest and numerical unity would be according to the aspect of humanity, if, as some philosophers and even Catholic theologians thought, humanity or the formal aspect of nature in reality and numerically one constituted Peter and Paul as human (see above, Scholion to Thesis IX).

Now, if the divine intellect really produces an immanent Word, it is evident that the essence or nature, one in number, is that of the producer and the Word (and the same applies to the immanent term of will or love). Then, under the formal aspect of the producer of the Word and the produced Word, there are two relatives really distinct from each other; but under the formal aspect of nature or deity, there is one in number, and thus one God. This unity under the aspect of the absolute and distinction under another aspect of relatives evidently follows from the posited production of the Word. Therefore, the ridiculous sophistries derived from the mathematical axiom must be dismissed if Rationalists do not wish to contradict evident reason; and thus, it remains for them to test the strength of their unbelief solely in demonstrating an evident contradiction in the fact that an infinite intellect produces a Word as an immanent term of intellection. All such attempts will necessarily fail, because, as we have said, neither from intellection per se, nor from intellection insofar as it is substantial and infinite, nor from the divine nature does any evident principle arise that evidently contradicts this revealed truth. Nor can such a contradiction be deduced from elsewhere; indeed, both by the light of reason from the very infinity of divine intellection and by revealed faith, it is most certain that no such evident contradictory principle can exist.

3. From this, a response has also been given to the remaining difficulties that the same Rationalists—Schleiermacher, Strauss, and others of their kind wandering in darkness (see *Folia Theologica Trimestria Tubingensia*, 1843, fasc. 1)—repeat from ancient heretics to demonstrate a contradiction in the concept of three persons who are one God. They say, namely: three persons necessarily imply three essences, because a person is not distinguished from an individual

> intellectual substance (a primary substance). Furthermore, if the persons are really distinguished, there must necessarily be some perfection in one that is not in another, and thus the three persons would be something more perfect than each individually. Finally, if one person is the principle of another, the latter depends on the first, and by this very fact is inferior and less perfect.

In rehashing these difficulties, which these triflers present as new insights arising in their philosophy, one thing is perfectly clear: either their own remarkable ignorance or their presumption of ignorance in their readers makes them foolishly presumptuous. For these objections were proposed almost in the same words by ancient heretics from the third century, refuted by the holy Fathers, and thoroughly dismantled by all Scholastic theologians. They could neither prevent the collapse of the Sabellian, Arian, Tritheist, Roscelin, Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers, Joachim of Fiore, and Socinian heresies, nor shake in the least the universal faith of the entire Church in one and triune God, or the theological elucidation of the dogma advanced by Catholic doctors; indeed, they were an occasion for a broader and more subtle Catholic explanation. "From heretics, the Catholic faith was asserted… When heretics were cut off, they stirred up the Church of God with their questions; what was hidden was revealed, and the will of God was understood… Was the Trinity perfectly treated before the Arians barked?" (Augustine, *In Psalmum* 54, n. 22).

a) We concede that, even in created and finite hypostases, the connatural hypostasis does not differ from a singular and integral substance by some superadded reality, but we say it is distinguished in concept with a foundation in reality; that is, the same thing under one aspect is a singular and integral substance (primary substance), insofar as it is this particular being or entity, and under another aspect is a hypostasis, insofar as it is whole in itself and not, as it were, a part of another or a common nature to many. Because of this diverse aspect of one and the same thing, a created nature, without ceasing to be a singular and integral substance, can fail to be a hypostasis in itself, and this solely by union as a part with a higher hypostasis, whose proper nature it becomes, and thus not by subtraction but by superaddition of reality, as has been demonstrated in many places regarding the human nature of the God-man (in the treatise on the Incarnation, Thesis XXXI). Much more do we not only concede but hold by faith that the divine essence or substance itself is really a hypostasis: "a certain supreme thing, which is really the Father who generates, the Son who is generated, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds." But the same thing under one aspect is absolute, and thus one essence in number, not multipliable; and under another aspect is relative, and thus there are three hypostases. For since a relation is of one to another, insofar as one proceeds from another through an immanent act by which the Word is expressed as the immanent term of substantial intellection, and the Holy Spirit proceeds as the immanent term of substantial love, under this formal aspect of relatives to each other, or of producer and proceeding by way of intellection and love, there are three relatives distinct from each other, but the absolute entity or divinity of the three is one in number.

Now, according to the analogy derived from creatures, we call the one absolute common thing essence, nature, or substance; the three distinct things of one intellectual nature we call persons (intellectual hypostases). None of us affirms that this distinction of the three can be demonstrated by reason alone; but rather, just as we believe it by faith because God Himself has revealed it, so too we believe that it cannot be demonstrated by the light of reason (Thesis XVII). But if it is established that through intellection and love, immanent terms, the Word and the Holy Spirit, are really produced, the remaining points concerning unity and distinction are demonstrated from this very dogma of the processions "by necessary reasons."

Therefore, we again call adversaries to that one point: to demonstrate evidently a contradiction in the fact that an infinite intellect produces a Word, and an infinite will produces love as an immanent term; a contradiction which we not only deny can be demonstrated but show cannot be demonstrated.

b) Those who imagine immanent relations and relatives in God as if they were three humans or as absolute and separated persons, each with its own numerically distinct nature, will indeed find an evident contradiction in the notion of one and triune God; but such a concept is no less opposed by revelation than by reason itself. Yet from this utterly false concept proceeds the second objection mentioned. For if one infinite essence simultaneously has the aspect of the absolute and the relative, and if the same infinite essence is identified with three relatives, it contradicts that more perfection be understood under the aspect of one or several relatives than under the aspect of the absolute infinite essence. We have said enough about this in Thesis XV.

c) Also in what they object concerning dependence, from which inequality of persons would follow, it is presupposed that there is a production of nature, and thus a distinction and by this very fact a diversity of natures, and further from this a production by an action that, producing another nature, is a true production ad extra. In one word, the Arian opinion of the production of the Son is presupposed, in which there is indeed an evident dependence and, included in it, an inequality of the Son. But the revealed doctrine is entirely different. The infinite act of divine intellection, from the intimate perfection and exigency of its nature, by understanding itself produces its Word as the immanent term of intellection, such that in the Word is the entire same perfection in number communicated, which is in the producer. "It is necessary, therefore, that God is in Himself as the understood in the understander; but the understood in the understander is the intention understood (concept) and the word. Therefore, in God understanding Himself, there is the Word of God as God understood" (St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, IV, c. 11). From the same necessary exigency of perfection by which God, understanding, expresses the Word, the Word is also as God understood.

If, therefore, dependence is improperly called the fact that one cannot exist without the other from the inherent exigency of perfection, in this sense dependence is mutual, because the paternal intellection cannot exist without the produced immanent Word, and the Word cannot exist without the producing intellection. But this is not dependence properly so called, implying imperfection, but is an internal necessary perfection, such that one God, as necessarily existing by infinite intellection expressing the Word, so too necessarily exists as the Word of infinite intellection: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (John 1:1).

Dependence properly so called is the negation of necessary Being and necessary perfection, and the affirmation of some being and some perfection through the influence of another as a cause (in some genus of material, formal, final, or efficient causality). This dependence is indigence and negates necessary Being and thus divine Being. Therefore, the procession of the Word, necessary from the necessary perfection of the divine nature, is not a dependence of indigence and imperfection; but it is an inherent exigency of perfection in an infinite spirit, such that one and the same spirit in one non-multipliable yet communicable essence is both producer of the Word and the Word. All this, as is clear, applies equally to the procession of love, or to the necessary immanent term of the infinite love of the Father and the Son. This necessary procession according to the natural exigency of perfection is to be understood when the

Fathers say that the Son depends on the Father, and the Holy Spirit on the Father and the Son. See Diego Ruiz, *Disputationes*, X, sect. 1, 2, 3; Suarez, *De Trinitate*, II, c. 2.

(Footnote): Hence it is clear what must be thought about the concept and essential predication of being *a se* (from itself). The particle *a se* negates production and producibility from an external cause or another being, and affirms the exigency and necessity of existence from the very internal reason of the essence; but it neither negates nor affirms anything about immanent production and procession through the necessary communication of one necessary essence. Moreover, being, when said simply of God, is understood as absolute Being; yet with an addition, it can also be said and understood hypostatically as relative being, and thus three relative beings can be spoken of. Hence, being *a se*, simply said, is an absolute predicate signifying the intrinsically necessary existence of the divine essence, and thus, by reason of the subject, negates all production; for the essence neither generates nor is generated nor proceeds; yet it does not negate the community of this essence and one absolute Being in three relatives. If relative being *a se* is said, i.e., if it is predicated of a hypostasis under the formal aspect of hypostasis, being *a se* affirms of each hypostasis the internal necessity of existing and negates production from another (diverse) being: "As the Father has life in Himself, so He has given to the Son to have life in Himself" (John 5:26); but it does not negate the immanent and necessary procession of hypostases in one necessary essence, except by reason of the subject in the first hypostasis, whose property is *agennetos* (unbegotten).

Chapter III: On the Manner of Conceiving Our Distinction of the Mystery of the Holy Trinity Through the Distinction of the Absolute and the Relative

Thesis XXI: On the Real Identity and Distinction in the Holy Trinity Through the Distinction of the Absolute and the Relative

"The one supreme thing that is God simultaneously has the aspect of the absolute, which is one divine essence, and the aspect of relatives to each other, which are really distinguished from each other; for all the divine internal relations, and each of them, according to the doctrine of faith, are really the infinite essence of God itself. Nevertheless, the revealed truth of the mystery requires that the essence and divine relation, as they can only be inadequately conceived by us, be understood as distinguished in concept with a foundation in reality and virtually."

To explain the concept of distinct persons in one essence, the primary foundation from which we proceed is the definition of the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter *Damnamus*: "There is a certain supreme thing, incomprehensible indeed and ineffable, which truly is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, three persons together and each of them individually; and therefore in God there is only a Trinity, not a quaternity, because each of the three persons is that thing, namely, the substance, essence, or divine nature, which alone is the principle of all things… And that thing is neither generating, nor generated, nor proceeding, but it is the Father who generates, the Son who is generated, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds; so that there are distinctions in the persons and unity in the nature."

According to this definition, therefore:

a) The divine essence itself is really the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, three persons together and each of them individually, or the divine essence is identified with three persons distinct from each other and with each of them individually.
b) Insofar as that supreme thing is formally the essence or divine nature, it is altogether one, not multipliable, although the same is identified with three mutually distinct persons, or (as it is commonly said) is common to three mutually distinct persons. Therefore, by this very fact, because it is one and not multipliable, under this formal aspect of the common nature, it neither generates nor is generated nor proceeds.
c) But the same supreme thing is the Father, and under this formal aspect as Father, it generates the Son; it is the Son, and under this formal aspect as Son, it is generated by the Father; it is the Holy Spirit, and under this formal aspect as Holy Spirit, it proceeds from the Father and the Son.

d) Therefore, it is evident that the same one supreme thing has the formal aspect of the absolute (as the absolute is said in opposition to the relative), because under the formal aspect of the essence, it neither generates nor is generated nor proceeds, and by this very fact has no (real) internal relation; but at the same time, the same one supreme thing has the formal aspect of relatives (for a real relative cannot exist or be conceived without a real distinction and multiplication of relatives), and under this aspect, it is itself the Father generating, the Son generated, and the Holy Spirit proceeding; and thus, the supreme thing, which under the formal aspect of the absolute is one, one essence, one God, is, under the formal aspect of relatives, three, which three are distinguished from each other solely under this formal aspect of relatives. But these distinguishing relations, by virtue of real immanent processions, are relations of origin expressed in revelation by the name and reality of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

The same doctrine is contained in Scripture, in the creeds, in the definitions of Councils, in the declarations of the Fathers, and in the universal ecclesiastical preaching, from which we have demonstrated the revealed doctrine: that one God is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; that one essence in number is not multiplied but is common to three distinct relatives to each other; that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not something distinct and something else, but altogether one and the same, although one is distinct from another, and thus not one but three; and in this sense, three persons are most perfectly consubstantial. “Neither is the Son the Father, for there is one Father, but He is what the Father is; nor is the Holy Spirit the Son, because He is from God; for there is one Only-Begotten; but He is what the Son is. These three are one in deity, and one is these three in properties” (Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration* 31 [al. 37], n. 9). They are three in properties, namely, under the formal aspect of the Father generating, the Son generated, and the Holy Spirit proceeding, which aspects are relative to each other, as Gregory said earlier: “The difference of mutual relation caused their distinct appellation.” In the baptismal formula, the Savior “shows it is sufficient if we remain in the appellation of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit for the perception of what is essentially; which indeed is one and not one. For by the aspect of essence, it is one; therefore, the Lord established by His law to look to one name (baptizing in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit); but by the notional properties of the hypostases, faith in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit discerns the indivisibly distinct and unconfusedly united” (Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium*, I, Book II, p. 3). But the doctrine of both the Fathers and Scripture pertaining to this must be recalled from above; here we are concerned only with deducing and declaring the concept from it.

As is clear, this entire doctrine, and specifically the Lateran definition, can be reduced to a twofold dogma. One, which is presupposed as a foundation, is known both by the light of reason and by

revelation, namely, the dogma of the unity and simplicity of God, that the infinite divine essence is necessarily one, both by a unity opposed to multiplication and by a unity opposed to any composition, not only physical from real parts, but also metaphysical, which would arise from diverse degrees of entity objectively distinct from each other. The other dogma, knowable directly only by revelation, is expressly stated: that one God is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, three persons really distinct from each other.

The simplicity of divine Being in the Lateran definition is presupposed as a foundation to declare that the divine essence…

(Footnote): The term "absolute" is said of God in two ways: first, as absolute insofar as it is being free from limitation, or being simply without negation of further entity that could still be conceived as possible, and thus as infinite and independent in opposition to participated and created or creatable being; second, as absolute as free from relation, which is not really referred to another, and thus in opposition to the relative. In this second sense, it is always understood where the essence and divine persons are compared. "A primary substance is called absolute as not depending on another. But the relative in divine things does not exclude the absolute, which is not dependent on another; but it excludes the absolute, which is not referred to another" (St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 9, a. 4, ad 10).

(Footnote): "For by the aspect of essence it is one… but by the notional properties of the hypostases, faith in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is distinguished as indivisibly distinct and unconfusedly united" (Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium*, I, Book II, p. 3, Greek text).

is itself the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and therefore it is not the absolute essence distinct from the mutually relative persons, but only the persons are really distinguished from each other. Because of this identity of the one essence with the three persons, the Council teaches that there is not a quaternity (as Joachim of Fiore, the Abbot, had objected against Lombard), but only a Trinity of persons. From the same infinite simplicity, as proposed again in the universal doctrine of Scripture, the Fathers, and the Council, it further follows that no perfection or formal aspect of God can be distinguished by our mental consideration without that same perfection or aspect, objectively and as it is in itself, including—or rather, being itself—really the infinite divine Being and the fullness of absolute being.

Therefore, it must be held that the essence and relation in God are not one thing and another, but altogether the same thing; however, the formal aspect of the essence is one thing, and that of the relation is another, and this distinction is with a foundation in reality. This distinction of reason, what it is and what its truth is, as well as its necessity, requires explanation.

1. Because, with our imperfect mode of knowing, we cannot encompass the entire fullness of being in one concept except in a wholly confused manner, to form some clearer understanding of God, we strive to grasp the one, most simple, infinite Being as if in parts, under various inadequate concepts of essence, intellect, will, wisdom, goodness, and other perfections, all of which correspond to one infinite Being; for in reality, that Being is both essence, intellect, will, and every perfection. But all these are not distinct in God Himself by various realities; rather, it is one infinite entity equivalent, as it were, to all these perfections according to diverse functions. What we conceive under the idea, for example, of infinite wisdom is truly in God and is God Himself;

or the same objective reality corresponding to this concept of wisdom is also the divine essence, goodness, omnipotence, justice, etc., because that reality is the very fullness of absolute being. Now, what we explicitly conceive under the ideas of wisdom, goodness, omnipotence, and other attributes, we call formal objective aspects; but the operation of our mind in this distinction we call a distinction of reason (subjective). Those formal aspects, as is now clear, are not really distinct in God, but are one most simple entity apprehended by us through distinct and inadequate concepts of perfections. However, the very infinite perfection of God, equivalent and supereminent in its most simple Being to all these perfections, as they are distinguished by our consideration or reason (*logos*), provides a foundation for why we can, from the truth of the reality, conceive the divine Being under diverse formal aspects; and this is what is called a distinction of reason with a foundation in reality. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, dist. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3. (Recall what we discussed in the *Treatise on God*, Theses XII, XIII, XXVI, XXVII.)

Now, from the same principle of the infinity and thus simplicity of the divine Being, it is understood in the same way, as was said about absolute attributes, that there is no real distinction between the same Being under the formal aspect of the absolute and under the formal aspect of the relative. For the same entity is both absolute and relative; but we can only apprehend these diverse formal aspects through distinct concepts, and this distinction of ours is indeed with a foundation in reality, since objectively and really one infinite entity is simultaneously both absolute and relative, and has the functions of both the absolute and the relative. In one word, it can be said: the distinction of many aspects, and thus also of the absolute and the relative, is not real; but what corresponds to those many aspects, and the absolute and relative itself, is a reality in God, a true reality, one in itself most simple.

This entire explanation we have given is that of the Angelic Doctor. "The aspect of substance and relation is different, and to each (our subjective aspect or concept) something corresponds (an objective aspect) in the reality that is God, not some diverse reality but one and the same… Although a relation does not add any reality above the essence but only an aspect (i.e., the same reality is truly the essence under one aspect and a relation under another aspect, and thus is conceived under a twofold aspect with a foundation in reality), nevertheless, a relation is some reality, just as goodness is some reality in God, although it does not differ from the essence except in aspect, and similarly with wisdom. And therefore, just as those things that pertain to goodness or wisdom really belong to God, such as understanding and other such things, so too that which is proper to a real relation, namely, to be opposed and distinguished (i.e., that relatives are really referred to each other, and by this very fact, under the formal aspect of relatives, are distinct from each other), is really found in divine things" (St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 8, a. 2, ad 2 and 3; *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 28, a. 2).

This same point, as far as the depth of the mystery allows, was most clearly expressed by Cardinal Cajetan in *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 39, a. 1: "In God, he says, according to reality or in the real order, there is one thing (as all Catholics must confess), not purely absolute nor purely relative, nor mixed or composite or resulting from both, but most eminently and formally possessing what is of the relative, indeed of many relative things (three really relative to each other and by this very fact really distinct from each other), and what is of the absolute. Thus, in the formal order or of formal aspects in themselves (as they are in God), not speaking with respect to us (who conceive that one thing through many distinct inadequate notions), there is in God a unique formal aspect, not purely absolute nor purely relative, not

purely communicable nor purely incommunicable, but most eminently and formally containing both whatever is of absolute perfection and whatever the relative Trinity requires. The Father does not understand the essence and paternity as two formal objects in themselves, but as one formally and many virtually, not such that in that supreme thing and formal aspect paternity and essence are only virtually, but such that they are formally and really (i.e., that one reality and one formal aspect is in itself both the absolute essence and the relative paternity to the Son as to a term), but their distinction is virtual, because they are there as if they were distinct, and again because that one reality and formal aspect exercises the function of both as if they were distinct."

In a few but clear words, Suarez says the same: "There is one thing truly absolute and truly relative without distinction between them, because as such (as absolute and simultaneously relative) they do not involve opposition or contradiction; for it is not of the nature of an absolute thing that it cannot have a relation under any aspect, but only that, insofar as it is absolute, it does not express that relation" (Suarez, *De Trinitate*, IV, c. 3, n. 19). Cf. Diego Ruiz, *Disputationes*, XI; Molina, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 28, disp. III.

(Footnote): Cajetan disputes this against those Scotists who, between diverse aspects in God, and specifically between the absolute and the relative, do not admit a real distinction (which would be heretical), but nevertheless a greater distinction than that of reason; hence, they call it a middle or formal distinction.

2. It is easily apparent that the foundation and necessity of the distinction between the formal aspect of the absolute and the relative are different and far greater than that between the formal aspects of absolute attributes. For the latter distinction is neither founded on any real distinction nor does any real distinction follow from it; but it is only necessary so that we may conceive the one absolute divine Being a little more distinctly with our inadequate notions (Treatise on God). But the matter is not so with the distinction between the absolute and the relative. It is indeed most true that one supreme thing, without any actual distinction in the reality itself, is both the absolute essence and the relative (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), just as one thing is the essence and absolute wisdom and goodness; but absolute attributes are distinguished by us either solely or certainly primarily according to diverse relations of reason and functions of the infinite Being ad extra, without any real distinction following from this; whereas the distinction between the absolute and the relative is according to a diverse function ad intra, such that under the formal aspect of the absolute, it remains one and indistinct, but under the formal aspect of the relative, there are three really distinct from each other. Thus, one supreme thing in itself contains both the aspect of the absolute and the relative, and really has the functions of both, as if those two aspects were distinct realities. Therefore, this distinction between the absolute and the relative, as well as between intellect and will in relation to the diverse processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit, is more properly called virtual than the distinction between absolute attributes, i.e., with a foundation according to the diverse functions of one and the same infinite reality, not otherwise than if they were two distinct realities, as we saw declared by Cajetan above. In this sense, those theologians must also be understood who say there is a greater distinction between the essence and the person than between the essence and attributes (cf. Petavius, *De Deo*, I, c. 10, n. 10).

Thus, presupposing the simplicity and unity of God, just as the real distinction of the persons among themselves clearly shows that one most simple supreme thing is, not only in our concept but in itself, simultaneously absolute and relative; so too, the same real distinction not only provides a foundation but renders necessary a formal distinction, i.e., one that is not objectively in God among diverse formalities, but is conceived only from our imperfect mode of understanding, so that we may conceive that same supreme thing through distinct notions of the absolute and the relative.

This necessity is so great that, if the distinction of both formal aspects is removed, the very dogma of the Trinity of persons in one most simple and non-multipliable essence is undermined. For the dogma is precisely posited in this: that God, according to the aspect of absolute Being and every absolute perfection, which we can distinguish by mental consideration, is one most simple infinite Being; but according to the aspect of relatives to each other through relations of origin or procession of one from another, that same one Being is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, who are really distinct from each other. Hence, heretics, both those who admitted only one truly divine person in the unity of essence (like the Arians) and the Tritheists who introduced three divine essences in three persons (like Abbot Joachim), in attacking Catholic doctrine assumed the negation of diverse aspects and the affirmation of an exaggerated identity between the absolute essence and relative properties; and therefore, the holy Fathers, in turn, placed no small part of the Catholic defense in demonstrating the diverse formal aspect of the absolute essence and the relative property of the person, so that, according to the clearest revelation, the unity and real community according to the formal aspect of the essence, and the real distinction and incommunicability according to the formal aspect of the relatives or persons, might remain intact. Extensive disputations on the distinction according to the twofold aspect of essence and relative properties are found in St. Basil and his brother Gregory of Nyssa in their books *Against Eunomius*, in Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration* 29 (al. 35), in Epiphanius, *Haereses* 76, Cyril, *Thesaurus*, Augustine, especially *De Trinitate*, Book V, and others, where they respond to the perpetual cavil of the Arians, which Gregory Nazianzen calls "the fortress and wall of heretics" (*Oration* 31, n. 23), and Augustine calls "a most cunning device" (*De Trinitate*, V, c. 3), namely, that the unbegotten and the begotten are diverse, and therefore the essence of the Father and the Son is diverse; for they held that whatever is said of God is said according to essence, rejecting the virtual distinction between essence and hypostasis. Hence, to the Arian objection, Gregory Nazianzen responds, among others, in *Oration* 29, n. 16: "The Father is not a name of essence, O most astute men, nor of action, but indicates the relation that the Father has to the Son or the Son to the Father. For just as among us (in human things) these names signify a true relationship (*to gennēton kai oikeion*), so too there they indicate the relationship of the begotten to the begetter in the community of nature (*hē homophylia*)." Likewise, Augustine in *De Trinitate*, Book V, poses the Arian difficulty: "Whatever is said or understood of God is said not according to accident but according to substance; therefore, to be unbegotten is for the Father according to substance, and to be begotten is for the Son according to substance. But to be unbegotten and to be begotten are diverse; therefore, the substance of the Father and the Son is diverse." The sum of Augustine's rather extensive response is contained in this conclusion: "Although to be Father and to be Son are diverse, their substance is not diverse (absolute essence), because they are said not according to substance but according to the relative, which, however, is not an accident because it is not mutable." He continues to explain regarding the unbegotten and begotten: "Just as 'begotten' is not said of the Son with respect to Himself, but that He is from the begetter; so too, when 'unbegotten' is said, it is not said with respect to Himself, but that He is not from a begetter, is shown. In the same predicative category called relative, both significations (of

begotten and unbegotten) are expressed; but what is pronounced relatively does not indicate substance: thus, although begotten and unbegotten are diverse, they do not indicate a diverse substance" (*De Trinitate*, V, c. 3–7). See Petavius, *De Deo*, I, c. 7–11; *De Trinitate*, V, c. 1–3.

Thesis XXII: Divine Relations Are Real and Therefore Substantial

"It follows from what has been said that these divine relations are not only relations according to the mode of consideration, but are real relations. Therefore, 1) they are substantial relations, because in God there is no accident; yet they must be considered not as realities superadded to the essence, but as the very reality of the essence under the formal aspect and function of relatives. This is confirmed and illustrated 2) from the doctrine of St. Thomas."

I. If, from what has been demonstrated, and specifically from the Lateran definition, just as one supreme thing is absolute, under which formal aspect it is called one divine essence, so too the same supreme thing is relative, under which formal aspect there are three distinct from each other; it is now clear that the divine relations are both substantial and do not add any reality to the infinite essence.

A real relation in creatures is an accident in a subject, by virtue of which the subject has an order to another real term. If, therefore, a relation is called the order itself to another, which respect, so abstractly considered, the ancients call the *esse ad* (to the term) of the relation, that respect is not an entity distinct from the term (to which it is referred) and from the accident that founds such an order, which is therefore called the foundation of the relation or, by the ancients, also the *esse in* (in the subject) of the relation. Hence, relations considered according to their foundation or according to their *esse in* the subject are inherent; considered according to their mere *esse ad* the term, they are called assisting, i.e., positing no reality in the subject. Hence, it is further evident that all real relations necessarily have their *esse in* a subject; for this signifies nothing other than that they are a reality or are founded in a reality inherent in the related subject. Conversely, relations that are conceived merely as an *esse ad* a term without a reality of foundation in the subject, or which are merely assisting and in no way inherent, are not a true reality; but they are conceived only as a reality (the ancients said they are beings not of first intention but of second intention), and thus they are relations of reason and not real.

Now, according to this more probable theory of created relations, which we will shortly confirm also from the doctrine of St. Thomas, divine relations are in some way explained by us. These are undoubtedly real (we speak of internal relations), and thus they are some entity in the very term that is related, not merely a respect and extrinsically assisting, as Gilbert of Poitiers said. For if this were so, the divine persons themselves would either not be really distinguished or would be distinguished not only by relations but also by absolutes; the former pertains to the Sabellian heresy, the latter to the Arian or Tritheist heresy. But presupposing the reality of divine relations, both points we state in the thesis—namely, their substantiality and their identity with the divine essence—require, after what has been proven above, not a new demonstration but only a declaration.

1. That entity or relation is not an accident inherent in God according to the *esse in* a subject, but is the very divine substance formally as relative. Namely, the divine substantial intellection is not

only an absolute intellection but, from its intimate nature, has a necessary order to its Word as to an eternally and necessarily produced term; likewise, the Word is the same absolute substantial intellection, but which, under the formal aspect of the produced Word, has a necessary order to the producer. The same applies to the Holy Spirit as substantial love and the immanent term of the love of the Father and the Son. Therefore, the entity of the relation is the divine substance itself, not indeed as this is formally absolute, but formally as, from its internal perfection, it expresses an order of the producer to the immanent produced term; therefore, both terms, both the producer and the produced, as existing not as another entity or having no other reality than that of the divine substance, are certainly substantial.

2. The respect or order to the term, or (as they say) the *esse ad*, we can indeed consider abstractly by itself, and the relation as if assisting; but this respect or formal *esse ad* so considered adds no entity beyond the reality of the relation considered according to the *esse in*. I do not say that the relation according to the *esse ad* is not a reality, which Ruiz (*Disputationes*, IX, sect. 6, n. 14) says is dangerous and close to error; but I say, with St. Thomas, Cardinal Pallavicini in the places cited below, and with Cardinal Cienfuegos, that the *esse ad* does not add any reality, even one distinguished only by reason, to the reality that the relation has according to the *esse in*. "The concept of a relation as superadded reality cannot be real but purely of reason (in divine things), although, if the formality of the *ad* is not conceived as superadded, it is per se simply real or formally entitatively the same as the divine absolute predicate. It is therefore real if that formality of the *ad* is conceived in itself and as it exists in the reality, but it is only of reason if it is conceived as accruing to or added to absolutes" (Cienfuegos, *Aenigmata Theologica*, disp. V, sect. 3, n. 9). Thus, the entity of the relation according to the *esse in* remains, and this entity itself is none other than the entity of the absolute essence, which, because of its eminence, has in its most simple Being the aspect of both the absolute and the relative. Therefore, to the infinite essence, both because it necessarily comprehends all divine reality, absolute and relative, and because, considered in the very nature of the relations, nothing of reality is superadded by the relations.

In a few words, to encompass the whole: a) just as in creatures a real relation is an accident inherent in a subject, so in God (since God is most simple Being) a relation is the divine substance. b) As in creatures a relation is not an accident in any way, but an accident by which the subject has an order to a real term; so in God, a relation is the substance, formally insofar as it intrinsically has an order to a real term. But c) in creatures, by the very fact that a relation is an accident, the mutually referred terms are presupposed to be distinct as substances; in God, on the contrary, because a relation is a substance, the relation itself is the term, which by itself has an order to another, or refers itself; and because the absolute in God is altogether one, the terms are distinguished from each other only under the formal aspect of substantial relations.

II. The doctrine thus far expounded on substantial divine relations and the mode of considering them according to *esse in* and *esse ad* is most clearly handed down by St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 28, a. 2; *De Potentia*, q. 8, a. 2; I, dist. 33, q. 1, a. 1). I will quote the words from *De Potentia*, loc. cit.:

"Supposing that relations exist in divine things, it is necessary to say that they are the divine essence, otherwise it would be necessary to posit composition in God, and that relations in divine things would be accidents, because every reality inherent in something besides its substance is an accident; it would also be necessary that some reality be eternal that is not the divine substance; all of which are heretical. For the

evidence of this, it must be known that among the nine genera contained under accident, some are signified according to the notion of an accident; for the notion of an accident is to inhere, and therefore I say those are signified as accidents which are signified as inherent in another, such as quantity and quality… But 'to something' (the category *pros ti* or of relation) is not signified according to the notion of an accident; for it is not signified as something of that in which it is, but as to that which is outside… Hence, some, considering the mode of signifying in relatives, said they are not inherent in substances, namely, as if assisting them, because they are signified as some medium between the substance that is related and that to which it is related. And from this it followed that in created things, relations are not accidents, because the being of an accident is to inhere. Hence, some theologians, namely the Porretans, extended this opinion to divine relations, saying that relations are not in the persons but, as it were, assist them. And because the divine essence is in the persons, it followed that relations are not the divine essence; and because every accident inheres, they would be accidents. But from this opinion, it followed that a relation is not some reality, but only according to reason; for every reality is either a substance or an accident. Hence, some ancients posited that relations are of second intentions (beings of reason). And therefore, the Porretans must also say that divine relations are only according to reason; and thus it would follow that the distinction of persons is not real, which is heretical. Therefore, it must be said that nothing prevents something from being inherent, even though it is not signified as inherent… Although 'to something' (relation) is not signified as inherent, it must nevertheless be inherent, and this when the relation is some reality; but when it is only according to reason, then it is not inherent. And just as in created things it must be an accident, so in God it must be a substance, because whatever is in God is His substance. Therefore, relations must, according to reality, be the divine substance, which, however, do not have the mode of a substance, but have another mode of predicating" (*De Potentia*, loc. cit.).

For a clearer declaration, the Angelic Doctor objects to himself: a) no substance is a relation; b) if a relation is the divine substance according to the reality itself, and is only another formal aspect, the relation seems to be nothing real. Hence, if a relation adds nothing real to the substance, it further seems to follow that the divine persons, since they can only be distinguished under the formal aspect of relations, are not really distinguished from each other, which is the Sabellian heresy.

He responds to the first: "No substance that is in a genus (i.e., finite and limited in being, including only a certain degree of being) can be a relation, because it is defined to one genus… But the divine essence is not in the genus of substance (restricted), but is above every genus, comprehending the perfections of all genera (and thus also of relatives); hence, nothing prevents what is of a relation from being found in it" (*ibid.*, ad 1).

To the second difficulty, the response is most clear: "Although a relation does not add any reality above the essence but only an aspect, nevertheless, a relation is some reality, just as goodness is some reality in God, although it does not differ from the essence except in aspect, and similarly with wisdom. And therefore, just as those things that pertain to goodness or wisdom really belong to God, such as understanding and other such things, so too that which is proper to a real relation, namely, to be opposed and distinguished, is really found in divine things" (*ibid.*, ad 2 and 3). Further, he says: "It must in no way be conceded that the being of a relation in divine things is other than that of the essence. But an aspect does not signify being, but being what, that is, what something is. Hence, two aspects of one thing do not demonstrate a twofold being of it, but demonstrate that what it is can be said of that thing in two ways,

just as of a point it can be said what it is, as a beginning and as an end, because of the diverse aspect of beginning and end" (*ibid.*, ad 11).

You have this doctrine of St. Thomas also declared by Cardinal Pallavicini (*Cursus Theologicus*, VIII, c. 52), from which I will cite a few things for the sake of example: "If that predicate, which is the principle of distinction between the producer and the produced (paternity, filiation, etc.), is added to infinite being, it adds no entity to it; infinite being has in itself all entity and all perfection (i.e., the infinite essence includes all reality, even that which can be conceived under the formal aspect of a relation). Therefore, as St. Thomas most acutely saw (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 28, a. 2), it adds nothing pertaining to its completion and to the *esse in*, but adds a pure *esse ad*, i.e., a respect to another. This respect in itself and above the *esse in* expresses no entity; for a being is either something absolute, i.e., a substance, or something inherent in an absolute, i.e., an accident; but that which is neither a substance nor inheres in a substance but is a mere respect to something else does not have the nature of a being… But the respect that is given in God of the producer to the produced or of the produced to the producer cannot really and identically not be a being, because… this respect constitutes and distinguishes one from another formally; therefore, it is a real being. However, this respect is not really distinguished from the divine essence itself (because, as we have declared, the essence itself, besides the aspect of the absolute, has the aspect of the relative)… Since no relative can be only relative but must either be received in some absolute or identified with it, and since a received relation is accidental, a divine relation, as substantial and not accidental, must therefore not received but identified with the absolute essence.

Given the notion of hypostasis and person, it is explained from the demonstrated principles concerning the real identity and virtual distinction between the absolute and the relative in God that divine persons are formally constituted by relations. For, 1) if the essence and relations are compared with each other, only the relation distinguishes those sharing one common essence, and therefore the relation itself is the formal aspect of a divine hypostasis or person. But 2) if the substantial relation is considered more fully, the divine relation itself, as identified with the substance, is the divine person. Furthermore, 3) in comparing origin and relation, due to the identity of the reality, divine persons can be understood as constituted equally by origins and relations; however, there is a reason in our mode of understanding why they are said to be formally constituted by relations rather than origins."

I. Preliminary Considerations on Hypostasis and Person

First and foremost, it is absolutely necessary to keep in mind what has been most fully demonstrated in the *Treatise on the Incarnation* (Section III, Chapter 3) concerning the proper notion of hypostasis and person in comparison with substance or nature. A hypostasis is an "individual substance," insofar as the term "individual" determines a substance not only as singular in opposition to the universal (such as genera and species), not only as an integral substance in opposition to a part (such as the body or soul in a human), not only as a whole substance in itself distinct from a substance that, though singular and integral, exists as the nature of another hypostasis (such as Christ's human nature); but an individual substance is also said to be one that is entirely incommunicable in itself, in opposition to real communication or identification with several entities really distinct from each other. In the first three senses, even by the light of reason, the deity or absolute divine essence is understood to be essentially an individual substance (*prōtē ousia*); for by its very absolute perfection, it is this one substance, distinct and infinitely diverse from all others that are or could be (undivided in itself, divided from all others, as the

notion of an individual is commonly explained). In this sense, we have seen in Thesis IX, n. II, that many Fathers said there is one hypostasis in God; and in the same sense, we will show below (Thesis XXIV) that some scholastic theologians taught one absolute subsistence in God.

However, we know solely through revelation that this one numerically absolute essence comprises three distinct entities: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; for it has been revealed that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three distinct entities yet one God. By this revealed truth, it is understood that the absolute essence, under the formal aspect of the absolute, is really common to the three who are distinct from each other, each individually and all three together being one God, as they share one non-multipliable infinite essence. Hence, with this revealed truth presupposed, we understand that the absolute essence, under this formal aspect of the absolute, is not an individual substance in the fuller sense by which an individual substance is conceived in the notion of hypostasis; for under that formal aspect of the absolute, the essence is not incommunicable but is, in fact, the nature of the Father, such that it is simultaneously the nature of the Son, who is distinct from the Father, and simultaneously the nature of the Holy Spirit, who is again distinct from both the Father and the Son. On the other hand, under the formal aspect whereby the same essence is this relative, e.g., the Father, it is an individual substance; for the divine substance itself has the formal aspect of the relative, whence the relation is substantial, as we have seen. And this relative Father, identified with the divine essence—or, as we are accustomed to say in our mode of understanding, possessing the divine nature—is, under this formal aspect of the relative, one in Himself and distinct from all others of the same nature (from the Son and the Holy Spirit), and thus is an individual substance in the sense of incommunicability. This incommunicability itself, or under the positive concept of being entirely in itself (*totietas in se*), is the formal aspect by which a singular and integral substance is understood to subsist in itself or, equivalently, is understood to be a hypostasis (see the *Treatise on the Incarnation*).

In created things, this is evident; for the essence of a human, or humanity, considered as common or communicable to many, is not a hypostasis but a common nature. This is not only because humanity, considered as a species, is not a singular substance, but because, by virtue of its very communicability, it would not have the character of a hypostasis, even if universal humanity were objectively and really one existent (as some philosophers and even theologians, though erroneously, have thought). A hypostasis, however, is this human, Peter, whose essence is human nature and who is distinct from all others of the same nature; or a hypostasis is this singular humanity concretely identified with this human, Peter. In the same way and by this analogy, in divine things, the essence, insofar as it is considered under the formal aspect of the absolute, under which aspect it is really common to the three distinct from each other, is understood as a common nature and not as a hypostasis. But insofar as the same essence, under the formal aspect of the relative, is this one Father in a necessary and eternal relation to the Son, and under this formal aspect of the relative is distinct from the Son and the Holy Spirit, so it is and is understood as the Father as a hypostasis, and thus (by reason of the intellectual nature) as a person. The same must be understood of the Son, under the formal aspect of the Son relative to the Father and distinct from the Father and the Holy Spirit, and likewise of the Holy Spirit (or the one breathed forth), who, under the formal aspect of the one breathed forth or proceeding, is relative to the Father and the Son and distinct from both.

Since there is one God and thus one non-multipliable divine essence, the distinction of the three from each other cannot be under the formal aspect of the absolute, according to which the three are one; but it

must necessarily be only under the formal aspect of relatives, which is manifested by the revealed names of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Therefore, a divine person is the divine essence itself under the formal aspect of a relative *ad intra*, under which aspect there are three distinct from each other; but not under the formal aspect of the absolute, under which aspect there is one indistinct essence or nature.

In this sense, Augustine argues: "Every essence that is spoken of relatively is also something apart from the relative… If a man were not something, that is, some substance, he would not be called a master relatively… Therefore, if the Father were not something in Himself (if He were a relation abstracted, including nothing of the absolute), He would be said to be something relative… The Father is not only Father, and the Son is not only Son, each being a substance and both together one substance (absolute)… And these two, when they are spoken of, that is, begotten wisdom, in one of them, because it is begotten, and Word, and Image, and Son are understood, and in all these names the essence (absolute and common) is not shown, because they are spoken relatively; but in the other, which is wisdom, because it is said with respect to itself—for it is wise in itself—the essence is also shown… Therefore, it is not because the Father is not the Son, and the Son is not the Father, or that the one is unbegotten and the other begotten, that they are not one essence, because by these names their relative properties are shown. But both together are one wisdom and one essence, where to be is the same as to be wise (both are absolute and thus one, without real multiplication or distinction); but both together are not the Word or the Son, because to be is not the same as to be the Word or the Son, as we have already sufficiently shown that these are spoken relatively" (i.e., the formal aspect of the absolute Being is virtually distinguished from the formal aspect of the relative Father and Word or Son, such that under the aspect of relatives they are really distinguished from each other, but under the aspect of the absolute they are one Being, one essence, one wisdom) (St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VII, n. 2–3).

With this doctrine presupposed, we can conceive of a divine person and the constitution of a person in two ways: first, more complexly and according to our mode of understanding, as if by some composition; then, more simply and, as far as we are able, moving away from that composition in our concept. In both ways, however, divine persons are understood to be constituted by relations.

II. The Formal Constitution of Divine Persons by Relations

Since in a divine person there is a twofold formal aspect, virtually distinct—namely, the aspect of the absolute essence and the aspect of the relative—each corresponding to our twofold inadequate concept, according to our mode of understanding everything through composition, we can conceive a person as this one under the aspect of the relative, distinct from others of the same nature, who possesses the nature, or whose nature is the divine nature, as if it were a metaphysical form (*en morphē Theou hyparchōn*, Philippians 2:6); thus, the relative is considered directly (*in recto*), and the absolute indirectly (*in obliquo*). Or, equivalently, we can conceive the essence as if affected by a relation, whether of paternity, filiation, or procession, and thus formally, as affected by such a determinate relation, it is this one distinct from others by the relation, or is a subsisting distinct entity; thus, the essence is considered directly (*in recto*), and the relation as affecting it indirectly (*in obliquo*). However, from the very infinity and simplicity of the divine essence and the divine person, it is evident that the relation is not some reality distinct and superadded to the essence, nor is the essence properly a form nor really distinct from the relative; but we apprehend the most simple reality only under the twofold aspect of the absolute and the

relative, to each of which one and the same reality truly corresponds, and we join this twofold aspect according to notions derived from creatures in a composite manner.

This mode of understanding was declared by John, the theologian of the Latins, at the Council of Florence: "We, however, say that the essence (*ousia*) and the person or hypostasis are the same in reality, but differ in our mode of understanding, such that a person consists of the essence and properties. And they are distinguished by reason… Now, therefore, since the essence is communicated to the persons, but the persons are in no way communicated, and this arises from the power of the relation… Indeed, according to both Greek and Latin doctors, it is the relation alone, called the relation of origin, that multiplies the persons in divine productions, to which only two things pertain: that from which another comes and that which comes from another" (Council of Florence, Session XVIII, Hardouin, *Concilia*, Vol. IX, pp. 202–203). See the holy Fathers who consider the persons in this way in Diego Ruiz, *De Trinitate*, disputations 86–90; Petavius, *De Deo*, Book II, c. 3; *De Trinitate*, Book IV, c. 10.

Now, if we speak of the constitution of a divine person according to this mode of understanding, a divine person is indeed understood as a relative, as if informed by the essence, or the essence as if affected by a relation, but a person is not merely a relation conceived so abstractly and with a distinction of reason from the essence. Rather, a person is formally such insofar as it is this one subsisting entity, i.e., incommunicably whole in itself and distinct from others of the same nature, and not something common to many. Therefore, since it is incommunicable and distinct, and thus subsisting, only under the formal aspect of the relative, while the essence and whatever is absolute is entirely one, common to the three distinct entities and in no way distinguishing, it is rightly said that a divine person is formally constituted by a relation. For, although, as I said, in this mode of understanding a divine person is not the relation alone, the distinguishing aspect, and thus the formal aspect of the person (*1*), is not the absolute but the relation alone; the Father is not distinct from the Son and the Holy Spirit by reason of divinity or essence, but only by reason of paternity. Therefore, paternity is the formal aspect constituting the person.

(*1*) It is evident per se that the question here is not about the reason why it is not only a hypostasis generically but the most noble hypostasis, called a person. The question is solely about the formal aspect of hypostasis, which is evidently the most noble in divine things, i.e., of an infinite intellectual nature (see *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis XXVIII).

Cardinal Bessarion clearly explained this in his oration to his fellow Greeks at the Council of Florence: "Since in any plurality where there is something common, there must also be something distinctive, in this Trinity of divine persons, which agree in the unity of essence, we must seek that which distinguishes them. And since it is not the essence—for in this they supremely agree—and since in divine things, apart from the essence and relations and the diverse mode of processions, which the Latins call origin, nothing else can be understood, it follows that either origin or relation, or both, distinguish the divine persons. But since relation and origin, though differing in our mode of understanding—for origin is signified as an act, such as generation, while relation is signified as a form—do not differ in reality; therefore, divine persons are distinguished in both ways, but primarily and principally, in our mode of understanding, by relations, by which the divine persons are also constituted" (Hardouin, *Concilia*, Vol. IX, p. 347). See St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 29, a. 4.

III. The Simplicity of Divine Relations

But although these things are so, that distinction of ours between the divine essence and relation, and that composition of ours, as it were, of a divine hypostasis from both aspects, exists only according to our inadequate concepts and imperfect mode of understanding, even though the distinction has a foundation in reality, which in itself is most simple, being simultaneously absolute and relative. Indeed, although we conceive a relation without expressly conceiving it as a substance, the reality conceived under the notion of a divine relation is essentially a substance; and therefore, from the truth of the reality, a divine relation cannot be conceived with an objective separation from the essence (see Thesis XV, n. III). For the person of the Father is the divine essence, not indeed under the formal aspect of the absolute, but insofar as the essence, as intellection, has by its intimate necessary exigency the aspect of a relative to the produced Word; and the same must be understood of the Word and the Holy Spirit.

Cardinal Pallavicini excellently noted this. After speaking of the mode of conceiving a divine person as a substance directly (*in recto*) with a relation indirectly (*in obliquo*), or as a relative directly (*in recto*) with the essence indirectly (*in obliquo*), he adds: "However, this doctrine applies only to a concept of second intention, that is, insofar as we conceive that simple reality, which on the part of the object corresponds to this notion of a divine person, in one way through the enigma of a created essence (through the idea of essence derived from creatures), in another way through the enigma of a created relation. But in the first intention (i.e., if the reality itself is conceived as it is objectively), since a divine relation cannot objectively be separated from identity with the essence, a divine person certainly expresses the integral concept of a relation (i.e., the relation itself is simultaneously the divine substance, and thus a substantial relation) as something simple and perfect" (Pallavicini, *Cursus Theologicus*, Book VIII, c. 54, n. 412).

According to these notions, the constitution of a divine person by a relation can be conceived somewhat differently. For, provided that the terms are rightly understood from the principles posited, a divine person is nothing other than a real divine relation. I do not say it is nothing other than a relation, but I say it is nothing other than a divine relation. For a divine relation is not an accident nor something abstracted from the divine substance, but is the divine essence or substance itself—substance, I say, not indeed under the formal aspect of the absolute, but under the formal aspect of the relative; since, as we have often stated this fundamental principle, the most simple divine entity has simultaneously the aspect of the absolute (under which it is and is called one communicable essence) and the aspect of the relative, and indeed of three relatives distinct from each other under this formal aspect. Thus, the essence under the formal aspect of a substantial relation is a divine person; under the aspect of one determinate substantial relation, it is one person, under the aspect of another determinate substantial relation, it is another person: the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit.

This explanation returns to the defined principle of faith from which it proceeded: "The essence (under the formal aspect of essence) is neither generating, nor generated, nor proceeding, but (under the formal aspect of the relative) is the Father who generates, the Son who is generated, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds." Therefore, since a divine person is nothing other than a substantial divine relation, or a relation identified with the essence, or the essence under the formal aspect of a relation, a divine person is rightly said to be constituted by a relation (*1*).

(*1*) "Personal properties (relations) are not understood to come to divine hypostases as a form to a subject, but they bring their own supposita with them, insofar as they are themselves (relations) subsisting persons" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 40, a. 3).

This mode of understanding, closer to the reality itself, is scarcely found better declared than in St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 28, a. 2; *De Potentia*, q. 8, a. 2; I, dist. 33, q. 1, a. 1), to which we have already referred above in Thesis XXII, n. II. The Angelic Doctor demonstrates there that a relation in God, in reality, is the divine essence itself, although we conceive the same reality under the twofold diverse aspect of absolute essence and relative, or relation, because what is signified by the abstract and the concrete in God is the same (*1*). The doctrine, specifically in *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 28, a. 2, is as follows. A relation, according to its real being in creatures, is an accident and thus inheres in a substance, which it has in common with all accidents. But according to its proper aspect, by which it is such an accident distinct from other genera of accidents, a relation signifies a respect to another term. And so, in creatures too, every real relation, besides its respect to another, is also something absolute, insofar as it inheres in a substance. But a relation that in no way inheres, conceived only as a respect to another, is in reality objectively nothing real, and thus is a relation of reason only, such as right or left in a column. Now, in God, relations are real, as is certain by faith; for the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are really distinct. Therefore, divine relations are something real with a respect to a term. But they cannot be an accident nor some reality superadded to the essence; for in God, due to His supreme simplicity, there is no accident, and to the infinite essence, which as the fullness of being comprises every aspect of perfection, no reality can be superadded. Therefore, relations, in reality, must necessarily be the divine essence itself. But the essence, under the formal aspect of absolute essence, does not signify a real respect to an immanent term; for under that aspect, it is entirely one and indistinct. Therefore, that same most simple reality, which has the aspect of essence, by its intimate nature also has the aspect of the relative. "Whatever in created things has accidental being, when transferred to God, has substantial being; for nothing is in God as an accident in a subject, but whatever is in God is His essence. Thus, from the perspective by which a relation in created things has accidental being in a subject, a relation really existing in God has the being of the divine essence, being entirely the same as it… And so it is clear that a relation really existing in God is the same as the essence in reality, and differs only in the aspect of understanding (with a foundation in reality), insofar as a relation implies a respect to its opposite, which is not implied in the name (and formal aspect) of essence" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 28, a. 2).

(*1*) "Just as the essence in God is the same as that which has the divine essence, as Deity and God; so the relation is the same as that which is related by the relation. Hence it follows that the relation is the same as that which subsists distinctly in the divine nature" (St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 9, a. 4).

Therefore, there are not two realities there, or even two aspects objectively distinct, the absolute and the relative, which concur to compose one reality; but one supreme reality, which we conceive under the aspect of a divine relation, e.g., paternity or concretely the Father, is in reality simultaneously the absolute essence. Just as, conversely, the same reality, when conceived under the aspect of essence, is simultaneously three relatives and each of them, who are not distinguished under the aspect of essence but under the aspect of relatives. However, our concept of the relative, derived from creatures, does not simultaneously express the absolute, just as the concept of the absolute does not simultaneously express the relative; therefore, that twofold aspect, which the supreme reality has in its eminence according to the function of both the absolute and the relative, is conceived by us under a twofold inadequate notion. Nevertheless, just as what we apprehend under the notion of an attribute, e.g., divine wisdom, is, on the part of the reality, the absolute infinite being in every line of perfection and thus the true God, so what we apprehend by an inadequate notion under the aspect of a relation, e.g., paternity, is, on the part of the reality, simultaneously paternity and absolute being, and the true God subsisting in the absolute nature.

Responding to the objection that, according to Augustine, "every reality that is spoken of relatively is also something apart from the relative," St. Thomas says: "Just as in creatures, in that which is spoken of relatively, not only is a respect to another found, but also something absolute, so it is in God; but differently in each case. For what is found in a creature besides what is contained under the signification of a relative name is another reality (namely, the substance in which the relation inheres as an accident); but in God, it is not another reality but one and the same (simultaneously absolute and relative), which is not perfectly expressed by the name of a relation as if comprehended under the signification of such a name. For it was said, when treating of divine names, that more is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified by any name. Hence, it does not follow that in God there is something other in reality (another reality than that which corresponds to the notion of a divine relation), but only in the consideration of the signification of names" (i.e., only that one reality is conceived under different aspects, which different aspects conceived by us must also be expressed by different names) (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 28, a. 2, ad 2).

Furthermore, the Angelic Doctor considers two things in a divine relation: that it is both a substance and a relation to another. Insofar as a relation is identified with the essence, it is a substantial relation; insofar as it is referred and has a respect to another relative term, it is this one distinct from other relatives of the same essence. And thus, the divine relation itself, identified with the essence, and under both the aspect of the absolute and the relative, one most simple reality, is understood to be a divine person subsisting. "Relations in divine things, he says, although they constitute hypostases and thus make them subsisting, do so insofar as they are the divine essence (insofar as they are substantial relations). For a relation, insofar as it is a relation (abstractly considered), does not have the quality of subsisting or causing to subsist; for this belongs to substance alone. But relations distinguish insofar as they are relations (not under the formal aspect as they are the common essence, but under the formal aspect of a relation to another term); for thus they have opposition" (St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 8, a. 3, ad 7). Since a hypostasis is an individual substance, or this one substantial entity distinct from all others, even of the same essence, a twofold aspect is required for a hypostasis: substantiality and distinction. Hence, unless divine relations were simultaneously a substance or the divine essence, the very foundation of a hypostasis would be lacking; unless they were formally relations, under which aspect alone they are opposed and distinguished, the formal aspect of a hypostasis would be lacking (*1*). Hence, he further says: "In divine things, relations are subsisting, and therefore, insofar as they have opposition to each other, they can distinguish supposita (or they themselves, as substantial and subsisting, are distinct supposita) (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 40, a. 3); yet the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other insofar as they are really identical with the essence" (they are not distinguished under the formal aspect of the essence) (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 39, a. 1, ad 1). Cf. Cardinal Cienfuegos, *Aenigmata Theologica*, disp. V, sect. 3, § 1; Francisco de Lugo, *Disputationes*, XI, c. 3, n. 8.

(*1*) From this most illustrious doctrine of St. Thomas, not rightly understood, some Scholastics derived the theory of one absolute subsistence in God besides the three relative subsistences, as we will see below.

Therefore, from this doctrine of St. Thomas, the divine relation itself, not indeed under the common concept of a relation derived from creatures, but formally as a divine relation (*1*), i.e., as a substantial relation or identified with the essence and thus as subsisting, is understood to be a divine person; therefore, divine persons are simply constituted by divine relations. It is evident per se that the term

“constitution” is taken here in the metaphysical sense, by which something concretely signified is said to be constituted by the entire formal aspect of itself, which is signified abstractly, as God is said to be constituted by deity, or a human by humanity; but the term is not taken in the physical sense, by which something is said to be constituted from two distinct concurring elements, as a human is constituted from soul and body. Cf. Diego Ruiz, *Disputationes*, 86, sect. 4, n. 5 ff.

(*1*) “Although a relation is an accident to that which is commonly signified by the name person, it is not an accident to a divine person” (St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 9, a. 4, ad 7).

IV. Relations vs. Origins in Constituting Divine Persons

To complete the doctrine, we add here a question that pertains more to the mode of expression than to the reality itself: whether and how divine persons can be said to be constituted by origins as well as by relations. Certainly, if we consider the identity of origin and (real) relation in God, it matters little whether we speak in one way or the other. However, insofar as we consider the different mode by which we conceive origin and relation, divine persons are more properly understood as constituted by relations than by origins.

In divine things, as far as the present matter is concerned, origin is said to be either active origin (*generare* and *spirare*, or active generation and active spiration, which are also called notional acts; cf. Suarez, *De Trinitate*, Book VI, c. 1, n. 2–3) or passive origin (*gigni* and *spirari*, or nativity and procession) (*1*). Thus, origin is the same as production in the active and passive sense, or the producing and being produced of divine persons. Since we are speaking of the constitution of persons, setting aside active spiration, which does not constitute a person, as we will explain later, here we consider generation (active origin), nativity, and procession (twofold passive origin).

(*1*) Some ambiguity in the signification of these terms—active spiration, passive spiration, procession—must be noted, as among the Scholastics themselves, they sometimes signify the formal aspect of origin and sometimes of relation. Cf. Diego Ruiz, *Disputationes*, 84, sect. 2, n. 2, 10; see St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 36, a. 1; q. 37, a. 1.

1. Now, what we said—that origin and the corresponding relation in divine things are entirely the same in reality—is easily understood. The divine intellect is not a potency distinct from act, but by its intimate nature is pure act and substantial intellection; therefore, the intellect, insofar as it produces the Word as its internal term, is not a potency passing into the act of producing the Word, but is a pure substantial act of intellection, by its nature (and in this sense essentially) productive of the Word. Hence, this eternal necessary producing or generating, whose immanent term is equally necessary, the Word, is not a transient action but is the substantial eternal intellection itself, immutably permanent and subsisting, relative to its Word. Thus, just as the divine relation of paternity is not something abstract but is this substantial intellection productive of the Word and thus by its nature related to the Word; so active origin, which is nothing other than this intellection productive of the Word, is the eternal, immutably permanent relation of paternity to the Word as its immanent term.

Conversely, as is already clear from the described formal aspect of the producing intellection, the eternal being produced or being generated of the immanent Word is not something transient; but it is, by its intrinsic necessary exigency, an eternally permanent being produced by the paternal intellection. Just as the substantial divine intellection, considered absolutely, is one indistinct divine essence, but taken relatively and as if actively, insofar as intellection is to express its Word by understanding, is the subsisting Father distinct from the expressed or produced Word; so too, the understood in God, immanent, considered absolutely, is the divine essence, but in the relative passive sense, as the understood is said to be expressed by the paternal intellection, it is the Word distinct from the producing Father (*1*), which is intrinsically constituted by a relation to the producing Father, insofar as it is produced, and is constituted by passive origin, insofar as it is conceived by an eternal act of being produced. In sum, because in the Word, eternal being produced and eternal producing are one and the same, the former founds a relation, the latter signifies origin; therefore, just as the Father, so too the Son can be understood as constituted no less by eternal origin than by relation. The same must be repeated if we consider the eternal being produced and being produced, or the eternal origin and relation of the Holy Spirit, who, as an immanent term, is eternally breathed forth and is breathed forth by the common love in the Father and the Son. See the holy Fathers in Diego Ruiz, *Disputationes*, 84, sect. 2.

(*1*) "Understanding and willing in God is nothing other than His being. But since God understands Himself, and everything understood is in the one understanding, God must be in Himself as in the one understanding. But the understood, insofar as it is in the one understanding, is a certain word of the intellect… Therefore, it is necessary to posit the Word of God in God" (St. Thomas, *Compendium Theologiae*, c. 37).

2. Nevertheless, it is clear, as we said in the second place, that divine persons are more aptly understood as constituted by relations than by origins, if we consider the mode by which we apprehend relation and origin with distinct concepts. For, as Bessarion argued at the Council of Florence (Hardouin, *Concilia*, Vol. IX, p. 347), "relation and origin, though differing in our mode of understanding—for origin is signified as an act (*kata ton tēs energeias tropon*), such as generation (*hē gennēsis*), while relation is signified as a form (permanent, *kata ton tou eidous tropon*); yet they do not differ in reality; therefore, divine persons are distinguished in both ways, but primarily and principally, in our mode of understanding, by relations." That is, as we explain in the words of Diego Ruiz (*Disputationes*, 87, sect. 5, n. 5), "according to the correct mode of understanding a reality permanent in its completed being or in its produced being, it must be conceived as a permanent form and as if in completed being, already having fixed being, not as a way or tendency toward that being. But this condition does not apply to origin; for it is conceived as a way tending toward being and as if becoming (*1*), for it is the very act of being produced. Therefore, origin cannot formally and intrinsically constitute a produced person, but only a relation."

(*1*) It is evident per se that "becoming" is not said in the sense by which it signifies in creatures being produced from nothing or a transition from non-being to being; but due to the poverty of terminology, it is used by some theologians to signify the eternal being produced of the Son from the substance of the Father, and of the Holy Spirit from the substance of the Father and the Son. Thus, Vázquez (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 42, a. 1, n. 39) says "filiation in becoming." But Ruiz (*Disputationes*, 85, sect. 3, n. 10) cautions that it should not be said simply "in becoming," but with some qualification: "the Son in being

produced and as if becoming." That is, as Suarez explains (*De Trinitate*, Book VI, c. 1, n. 4), "passive origin is nothing other than the way to the produced term, insofar as it tends toward it; but this way, even in created things, is nothing other than the term itself, as it is in becoming; therefore, we conceive divine things in the same way, with this difference observed… that there is no proper becoming, as far as the imperfection it implies, but it is conceived as if it were."

These things are immediately understood only of passive origin; for the first person is in no way produced. Nevertheless, the reason given—that origin, in our mode of understanding, by which alone it is distinguished from relation, and according to which this whole question is treated, is not conceived as a permanent form—applies equally to active origin, such as generation. Therefore, it is rightly conceived from the same reason that the first person too is constituted by a relation and not by origin, according to the mode by which we apprehend origin as something transient and distinct by reason from relation. "The Father must be constituted by a fixed and permanent form, such as paternity, not by the formality of a transient way tending toward some term to be constituted (such as generation is conceived)" (Ruiz, *ibid.*, n. 7). Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 40, a. 2; Suarez, *De Trinitate*, Book VII, c. 6, n. 12.

However, setting aside this distinction between a permanent form and an act conceived as transient, which, as it were, requires correction in retrospect lest it contain error; the same can be declared in another way. The distinction between origin and relation is transferred from creatures to God so

So that neither can be understood as prior in reason to the other.

The same should be understood regarding filiation compared to nativity, and regarding the relation of the Holy Spirit compared to His passive origin, namely, His procession.

Provided that the declared real identity of the notional act or origin with the personal relation is rightly kept in view, the futility of the objection will easily become apparent, whereby someone might attempt to prove that the person of the Father is prior in reason to the notional act of generation, or, conversely, that the act of generation is prior to paternity. For it is often said on one side: actions belong to supposits (subjects), and therefore it is inconsistent to conceive of the act of generation without first, in reason, understanding the person; for if it were not so, it would not be the person but the nature that generates, contrary to what was defined in the Lateran Council (chapter *Damnamus*). On the other side, it is objected: the first person cannot be understood in the formal sense of the Father unless because He generates; therefore, active generation must necessarily be understood first, and from this, paternity or the formal concept of the Father is understood.

We respond: in both objections, the concept of the person of the Father is first assumed inadequately and confusedly, to which the explicit notion of paternity is then added. In this manner of consideration, based on the analogy found in created persons, we do not deny that the object represented by an inadequate concept can be considered prior in reason, and the same object, represented under the explicit notion of paternity, can be considered posterior in reason, as we will soon discuss. But now we speak of the person of the Father and the notional act according to their perfection, as we can understand them in reality, enlightened by faith. Thus, primarily, the intellective act producing the Word is not an elicited action of some supposit, as intellection is in creatures; rather, the divine intellection is a pure substantial act which, formally, as relative to the eternally produced Word by its necessary perfection, is God the Father. Hence,

that relative act is not as if it inheres in some pre-understood person, but it is itself this determinate divine person, distinct from the Word and the Holy Spirit.

To the first objection, therefore, we say: not only is it not inconsistent to conceive of the substantial relative act without first, in reason, understanding a person in which it inheres or from which it is elicited; but rather, that imperfect mode of conceiving, based on the analogy of creatures as if it were an elicited act, requires this correction: the substantial relative act itself is understood to be the divine person. Hence, further, the person, under the formal aspect of a person, that is, under the formal aspect of a distinct relative, generates, not the nature under the aspect of something absolute and common; but the divine person is not a supposit eliciting an act distinct from itself, but (as we said) the substantial relative act itself is the person.

From this, the response to the contrary second objection is also clear. Active generation, as it is in God, is a relative act, always completed by its inherent necessity, having the Word as its eternal internal term. Hence, that act of generation is not prior in reason, such that paternity follows from it; but rather, that relative act is itself, without priority of reason or even mental consideration, simultaneously paternity. It can indeed be said: the Father is because He generates, and conversely, He generates because He is the Father; not as if one must be conceived as prior to the other, but because one concept includes the other and its formal aspect, just as the defined includes its definition, and vice versa, the definition includes the defined.

2°. Although this is so, we can still, according to the analogy of creatures, consider the person, the relation, and the notional act confusedly, and thus, by comparing these formally conceived notions, we can indeed conceive one as prior in reason to another.

First, regarding the proceeding persons, that is, the Son and the Holy Spirit, if generation or nativity and spiration or passive procession are considered, as St. Thomas says, as a way to the person, whereas the person of the Son and the Holy Spirit is the term and the person itself; without doubt, the origin (generation and spiration) is conceived as prior in reason, and the generated and spirated person is conceived as posterior in reason.

Then, regarding the person of the Father, around which this question primarily revolves, we can conceive the generating person such that the first or unbegotten person is conceived as prior in reason, confusedly, without an explicit concept of paternity, and the same person is understood as generating as posterior in reason: thus, the confused notion of the person is prior in reason, and the notional act is posterior. Alternatively, we can consider paternity merely as a relation, abstracting from the fact that the divine relation is itself the divine substance and therefore a person. Hence, because in creatures the relation of paternity follows generation, according to this analogy, we can conceive generation in God as the foundation of the paternal relation, and thus prior in reason to paternity so inadequately considered.

This analogous mode of conceiving, though imperfect and requiring correction lest we judge that the person is prior in reality, then the act of generation, by which the Father is finally constituted, should still be noted, because it underpins a frequent and quite convenient manner of speaking, and because the Scholastics almost always base their comparisons between the persons and their origins on it. See St.

Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 40, a. 4, and especially *De Potentia*, q. 10, a. 3. Cf. Suarez, *De Trinitate*, Book VII, c. 7, n. 11; Ruiz, *Disputationes*, disp. 91, sect. 2.

THESIS XXIV.

On the manner of signification of the term "person" and the opinion of theologians asserting an absolute subsistence in God.

The term *person* signifies a subsistent in a rational or intellectual nature. Hence:

1°. The term *person* does not, by its manner of signification, express a relation, but in God, because of the reality signified, it stands for relatives, and therefore persons are predicated of God in the plural; this doctrine is excellently reconciled with the discussion of St. Augustine (*De Trinitate*, Book VII, c. 4, seqq.).

2°. Therefore, no absolute subsistence in God is to be admitted if the term *subsistence* is taken in its fuller and proper ecclesiastical sense.

I. From what was said in the previous thesis, the first question can be resolved, which, following St. Augustine (*De Trinitate*, Book VII, c. 4, seqq.), St. Thomas (*Summa Theologica* I, q. 29, a. 4; *De Potentia*, q. 9, a. 4; *Summa Theologica* I, dist. 23, a. 3) and many other Scholastics discuss: what does the term *person* properly signify in God, and how is it that a term which is said not relatively to another but to itself, and thus seems to signify something absolute, is nevertheless predicated of God in the plural?

1°. The term *person* signifies a subsistent in a rational or intellectual nature, distinct from others even of the same nature; and thus, when applied to God, it signifies a distinct subsistent in the divine nature. Furthermore, it is clear from revelation that there are three subsistents in the divine nature under the formal aspect of relatives distinct from one another, but under the formal aspect of the absolute, they are entirely one indistinct essence.

Hence, in those three distinct realities, two things are to be considered:

a) Each is something really distinct from the others, and thus incommunicable, and consequently subsistent in itself; this is expressed by the term *person*.

b) It must be considered that they are distinct and subsist in themselves only under the formal aspect of a substantial relation. This aspect of relation is not explicitly expressed by the term *person*; for it does not designate a relative by its manner of signification. Thus, the term *divine person* formally signifies a distinct subsistent in the divine nature; yet this distinct reality in God is truly a relative, although the aspect of relation is not expressed by that term through its manner of signification (as I said). In brief, it can be said: the term *person* in God formally signifies a distinct subsistent, but materially signifies a relative; or also: it signifies a distinct subsistent, but stands for a relative (cf. above, p. 27).

As St. Thomas says: “The proper meaning of a name is what the name signifies; but that to which the name is attributed, if it is rightly taken under the reality signified by the name, as the determinate under the indeterminate, is said to be stood for by the name (as Peter can be stood for by the term *man*). But it

must be known that something signifies in two ways: formally and materially. Formally, what is signified by a name is that for which the name is primarily imposed, which is the meaning of the name, as the term *man* signifies something composed of body and rational soul. Materially, however, what is signified by a name is that in which such a meaning is preserved; as the term *man* signifies something having a heart and brain and such parts, without which there cannot be a body animated by a rational soul. Accordingly, it must be said that the term *person*, commonly taken, signifies nothing other than an individual substance of a rational nature. And because under an individual substance of a rational nature is contained an individual, incommunicable substance distinct from others, whether of God, man, or angel, it follows that a divine person signifies a distinct subsistent in the divine nature, just as a human person signifies a distinct subsistent in human nature; and this is the formal signification of both divine and human persons. But the incommunicable distinction in the divine nature can only be a relation, because everything absolute is common and indistinct in the divine. It is clear, therefore, that *person*, commonly taken, signifies an individual substance of a rational nature, but a divine person, by its formal signification, signifies a distinct subsistent in the divine nature; and because this can only be a relation or relative (which in God are the same), it therefore materially signifies a relation or relative" (*De Potentia*, q. 9, a. 4; cf. *Summa Theologica* I, q. 29, a. 4).

Thus, although the term *person* in God is said in some sense to itself and not relatively to another, what is designated by this name is not absolute but relative. To be said to itself is understood in two senses: either such that the formal aspect of something absolute is signified, in which sense essence, wisdom, goodness, and all absolute attributes are said to themselves; or it is said to itself such that something is signified as incommunicable in itself and thus subsistent, without denying its formal aspect as a relative; in this sense, a divine person is said to be and is to itself. For indeed, the Father is in Himself this one, incommunicably and thus really distinct from the Son and the Holy Spirit (which applies equally to the second and third persons); but this is under the formal aspect of a relative. The difference, therefore, between the proper designation of each of the three distinct realities, namely the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and the common name *person* is that those proper names express both the subsistent and the aspect of relation, and indeed each expresses one determinate subsistent and relative: one Father, not three Fathers, and the Father of the Son; one Son, not three Sons, and the Son of the Father, etc. But the name *person*, by itself and its manner of signification, signifies only a subsistent indeterminately, whence it can be said of each, and because there are three subsistents under the formal aspect of really distinct subsistents, they can be numbered plurally as persons. But the formal aspect of a relative or the relation of origin of one from another, as we said, this name does not signify but stands for, so that the Father is a person in Himself, that is, subsistent in Himself, but He is not nor can He be said to be the person of the Son; for that would signify that, under the formal aspect of a subsistent, the Father and the Son are one and the same, which is the Sabellian error. In brief, the name *person* in God does not signify something absolute, but a distinct subsistent in itself; but the subsistents in themselves in God are relatives and are three, and therefore the name *person* in God does not, by its manner of signification, designate a relative, but because of the reality signified, it stands for a relative, and three persons are to be spoken of in the plural.

2°. As regards the essence of the matter, this same doctrine of St. Thomas seems to us to have been handed down by St. Augustine in the famous passage of *De Trinitate*, Book VII, nn. 7–12. There Augustine asks why, since there are not nor can there be three divine essences, because God is one, the Greeks nevertheless speak of three substances, i.e., hypostases, and the Latins of three persons? The difficulty that the holy Father presses is as follows. In God, whatever is absolute and in this sense said to

itself is entirely one and indistinct; but the three are distinct only under the formal aspect of relatives to one another: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Now, if a created person is considered, it is something absolute, namely, a singular substance of an entire rational nature, wholly in itself; hence, there are always as many persons as there are singular, entire rational natures naturally subsisting, and distinct persons each have a numerically different essence. Therefore, if the term *person* were said of God in this sense, no less would one person in number be said than one essence; for there is one singular, entire, intellectual substance. Therefore, Augustine says, since a common name was sought by which not an absolute one in three would be signified, but by which the three, as distinct, would be numbered, the name *person* was used, not in the signification of something absolute, but to designate several distinguished by relation, although the name itself does not, by its nature, have the form of relative signification, as do the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

[Note (i): This same interpretation of Augustine's doctrine was already given by St. Anselm: "Although I can speak of the Trinity because of the Father and the Son and the Spirit of both, who are three; yet I cannot express with one name why they are three, as if I were to say because of three persons... For three persons are not to be thought of as subsisting separately from one another, such that there must be as many substances as there are persons, as is known in many humans, who, as many persons as there are, so many individual substances there are. Therefore, in the supreme essence, just as there are not multiple substances, so neither are there multiple persons (if person is understood as in creatures, as something absolute...). Unless, perhaps, someone, compelled by the lack of a properly fitting name, chooses one of those names which cannot be said plurally of the supreme essence... as if he were to say that the admirable Trinity is one essence or nature and three persons or substances" (*Monologion*, c. 78).]

When human inadequacy in speaking sought to express to human understanding what it holds in the secret of the mind concerning its Lord God, its Creator, it feared to say three essences, lest any diversity be understood in that supreme equality; yet it could not say that there are three somethings, because Sabellius, who said this, is known to have fallen into heresy. For it is most certain from the Scriptures that there is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and that the Son is not the same as the Father. It sought what to call the three, and it said substances (hypostases) or persons, by which names it did not intend diversity to be understood, but singularity; so that not only is unity understood from the fact that one essence is spoken of, but also the Trinity from the fact that three substances or persons are spoken of. And so it says one essence, such that it does not think one is greater or better than another or different in any way; not that the Father Himself is the Son and the Holy Spirit, and whatever else is said relatively to one another, because of which they admit a plural number, as it is written in the Gospel: "I and the Father are one." Or, if it now pleases, for the necessity of disputation, even apart from relative names, to admit a plural number, so that with one name it may be answered when asked what the three are, and to say three substances (hypostases) or three persons, let no mass or intervals of any dissimilarity be thought of, so that there is neither confusion of persons nor such a distinction as implies any inequality (*De Trinitate*, Book VII, nn. 9, 12).

Thus, Augustine not only does not say, as Günther distorted this passage, that three Gods and three essences could be predicated unless external reasons prevented it; but rather, he says that, because God is entirely one and one essence, three persons cannot be said in the signification of something absolute, but only three persons can be numbered insofar as what is designated by this name in God is relative (cf. above, pp. 269–270).

We also think that, according to what we have said, some moderation is needed regarding what Petavius wrote in *De Trinitate*, Book IV, c. 11, where he sought to refute Augustine's opinion, which he interpreted as if the holy Father simply taught that in God a person is said to itself, not to another, which is to be said absolutely and according to essence or substance, not according to relation, as Petavius puts it. Indeed, Augustine says: "As the substance of the Father is the Father Himself, not because He is the Father, but because He is; so too the person of the Father is nothing other than the Father Himself; for a person is said to itself, not to the Son or the Holy Spirit, just as God is said to Himself as great, good, and just" (*De Trinitate*, Book VII, n. 11). But by the very fact that it is said that "the person of the Father is the Father Himself," it is not denied that that for which the name *person* stands is relative to the Son and the Holy Spirit; but it is only said that by the name *person* is signified a subsistent in itself, not the subsistence of another, which is also clear from Augustine's added explanation of the sense in which a person is said to itself and not relatively to another: "What then," he says, "does it please us to say that the Father is the person of the Son and the Holy Spirit?" All this, finally, is reduced to the sense of St. Thomas, the most illustrious interpreter of Augustine.

II. The question of the absolute subsistence of God, about which the Scholastics sometimes disputed, is so clear from what has been said that among Catholics the controversy can hardly be about anything other than the name. Durandus (*In III Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 7) and some other early Thomists taught that "subsistence in the divine is one and absolute, belonging to all the persons by reason of the essence." For, they said, in the divine, "the formal aspect of a supposit (hypostasis) is not subsistence itself but something else; for a supposit is formally such by a relative property, but it subsists not by the relative property but by the essence or substance" (ibid.). Others, among whom Cajetan was the first (*Summa Theologica* I, q. 29, a. 4; III, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3; q. 3, aa. 2, 3), and later Suarez (*De Incarnatione*, T. I, disp. XI, sect. 3; *De Trinitate*, Book III, c. 4; Book IV, c. 11), held that in God there is one absolute subsistence and three relative subsistences. But the common manner of thinking and speaking, confirmed by the consensus of the Fathers and Councils, is that there are three subsistences in God under the formal aspect of relatives, but no absolute subsistence common to the three persons. See Vasquez (*In I Sent.*, disp. 125); Gregory of Valencia (*De Trinitate*, T. I, disp. II, q. 13, punct. 3); Ruiz (*Disputationes*, disp. XXXIV); Francisco de Lugo (*De Trinitate*, disp. XI); Petavius (*De Trinitate*, Book IV, c. 12, nn. 1–4).

The term *subsistence* in its proper signification, consecrated by many centuries of ecclesiastical use, has no other meaning than what we have said: namely, a subsistent (whence *subsistence* is derived) is that which exists incommunicably in itself, and by this very fact is distinct from all others, even of the same essence or nature. Therefore, three things are required for the proper concept of subsistence: that it be a singular, entire substance; that it not be in the manner of a part or in the manner of a nature held in another superior hypostasis (as the human nature in the Word); and that it not be common or identified with several distinct from one another. In this sense, both etymologically and by the ecclesiastical use of the Fathers and Councils, *subsistence* is entirely the same as what is called *hypostasis* in Greek; for among the Fathers and ancient theologians, *subsistence* is not taken in an abstract sense, but concretely in the same way as *hypostasis*. But if, as became common among the Scholastics after Cajetan, it is taken abstractly, subsistence will be that formal aspect of incommunicability in itself, under which a substance is understood to be a hypostasis. In either way of considering subsistence, no absolute subsistence is to be predicated in God, but three relative subsistences; for whatever is absolute there is one, common, or identified with the three distinct realities; but the distinct realities are only such under the formal aspect of

relatives. By this very fact, the absolute is not subsistent, i.e., incommunicable, under the formal aspect of the absolute, but under the formal aspect of the three relatives and each of them.

If, however, *subsistence* is taken in a twofold different signification—first, more broadly, under only the first two characteristics, as a singular, entire substance existing and not assumed in the manner of a nature by a superior hypostasis; and then more strictly, with the added third characteristic of incommunicability—then indeed, in that former, less full signification, the divine absolute essence can be called a subsistence, or (taking the term abstractly) absolute subsistence can be attributed to the essence, as was predicated by many before the fourth century, that there is one hypostasis in God, i.e., one singular, most perfect, really existing absolute substance in the three distinct persons (see above, Thesis IX, n. II, and *De Incarnatione*, Theses XXVI, XXVII). Hence, if it is said that in God there is one absolute subsistence and three relative subsistences, taking the term in that twofold different signification, as Suarez explained his view in the cited passages, nothing is said concerning the reality itself that is contrary to the truth; but the term is deflected from its solemn signification to another sense without any benefit, and thus, when it is used in an ambiguous sense in explaining one and the same mystery, it certainly does not conduce to clarity but gives occasion for confusion of concepts, not only in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity but also in the explanation of the mystery of the Incarnation.

Those, however, who understand something more by that absolute subsistence than what has been said undoubtedly err even concerning the reality itself. Thus, Cajetan insists in the cited passages that, abstracting from the persons, there is and must be understood not only God but (as he says) *this God*, namely, one having the divine nature; whence he thinks that God so conceived is a supposit and a person, though not entirely complete, because it is something common to the three distinct persons. But in truth, whether it is called God or *this God*, He is none other than the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the three persons together and each of them. And so, given the revelation of the three divine persons, the name *God* or *this God* signifies nothing other than the one, non-multipliable divine nature with the connotation of subsistence, either indeterminately and confusedly, or of a threefold subsistence, or of the determinate subsistence of one of the three. But in whatever way subsistence is connoted, it always has the formal aspect of a relative; the difference lies only in our manner of conceiving, in that in the second and third ways we expressly conceive subsistence as relative, while in the first way we can conceive it confusedly without the express notion of a relative; yet even confusedly, according to the truth of the reality, divine subsistence cannot be conceived with the exclusion of the relative and under the express aspect of the absolute, since objectively and in reality it exists only under the formal aspect of a relative.

What Durandus affirms about one absolute subsistence and denies about relative subsistences arose from a mistaken interpretation of St. Thomas's doctrine, which we described above, concerning substance as the foundation of subsistence. "Relations in the divine," says the Angelic Doctor, "although they constitute hypostases and thus make them subsistent, do so insofar as they are the divine essence; for a relation, insofar as it is a relation, does not have that it subsists or causes to subsist, for this belongs only to substance" (*De Potentia*, q. 8, a. 3, ad 7). Hence, Durandus and some others concluded that the absolute essence gives subsistence to relations, but relations do not give subsistence to the essence; and therefore, it must be said that there is one absolute subsistence common to the three, but no relative subsistence. But from what has been said, it is clear that this inference is absurd in itself if *subsistence* is taken in the fuller sense of incommunicability according to the use of the Councils and Fathers. As regards St. Thomas's doctrine, it is indeed most true that relations cannot be subsistent unless they are substantial; and thus,

subsistent relations are such, not because they are relations in the common sense, but because they are such relations, namely, identified with the essence and therefore substantial.

In a more proper manner of conceiving and speaking, it should not be said that the essence gives subsistence to relations nor that relations give subsistence to the essence; for neither are relations really distinct from the essence, nor is subsistence a reality superadded to either the essence or the relations. Rather, the most simple and infinite essence, by its internal exigency and by itself, is really subsistent as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and conversely, the relation, e.g., paternity, is by itself God the Father, filiation is God the Son, and spiration (passive spiration) is God the Holy Spirit. Therefore, it is more properly said that the one most simple essence simultaneously has the formal aspect of the absolute and the relative, such that under the aspect of the absolute, it is understood as the essence common to the three distinct realities, and under the aspect of the relative, it is the Father distinct from the Son, the Son distinct from the Father, etc., and thus incommunicably subsistent as the Father, as the Son, as the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, because the essence and relations are distinguished in reason, and the function under the formal aspect of the essence is different from that under the formal aspect of the relative, in our inadequate manner of conceiving, we can say: the essence gives to relations that they are substantial, which aspect of substance is a necessary foundation for the concept of subsistence; relations give to the supreme reality, which is the essence, incommunicability, which is the formal aspect of subsistence properly so-called. [Note (i): In this sense, the holy Fathers teach that what is nature and common is circumscribed and, as it were, determined by properties to be a hypostasis. "A hypostasis is that which, through the properties shining forth in it, establishes and circumscribes the common and uncircumscribed in a particular reality" (St. Basil, *Epistle* 36, al. 43).]

Hence, subsistence in its concrete signification is not only the formal aspect of the essence nor only the formal aspect of relation in general, but is complexly a substantial relation or a substantial relative; therefore, subsistence in its abstract signification is conceived as the mode by which there is a substantial relative (see above, p. 330).

Corollary. The term *person* does not signify a universal or an abstract notion common in the proper sense to several individuals, but even in God, it designates indeterminately this one distinct from others, the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit; and thus, it is not a name of a species comprehending individuals under it, but it functions as denominations of a vague individual, *someone*, *some man*. Against this, the objection is inept that these appellations cannot yet have the partitive *some* added, when yet it can be said *some person*. For, first, it could very well be said: *someone who is some man*; secondly, although a vague individual already indeterminately expressed by the particle *some* cannot admit the repetition of this particle, it can nevertheless admit a name that by itself designates an indeterminate individual, such as the name *person*. See St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 30, a. 4.

THESIS XXV.

On the notions of active spiration and unbegottenness.

Active spiration and being unbegotten (*innascibilitas*, ἀγεννησία) do not constitute persons. For spiration is not really but only rationally distinct from paternity in the Father and from filiation in the Son, and is

included in the fuller concept of paternity and filiation. Likewise, being unbegotten, as a notion of the first person, is included in the fuller concept of divine paternity.

Since it was demonstrated in Thesis XXIII that the substantial relations, insofar as they are really distinct from one another and thus subsistent, are the divine persons, or formally constitute the persons, it is evident that there are as many really distinct constitutive relations as there are divine persons; namely, the formal aspect of the Father, another of the Son, and a third of the Holy Spirit, that is, paternity, filiation, and procession.

But since the internal relations in God are relations of origin, by that very fact, in every procession, there is necessarily a twofold relation, opposed and distinguished by opposition, namely, the relation of the principle and of that which proceeds from the principle. And thus, since there are two distinct processions—the Son by generation from the Father, and the Holy Spirit by spiration from the Father and the Son—there must be four relations; just as, namely, to the Son corresponds the Father or to filiation corresponds paternity, so to the spirated corresponds the spirator, and to procession or passive spiration (as it is called) active spiration corresponds and is opposed as the principle related to that which proceeds from the principle. Furthermore, both from the general doctrine of the mystery of the Holy Trinity and from the specific declarations of the Fathers and all theologians, it is expressly proposed that unbegottenness or being unbegotten (ἀγεννησία) is a notion proper to only one person and by no means common. It must therefore be explained how, beyond the three constitutive properties or relations, first the relation of spiration and then unbegottenness are to be understood.

I. Regarding the first, therefore, it is asked why this relation of (active) spiration, or the formal aspect of the spirator, which is opposed and really distinct from procession or the formal aspect of the spirated, is not per se subsistent and constitutive of a person?

1°. According to our imperfect manner of conceiving, the response could be obvious and (as it seems) easy: active spiration presupposes the persons of the Father and the Son already constituted, and is conceived as a common act, as it were, supervening upon them. [Note (i): Properties are conceived to be in persons in two ways, says St. Thomas: "either as constitutive, and these are personal properties (paternity, filiation, being spirated), or as that which comes after the constituted being, as whiteness is in Socrates; and thus, according to our understanding, non-personal properties such as unbegottenness and common spiration are in persons" (*Summa Theologica* I, dist. 33, q. 1, a. 3).]

Moreover, the act itself or active spiration does not really proceed from the Father and the Son, and thus it has no opposition to the persons whose act it is, and therefore is not really distinguished from them; but through this act of spiration, the Holy Spirit really proceeds from the Father and the Son, and therefore the Father and the Son, through this their common act, under the formal aspect of the spirator as the principle, are referred to the Holy Spirit and are really distinguished from Him. Thus, *spirator* does not designate a person distinct from the Father and the Son, but signifies one spirative power or one act and one relation of spiration common to the two persons, and indeterminately connotes these persons whose act it is, in much the same way that the name *creator* signifies one divine essence under the formal aspect of the act of creating and indeterminately connotes the persons whose essence it is.

2°. Nevertheless, since spiration in the Father is really identical with paternity, and the same spiration in the Son is really identical with filiation, and is distinguished from paternity and filiation only in reason, that concept by which spiration, according to our imperfect manner of understanding through composition, is thought to supervene upon constituted persons can be refined to correspond more closely to divine simplicity, as we said regarding the concept of the constitution of a person through relation and essence. Thus, just as two non-opposed relations of paternity and spiration are understood as one person, so too one person is understood as the relation of filiation with

The same non-opposed spiration will aid the following consideration.

a) That "supreme reality, namely, the divine essence or nature," under the formal aspect of the intellection expressing the Word, is God the Father; the same supreme reality, under the formal aspect of the expressed intellection, or as the immanent term produced by the Father's intellection, is the Word or God the Son. Now, the intellection, both as it expresses the Word and as it is the expressed Word, is simultaneously a love producing or spirating its immanent term, which is the Holy Spirit. For the Father's intellection simultaneously has the formal aspect of a spirating love, such that under one aspect it is referred to the Word, and under another aspect it is referred to the spirated (the Holy Spirit). But because in every spirit, even the infinite one, love presupposes intellection, while intellection does not presuppose love; and because the intellection expressing the Word, by the intimate nature of the reality, communicates the essence to the Word under all formal aspects (except the formal aspect of the expression of the Word, of which the Word itself is the really distinct term), therefore, the Word is expressed, communicating the essence also under the formal aspect of spirating love. Hence, the Father's intellection has the formal aspect of spirating love only when the expression of the Word is presupposed (in the order of origin), and the Word is expressed as having the same formal aspect of spirating love, or the Father, fruitful of the Holy Spirit, expresses by generation the Word, fruitful of the Holy Spirit.

Thus, just as the essence and paternity (the formal aspect of the intellection expressing the Word) are not two really distinct things but one supreme reality under a twofold formal aspect of the absolute and the relative, so too paternity and spiration are not two relatives, but under a twofold formal aspect, one relative to a twofold really distinct term. For since that twofold formal aspect does not have opposition one to the other, there is no real distinction between them, and there is one relative; yet, because that one relative has an order under the formal aspect of generating and spirating toward a twofold really distinct term (the Son and the Holy Spirit), paternity and spiration are two relations distinct in reason with a foundation in reality. The relations, I say, are two not by reason of mutual opposition, which there is none, but by reason of the terms to which the relation refers. If they were really distinguished by mutual opposition, there would be two persons; but because they are distinguished only in reason, they are one person. "Opposed relations are persons, and there are two persons as there are two relations; but relations that are in the same person and not opposed are indeed two relations or properties but not two persons, indeed one person" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, dist. 33, a. 2, ad 1).

Similarly, it is clear that the same must be said regarding the distinction in reason and real identity of the same spiration, as it is communicated to the Son, with the relation of filiation. For the Son, by the very mode of His procession from the Father through intellection, is generated as one with the Father, a fruitful principle of the Holy Spirit. "For in the infinite Word, representative of the infinite good, there is contained quidditatively the power (and with the power, the act identified with it), so that together with its

speaking principle, it produces the love of the same good. Hence, the person producing the Word, by the very fact that it is productive of the Word, is also simultaneously with the Word productive of love" (Ruiz, *Disputationes* XVII, sect. 6, n. 8). Thus, just as in the Father paternity and spiration, so in the Son the relation of filiation or being generated and spiration are "two relations but not two persons, indeed one person."

b) From this, it is understood how active spiration pertains to the inner notion and the adequate concept (as far as we can understand it) of the persons of the Father and the Son. For:

α) Paternity and filiation, if considered more fully, by their intimate exigency include spiration, and without it, they are not fully conceived; hence, active spiration pertains to divine paternity and filiation, such that they are necessarily as they are. Hence, Dominic Viva rightly says of the Son, which equally applies to the Father: "The Son, in the chimerical hypothesis that He did not spirate, would have the concept of the Son inadequately, such that it would be repugnant for Him to be found anywhere according to such an inadequate concept" (*De Trinitate*, disp. V, q. 6, n. 9).

Therefore, [i] because paternity and filiation, by their intimate nature, are necessarily simultaneously active spiration, and because through this formal aspect of spiration the Father and the Son are constituted as the principle of the third person proceeding, both as regards the reality itself and as regards the manner of speaking, the doctrine of theologians has a solid foundation, who, presupposing the distinction in reason and real identity of spiration with paternity and filiation, say that the constitution of the Father and the Son in their full concept is understood through the formal aspect of paternity and filiation, insofar as each includes active spiration. "The Father and the Son are distinguished from the Holy Spirit by the same property by which they are constituted. Therefore, just as they are radically distinguished from the Holy Spirit only by paternity and filiation, so too they are not fully and integrally constituted by the explicit concept of paternity and filiation until active spiration is explicitly understood, through which they are formally distinguished from the Holy Spirit and also ultimately and fully constituted" (Didacus Ruiz, *Disputationes* XVII, sect. 6; cf. disp. 106, sect. 2, n. 1; sect. 3, n. 6). So too Dominic Viva: "That by which the Son is distinguished from all that is not Himself is not passive generation in any way, but passive generation as imbued with spiration—In that hypothesis (that the Son were not with the Father the principle of spiration), such passive generation would not remain; therefore, He would not have that by which the Son is now ultimately constituted and primarily distinguished from all that is not Himself" (Viva, *De Trinitate*, disp. V, q. 6, nn. 8–10). See also Aureolus, *In I Sent.*, dist. II, a. 3. Nor does the most certain axiom that active spiration is a relation not constituting a person but only distinguishing the Father and the Son from the Holy Spirit contradict the truth of this fuller consideration. For this axiom denies the constitution of a person distinct from the Father and the Son; but that spiration pertains to the notion of the person of the Father and the Son in presenting their full concept is not only not denied but implicitly affirmed, because active spiration is said to be a relation distinguishing the first and second persons from the Holy Spirit.

II. We proceed to the consideration of unbegottenness or ἀγεννησία, which we said is some fifth notion proper to only one person besides the four relations.

1°. Regarding the force of the term, *unbegotten* (τὸ ἀγέννητον) can be taken primarily in three senses:

a) Such that it is opposed to created, and is the same as uncreated. In this sense, the Fathers, such as Epiphanius (*Haereses* 64, n. 8) and Damascene (*De Fide Orthodoxa*, I, c. 8), noted that it should rather be written as ἀγέννητον (with one nu), and it is an absolute attribute of the divine essence and thus common to the three persons, by which the imperfection of created being is denied, and by this very fact, the absolute perfection of necessary being is affirmed. This sense was assumed by the Arians in their incessant cavils, by which they attacked the divinity of the Son of God, because only the Father is unbegotten.

b) *Unbegotten* or unbegottenness is taken hypostatically in opposition to generated. This opposition can be understood in two ways: if unbegotten is opposed to generated precisely according to the mode of procession by generation, it must be denied not only of the Father but also of the Holy Spirit that He is generated (St. Thomas, *Opusculum I, Contra Errores Graecorum*, c. 8); and thus, in this broader sense, unbegotten is not proper to the Father. "The Father is from no one, neither made nor created (ἀγέννητος) nor generated (ἀγέννητος); the Son is from the Father alone, not made nor created (ἀγέννητος) but generated (γεννητός); the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, not made nor created (ἀγέννητος) nor generated (ἀγέννητος) but proceeding." But although in comparison with the generated Son, the Holy Spirit can be said to be not generated, nevertheless, the compound *unbegotten* (ἀγέννητος) in its strict signification is opposed not only to the mode of procession by generation but simply to procession and origin from a principle. The holy Fathers, in their disputations against the Arians, explicitly tend to mention only the opposition of unbegotten to the generated Son, because the direct controversy with those heretics was restricted to the dogma of the divinity and consubstantiality of the Son (cf. above, p. 51), but they implicitly always include the opposition to the procession of the third person; for they hold τὸ ἀγέννητον as proper to the Father, and by this very fact, simply as the negation of origin.

Thus, c) *unbegotten* in its hypostatic signification directly, as a negation, is opposed to generated but includes simultaneously the negation of any procession; and thus, it is proper to the Father alone. Therefore, the Father is said to be unbegotten according to direct opposition, to signify His distinction from the Son, and according to the included signification, to distinguish Him from both proceeding persons.

Hence, St. Basil most excellently notes that if there were no Son, and by this very fact there could not be a proper Son of God, it would never have been said that God is unbegotten; but rather, He would have been called uncreated; for in that hypothesis, the Father would not need to be distinguished from the Son by the opposition of unbegotten to generated, but it would only be necessary to distinguish God as uncreated from creatures. "If the Father is unbegotten because He is not generated, and the Son is generated because He is generated, therefore unbegotten is understood after generated, for He would not have (if there were no generated one) that in comparison to which He is called unbegotten; for comparisons are made of things that are, not of things that are not. If the Son is a creature, He is not generated, and if all things that are, are creatures, the Father is pointlessly called unbegotten, since there is absolutely no generated one in respect of which He is called unbegotten; therefore, He would more rightly be called uncreated than unbegotten" (Basil, *Contra Eunomium* IV, Tom. I, p. 283).

2°. It remains to explain the proper notion of unbegotten insofar as it is a hypostatic notion of the Father.

a) Insofar as the name *unbegotten* designates not the nature but the hypostasis, in divine things it does not signify something absolute but is reduced to a relative signification, or, as St. Thomas says, it is a relation by reduction. How this is so, St. Augustine explains (*De Trinitate*, V, c. 7). Negative names are in the same order as the affirmative names opposed to them, which the holy Doctor shows there through all ten categories. "Just as I say according to substance, He is a man; so according to substance, I deny when I say, He is not a man; and when it is asked how great he is, and I say, He is four feet tall, I affirm according to quantity; he who says, He is not four feet tall, denies according to quantity." Hence, for the present matter: "If I were to affirm substantially (by absolute predication) by saying, He is the Son, I would deny substantially by saying, He is not the Son. But because I affirm relatively when I say, He is the Son, for I refer to the Father; I deny relatively if I say, He is not the Son, for I refer the same negation to the parent, wishing to show that He is not a parent to Him. But it is of the same force… to say He is not generated as to say He is not the Son. We deny relatively by saying, He is not the Son; therefore, we deny relatively by saying, He is not generated. Moreover, what is unbegotten but not generated? Therefore, we do not depart from the relative predicament when unbegotten is said" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, V, c. 7; cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 33, a. 4, ad 3).

b) Now, negation in divine things cannot be a negation of perfection; but it is only some mode of ours in conceiving what is positive and a perfection in God. However, negation behaves differently in the order of absolutes and in the order of internal relations.

In absolutes, negation exhibits an absolute perfection by excluding imperfection or, what amounts to the same, by denying a perfection limited by the defect of further perfection, such as created perfection; and thus, it is a negation of negation and consequently an affirmation of absolute perfection, which we inadequately and confusedly conceive by comparison with limited perfections; such attributes are infinite, uncreated or unbegotten in the absolute signification first indicated by us, eternity, immensity, etc. (see *Treatise on God*, Thesis XXI on so-called negative attributes). But absolutes, as regards the reality itself, cannot be denied of one another, because they are not really distinguished from one another. Hence, it is false if it is said: in God, justice is not mercy; although the concept of justice is different from that of mercy, and therefore it can and must be said: the concept of divine justice is not the concept of divine mercy.

But relatives, under the formal aspect of relatives, are really distinguished from one another, for the Father is really other than the Son, and other than the Holy Spirit; hence, they deny one another of themselves. The Father is not the Son and not the Holy Spirit, and so the Son is not the Father and not the Holy Spirit, etc. Hence, it might seem to someone that, no less than the notion of unbegotten, other negative notions should be posited, that the Father is not the Son and not the Holy Spirit; the Son is not the Father nor the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son. But negations so conceived do not exhibit another notion and formal aspect of a person than the affirmation that He is this Father, i.e., this one under the formal aspect of the Father related to the Son and distinguished from the Son, and under the formal aspect of spiration included in paternity, related and distinguished from the Holy Spirit; and the same must be said of the Son's relation to the Father and the Holy Spirit's relation to the Father and the Son. Therefore, in the Son and the Holy Spirit, besides these, no other notion distinct in reason is found by which each is opposed to the other persons by negation; namely, in the Son, filiation, i.e., being generated, and in filiation, the active spiration common with the Father included; in the Holy Spirit, procession or being spirated are the only formal aspects really distinguishing, so that He is another

and another. But in the first person, the negation of procession from another, by which He is called unbegotten in opposition to the generated Son and the proceeding Holy Spirit, has another formal aspect distinct in reason from paternity and active spiration.

Moreover, regarding the signification of that negation, procession from a principle is certainly not an imperfection in the Son and the Holy Spirit; but procession would be an imperfection and thus a negation and destruction of the first person of the Trinity. Hence, the negation of the relation of being generated and proceeding in the Father is an affirmation of a relative or personal perfection, that just as God is essentially Being unbegotten in the absolute sense, i.e., a being from Himself, so the first person of the Trinity is, by the internal necessity of the nature, a person from Himself, which hypostatic perfection we conceive and explain by the negation of origin. "The Father is unbegotten, for He is not from anyone; for He has from Himself that He is, nor does He have anything of what He has from another; but He Himself is rather the principle and cause of all, that they are and are naturally in a certain way" (Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, I, c. 8; cf. other Fathers in Petavius, *De Trinitate*, V, c. 5, n. 14). Negation is necessary for us, just as in explaining other most simple concepts, so too in this concept of the first and self-subsistent. "The notion of the first, which is most simple, is not explained by us without negation. Therefore, the first person in the notion of the first producing inwardly is not explained except by the negation of production terminated at Him, and this negation is unbegottenness" (Suarez, *De Trinitate*, V, c. 10, n. 4).

c) However, this property of unbegotten does not really distinguish itself from paternity, which is already clear because there is no origin of one from the other and no opposition. But it can easily be understood how this notion of the first person of the Trinity, and thus a person from Himself, is the same under a less full concept as paternity, including spiration under a fuller concept. For what is the first person of the Trinity and thus a person from Himself, by this very fact, from the inherent nature of the reality, is the principle of the other persons, i.e., the Father of the Son and, with the Son, the spirator of the Holy Spirit. This connection of the notions of unbegotten and Father is indicated by St. Basil, and his brother St. Gregory of Nyssa defends it at length (*Contra Eunomium*, I, ed. Gretzer, p. 136 seqq.), where Basil speaks thus: "For He who truly and only is the Father (in the divine manner) is from no one; but He who is from no one is unbegotten." Most excellently, Suarez: "By that negation (by unbegotten), we intend to explain the dignity of the first person. But we say that this dignity is none other than paternity itself, which, in our manner of conceiving, by the force of its notion includes two things. One is that He is by Himself or from Himself through immediate conjunction with the essence (because without real production of the person, the nature immediately brings with it such personality), and this we declare by this negation (unbegotten). The other is to be constitutive of the principle of generating, which is called Father" (Suarez, *De Trinitate*, VIII, c. 2, n. 12; cf. V, c. 10, nn. 2, 4).

Scholion. For the clarification of the reality itself and especially of the manner of speaking, we can now, after what has been said, briefly summarize what is customarily taught by comparing the properties, relations, and notions of the divine persons.

Property here is not only opposed to something foreign or superadded, in which sense there are also absolute properties common to the three persons (cf. *Treatise on God*, Thesis XXI, n. 3); but *property* in the sense in which we now speak is opposed to common. In a stricter sense, therefore, properties are those formal aspects that belong to only one person and are not common to several. Thus, there will be four

properties: paternity, unbegottenness, filiation, and passive spiration or being spirated. (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 32, a. 3). But if *property* is taken a little more broadly as that which is not common to all three persons, even active spiration, common to the Father and the Son but not to the Holy Spirit, can be counted among the properties.

Real relations are four: paternity, filiation, active spiration, and being spirated. However, unbegottenness, as it is called, can be reductively counted among them, both because it is a negation of a relation and because it designates a person, which in divine things can only be a relative. (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 33, a. 4, ad 3). Thus, every property is a relation or is reduced to a relation, and conversely, every relation is a property at least in the broader sense, as something not common to all persons. The reason is evident, because whatever in God does not pertain to the order of the relative but to the absolute is common to the three persons.

A *notion* of the persons (γνωρίσματα) is a characteristic or formal aspect by which a person is known to us as distinct from others. Hence, it is clear that a notion must necessarily be a property at least in the broader sense, and by this very fact pertains to the order of relatives; for a person cannot be known as distinct through that which is common and one in the three persons. Regarding the number of notions, we could indeed say here that, in a stricter sense, there are only four notions, just as there are four properties; for active spiration, by the very fact that it is common to the Father and the Son, neither distinguishes them from one another nor consequently manifests these persons as distinct from one another. Nevertheless, because through that relation these two persons, though not distinguished from one another, are distinguished from the third person and are known as distinct from it, all theologians, even those who count only four properties, agree that there are five notions (cf. Suarez, *De Trinitate*, V, c. 9, n. 5).

Thus, presupposing the distinction between the stricter and less strict sense, we will say with St. Thomas: "There are five notions in divine things, namely, unbegottenness, paternity, filiation, common spiration, and procession. But of these, only four are relations; for unbegottenness is not a relation except by reduction. There are only four properties (in the strict sense); for common spiration is not a property, because it belongs to two persons. But there are three personal notions, i.e., constituting persons, namely, paternity, filiation, and procession. For common spiration and unbegottenness are called notions of persons but not personal" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 32, a. 3).

The properties or relations or notions constituting are three, as was shown above and as we have just heard from St. Thomas. Aureolus seems somewhat opposed to this common and certain doctrine, although the difference is not in the reality itself but rather in the manner of considering the same reality. "Filiation," he says, "does not precisely constitute the personality of the Son, because according to this, active spiration would be adventitious and outside the personality of the Son, as something extrinsic and without which the person would remain; therefore, it is impossible to posit that the essence with only filiation, as generation and active spiration, intrinsically and similarly concur to the personality of the Father and the Son; but to be generated and to spirate and the essence to the personality of the Son; but to be spirated and the divine essence only to the personality of the Holy Spirit" (Aureolus, *In I Sent.*, dist. II, a. 3). In this doctrine, it is indeed true that, on the part of the reality and according to a fuller concept, paternity involves spiration and being unbegotten (and similarly, filiation more fully conceived includes spiration), as we declared in the thesis; but when these formal aspects are distinguished by the consideration of the mind, and then it is asked under which of them we first conceive the Father and the

Son as distinct persons, without doubt, it must be answered that the formal aspect of the Father is conceived as paternity, which person is then understood simultaneously as unbegotten and spirating the Holy Spirit; the same is said of filiation compared to spiration. Therefore, simply with St. Thomas and according to the common consensus of theologians, it must be said that the constituting properties are three, as we have mentioned. "It must therefore be understood that of several properties or notions belonging to one person, that which precedes according to the order of nature constitutes the person, while the others are understood as inhering in the person already constituted. But it is manifest that unbegottenness cannot be the first notion of the Father. Common spiration, however, in the order of nature presupposes paternity and filiation, just as the procession of love presupposes the procession of the Word. Hence, neither can common spiration be the first notion of the Father, nor of the Son. It remains, therefore, that the first notion of the Father is paternity, of the Son filiation, and of the Holy Spirit, procession alone is the notion. It remains, therefore, that there are three notions constituting persons, namely, paternity, filiation, and procession" (St. Thomas, Compendium Theologiae, Opusculum III, c. 60).

CHAPTER IV. DISTINCTION THROUGH THE CONSIDERATION OF THE INTELLECT AND WILL IN DIVINE PROCESSIONS

THESIS XXVI. The mode of procession of the Word through the intellect and of the Holy Spirit through the will is demonstrated from Scripture and the doctrine of the Fathers.

« The foundations for conceiving the mode of the divine processions and relations somewhat more distinctly are contained in revelation, insofar as it is taught in the Scriptures and in the explanations of the Fathers and theologians that the Son or Word proceeds through the formal aspect of the intellect, and the Holy Spirit through the formal aspect of the will or love. »

I. The proper personal character of God the Son is most clearly declared in the Scriptures and in the unanimous doctrine of the Fathers as being the Word of the Father (ὁ Λόγος).

The Word, moreover, is understood in a proper, non-metaphorical sense, since this notion of the Word is presented throughout revelation as the proper name of the Son, by which His formal and distinguishing character is designated (cf. Ruiz, *Disputationes* 55, sect. 4). Although, of course, in comparison with the word in created spirits, the signification is analogous, such that the notion of the Word applies most perfectly to the Son of God with respect to the reality signified, while it applies analogically and as a shadow to the created word. However, with respect to the imposition of the name and according to our prior cognition, the reverse order applies: it is first said of the created word and from this is transferred to the divine archetype. This is common to all ideas and names by which we know and express divine things (cf. above, Thesis XIX).

Furthermore, in created beings, it is not the spoken word but the mental word that must be considered, so that from the analogy of the image we may be led to some understanding of the archetype. "Consider your heart… when you conceive a word that you will utter, you wish to express a thing, and the very conception of that thing in your heart is already a word; it has not yet proceeded, but it is already born in the heart and remains so that it may proceed… Just as you have the word you speak in your heart, and it is with you, and that spiritual conception is; for just as your soul is a spirit, so too the word you have

conceived is a spirit, for it has not yet taken on sound to be divided into syllables, but it remains in the conception of the heart and in the mirror (or spectacle) of the mind: so too God brought forth the Word, i.e., He generated the Son. And you indeed generate a word even in your heart in time, but God generated the Son without time, through whom He created all times" (St. Augustine, *In Johannem*, Tractate XIV, n. 7; and Augustine himself elsewhere frequently, as well as other Fathers).

When the Fathers sometimes consider even the externally spoken word, it is to make the distinction between the word and its producer more evident against the Sabellians; yet even there, they consider the word insofar as it is the image and expression of the thing understood, as the offspring of the mind, and thus including the internal word. For as St. Thomas says (*Summa Theologica* I, q. 34, a. 1), "The external voice is called a word because it signifies the internal concept of the mind; thus, primarily and principally, the internal concept of the mind is called a word, and secondarily, the voice itself signifying the internal concept." St. Cyril of Alexandria excellently considers the analogy from both the spoken and internal word together. "The spoken word (ὁ λόγος ὁ προφορικός) we use is generated in the mind (ἐν νῷ, cf. above, pp. 209–210) and by the mind, and it seems to be something other than that which resides in the heart, insofar as it is sent forth from the depths into the light outside the mouth; yet it is again in that (internal word) and entirely like it. For in the (spoken) word, the thought of the heart is seen, and again in the mind, the word is still silent; so too the Son of God, proceeding indivisibly from the Father, is the character and likeness of His property, being a hypostatic and living Word from the living Father. Thus, the Father generated the Son from Himself indivisibly, as if a wise man generates a wise thought, such as the science of mechanics or geometry or something of this kind. For such things seem to be in some way the fruits of wisdom, and this they are by their nature. But the art does not divide from the wisdom that conceives it; it is from it and in it, exhibiting the image of its generative source, and yet it seems to be another from it without division: so too the generation of the Son, though indivisible from the Father, is preserved in His proper hypostasis, yet far surpassing the force of this likeness" (St. Cyril, *Thesaurus*, Tom. V, Part I, pp. 47–48). Conversely, the holy Doctors sometimes call the Son the *Reason* of the Father or the *reason* in the Father's mind, to more clearly declare the unity of essence; although *reason*, as proceeding from the mind and thus distinct from the mind, is nothing other than expressed wisdom or the Word.

Furthermore, just as the Word, so too generated wisdom is presented both in the Scriptures (cf. above, Thesis VII) and most frequently by the Fathers as the proper notion of the Son, who is other from the Father but not something else. Therefore, if it is asked about the mode of the Son's procession from the Father, revelation itself contains the doctrine that the Father generates the Son intellectually as His Word and as generated wisdom. This is the same as saying: the Father, under the formal aspect of the intellect, by understanding produces the Word; or the Father's intellection, by its intimate necessary nature, produces the Word as its immanent term. The intellection, formally as producing the Word and thus relative to the Word, constitutes the Father, or is the Father Himself; hence, it is a notional intellection, i.e., which, under this formal aspect of producing the Word, is proper to the Father and through which the Father is known to us as a distinct person (cf. above, p. 85). The very act of producing through intellection, by the same reason, is a notional act and is usually called *speaking* inwardly; thus, notional *speaking* in God is nothing other than understanding as inwardly active, i.e., productive of the Word.

II. We proceed to the procession of the third person, as far as it pertains to this matter, where we inquire only one thing: whether this procession is through the will, i.e., through the formal aspect of volition or love.

Here, the demonstration is somewhat more difficult through deduction from less explicit testimonies; hence, some theologians, not finding the Holy Spirit presented in the Scriptures as love, as the Son is presented as the Word, think that the biblical argument is limited to deducing the procession of the Holy Spirit through the will from the already demonstrated procession of the Word through the intellect. The deduction is as follows: spiritual processions can only be through the intellect and the will; the procession of the Word is through the intellect, as the Scriptures demonstrate; but the procession of the third person is different, such that the Holy Spirit is not the Word; therefore, it is through the will (Ruiz, *Disputationes* 73, sect. 1, nn. 7 ff.). Others judge that this deduction is not convincing; rather, it must be demonstrated by authority and positive doctrine that the proper character of the Holy Spirit is that He proceeds as subsisting love, and thus is the immanent term produced by love, just as the Word is the term of intellection (Francisco de Lugo, *Disputationes* II, c. 2, nn. 6 ff.). Certainly, to demonstrate whether this mode of procession exists, that theological reasoning does not seem sufficiently effective unless it relies on the positive doctrine of the Scriptures and the Fathers concerning the personal character of the Holy Spirit; but with this doctrine presupposed, we can, as far as the nature of the mystery allows, advance in understanding the mode of procession and why it is so through that internal and, as it were, a priori reasoning.

1°. The Scriptures teach us about the mode of divine processions or the proper notion of the personal characters through appropriations, namely, that certain external operations, though common to the whole Trinity, are by a certain rule ascribed to one person, insofar as those operations have a particular analogy with the proper character of the person (cf. Thesis XIII).

Now, in the Scriptures, the work of the Incarnation itself, which stems from the infinite charity of God and from which is the origin of all grace and holiness in us, is particularly attributed to the Holy Spirit; the union of humanity with the Word and thus (efficiently) the substantial sanctification of that humanity, as well as the anointing of the most holy humanity through created grace, are attributed to Him (Luke 1:35; Matthew 18:20; Acts 10:38; Luke 4:18; cf. *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis XLI). Further, with respect to the members of Christ, the diffusion of charity in the hearts of the faithful is from the Holy Spirit: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us” (Romans 5:5). Hence, not only the operation of created charity but uncreated charity is specially appropriated to Him: “I beseech you by the charity of the Holy Spirit” (Romans 15:30). The supreme happiness that the Apostle prays for the faithful is “the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit” (2 Corinthians 13:13). The Holy Spirit is the author of all holiness, piety, and sweetness: “The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, long-suffering, meekness, faith, modesty, continence, chastity” (Galatians 5:22–23). The distribution of all charisms is through the Holy Spirit (1 Corinthians 12:4, 8–11; Hebrews 2:4). In the body of the Church, individual members are baptized and sanctified in the Holy Spirit; regeneration is “the renewal of the Holy Spirit” (John 1:33; 3:5, 8; Acts 1:5; 11:16; 19:2–6; 1 Corinthians 12:13; Titus 3:5; Hebrews 6:5). They are transformed “from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord” (2 Corinthians 3:18). The Holy Spirit is “the Spirit of adoption of sons, in whom we cry: Abba, Father” (Romans 8:14–16; Galatians 4:6). The Holy Spirit dwells in His sanctified ones as in a temple; He is the anointing and pledge in their hearts: “Your members are the temple of the

Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have from God… Glorify and bear God in your body" (1 Corinthians 6:19–20); "He who anointed us is God, who also sealed us and gave the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts" (2 Corinthians 1:22; cf. Romans 8:9, 11; 1 Corinthians 3:16; 2 Corinthians 5:3; Ephesians 1:13; 5:18; 1 Thessalonians 4:8; 2 Timothy 1:14; 1 John 3:24; 4:13). "The sons of God are led by the Spirit of God" (Romans 8:14). He "intercedes for us with inexpressible groanings" (στεναγμοῖς ἀλαλήτοις, Romans 8:26). The Church is "filled with the consolation (παράκλησις) of the Holy Spirit" (Acts 9:31; Romans 14:17); the disciples "were filled with joy and the Holy Spirit" (Acts 13:52; 1 Thessalonians 1:6). By sins, "the Holy Spirit is grieved" (Ephesians 4:30; cf. Matthew 12:31; Acts 5:3; 7:51; Hebrews 10:29). Likewise, the duties and governance of the body of the Church, especially the infallibility of the Church, are from the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, whom the world cannot receive, who is sent and remains in the Church forever (Acts 13:2; 20:28; John 14:16–17, 26; 15:26; 16:13–14). The sensible symbols of the Holy Spirit sent are the breath of the incarnate Word, by which remission of sins and sanctification are given (John 20:22); the dove remaining over the beloved Son of the Father (Matthew 3:16–17); the tongues of fire resting upon the consecrated Apostles (Acts 2:3–4).

(1) "Indeed, at that hour, those things appeared which visibly signified and showed the invisible Holy Spirit: the dove on account of holy love, the fire on account of the light and fervor of charity" (Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, I, c. 19). "He breathed on them and said: Receive the Holy Spirit. It was a proffered kiss. What? Was that a corporeal breath? No, but the invisible Spirit, which was given in that dominical breath, so that it might be understood that He proceeds from Him equally as from the Father, as a true kiss, which is common to the one kissing and the one kissed. For if the Father is rightly understood as kissing and the Son as kissed, it will not be inappropriate to understand the Holy Spirit as the kiss, since He is the undisturbed peace of the Father and the Son, the firm bond, indivisible love, and indivisible unity" (St. Bernard, *In Cantica*, Sermon VIII, n. 2; cf. Petavius, *De Trinitate*, VII, c. 12, n. 7).

All these things are so arranged that the Holy Spirit is most manifestly presented according to His proper character as love, which cannot be understood of essential or absolute love; for in that sense, love is common to the three persons as the absolute essence: "God is charity" (1 John 4:8). But love as the proper character of one person is necessarily a relation of origin, and thus it is understood according to the mode of procession through the act of love, whose immanent term is the produced love.

This is also expressed by the revealed proper name of the third person, *Spirit*. Because it is a hypostatic name, it is necessarily relative, such that *Spirit* (πνεῦμα), in a grammatically passive sense, is the same as produced by spiration; but spiration inwardly, with a (virtual) distinction from the intellection producing the Word, in a purely spiritual nature, what is it if not love producing love as an internal term?

This signification is further determined by the constant epithet "Holy Spirit." Since the name is relative, as we said, it does not signify essential and common holiness to the three persons, but a procession through the mode of holiness is declared; hence, the Fathers frequently call holiness or the sanctifying power the proper character of the third person (Basil, Cyril, Damascene, Augustine, and others in Petavius, *De Trinitate*, II, c. 15, n. 2; VII, c. 12, n. 11; c. 13, nn. 21–22; cf. VIII, c. 6, n. 7). The formal aspect of divine holiness is the infinite love of infinite good (cf. *Treatise on God*, Thesis XXIX); hence, procession through the mode of holiness is the same as procession through love.

2°. The holy Fathers understood the doctrine of the Scriptures in this sense, which we have mentioned, and declared it most clearly, so that if any doubt remained, the interpretation of the Fathers would entirely exclude it.

a) Through descriptions, both with proper words and with most fitting metaphors, they declare the notion of the Holy Spirit as holiness, as well as sweetness and goodness. "The Spirit," says Athanasius, "is the seal, in which the Word anoints and seals all things. The ointment indeed retains the fragrance and scent (εὐωδίαν καὶ πνοήν) of the one anointing… The ointment and seal are not of created nature but of the Son's nature, who through the Spirit, who is in Him, joins us to the Father" (Athanasius, *Ad Serapionem*, Epistle I, nn. 23–24). He repeats the same with slight variation in Epistle III. Again, "This ointment (the Holy Spirit) is the fragrance (or breath, τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Υἱοῦ) of the Son… In the Trinity, the Apostle prayed (2 Corinthians 13:13): The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, the charity of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit be with you all. For when we are partakers of the Spirit, we have the grace of the Word, and in Him, the charity of the Father" (ibid., nn. 3, 6). Without metaphors, another eminent herald of the Holy Spirit, Basil, speaks: "The way to the knowledge of God is from the one Spirit through the one Son to the one Father. And in the reverse order, natural goodness, essential holiness, and royal dignity flow from the Father through the Only-Begotten to the Spirit" (Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, n. 47). "The Holy Spirit, being essentially holy, is called the fount of holiness" (Basil, Epistle 8, n. 10). "Whether you say angels, archangels, or all heavenly powers, they receive holiness through the Spirit; but the Spirit Himself has natural holiness, not received by grace but essential, whence He uniquely obtains the name of Holy" (Epistle 159, n. 2; cf. Epistle 38, n. 4). Similarly, Gregory of Nazianzus handed down holiness as the character of the Holy Spirit: "Define our pious faith, teaching the Father truly Father, the Son truly Son… the Holy Spirit truly Holy; for no other is such or in such a way, nor is holiness by addition, but He is holiness itself (αὐτοαγιότης)" (Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 25, alias 23, n. 16). Cyril agrees with these not only in doctrine but also in manner of speaking and arguing. The Spirit, he says, is from the Son, as "sweetness is from honey, heat from fire, cooling from water… Let those who dare to say the Spirit is holy by participation and not naturally tell us what the Spirit is in Himself in His proper hypostasis. But we have heard from the Scriptures nothing other than Holy; therefore, He is not holy by participation or composition, but He is the sanctifying essence and nature, and, so to speak, the quality of the holiness of God and the Father, as sweetness from honey and good fragrance from a flower… This very appellation signifies what He is according to essence; for He is called Holy" (Cyril, *Thesaurus*, Tom. V, Part I, pp. 350–351). "Think something of this kind, indeed far above it, about God and the Holy Spirit: for He is as it were a fragrance of His substance; living and effective, which transmits what is from God to the creature, and through Himself inserts participation in the supreme substance of all" (Cyril, *In Johannem*, Book XI, Tom. IV, pp. 930–932). Relevant here are all the sayings of the Fathers in which the proper notion of the Holy Spirit is presented as stemming from the mode of procession, either as sanctifying power (ἁγιαστικὴ δύναμις) or as the formal aspect of the gift (cf. Petavius, *De Trinitate*, VIII, c. 3; Ruiz, *Disputationes* 76). To understand the force of these descriptions among the Fathers, it is helpful to compare Augustine's explanation: "The Holy Spirit exists in the same unity and equality (with the Father and the Son), whether He is their unity, their holiness, or their charity, or unity because He is charity, and charity because He is holiness, it is manifest (from revelation) that He is not one of the two by whom both are joined" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VI, c. 5, n. 7).

Against the argument deduced from all these sayings of Scripture and the Fathers to demonstrate the mode of procession of the Holy Spirit through the formal aspect of the will or love, of which He is the

immanent term as expressed love, the only difficulty that can be raised is that, primarily, the third person is designated by Christ the Lord Himself as the *Spirit of truth*, who bears witness and teaches all truth (John 14:17, 26; 15:26; 16:13 ff.), no less than as the *Holy Spirit* and the *Spirit of grace*. Furthermore, some of the most ancient Fathers, Irenaeus, Theophilus of Antioch, and Tertullian (cf. above, pp. 102, 136, 160), expressly designate the Holy Spirit with the name of wisdom, which otherwise, as we said earlier, is usually the appellation of the Word, and thus they seem to have understood the procession through the mode of the intellect in the third person as much as in the second.

Response: Regarding the text of Scripture, the holy Fathers who understand the name *Spirit of truth* here as an appropriation according to the mode of procession say that truth is the Son. "He calls Him the Spirit of truth to signify that He is His own, for He Himself is the truth" (Cyril, *Caten. in Johannem*, ed. Corderi, p. 394; cf. *In Johannem*, Book IX, Tom. IV, p. 810). This interpretation is most frequent, and some others, though less convenient, by which the *Spirit of truth* is explained as the Spirit of the New Testament, the faithful and constant Spirit, etc., make it clear how firmly the Fathers were persuaded that the proper character of the second person, not the third, according to the mode of proceeding, is that He is truth. Moreover, in the contexts of the Gospel, the *Spirit of truth* is most aptly understood both as originating from the truth that is the Son and as the gift of truth, insofar as, sent by the Father and the Son, He revealed to the Apostles and always preserves in the Church through His assistance the doctrine of faith, all of which pertains to the distribution of charisms and graces; hence, the appellation *Spirit of truth* is contained under the other, *Spirit of grace*, if this is taken in a broader signification.

As for what is said about the Fathers who designated the Holy Spirit with the name of wisdom, they are very few and singular in this manner of speaking, since, in the common usage of the Fathers and the whole Church, wisdom is appropriated to the Word from its mode of proceeding through the intellect, indeed, generated wisdom is an entirely synonymous hypostatic name with the appellation *Word*; nor did those few ancient doctors, in this use of the name, think about the particular mode of procession of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, there is some signification in which they could, without disagreement from the other Fathers, appropriate wisdom to the Holy Spirit. Wisdom can be considered not only as pertaining to the intellect but also, especially, as pertaining to the will; thus, wisdom is one of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit (Isaiah 11:2). Indeed, St. Augustine notes that what is called true wisdom in the Scriptures is θεοσέβεια, "which name our translators, wishing to render it with one word, called piety—but since it cannot be perfectly expressed with one word, it is better translated with two, as the worship of God" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XIV, c. 1). "And what is His worship but love of Him, by which we now desire to see Him, and believe and hope that we will see Him, and as we make progress, we now see through a mirror in an enigma, but then in manifestation?" (ibid., XII, c. 14, n. 22). More strictly, St. Thomas defines: "Wisdom implies a certain rectitude of judgment according to divine reasons. But to have right judgment about divine things according to a certain connaturality with them pertains to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit… This kind of connaturality with divine things comes through charity, which unites us to God" (*Summa Theologica* II-II, q. 45, a. 2). Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is called wisdom as the cause of this piety or wisdom, it is reduced to nearly the same reason as when He is called holiness or charity (cf. Petavius, *De Trinitate*, VII, c. 12, n. 16).

b) Augustine and other Fathers after him explicitly teach, as a most certain reason by which one may "seek understanding from faith," that the Holy Spirit is the love or goodness or holiness of the Father and the Son, insofar as He proceeds through the mutual and one love of both. (Augustine, *De*

Trinitate, VI, c. 5; cf. Fulgentius, *Ad Ferrandum*, Epistle 14, q. 4, n. 38; *De Trinitate*, IX, X, XI, XIII, c. 20, n. 26; XIV, c. 7, 8, 10, 12; XV, c. 17; c. 19, n. 37; c. 27, n. 50; Pseudo-Hieronymus, *In Psalmum XVII* (in Jerome's *Opera*, ed. Vallarsi, Tom. VII, appendix, p. 39); Ambrose (or another), *De Trinitate* or *In Symbolum Apostolorum*, c. 1 (Tom. II, appendix, p. 321); Gregory the Great, *Homily 30*, n. 1 on Pentecost (Opera, Tom. I, p. 1674); Isidore, *Etymologiae*, VII, c. 3, nn. 5, 18–20 (Tom. III, pp. 306, 308); Anselm, *Monologion*, cc. 50–60; Bernard, *Sermon 3 on Pentecost*, n. 2; *In Cantica*, Sermon 8, nn. 1, 2, 4; Guitmundus, *Confessio Trinitatis* (Bibliotheca Maxima, Tom. XVIII, p. 466); Hugh of St. Victor, *Eruditio Theologica*, VII, c. 21; *Sententiae*, Tract. I, c. 6; Richard of St. Victor, *De Trinitate*, VI, c. 10; Council of Toledo XI (675), *Profession of Faith* (Hardouin, III, p. 1020)). The Scholastics, both ancient from the time of the Master (Peter Lombard, *Sentences*, I, dist. 10) and more recent (cf. Ruiz, *Disputationes* II, sect. 2, 5, 6), then presuppose and teach the same, except for Durandus, to whom some add Gregory of Rimini, and the Nominalists Ockham and Gabriel Biel.

(1) Recent Scholastics often cite Durandus, not without sharp criticism, for teaching that the procession of the Son and the Holy Spirit is not through the formal aspect of intellection and volition (love) but through the formal aspect of nature, insofar as the producing principle is such a perfect being and fruitful in perfection (cf. Suarez, *De Trinitate*, I, c. 5; Ruiz, *Disputationes* II, sect. 3, n. 11). "Understanding and willing are not productions of persons," says Durandus, "nor principles of productions, but even if intellect and will with all their acts were excluded from God (in our understanding), there would still be in divine things the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit, such that these are in divine things from the fecundity of nature radically, which fecundity it has from its infinity, and this as being intelligent and willing" (*In I Sent.*, dist. 6, q. 2, n. 10; cf. nn. 5–13). But when it is said that the Son proceeds through the intellect and the Holy Spirit through the will, he says this must be understood solely according to the analogy that in created beings the intellect precedes volition, just as in God generation is presupposed to spiration (ibid., n. 18).

Thus, from the manner in which the Scriptures themselves describe the person of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and from the sense and consensus of the Fathers and doctors, a certain foundation remains for some analogous understanding of ours, by which we can conceive the Holy Trinity. Namely, just as in a created spirit an internal word proceeds as the term of intellection, and immanent love as the term of active love, so in the uncreated spirit, the substantial Word and the substantial love, the Holy Spirit, proceed through the formal aspect of intellection and love. "Not without reason in this Trinity is only the Son called the Word of God, and only the Holy Spirit the Gift of God… Hence, it came about that the Word of God is also properly (hypostatically) called the wisdom of God, although (essentially) both the Father and the Holy Spirit are wisdom. Therefore, if any of these three is to be properly called charity, what is more fitting than that this be the Holy Spirit? Just as we properly call the unique Word of God by the name of wisdom, although universally (by the common essence) both the Holy Spirit and the Father Himself are wisdom, so the Holy Spirit is properly called by the name of charity, although universally both the Father and the Son are charity (both are proved from 1 Corinthians 1:24; 1 John 4:7)… I see that in this book I have discussed the Holy Spirit according to the Scriptures, which suffices for the faithful who already know that the Holy Spirit is God… Concerning the creature that God made, as far as we could, we have admonished those who demand an account of such things to behold, as they are able, His invisible things through the things that are made, and especially through the rational or intellectual creature, which is made in the image of God, through which, as through a mirror, they might, if they could, discern the

Trinity of God in our memory (the intellect informed by habitual ideas, cf. above, p. 210), understanding (the act of intellection)

Indeed, I have endeavored to show, as far as I was able, that God the Father and God the Son, that is, God the generator who, in a certain way, spoke all that He has substantially in His coeternal Word, and that very Word of His, God, who has neither more nor less substantially than what is in Him who generated the Word not falsely but truly, are signified in the memory and understanding of our mind—not as if I were already seeing it face to face, but by conjecturing, however slightly, through this likeness in an enigma. To memory I attributed all that we know, even if we are not thinking of it; to understanding, a certain actual informing of thought, where the innermost word is generated, which belongs to no language, as knowledge from knowledge, vision from vision, and understanding that appears in thought from the understanding that was already in memory but was hidden… Concerning the Holy Spirit, however, I have shown nothing in this enigma that seemed similar to Him except our will or love or expressed affection, which is a stronger will. Although the memory of man, especially that which beasts do not have, namely, that by which intelligible things are contained in such a way that they do not come into it through bodily senses, has, in its own measure, in this image of the Trinity an incomparably unequal yet nonetheless some kind of likeness to the Father; and likewise, the understanding of man, which is informed by the intention of thought when what is known is spoken (in the mind) and is a word of no language, has in its great disparity some likeness to the Son; and the love of man, proceeding from knowledge and joining memory and understanding as though common to parent and offspring, where neither parent nor offspring is understood to be, has in this image some, though very unequal, likeness to the Holy Spirit. However, just as in this image of the Trinity these three are not one man but belong to one man, so in the supreme Trinity, of which this is an image, those three are not of one God but are one God, and there are three, not one person" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XV, nn. 29, 31, 39–41, 43). See the remaining passages of Augustine cited above.

(1) "Where it concerns the thought of oneself, Augustine calls the mind itself memory: 'What the mind is to itself, it is memory without absurdity, by which it is present to itself, so that it can be understood by its own thought, and both are joined by its love'" (*De Trinitate*, XIV, n. 14).

THESIS XXVII. Supposing revelation, some analogous understanding of the divine processions is deduced.

« Supposing the faith in the real procession of the Word and the Holy Spirit, and supposing the mode of processions through the intellect and the will, an analogy and image can be found in the created spirit, following the holy Fathers and Doctors, from which faith may seek understanding and a somewhat more distinct concept of the Most Holy Trinity. »

Presupposing the foundation we established in the preceding thesis and guided by the light of revelation, we strive toward some, albeit imperfect and only analogous, understanding of the internal processions in the infinite spirit and how they are to be conceived. In the infinite spirit, the productions and internal processions we inquire about must necessarily correspond to its spiritual nature. Processions in a spirit, however, can only be through immanent vital acts; but such acts in a perfect spirit, and all the more in an

infinite spirit, are necessarily the intellection of the true and the volition of the good or love, and there can be no others, because all other vital acts include imperfection (Pallavicini, *Cursus Theologicus*, VIII, c. 51, n. 376). Therefore, just as revelation teaches two processions, so too it is understood from the nature of the infinite spirit that, if there are processions, they can only be through the intellect and the will, or better, through intellection and volition (*Summa Theologica* I, q. 27, aa. 1, 3, 5; *Contra Gentiles* IV, cc. 11, 19, 26; *Compendium Theologiae*, cc. 52, 56; *De Potentia*, q. 9, a. 9). We will consider both modes of procession.

I. The divine intellect is, first, not a faculty added to the essence but is the divine essence itself; second, it is not an intellect in potency or habit toward acts but is, by its intimate nature, a pure, substantial act, namely, an infinite actual intellection.

The object of this intellection is God Himself or the divine essence, with which the intellection is identified, and in the divine essence, all truth. Hence, divine intellection is not perfected, as in creatures, by multiple elicited acts, but is itself one substantial act comprehending the infinite true and, in itself, all truth. Thus far, we arrive even by the light of reason, and this has been explained in many ways in the *Treatise on God* (Section IV, c. 1).

Now, the infinite substantial intellect, by understanding itself, produces its Word, as we know solely from revelation. But now, from this faith, we seek some understanding of this production. The created spirit, the image of the infinite spirit of God, by understanding itself produces in itself its word, that is, its intellectual expression or, as the ancients say, its intention. This intellectual expression of itself, this concept of the mind, even in us, is a certain likeness and, as they say, an intentional being of the thing understood; and thus, while the spirit understands itself, the word or intellectual expression of the spirit is in the substantial spirit as the spirit of the intellect in the intelligent spirit.

Furthermore, the word is more perfect the more fully and adequately it expresses the thing understood, and thus the more it approaches identity with the thing understood, and the more perfect the thing understood and expressed by the word is. In us, the word always falls short of the fullness of perfection, because: first, the more perfect things are in themselves, the less we express them by the word according to their entire notion and intelligibility; second, what we express more perfectly by the word of the mind is imperfect in itself; third, even insofar as we express things more perfectly, our word is an accident and only an intentional likeness, not a substance and the thing understood itself. Namely (which we especially consider here), when the mind expresses itself by a word, the word falls short of perfection according to all three reasons.

In God, just as the understanding itself is infinitely perfect, so the Word expressed by infinite intellection is infinitely perfect. For God understands Himself, and thus the thing understood is infinite; He understands or comprehends Himself according to the entire notion of infinite intelligibility; by this understanding of Himself, He does not merely produce an intentional image of Himself, which would be an accident, but by understanding Himself according to the entire infinite intelligibility and thus according to the entire infinite Being, He produces an immanent substantial Word. Indeed, the substance understanding itself by substantial expressive intellection of the Word does not multiply but, by understanding, communicates and radiates (according to the manner of speaking of St. Basil) the numerically same substance as understood. Hence, the substantial intellection producing the substantial

Word and the immanent produced Word are one in essence, because (as we said) the intelligent being, understanding itself according to its entire infinite Being, not only intentionally expresses the Word but substantially communicates its entire Being. Nevertheless, the substantial intellection expressing itself in the substantial Word and that Word expressed are two relative to each other by a relation of origin of one from the other, because the procession of one from the other is real.

"All understanding, insofar as it is understood, must be in the intelligent being; for understanding signifies the apprehension of what is understood by the intellect; hence, even our intellect understanding itself is in itself not only as identical to itself by essence but also as apprehended by itself through understanding. Therefore, it is necessary that God be in Himself as the understood in the intelligent; but the understood in the intelligent is the understood intention and word. Therefore, in God understanding Himself, there is the Word of God as God understood… When our intellect understands itself, its being is one thing and its understanding another—hence, it is necessary that in man understanding himself, the internally conceived word is not a true man having the natural being of man but is only man understood, as a certain likeness of the true man apprehended by the intellect. But the Word of God itself, by the very fact that it is God understood, is true God naturally having divine Being, because the natural Being of God and His understanding are not different… It is of the nature of the inner word, which is the understood intention, that it proceeds from the intelligent being according to its understanding, since it is as a term of intellectual operation; for the intellect, by understanding, conceives and forms the intention or understood notion, which is the inner word. Therefore, it is necessary that from God, according to His understanding, proceeds His Word. The Word of God is thus compared to the intelligent God, whose Word it is, as to Him from whom it is; for this is of the nature of the Word. Since, therefore, in God the intelligent, the understanding, and the understood intention or Word are one in essence, only the distinction of relation remains, insofar as the Word is referred to the conceiver as from whom it is" (St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, IV, c. 11).

II. Just as in God the infinite true is the infinite good, so the intellection of Himself as the infinite true is simultaneously and necessarily the love of Himself as the infinite good.

Furthermore, just as the intellection of Himself, by its intimate nature and fecundity, expresses the Word as its immanent term in the manner described, so love is an act producing love as its internal term. Although the divine essence itself has both the formal aspect of intellection and the formal aspect of love, or rather, the essence itself is both intellection and love, and thus the intellection is really and identically love; nevertheless, the function under the formal aspect of intellection is different from that under the formal aspect of love, not only externally but in the internal productions themselves. For the Word proceeds through the formal aspect not of love but of intellection, and conversely, love (the Holy Spirit) proceeds through the formal aspect of love and not of intellection. There is, therefore, a virtual distinction between intellection and love, because the functions are distinct in relation to the twofold really distinct immanent term, just as if the intellection and love themselves were really distinguished.

Now, what is of utmost importance here is that intellection does not presuppose love, but love necessarily presupposes intellection, not in time but in the intrinsic order of formal aspects. For by the internal formal aspect of intellection and love, the good is loved insofar as it is known, not known insofar as it is loved. Indeed, just as there can be no love without intellection, so there cannot be perfect intellection of the infinite good without love; but the difference is that love, by its proper formal aspect, presupposes

intellection, while perfect intellection of the infinite good necessarily results in love because of the nature of the good comprehended by intellection. Therefore, by the intimate necessary nature of the thing, even God, the infinite spirit, by understanding Himself loves Himself, but not conversely, by loving Himself understands Himself. Thus, the formal aspect of the love of Himself is founded on the formal aspect of the intellection of Himself; and love necessarily presupposes the act of intellection of Himself. But this intellection in the divine being or infinite spirit, by the necessary exigency of its nature, has the Word eternally produced as its immanent term. Therefore, the formal aspect of the act of love, whose produced term is love or the Holy Spirit, presupposes the formal aspect of the act of intellection with its produced term, which is the Word, without which Word the intellection in act, as eternally productive of the Word by the necessary exigency of its perfection, could neither be nor be fully conceived (as is known from revelation).

Since, therefore, love and thus the love productive of love presupposes, as stated, the intellection having the produced Word, it follows that the love productive of love is necessarily expressed and communicated to the Word; and thus, the love productive of love and, consequently, the procession of love cannot be conceived except as simultaneously from the generator of the Word and from the Word. "Since it belongs to the concept of volition to be an act and vital, and thus to be produced (if, namely, volition is regarded as the term of a vital act), and not only to be produced in any way but also to draw its origin from produced knowledge (which is the 'understood intention, the word,' as St. Thomas says above), therefore another production is given in God (besides the production of the Word), posterior in origin, flowing not only from the producer of the Word but from the Word itself" (Pallavicini, *Cursus Theologicus*, VIII, c. 51, n. 378; cf. St. Thomas, *Compendium Theologiae*, c. 49).

(1) "The matter is clear in itself and will be explained even more distinctly shortly. The intellection of the divine being cannot exist without producing the Word, but not every person who shares that same intellection produces the Word; indeed, since the Word can only be one, and since the same Word is presupposed in order to the procession of the Holy Spirit who proceeds from Him, it is repugnant that the Word or the Holy Spirit produce the Word. On this matter, Pallavicini speaks thus: 'We cannot conceive any intelligent or willing being except through such intellection and volition as essentially have being produced by that same being, so that an intelligent and willing being cannot be conceived as doing nothing physically but merely receiving. I said *being* intelligent and willing, not *person* intelligent and willing; for although actions belong to supposits, and thus every action that belongs to a nature as *by which* belongs to a supposit as *that which* has that nature, it is not necessary that it belong to every such supposit if that nature has multiple supposits by the very fact of producing or being produced. For just as the producer and the produced cannot be the same, so what is constitutive of the producer and what is constitutive of the produced cannot be common to both. Therefore, since multiple supposits of the divine nature are constituted by active or passive production, such productions cannot be in all supposits of the divine nature. But for each of those supposits to be said to know and will, it is sufficient if in each of them there is that knowledge and volition produced by the same being that is such a supposit; for all divine supposits are one being'" (Pallavicini, *Cursus Theologicus*, VIII, c. 51, n. 380).

Concerning the substantiality and real distinction of the produced love from its producing principle, all that was said earlier about the substantiality and distinction of the Word applies easily. For what is loved is the substantial infinite goodness, namely, the divine essence itself according to the entire notion of infinite goodness; and the loving act is the same divine essence, thus not an accident but a substantial act;

hence, the immanent term produced by this substantial act is substantial love. Likewise, to this term or produced love, through the act by which the infinite substantial goodness is loved according to the entire notion of lovability, the entire infinite substantial goodness or the numerically same divine essence is communicated and inheres.

Thus, just as in the manner we described, there is God understood in God understanding Himself, so in God loving Himself there is God loved; not three Gods, because there is one essence numerically absolute, but yet one as producing or speaking the immanent Word by intellection, another as the Word produced by intellection, and another as love produced by the one common love of the one speaking the Word and of the Word. Therefore, there are three really distinct from one another, insofar as one proceeds from another as from a principle by a real, though immanent, procession, and thus three insofar as they are relative to one another; and they are three substantial, because these distinct from one another, individually and all together, are the divine intellectual essence, which is indeed the supreme substance. But one distinct from the others, who is the intellectual substance, or (which is the same) a subsistent distinct in an intellectual nature, is a person; therefore, there are three divine persons of one essence.

The three would not be distinct unless they were relative by a real procession of one from another; individually, they would not be persons unless they were the substance or divine essence. Therefore, the foundation of personality is intellectual substantiality, and the formal aspect by which the persons are distinct is relation (cf. above, pp. 330, 345).

This entire explanation is drawn from St. Thomas: "Just as understanding is in the intelligent insofar as it is understood, so what is loved must be in the lover insofar as it is loved… But God, just as He understands Himself, so it is necessary that He love Himself; for the good understood is lovable in itself. Therefore, God is in Himself as the loved in the lover… But just as God's understanding is His Being, so is His loving. Therefore, God does not love Himself by something added to His essence but according to His essence (both the loved object and the loving act, and thus also the term proceeding through this act, is identically the divine essence, not an accident). Since, therefore, He loves Himself insofar as He is in Himself as the loved in the lover, God is not in Himself as the loved in the lover accidentally, as loved things are in us who love accidentally; but God is in Himself as the loved in the lover substantially. Therefore, the Holy Spirit Himself, by whom divine love is intimated to us, is not something accidental in God but is a subsistent thing in the divine essence, like the Father and the Son… It is common to every intellect that what is conceived in the intellect must proceed in some way from the intelligent insofar as it is intelligent, and by its procession is distinguished in some way from it, as the conception of the intellect, which is the understood intention, is distinguished from the intelligent intellect; and similarly, it is necessary that the affection of the lover, by which the loved is in the lover, proceeds from the will of the lover insofar as it is loving. But the divine intellect has this property, that since its understanding is its Being, it is necessary that the conception of the intellect, which is the understood intention, be its substance; and similarly with the affection in God loving Himself. It follows, therefore, that the intention of the divine intellect, which is His Word, is not distinguished from the one producing it in that it is Being according to substance but only in that it is according to the notion of procession of one from another; and similarly with the affection of love in God loving Himself, which pertains to the Holy Spirit… From all that has been said, it must be concluded that in the divinity we posit a certain ternary, which nevertheless does not contradict the unity and simplicity of the essence. For it must be conceded that God exists as existing in His nature (as the first person proceeding from none and as the fount of the Trinity), as

understood, and as loved by Himself in Himself. But this happens differently in God and in us. For since man's nature is a substance, but his understanding and loving are not his substance, man, considered according to his nature, is a certain subsistent thing; but considered according to what is in his intellect, he is not a subsistent thing but a certain intention of a subsistent thing; and similarly, according to what is in himself as the loved in the lover. Thus, in man, three things can be considered: man existing in his nature, man existing in the intellect, and man existing in love. And yet these three are not one, because his understanding is not his being, nor is his loving; and of these three, only one is a subsistent thing, namely, man existing in his nature. But in God, His being, understanding, and loving are the same. Therefore, God existing in His natural Being, God existing in His intellect, and God existing in His love are one, yet each one of them is subsistent. And because subsistent things in an intellectual nature are customarily called persons by the Latins and hypostases by the Greeks, for this reason in divine things the Latins say three persons, and the Greeks three hypostases, namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit" (St. Thomas, *Compendium Theologiae*, cc. 45, 48, 50, 52; cf. above, Thesis XIV).

THESIS XXVIII. On notional intellection and love compared with absolute attributes, and on the number of processions in God.

« Although absolute intellection and love are one and common to the three persons, nevertheless, intellection, only insofar as it is the Father's, and love, insofar as it is the Father's and the Son's, are relative or notional and fecund in producing an adequate immanent term. But from the very infinity of both the act and the term, it is explained why the Word can only be one and the proceeding love can only be one. »

From the already explained procession of the Word through intellection and the procession of the Holy Spirit through love, we can proceed a little further in understanding the mode of fecund intellection and love. For from what has been said thus far, solutions follow to some questions that are somewhat more difficult but necessary both for the understanding of the dogma, as far as we are permitted to attain it from faith, and for the defense of the mystery against adversaries. With the explanation of these points, divided into several theses, we will conclude this entire part on the understanding of the dogma. The first of these questions is the one we have posed in this thesis: how fecund and thus relative intellection and love relate to absolute and thus common intellection and love to the three persons; and at the same time, it is asked how it is that, although the Word is intelligent with the same intellection and the Holy Spirit is loving with the same love, there are not multiple processions in God.

I. From what has been said above, it is clear that the formal aspect of intellection is that by which the Word is produced, and the formal aspect of love is that by which the Holy Spirit is produced as immanent terms of intellection and love.

But intellection and love are entirely one and common to the three persons; how, therefore, is the production of the Word proper to the Father and the production of the Holy Spirit proper to the Father and the Son, and not common? It is commonly attributed to Scotus (*In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 7, nn. 22, 26; *Quodlibeta*, q. 2, n. 8) that, on account of this difficulty, he held that understanding and speaking in the Father, and likewise love and active spiration in the Father and the Son, are distinguished such that

intellection in the Father and the speaking of the Word, and similarly love in the Father and the Son and spiration, are two distinct formalities; and thus, understanding all truth and speaking the Word in the Father must be conceived as parallel acts; and the same must be understood of the acts of love and spiration in the Father and the Son (Suarez, *De Trinitate*, I, c. 6; cf. Ruiz, *Disputationes* 59, sect. 4). If this is posited, it would have to be said that the Word proceeds not through the formal aspect of intellection but of speaking or locution, and the Holy Spirit not through the formal aspect of love but of spiration. But indeed, mental speaking, both in a created mind and in God, is nothing other than intellection as active, by which the mental word is produced, nor can any other act be conceived besides the intellection of the true by which the mental word is produced, and which thus is the speaking of the word. But intellection in God is one most pure substantial act, by which the divine essence, the primary true, and in the essence all truth, is comprehended according to its entire intelligibility. Therefore, this intellection, according to its formal aspect insofar as it is intellection, and no other act distinct in reason, is the speaking of the Word. This consideration must also be applied to the speaking as active, by which love or the Holy Spirit is spirated as the term intrinsically produced by love. Therefore, the entire difficulty remains: how is the production not common when intellection and love are common?

This difficulty can be resolved from what was demonstrated above (Theses XXI–XXIII), that the absolute in God simultaneously has the aspect of the relative, such that under the formal aspect of the absolute, it is one and common to the three distinct persons, but under the formal aspect of the relative, it is proper and incommunicable, and thus under this formal aspect of the three relatives, there are distinct persons. Hence, even understanding itself is absolute as the comprehension of all truth, and thus is common to the three persons; and the same understanding simultaneously has the aspect of the relative (inwardly), and thus produces the Word and is in a relation of opposition to the Word, as producer to produced; hence, under this formal aspect of the relative, it is proper, for substantial understanding relative inwardly as expressing the Word is the very person of the Father. In this way, essential understanding common to the three and notional understanding proper to the Father alone are distinguished, not as if there were a double act of intellection in the Father, but, as we said, one and the same understanding is simultaneously absolute and relative, that is, the intellection of all truth and, by this very fact, the expression of the Word (cf. above, p. 360).

II. Although this is so, the question remains not yet sufficiently clear: why is substantial intellection, being the same in the three persons, fecund only in the Father, and love in the Father and the Son but not in the Holy Spirit, and thus why are there only two processions in God.

The reason for this lies in the infinity of perfection, which can be considered both in the act of intellection and love and in the immanent term produced, namely, in the Word and in the proceeding love.

1°. The divine intellect comprehends the divine essence and in it all truth according to all intelligible aspects, not by multiple acts but by one simple and infinite act, or rather, the divine intellect is itself one infinite act of comprehension.

This one infinite and therefore non-multipliable act expresses as its immanent term an adequate Word, and thus infinite in the formal aspect insofar as it is the Word. “As if speaking Himself, the Father generated the Word equal to Himself in all things; for He would not have spoken Himself wholly and perfectly if there were anything less or more in His Word than in Himself” (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XV, c. 14, n. 23).

Whence Gregory of Nazianzus most acutely said: “The Son is to the Father as a definition to the defined” (Oration 30, alias 36, n. 20). And according to the explanation of the Angelic Doctor: “It is manifest that if God understands Himself, it is necessary that the entire fullness of Himself be contained in the Word” (St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, IV, c. 14; cf. Ruiz, *Disputationes* 28, sect. 2, n. 2). From this, it is understood that it is as repugnant for there to be multiple Words in God as it is repugnant for there to be a plurality of Gods.

a) From the perspective of the act, if there is one non-multipliable infinite act infinitely understanding all truth, and if, by the nature of this intellection, it necessarily expresses all that it understands in the Word, it is repugnant that the Word be not one, just as the act of understanding and speaking the adequate Word is one.

b) The same is clear from the perspective of the Word. For since the Word is infinite in the formal aspect of the Word, that is, the adequate and thus infinite expression of the divine intellect, by this very fact it encompasses the entire possible expression, beyond which no other can exist, except only as an imitation or adumbration externally of this infinite internal expression. Everyone sees that, for the same reason that the multiplication of an absolute (infinite) being is repugnant, the multiplication of the infinite Word proceeding through the infinite intellect is repugnant. The reason, namely, is that two infinites, just as in the supreme notion of being, so too in any formal aspect, are repugnant. However, just as the necessary unity of the infinite being not only does not exclude but indeed includes the possibility of beings that, as external adumbrations before it, are analogically beings, so too the infinite Word does not exclude but includes the possibility of external imitations and adumbrations of the infinite Word (see *Treatise on God*, Section III, c. 2).

It is clear, therefore, from its infinity, that the divine Word is one, and from this, the singularity of the fecundity in producing the Word is proper to the Father alone. Indeed, the divine intellect, numerically one in the three persons, is such that it is uncommunicated in the Father, communicated by the Father to the Son, and by both to the Holy Spirit. Supposing the expression of the infinite Word, it is understood that it is not still fecund, as it were, twice, whether to produce the same Word or another Word. Not the first, for the intellect, insofar as it is uncommunicated in the first person, necessarily produces the Word by its intellection of itself, but the produced Word cannot produce itself, nor can the third person, whose principle (together with the Father) is the Word itself, be the principle of its own principle. Not another, because, as stated, the divine intellect is fecund of only one Word, which unity follows from the infinity of its fecundity, that is, from the fact that, by reason of its infinity, the divine intellect is one pure act expressing an adequate and thus infinite and therefore one Word.

2°. The same must be said of the one act of love and the term produced by this act, which is the Holy Spirit. “God understands all things by one simple act and similarly wills all things; hence, there cannot be in Him a procession of a Word from a Word, nor of love from love, but in Him, there is only one perfect Word and one perfect love; and in this, His perfect fecundity is manifested” (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 27, a. 5, ad 3). Suarez distinctly explains the matter (*De Trinitate*, I, c. 7, nn. 11–12): “The eternal Father produces the Son through that understanding which is common to all persons, insofar as He has it from Himself and not through generation; for this is sufficient for the Father to produce through that understanding and not the Son nor the Holy Spirit. For since the Father has it from Himself and before all production, He can rightly communicate it to another person; but He communicates it by

the power and fecundity of that very act of understanding… But the Son and the Holy Spirit already have that act communicated to them and do not have it from themselves as adequate, which cannot be multiplied. And in this way, and with the same proportion, we must philosophize about love or volition as regards the matter. In the will, due to the poverty of names, we are accustomed to signify the act of loving, the production, and the term by the same word, namely, the name of love or affection. Properly, however, essential love is common, and through it, the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit, insofar as they have that love without emanation of the will, either from themselves as the Father, or through generation as the Son (i.e., in the Father and the Son, the act of love or affection is not already supposed as emanating or producing its term, but rather as producing its adequate term, which is the Holy Spirit or the proceeding love); and therefore, although they produce through that love, the Holy Spirit, nevertheless, loving with the same love, produces nothing inwardly, because He already supposes the (adequate) production of love."

THESIS XXIX. On the objects whose intellection and love constitute the divine processions; and how the Father can be said to be wise by the Word, and the Father and the Son to be loving by the Holy Spirit.

« The Word proceeds through the intellection of both the divine essence, the divine persons, and all necessary truth; similarly, the Holy Spirit proceeds through the love of the necessarily loved good. Therefore, although neither the Word proceeds through the vision of contingent creatures, nor the Holy Spirit through the love of the same, nevertheless, the Word as Wisdom proceeds with respect to the creature to be made, and the Holy Spirit as love with respect to the creature to be loved. Hence, the Father can be said to be wise by the Word, and the Father and the Son loving by the Holy Spirit, not formally but terminatively, insofar as the Word and the expressed love are the necessary term without which divine wisdom and love cannot exist. »

In the question of which things' intellection expresses the Word and which things' love produces the Holy Spirit, there is some diversity of opinions among theologians, depending on whether they are more concerned with our mode of understanding according to analogies drawn from creatures and distinguishing what in God is entirely one, or whether they strive more to transcend these analogies and, as far as possible, to conceive the matter as it is objectively. In the mode of consideration, we must first keep in mind what is demonstrated in the *Treatise on God* concerning divine simplicity, knowledge, will, and the objects of both.

I. Concerning the production of the Word, since the divine intellect is one necessary substantial act comprehending, by its infinite perfection, all truth according to all intelligible aspects, the objects comprehended by this one most simple act are, by this very fact, greatly diverse among themselves. As pertains to the present matter, the objects are either necessary in themselves or non-necessary, that is, contingent. The necessary objects, in the order of existence, are God alone, both according to absolute aspects in Himself (according to the essence and attributes), according to relative aspects (inwardly), and the essence according to its imitability externally, which imitability of the essence we can call by other names: divine objective ideas, eternal reasons of things, or the eminent being of creatures in God. Hence, from this last point, the entire metaphysical order of possibles pertains to necessary objects, which in

themselves are actually nothing but could be according to the actually existing and necessary imitability of the divine essence externally. The non-necessary objects, then, are all things existing besides God (formally as existing) for any difference of time, to which, as is clear, all conditioned things that would actually be under any hypothesis through the freedom of creatures are reduced as regards contingency. Hence, further, the divine intellect necessarily comprehends necessary objects, such that if it did not comprehend any of them, there would be a defect on the part of the intellect itself, and it would no longer be an infinitely perfect act. On the other hand, although in the hypothesis that contingent things exist for some time, the divine intellect necessarily comprehends them as existing, it would remain equally perfect if they never existed and were thus understood as merely possible. Therefore, this vision of existing creatures is nothing in God other than the very intellection of the divine essence according to all aspects, distinguished only in our mode of consideration, with a non-necessary connotation of existing creatures, which are subjected to the same infinite act comprehending all necessary truths without any change in it, if they exist, or to which the same one infinite act of intellection extends itself, as it were, without any change in itself (St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 3, a. 3, ad 8).

Having briefly recalled these points from the other treatise, the first part of the proposed thesis is demonstrated.

1°. The infinite intellectual act, by its internal necessary perfection, produces by understanding the Word adequate to itself, under which formal aspect of producing the Word it is relative intellection or a notional act, and really God the Father. Now, according to what was said, that infinite act, by its internal necessary perfection, understands itself most perfectly both as the divine essence (with all attributes, which we distinguish by reason); it comprehends in itself the production of the Word, or itself as fecund of the Word, and in this very fact understands the Word as an immanent term; further, it comprehends intellection as simultaneously love and love fecund of the Holy Spirit, and in this again comprehends the Holy Spirit as its term; finally, it comprehends the essence according to its entire imitability externally, that is, according to all eternal reasons of things, and in this very fact, all possibles, both through simple intellection and through wisdom in the first practical act (*Treatise on God*, Thesis XLII, n. II). Further, this one most simple necessary act of intellection, by itself, or as such intellection, produces the Word adequate to itself; but the Word would not be adequate unless it were expressed according to all understood aspects. Therefore, the Word is expressed by the intellection of the essence (with all absolute attributes), of the three divine persons, and of the entire metaphysical order of possibles externally, founded in the imitability of the divine essence or in divine ideas. "The Father, by understanding Himself, the Son, the Holy Spirit, and all other things contained in His knowledge, conceives the Word, so that the whole Trinity is spoken by the Word, and also every creature" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 3). "In God, for His Word to be perfect, it is necessary that His Word express whatever is contained in that from which it arises, and especially since God sees all things in one intuition, not separately. Thus, it is necessary that whatever is contained in the Father's knowledge be entirely expressed by this one Word of His, and in the manner in which it is contained in knowledge, so that it is a true Word corresponding to its principle through knowledge, and the Word expresses the Father principally and consequently all other things that the Father knows by knowing Himself. And thus, the Son, by the very fact that He is the Word, perfectly expresses every creature… The Word directly regards God, who is primarily expressed by the Word, and consequently creatures; and because creatures, insofar as they are in God, are one (one divine essence imitable externally), there is one Word of all creatures" (St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 4, a. 4, corp. and ad 5).

(1) “This term ‘spoken’ is used in two senses: either for that which is produced by intellection, and thus only the Word is said to be spoken; or for that which is understood by the intellection producing the Word, and thus the whole Trinity is said to be spoken: ‘It belongs to one person alone to be spoken in the way the Word is spoken, but in the way a thing is understood in the Word, it belongs to any person to be spoken,’ as St. Thomas explains there.”

(2) “The Word of creatures is not as if proceeding from them, as is clear; but it proceeds through the intellection of the divine essence, insofar as the ideas or eternal reasons of all possible creatures are contained in it, and actual creatures, as will soon be said, are freely brought into being through the Word as through the expression of divine ideas, or the ideas are manifested through creatures” (St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 4, a. 6 and 7).

Some find an insurmountable difficulty in how the Word can be conceived to proceed through the intellection of the Word itself, and much more through the intellection of the Holy Spirit, because, they say, in the sign in which the intellection producing the Word is conceived, the Word does not yet exist and thus could only be understood as future, not by intuitive knowledge as existing; this difficulty seems to them even greater and more evident regarding the knowledge of the Holy Spirit, since this third person is posterior in origin to the Word as proceeding from the Word. Several explanations of this matter are given by different theologians, not all agreeing; but the entire difficulty rests on a false or certainly overly imperfect concept of prior and posterior in the origins of the divine persons, as is clear even from the proposition of the objection, where they speak of the Word as not yet existing and as future (see Vasquez, *Disputationes* 142, c. 2, n. 6; c. 4, n. 15). Therefore, the matter must be explained by correcting this concept.

The intellection producing the Word is not an action properly so-called, as if issuing from potency, but is a pure, necessary, eternal act having an internal, necessary, eternal term, which is the Word; and thus, that producing is to have eternally in complete act an intrinsically necessary term, it is an eternal substantial relation which cannot be or be truly conceived without its eternal correlated term. Conversely, that being produced is to be eternally produced in act as necessary as the divine understanding itself is necessary. Therefore, if there is talk of prior and posterior in origins, it is not a priority as if the paternal relative understanding could be conceived without the Word, as, for example, God can be conceived without the will to create or operate externally, which is called priority *in quo*; but what we call prior and posterior in divine origins is solely in this, that the relative B, namely the Word, by internal necessity is and exists eternally from the relative A, namely from the paternal intellection necessarily and eternally expressing the Word; but the relative A is not, conversely, from the relative B. This is usually called priority *a quo* (see Francisco de Lugo, *Disputationes* II, c. 5, nn. 6 sq.). There is, therefore, (if it is permissible to speak thus) a simultaneity of relatives *in quo*, and only a priority of one to another *a quo*. Hence, the paternal intellect, a pure act, understands itself as in complete second act fecund of the Word, and by this intellection of itself is the principle of the Word in complete act eternally proceeding and always produced. But the Father, understanding Himself in complete second act fecund of the Word, understands the Word not as to be produced or as future (as some absurdly say), but as eternally proceeding in act and necessarily existing. Therefore, the paternal intellection, understanding itself and the Word proceeding from itself, is the principle of the Word proceeding. This order is not only not repugnant but is entirely necessary; for the infinite producing intellection and the proceeding and immanent Word are simultaneous

not only in reality but also in reason with simultaneity *in quo*, and there is only the priority *a quo* of the producing intellection to the coeternal Word.

(1) "In divine things, a principle is spoken of according to origin without priority; hence, there must be an order according to origin without priority; and this is called the order of nature according to Augustine, not that one is prior to another, but that one is from another (priority *a quo*)… Relatives are simultaneous in nature and intellect, insofar as one is in the definition of the other. But in divine things, the relations themselves are subsistent persons in one nature. Hence, neither by reason of nature nor by reason of relations can one person be prior to another, not even by nature and intellect" (i.e., not prior by priority *in quo*) (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 42, a. 3).

From the same foundation, the difficulty against the procession of the Word through the intellection of the Holy Spirit must be resolved. The intellection producing in eternal act and the Word eternally produced, and the love producing in eternal act and the love as the internal produced term, are simultaneous with simultaneity *in quo*, that is, one cannot be or be conceived without the other as regards reality; but the priority, namely between the produced Word and the produced love, is solely priority *a quo*, that the spirated love is by eternal relation from the Word as from a principle with the Father, but the Word is not from the love as from a principle. This simultaneity *in quo* is sufficient for all these to be understood simultaneously and thus, just as the Word, so too the Holy Spirit is understood by one most simple act by which the Father is the eternal principle of the Word. Namely, the Father, understanding Himself as the principle of the Word, understands the Word, and simultaneously Himself and the Word as love eternally producing an immanent term, which is the Holy Spirit, and by this one most simple intellection is the principle expressing the Word adequate to Himself.

2°. The question remains why it is not said that the Word proceeds through the intellection or vision of existing creatures. Lest we be mistaken about the state of the question, the Word certainly proceeds through that intellection which is also the intellection of existing creatures, since the divine intellection is one in itself, not one whose object is God and another whose object is creatures; but by the same intellection by which God understands Himself, He understands all intelligible things. We only say that the Word does not proceed through intellection formally insofar as it refers to existing creatures. The reason is primarily twofold: **a)** that God subsisting in three persons is prior in reason by priority *in quo* to the decree of operating externally; or in other words, that the necessary notional acts inwardly, according to which the persons proceed, are prior by priority of reason *in quo* to free acts externally, without which there can be no intellection of existing creatures (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 33, a. 3, ad 1). **b)** The second reason is that the Word proceeds through absolutely necessary intellection, but the intellection of existing creatures, or rather the relation of intellection to existing creatures, is not necessary in itself but only in the hypothesis of a creature existing for some difference of time.

3°. Nevertheless, it can be said that the Word proceeds with a (rational) relation to creatures, which respect Augustine thought was signified in the very name of the Word. It is better, he says, to call it the Word than reason, "to signify not only a respect to the Father but also to those things that are made through the Word by operative power" (*De Trinitate*, VI, c. 10, n. 11). For the Word is expressed, as we said, through the paternal intellection of the divine essence, even formally as it is imitable externally and the exemplary cause containing eternal reasons, according to which all possible things are possible, and according to which, with the addition of free will, all things are created. Hence, the Word expressed by

this intellection not only, as it were, materially, insofar as the divine essence is communicated to it, but formally, from the very mode of proceeding through the intellect as generated wisdom, contains the ideas and eternal reasons of all creatable things and of the entire created order "as a perfect Word to which nothing is lacking, and a certain art of the omnipotent and wise God, full of all unchangeable living reasons, and all are one in it (art), as it is one from one, with which it is one; there God knows all things that He made through it" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VI, c. 10, n. 11). Therefore, although the expression of the Word is not through the vision of created creatures, it is nevertheless as the expression of subsistent wisdom and art with a radical respect, as it were, to the creature to be made (see Suarez, *De Trinitate*, IX, cc. 4–7).

(1) "The Word differs from an idea; for an idea signifies the exemplary form absolutely, but the Word of the creature (i.e., the Word by which the Father speaks the creature) in God signifies the exemplary form deduced from another, and thus the idea pertains to the essence in God, but the Word to the person" (St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 4, a. 4, ad 4).

II. The question of the Holy Spirit, through the love of which goods He proceeds, after what was said about the procession of the Word, presents no further difficulty.

1°. The Father and the Son, by one common love of infinite goodness, produce love as an immanent term, which is the Holy Spirit. And thus, the love through which the Holy Spirit proceeds is the love of the divine essence (with all attributes); by this very fact, insofar as it is in the Father, it is the love of Himself and the Son; in the Son, it is the love of Himself and the Father. This is what the Fathers mean when they say that the Holy Spirit is produced by the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Nor is it permissible to understand this doctrine as if a double love were spoken of, which, as it were, by conspiring produces love as one term; but it must be understood that two distinct persons love by a substantial love, which is numerically one for both as subject and has both as object, both insofar as they are one in essence and insofar as they are distinguished in hypostasis. Moreover, no less does the same love reflexively encompass the love of itself as producing and simultaneously its internal term, the Holy Spirit eternally proceeding. For the love is of the divine essence as it is in itself according to all aspects of lovability; but thus the essence is both all absolute perfection and the three persons together: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

The difficulty usually arising concerning this last point from our imperfect mode of understanding, by which the producing love is conceived as prior in reason to the produced love, must be resolved from what was said above. For just as the producing intellection and the produced Word, so too the relative and eternal love and its eternal correlate, that is, the love eternally proceeding in complete act, are simultaneous not only in duration but also in reason with simultaneity *in quo*, and the order is solely according to origin *a quo*. Hence, what we said about intellection we can even more easily conceive about love; namely, substantial love, fecund in complete act of eternally proceeding love, by loving itself and the proceeding love in itself, is the principle of the proceeding love.

2°. The same love, formally as producing love, is also the love of the essence insofar as it is goodness communicable externally through participated good, especially through participated holiness, which most closely imitates the substantial divine goodness and holiness. Hence, just as the Word proceeds through intellection with a radical respect (if one may say so) externally and in first act, as generated wisdom and

"art full of ideas," so the love, the Holy Spirit, from the very mode of His procession through such love, is proceeding goodness and a gift, as it were, in first act, namely, as donable to a rational creature through sanctification and for its sanctification, and thus proceeds with a (radical) respect externally. "Just as the Father speaks Himself and every creature by the Word He generated, insofar as the generated Word sufficiently represents the Father and every creature, so He loves Himself and every creature by the Holy Spirit, insofar as the Holy Spirit proceeds as the love of the primary goodness according to which the Father loves Himself and every creature. And thus, it is clear that a respect to the creature is imported both in the Word and in the proceeding love secondarily, insofar as the divine truth and goodness are the principle of understanding and loving every creature" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 37, a. 2, ad 3; cf. q. 38, a. 2).

3°. Finally, from what was just said, the question arises whether the Holy Spirit proceeds not only through the love of divine goodness as communicable externally through analogical participation, as we said, but also through the love of creatures, either possible or to be actually produced or produced. This last must be denied for the same reasons and in the same way that we denied that the Word proceeds through the intellection of existing creatures.

As regards the orders of possibles, which we said are comprehended in the intellection through which the Word is expressed, here the response depends on another question: whether possibles, not only according to their eminent being in the divine essence but formally according to their possible being, are certainly a necessary object of divine intellection, and whether they can also be said to be an object of necessary love. To this question, it must be said: if the love of God externally is taken in the sense of a will to confer actual good, evidently there is no such love of God toward possibles, precisely because they are and remain in the state of mere possibles. But if love is taken as complacency and approval of possible goods, then it is primarily the infinite and necessary love of the divine essence as imitable and participable externally, about which love of the essence we spoke earlier; but insofar as the simple approval of possible goods in themselves is considered, this is rather an intellection than a love of the good. It follows, therefore, that, properly speaking, there is no absolutely necessary love of God toward creatures in themselves, although there is a necessary love of divine goodness, even insofar as this goodness, imitable and communicable externally through analogous perfections, contains the supreme reason of all possible good. Therefore, this latter, and not the love of possible creatures, pertains to the love through which the love proceeding from internal necessary perfection, which is the Holy Spirit, is expressed (see Suarez, *De Trinitate*, XI, c. 2; cf. Ruiz, *Disputationes* 63, sect. 5).

III. The question follows whether and in what sense the Father understands by the Word and both love by the Holy Spirit.

The holy Fathers, both Greek and, following their example, Latin, disputing against the Arians, very frequently affirm that without the Word, the Father would be devoid of intelligence and wisdom (*alogos* and *asophos*). See the opinions of the Fathers in Ruiz (*Disputationes* 74, sect. 4); Petavius (*De Trinitate*, VI, c. 9). From these, St. Thomas, in more than one place, hands down and explains the same doctrine: "We attribute another kind of operation (besides operation externally) to God, insofar as we say He is understanding and willing, in which His perfection is signified; for He would not be perfect unless He were understanding and willing in act, and from this we confess Him to be living… According to this kind of operation, we say there is in divine things a procession of the Word and of love; and this is the

procession of the person of the Son from the Father, who is His Word, and of the Holy Spirit, who is His love and breath of life. Hence, Athanasius in a certain sermon says that the Arians, positing that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not coessential with the Father, consequently seemed to say that God is not living and intelligent but dead and without mind" (St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 10, a. 1). But these can be understood in two different senses. If it is said

that the Father is formally wise by the Word, and the Father and the Son are formally loving by the Holy Spirit, the sense is false and absurd. For a divine person cannot be formally wise or loving through another really distinct from Himself; but He understands and loves through His own essence, which is absolute wisdom and absolute will or love, and therefore the wisdom and absolute will of the three persons are numerically one.

The sense, therefore, of that statement of the holy Fathers is different. The divine intellection (as it is of the Father), by its internal perfection, produces the Word by understanding as necessarily as the divine intellection is necessary, nor can there be divine understanding (of the Father) unless its intrinsically produced term is the Word; similarly, there cannot be divine love (of the Father and the Son) unless it has love produced as an immanent term. "For (as St. Thomas says, *Contra Gentiles* IV, c. 14), the intellect in act is never without the Word," and for the same reason, love in act is never without produced love. Hence, it is most correctly inferred that if ever the Word or the Holy Spirit were not, as the Arians claimed, neither would the divine intellection and love have been in act, and thus the divine intellect and divine love, and so the divine life, which are necessarily always in perfect act, would be simply denied. See Ruiz, *Disputationes* 111.

Thus, the matter itself is sufficiently clear. The Father, formally understanding, and the Father and the Son, formally loving, are so through the essence, which itself is absolute wisdom and love; nevertheless, the Father, by understanding, necessarily produces the Word, and He could not be understanding without it; and both, by loving, necessarily produce love (the Holy Spirit), and divine love could not exist without produced love. Therefore, the Father is wise by the Word not formally but as the necessary immanent term of His fecund wisdom, without which that wisdom would not be; and for the same reason, the Father and the Son are loving by the Holy Spirit as the necessary internal term of love, without which that love would not be.

The only remaining doubt concerns the manner of speaking, whether the Father can simply be said to understand by the Word, and the Father and the Son to love by the Holy Spirit. Theologians differ considerably in their opinions and ways of explaining these expressions; the matter can be resolved briefly as follows. A distinction must be made between words that signify only an absolute act and those that also signify a notional act, that is, the production of a term inwardly. The former cannot be construed with ablatives of distinct persons of this kind. Hence, because "to understand" (*intelligere*), taken simply in an absolute sense, is usually employed, it would be less correct to say: "The Father understands by the Word"; for this would seem to signify that the Father is constituted formally wise or understanding through the Word, which is false, as is clear from what was said above. The notional term designating the production of the Word is "to speak" (*dicere*). Further, "to love" (*diligere*) is used not only in an absolute sense but also in a notional sense, in which latter sense it is equivalent to producing love by loving as an immanent term.

Now, in this notional sense, what the Father speaks (i.e., understands and, by understanding, expresses or represents by the Word), and what the Father and the Son love, can be signified as an object (in the accusative), and because such speaking and loving is, as it were, in complete act through the intrinsically produced term, without which the speaking and loving would not be, this term is rightly added in the ablative as produced by speaking and loving. Thus, therefore, the Father speaks Himself and all other things that He speaks (i.e., that He comprehends by the intellection producing the Word) by the Word; the Father and the Son love themselves (and whatever they comprehend by the love producing immanent love) by the Holy Spirit. For by these words, says Ruiz, it is signified "to love by the Holy Spirit as the simply necessary produced term, so that the operation of loving can be directed toward loved objects." See Ruiz, *Disputationes* 74, sect. 2; *Disputationes* 111, sect. 2–6. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 37, a. 2; Suarez, *De Trinitate* IX, c. 10; XI, c. 3.

THESIS XXX. On the manner in which the procession of the second person is manifested as generation, but the procession of the third person as distinct from generation in revelation.

« From divine revelation, it is clear that the second person proceeds through generation, but the procession of the third person is distinct from generation. However, the procession of the second person is to be believed as intellectual and perfect generation in a proper sense, excluding the imperfections found in the generations of creatures. »

Before faith seeks some understanding of the diversity by which the procession of the second person, but not the third, is properly generation, and consequently the second person is the only-begotten Son, but the third is not a Son, we must examine the manner in which the matter itself, because it is, is manifested to us in revelation; for from revelation, some understanding, however imperfect, of how it is must be deduced. Indeed, the holy Fathers unanimously condemned the presumption of investigating, by the light of reason alone, both other mysteries and, in particular, the profound mysteries of God in the mode and diversity of processions, about which we now speak, when heretics attacked the mystery itself from philosophical principles or demanded a reason for faith from Catholics based on those principles. However, the same holy Fathers commended, both by explicit words and by their example and most profound meditations, the pious and humble inquiry for some understanding presupposing faith and from the principles of faith (see Diego Ruiz, *Disputationes* V).

Therefore, we will first consider the matter itself as revealed in the Scriptures, that the second person, but not the third, is properly generated; then, with the light of revelation, we will inquire, as far as is permitted, into the proper reasons for divine generation. For these are the foundations from which it must be deduced why the procession of the Holy Spirit is not generation, which we will discuss in the following thesis.

I. That diversity in the procession of the second and third persons is revealed in the Scriptures no less than the procession itself and the distinction of persons.

1°. This revelation is contained in the very proper names of the persons. For it is constantly taught that between the first and second persons there is not only an indeterminate relation of principle and

proceeding from the principle, but determinately the relation of Father and Son. The Father is said in the Scriptures to be the proper Father of the Son (John 5:18); the Son the proper Son of the Father (Romans 8:32); the true Son (1 John 5:20); the only-begotten Son (*monogenes*); only-begotten from the Father (John 1:14; 3:16; cf. Thesis II above). The Father is such only as a principle, the Son as the term of that production singularly distinct from all other modes of production, which is called generation. It should be noted, however, that this notion of Father for the first person and of Son for the second person is so proper that by this alone they are really distinguished from each other, as has been frequently demonstrated throughout this treatise. Further, by this very notion of Father and Son, they are distinguished from the third person, who is neither Father nor Son, although He too is proceeding. Hence, both when named individually and in the enumeration of the three persons, He is designated as proceeding indeed, but not proceeding as a Son, and thus in a manner distinct from generation. "In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" (Matthew 28:19; cf. Matthew 3:16–17; 1 John 5:7). "I (the Son) will send you from the Father the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father (my Father)" (John 15:26). "The Spirit of your Father" (Matthew 10:20); "God sent the Spirit of His Son" (Galatians 4:6); "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me" (Luke 4:18); "The Spirit of God" (Romans 8:14); "The Spirit of Christ" (Romans 8:9; 1 Peter 1:11); "The Spirit of Jesus" (Acts 16:7).

2°. Just as the second person alone is the term of generation, that is, the Son, so too in the Scriptures, the mode of procession of the second person alone is expressly declared to be generation. This express declaration is already contained in the proper appellation by which the distinguishing notion of the only-begotten Son, only-begotten from the Father, is designated. Then it is expressly declared that the Son of God is proper because He is through an eternal, always complete generation. "In these last days, He (God) has spoken to us in His Son, whom He appointed heir of all things, through whom He also made the ages; who, being the splendor of His glory and the figure of His substance… sits at the right hand of the Majesty on high, having become (*genomenos*) so much better than the angels… To which of the angels did He ever say: 'You are my Son, today I have begotten you'; and again: 'I will be to Him a Father, and He will be to me a Son'… But to the Son He says: 'Your throne, O God, is forever and ever… And: You, Lord, in the beginning founded the earth, and the heavens are the work of your hands'" (Hebrews 1:2–10). Both in Psalms 2:7, 44 (45):7, and 101 (102):26, from which these words are taken, and as the Apostle says these things about Christ the incarnate Son, He is none other than the eternal Son, although He became man in time. Hence, this man, that is, this person who is also man, is the Son of God begotten from eternity, is God the creator of heaven and earth. With these premises, the words "You are my Son, today I have begotten you" must necessarily be understood of this person, who is God and man. The second clause explains the reason why He is the Son, namely, because He is begotten by the Father. He who is the splendor of the glory of God the Father, God the creator of heaven and earth, the Son cannot be other than eternal, and therefore the generation is eternal. Thus, the particle "today" does not express the beginning of generation but the immutable *now* of eternity, by which generation is always in complete act. However, these words pertain in time to this man specifically as man, not because He was begotten in time, but because, having been begotten from eternity, He begins in time to be man. Hence, in the Incarnation, it is first verified of the man: "I have begotten you today (i.e., in the eternal immutable act)," as the words are taken in Hebrews 5:5; and in the same way, they are true of this man in the resurrection, while also containing the reason for the resurrection, as the words are taken in Acts 13:33 (cf. P. Patrizi, *De Interpretatione SS.*, I, n. 36).

Still more definitely, the generation from the substance of the Father is declared in Psalm 109 (110):3, (1) as this passage of Scripture has been understood by the common consent of the Fathers.

(1) The Psalm, as no Christian denies, is about the Messiah; for this is clear, besides its internal evidence, from the citations of Christ the Lord Himself and the Apostles (Matthew 22:44; Acts 2:34–35; Hebrews 1:13; 5:6; 7:17; cf. 1 Corinthians 15:25; Hebrews 10:13). The words of the passage in question in Hebrew are: *'amkha nedavot beyom cheilekha behadre kodesh merechem mishchar lekha tal yaldutekha*. In our Vulgate, it reads: "With you is the principality in the day of your strength, in the splendors of the holy ones, from the womb before the morning star I have begotten you." The Septuagint and the Syriac version, which were translated directly from the Hebrew text, have it similarly: *meta sou he arche en hemera tes dynameos sou, en tais lamprotesi ton hagion sou, ek gastros pro heosphorou egennesa se*. The word *'am* seems not to have been in the text of the Alexandrians; for the rest, they read *'amkha nedavot… merechem mishchar…* The Syriac has: "from of old (from eternity) I have begotten a son." Thus, it also read *merechem* and took the noun *'am* for a related term in its language. As for the sense, the ancient versions—Jerome's, Aquila's, Symmachus's, Theodotion's, and the so-called Fifth and Sixth—agree (see Epiphanius, *Haereses* 65, n. 4, T. I, p. 610). Jerome translates: "as if from the womb, the dew of your youth will arise for you," and the others mentioned have it in nearly the same way (apud Epiphanius, loc. cit.). Jerome himself, in Micah 5:2 (T. VI, p. 489), along with the other Fathers, interprets the passage of the Psalm without any ambiguity as referring to the eternal generation of the Son of God. Petavius cites twenty most weighty Fathers who held it certain and established that this passage declares the eternal generation of the Son from the substance of the Father, to which many others could easily be added (*De Trinitate*, V, c. 7, nn. 4–5). Nor do I think any of the Fathers of the Church can be found who contradict this common interpretation. For if a few understand the "womb" here as the Virgin's, so that the sense would be: "I (the eternal Father) have begotten you from the womb of the Virgin (in the Incarnation)," it should not be thought that they differ from the others as regards the substance of the matter. For the generation of the Word is eternal, which, as it never began, so it never ceases, not as in human beings as an imperfect act tending toward a term, but as an act perpetually complete, having an immanent term always produced. Hence, in the Incarnation itself, the God-man is begotten from the eternal Father through the communication of the divine nature. Therefore, those doctors interpreting the womb of the Virgin do not thereby understand the passage as referring to the generation of Christ according to His human nature, but they understand the eternal generation from God the Father; however, they consider it in the incarnate Word, just as in the Psalm, the Messiah, namely the incarnate Word, is said to be begotten before the morning star. Those ancient doctors who can be said to understand the womb of the Virgin as named here include Justin (*Dialogue with Trypho*, n. 63), Tertullian (*Contra Marcionem*, V, 9), and Hesychius (on this passage). Indeed, Tertullian elsewhere (*Contra Praxeam*, c. 7 and 11) shows that the eternal generation is not excluded but included, interpreting the text of the Psalm simply as describing the divine generation "from the womb of the heart" of the eternal Father. Even Eusebius, who in his commentary on this passage seems to have understood it as generation from the mother, in *Demonstratio Evangelica* (IV, c. 14, pp. 176, 179) follows the common interpretation of divine generation. Thus, the consensus of the Fathers and the exegetical tradition is so constant and universal that, according to the principles of Catholic hermeneutics (Council of Trent, Session IV, Decree on the Use of Sacred Books), the interpretation of more recent scholars who impose an entirely different sense on the text, such that it no longer mentions the generation of the Son of God, must be considered false. What they say, that the Hebrew words do not allow the sense of our Vulgate, the ancient interpreters did not see, nor can it be

demonstrated by examining the words. Literally, the Hebrew words can be translated: "Your people are a freewill offering (cf. Romans 15:16) in the day of your strength (when you manifest and demonstrate your power in the redemption and subjection of all nations); in the splendors of the holy ones, from the morning womb, to you the dew of your birth." This second clause, declaring eternal generation, contains the reason for the victory described in the first clause, in the same way that in Acts 13:33, eternal generation contains the reason for the resurrection of Christ, the Son of God. Moreover, with the metaphor "from the morning womb (or from the womb of the dawn) to you the dew of your birth (or your birth is as the dew)," parallel passages, at least to some extent verbally and really, can be compared: "His going forth is prepared as the dawn (*mishchar*), and He will come to us as the early and late rain to the earth" (Hosea 6:3). "Drop down, O heavens, from above, and let the clouds rain the just" (Isaiah 45:8). Certainly, in these passages, the discourse is directly about generation according to human nature; nevertheless, they show that the metaphors of "dawn" and "dew from heaven" are not foreign to describing the birth of the Messiah, and moreover, eternal generation is implicitly contained in them. Both are explicitly joined in Micah 5:2–3: "And you, Bethlehem… from you shall come forth for me one who is to be ruler in Israel (cf. with you is the principality in the day of your strength), whose going forth is from of old, from the days of eternity" (cf. before the morning star I have begotten you). What the Vulgate says in this prophetic passage as "from of old" is in Hebrew *min-kedem*, which is the same word the Syriac has in the Psalm for what in Latin is "before the morning star" and in Hebrew "from the morning womb," so that this most ancient interpreter in the Psalm's version seems to have entirely referred to this passage of Micah.

With the words of the Psalm: "from the womb before the morning star I have begotten you," the declaration of John is parallel: "the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father" (*ho monogenes huios ho on eis ton kolpon tou patros*) (John 1:18). "When you hear 'womb' concerning God, say that the generative power of God (*to gennetikon tou theou*) has been manifestly revealed to you" (Basil, *Contra Eunomium* V, p. 316). Further, those passages should be compared in which hypostatic Wisdom is said to be possessed, conceived, brought forth, generated from eternity by Him whose Wisdom it is, the firstborn before all creation (Proverbs 8:22 sq.; Sirach 24:5; see Thesis VII).

II. We presuppose what has been demonstrated elsewhere concerning our mode of knowing divine things. Perfections in creatures are adumbrations and images of divine perfections. Hence, since we do not know God immediately in Himself in this life, the only way open to us for the knowledge of God is by concluding from the greatness of the species and the creature to the Creator: "For from the greatness and beauty of created things, the Creator of them is seen by analogy" (Wisdom 13:5). Without preconceived notions of perfections, which notions we draw from the consideration of creatures, God would remain unknown to us, nor could we in any way understand revelation about God, divine attributes, and persons. (I speak of the ordinary way in the present order, prescinding from the infusion of prophetic intellectual light, which is a certain participation and imitation of the light of glory.) Hence, divine revelation descends to us according to our mode, as Dionysius, St. Thomas, and other Scholastics are accustomed to say; that is, revelation presupposes in us multiple ideas of perfections and, with these, connects and renders intelligible to us the heavenly doctrine about God and divine things (see Thesis XIX). Therefore, the perfections we know in God by reason or revelation according to the analogy of creatures are most true in God, though in a different mode than in creatures; namely, in God, according to the exigency of the divine Being, they are in the purest act without limitation or imperfection, originally and exemplarily, while in creatures they are their adumbrations circumscribed by imperfection. Thus, the reality itself

revealed to us about God by the name of generation and the name of Son must be believed to be in God properly and without any imperfection that these notions implicitly have in creatures. Hence, supposing the revelation that there is a twofold procession in divine things, both indeed through the communication of nature, but such that one is properly generation and the other is not, we can also attain some understanding of this difference, since the proper notion of generation, by which it is distinguished from all other processions, is sufficiently known to us in creatures; but this procession, which in creatures is and is called generation, corresponds to generation in God not univocally but according to likeness and imitation (analogically), so that, as regards the reality signified, generation is most perfectly and most properly in God, according to some adumbration of the divine exemplar in creatures. "Since all our knowledge of God is taken from creatures, if there were agreement only in name (when we predicate perfections of God and creatures with the same name), we would know nothing of God except empty names to which no reality corresponds. It would also follow that all demonstrations given by philosophers about God would be sophistical… Therefore, it must be said that nothing is predicated univocally of God and creatures; however, what is commonly predicated (of God and creatures) is not predicated purely equivocally but analogically" (St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 7; cf. *Summa Theologica* I, q. 13, a. 5).

With these premises, all imperfections that any generation in creatures implicitly has, which, however, do not pertain to the proper notion of generation considered in itself, must first be set aside. The mode of this precision of imperfections is taught to us by revelation itself, not only by the general doctrine of God's infinite perfection but also by specifically declaring generation as intellectual. For under a twofold appellation, the proper notion of the second person of the Trinity is presented to us in all revelation: that He is the Son and the Word (*ho Logos*) of the Father. Both names designate one and the same notion (1), but under different analogies (Thesis XIX, n. I, 2°).

(1) "For He is the Son insofar as He is the Word, and He is the Word insofar as He is the Son" (Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, c. 2).

in a special communication of nature, which is generation. But in creatures, generation, and consequently a son, cannot occur in pure spirits, but only in corporeal beings; nor is generation by the communication of the entire substance that is in the generating principle, but by some vital separation and division from the substance of the generator; hence, the unity of nature between father and son is only a specific unity, not a numerical one, and furthermore, the father as a hypostasis is prior to the son. Consequently, the hypostases of father and son are not only distinct but separated in different natures numerically, with the other diversities that follow from the distinction of nature; hence, the likeness cannot be absolute, which coincides with the numerical unity of nature (Thesis XVI). However, all these imperfections inherent in generation in finite and corporeal beings are repugnant in God, an infinite spirit (1).

(1) On how the mode of emanation differs according to the diversity of beings and natures, from inanimate bodies up to the supreme spirit, God, see St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* IV, c. 11.

Hence, divine revelation expressly manifests the notion of intellectual generation, which alone can be fitting for a pure spirit, under the name of the Word. Even a created spirit, by understanding itself, produces its own word, as has been sufficiently discussed above. According to this analogy, it is easily understood that all those imperfections of corporeal generation, which we mentioned earlier, are excluded. Hence, the Fathers so diligently commend the comparison of the Word with the appellation of Son to

attain some understanding of the matter. See what we cited above, p. 288; cf. St. Thomas, *Compendium Theologiae*, c. 40. But the word in creatures falls short of perfection because it is not a substance, and thus the producer and the produced word cannot be two hypostases, nor can the generation of a word in creatures be called generation except improperly (cf. St. Thomas, *Compendium Theologiae*, c. 38). Therefore, both analogies must be combined, so that one complements the other, and what is perfectly expressed by both names, Son and Word, is understood as most perfect in God; but what is included in the signification of either, as derived from creatures, that involves imperfection is corrected by the signification of the other (2).

(2) From what has been said, it is clear that it is in no way permissible to consider the appellation of Son in the Holy Trinity as improper; indeed, there could be a suspicion of denying the real distinction of hypostases if someone, by comparing both revealed appellations, were to claim that only the Word, and not the Son, is properly named. This is what Pius VI (in the Bull *Auctorem Fidei*, in the epilogue) condemns in the Pistoian Synod among those things that "if not with a perverse mind, certainly slipped from the synod imprudently," namely, "that it teaches about the three divine persons themselves, that according to their personal and incommunicable properties, they are more precisely expressed or called Father, Word, and Holy Spirit, as if the appellation of Son, consecrated by so many passages of Scripture, were less proper and precise… and that it should not rather be held, as the Angelic Doctor, taught by Augustine, in turn teaches (*Summa Theologica* I, q. 34, a. 2, ad 3), that the same property is imported in the name of Word as in the name of Son, with Augustine saying: 'He is called Word for the same reason that He is called Son.'"

Now we could say: just as in corporeal emanations, not every production, even of living things, and even those from the substance of the producing principle, but only one special procession determined by its proper characteristics is properly called and is generation, so in spiritual processions, which are substantial only in God, the infinite spirit, only the procession through the formal notion of the intellect, and thus the procession of the Word, is properly generation and is revealed to us as such. But for some further analogical understanding, it is necessary for us not merely to analyze the essential marks of generation as we know them from creatures, but to consider the infinite perfection under the formal notion of generation in this intellectual procession of the Word, comparing these marks, stripped of imperfections, with the presupposed revealed dogma.

The very essence of generation properly so-called includes primarily a threefold mark: **a)** that it is the procession of a living being from a living being. For although even in inanimate things, the production of one by the power and operation of another is often called generation, as fire generates fire, etc., this is improper and essentially different from the proper generation of a living being from a living being. And indeed, generation is nobler the nobler the nature and life of the generator and the generated. Thus, generation in beings living with an animal life is nobler and specifically different (though generically similar) from generation in beings living only with a vegetative life; likewise, it is nobler in humans with rational life than in brute animals. However, because the power of propagation and the efficacy of generation, even in rational animals, is not from the nature formally as rational but as animal, the diversity is primarily constituted in the propagated nature and in the relation arising from generation. Hence, although generation is properly said to occur both in brute animals and in humans, in humans, father and son are more properly so. Further, therefore, generation would be still nobler in pure spirits living an intellectual life; but in finite spirits, what is produced by an intellectual act is not produced by the

propagation or communication of nature and thus is not a substance, and therefore there is no generation there. But in God, the infinite spirit and pure act, who is life itself essentially (*ho autozoe*), the Word is produced as substantial by an intellectual act, as shown above; and thus, from this first reason, insofar as it is the procession of a living being from a living being, generation in God is infinitely perfect, as the very life of God is infinitely perfect. "As the Father has life in Himself, so He has given to the Son to have life in Himself" (John 5:26); "Christ, the Son of the living God" (Matthew 16:16).

b) It is contained in the notion of generation that the production is from the substance of the generator: "For what is begotten from the nature of something and not acquired externally, that nature acknowledges as a son, and this is the signification of the name" (Athanasius, *De Decretis Nicaenis*, n. 10).

c) It is required that the production not only be from the substance and nature of the producer but that the nature of the producer be propagated or communicated in the product through an intrinsic principle, which we can call the principle of fecundity. This is what, as the ultimate difference distinguishing it from other productions, is included in the definition in which generation is called the procession of a living being from a living principle in the likeness of nature. Hence, the production of Eve from Adam's rib, although it might perhaps be called the procession of a living being from a living being, from the substance of Adam and even in the likeness of nature, was not generation, because it was not through a connatural principle of fecundity as through a cause from itself, but through the sole creative operation of God, where Adam's rib was in no way a connaturally efficient cause but merely a material cause, and that not per se and according to the established law of nature, but accidentally and beyond the law of nature.

Now, just as the first, so also these second and third notions of generation are found in creatures, but they are imperfect, as will be easily evident to one considering it. For this generation is annexed to material and corporeal things and is accomplished through acts of sensitive and animal life, which by their very nature belong to a lower and essentially imperfect order.

But in the communication of the divine nature, all these imperfections are excluded by the opposite infinite perfection. Generation there is intellectual, in the purest act, absolutely necessary, of substantial intellection, and thus it is not a transition from potency to act, but an eternal, necessary, complete act with an eternally produced term immanent to it. This very act, as having the Word as its immanent produced term, is the principle of fecundity; and thus, the principle of fecundity is not in potency or habit, but is the act itself, always complete by its necessary perfection. Hence, generation, as we cited above from the Fathers and St. Thomas, is in act as necessarily as God is necessarily understanding Himself and is intellectual life itself. Further, the divine essence is itself substantial intellection, and thus the procession there is according to the entire essence or substance of the producer, which is otherwise evident, since the divine substance, being most simple, has no parts. Hence, in the Word produced through the intellection by which the Father perfectly comprehends Himself, no numerically different essence is produced, but the same essence numerically is communicated and, as it were, radiated; the Son is from the substance of the Father in such a way that He is consubstantial with the Father (*homoousios*) (Thesis VIII, n. II).

From what has been said, therefore, it must be concluded thus: the more perfect the life in generation, the more perfect the production from the substance of the producer, the more perfect the communication and unity of nature in both, and the more essential and perfect the principle of fecundity in act, the more fully and perfectly is had what is signified by the name of generation. But in created generations, from which

we first derive the knowledge of such a special production and in which the first imposition of the name occurs, all those notions are indeed present but imperfectly; in God, according to the reality signified, they are most perfectly. Therefore, in the same way that we have said elsewhere about divine perfections, so too it must be judged about generation, and consequently about the appellations of Father and Son. According to the imposition of the name, they are first known and said of creatures; according to the reality signified, they are first in God with infinite perfection, and in creatures only analogically through some participation and adumbration derived from God the Creator. Thus, in the sense in which God alone is powerful, alone wise, in that fullest signification, generation, paternity, and filiation can be said to be in God alone. "It must be known that the names of paternity, filiation, and procession have not been transferred by us to the blessed Deity, but rather communicated from there to us, as the Apostle says (Ephesians 3:15): 'I bend my knees to the Father… from whom every paternity in heaven and on earth is named'" (John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, I, c. 8).

THESIS XXXI. On the reason why the procession of the third person is not generation.

« If the general notion of generation is refined from the revealed mystery itself, the mode of procession that we have shown to be taught in revelation provides the internal reason why the procession of the second person is generation, but that of the third person is not. »

Although from what we said in the previous thesis it is understood that the Word is properly begotten and properly the Son, if a comparison is made with generation in creatures and especially with the noblest generation, which is in human nature, it is not yet clear why the procession of the third person is not generation. Certainly, the three proper marks of generation mentioned in the previous thesis seem to apply no less to the procession of the third person than to the second. Here, I confess, although I do not find it noted by theologians, that our rational concept of the proper notion of generation has been refined to a fuller understanding from the revelation of the mystery, in much the same way as we demonstrated elsewhere (*Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis XXVI) that it is necessary to refine the merely rational concept of hypostasis in comparison with a singular and integral nature from truths known only by revelation.

In substantial corporeal processions, which alone occur in creatures, if they are through the communication of the same (specific) nature from an intrinsic principle of a living being, there is none that is not by that very fact generation. But in spiritual processions, which occur in God, revelation teaches us that the procession of the third person, although it is the production of a living being from a living being from an intimate principle of fecundity through the communication of the same (numerical) nature, is nevertheless not generation (1); but only the procession of the second person is truly and properly generation.

(1) Because no such procession is found in creatures, as St. Thomas notes, we do not have a special name for this production of the third person. "We cannot name God except from creatures; and because in creatures the communication of nature occurs only through generation, the procession in divine things does not have a proper or special name except that of generation. Hence, the procession that is not

generation remains without a special name; but it can be called spiration, because it is the procession of the Spirit" (*Summa Theologica* I, q. 27, a. 4, ad 3).

Therefore, it is necessary that, besides the three marks mentioned, there be some other essential mark proper to generation, by which the procession of the second person as generation is distinguished from the other procession, which is not generation.

1°. The further essential mark related to the first notion of generation lies in the very internal character of the producing act, namely, that the act by its nature is directed to expressing a substantial likeness of the producer; or, in other words, it is required for the true notion of generation that, from the very mode of procession, a substantial image of the producer be produced. If this mark is essential, it must certainly be found in every generation, even in creatures; but in created processions, the production of a living being from a living being through the communication of nature from an intrinsic principle of fecundity always has an act by its nature ordered to producing a substantial image of the producer; and therefore, it would never have been noticed that this last mark is distinct and separable from the prior ones, and that there could be a production according to all three prior marks that is not an expression of an image and generation—this, I say, would never have been noticed unless revelation had taught us that in God there is indeed such a procession which, although it has those three intimate marks, is not generation, and thus the proceeding term is not a Son. In the same way, we saw (*Treatise on the Incarnation*, loc. cit.) that in the concept of hypostasis, which is a singular, integral substance complete in itself, this last mark is understood to be distinct and separable from the prior ones not by the light of reason alone but by the light of revelation concerning the mystery of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation.

Therefore, in the customary definition of generation, that it is "the production of a living being from a living principle in the likeness of nature" (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 27, a. 2), the last part must be taken in a formal sense (as they say), not merely in a material sense; that is, it must not only be a likeness from elsewhere, but from the very mode of procession.

Now, the difference between the expression of a word through intellection and the procession of love through volition is evident. The intellect, by the very nature of its act of understanding, produces an expressed likeness of the thing understood; the will, by willing, by the nature of its act, does not produce a likeness of the thing loved, but an inclination toward and complacency in it. Thus, the first divine person, by understanding Himself with an infinite substantial intellection, by the very nature of such an act expresses a substantial, adequate image of Himself; and therefore, this is most truly and properly generation, and thus there is properly a Father and a Son. But the Father and the Son, by loving themselves with a substantial love, produce an immanent term, substantial love, which indeed, as substantial and thus identified with the divine essence, is true God, one with the Father and Son; but the love in the Father and Son, by its formal notion of love, does not tend to express an image, nor can love, by its formal notion as love, be understood as an image of the thing loved; although the love proceeding in God, insofar as it is the divine substance, is one with the Father and Son. "Just as the Holy Spirit, although by His procession He receives the nature of the Father as the Son does, is not said to be born; so, although He receives a likeness of the Father's species (although He is of one nature and perfection with the Father), He is not said to be an image; because the Son proceeds as the Word, whose notion includes the likeness of species to that from which He proceeds, but this is not part of the notion of love; although this befits the love that is the Holy Spirit insofar as it is divine love" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q.

35, a. 2). Therefore, because the formal notion of love does not refer to expressing a likeness of the lover, and the formal notion of love is not a representation and image of the producer, the production of love is not generation; but it has a reason distinct from generation, which can and is usually called spiration (as we have explained elsewhere). By Augustine, it is called a giving (*datio*), that is, the procession of the Holy Spirit through love as donable: "He (the Holy Spirit) came forth not as born, but as given; and therefore He is not called a Son" (*De Trinitate* V, n. 14).

In this matter of how the procession of the third person differs from generation, Augustine confesses that he found the greatest difficulty (*De Trinitate* XV, n. 45). Often, he proposes only the reason that the Spirit proceeds not from the Father alone but from the Father and the Son together (*In Johannem*, tract. 99, n. 9; *Contra Maximinum* II, c. 14, n. 10; *De Trinitate* XV, n. 47, 48, and elsewhere). But he himself perceived that this does not sufficiently explain the difference and that it remains "most difficult to distinguish generation from procession" (loc. cit.). Finally, however, he indicated that the intimate reason must be sought in the fact that the Word, as the image of the Father and thus by generation as the Son, proceeds; but the love that is the Holy Spirit does not proceed by the formal notion of an image and therefore not by generation. This he explained by the analogy of a created spirit, where from the thinking memory proceeds an expressed thought or word as the perfect image of the mind or thinking memory; but love proceeds from the thinking memory and from the formed thought or word, yet not as an image of the thinker and the thought, since to behold by thought and to desire or enjoy by will are by no means similar per se, or do not have between them the relation of archetype and expressed image. "O my soul, lift up your eyes to that very light and fix them on it, if you can; for thus you will see what distinguishes the birth of the Word of God from the procession of the Gift of God… Hence, although there is a certain consubstantial communion of the Father and the Son in the Spirit of both, He is not, heaven forbid, called the son of both. But to see this clearly and distinctly, you cannot fix your gaze there; I know, you cannot… Yet that light itself shows you those three things in you, in which you might recognize an image of the Trinity, of that highest reality which you cannot yet contemplate with fixed eyes. It shows you that the true word is in you when it is begotten from your knowledge, that is, when our thought is formed from what we know… and there is in the mind of the thinker a most similar image of the thought that the memory contained, these two, as it were parent and offspring, being joined by a third, the will or love. This will, indeed, proceeds from the thought, for no one wills what he does not know at all or what it is like, yet it is not an image of the thought, and thus a certain distinction is intimated in this matter between intelligible birth and procession; for to behold by thought is not the same as to desire or even to enjoy by will, as one who can discern sees and distinguishes. You too could see this, although you could not and cannot express with sufficient eloquence what, amid the clouds of corporeal similitudes that do not cease to occur to human thoughts, you have barely seen" (Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, c. 27, n. 50). See St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 27, a. 4; *Contra Gentiles* IV, c. 19; Suarez, *De Trinitate* XI, c. 5, 6; Petavius, *De Trinitate* VII, c. 14; cf. V, c. 18; Pallavicini, *Cursus Theologicus* VIII, 2°, c. 47, n. 482 sqq.

It remains for the conclusion of this discussion to declare the notion of image. In the Scriptures themselves, the notion of a substantial image is undoubtedly presented as a property of the Son. "The image of the invisible God" (Colossians 1:15; 2 Corinthians 4:4); "the splendor of glory and the figure of His substance" (Hebrews 1:3); "the vapor of the power of God and a certain emanation of the brightness of the almighty God, pure, the radiance of eternal light, and the spotless mirror of the majesty of God, and the image of His goodness" (Wisdom 7:25–26). This same property of image, which, as can now be clear from what has been said, does not differ from filiation except as a definition from the thing defined, has

been claimed for the Son by the Fathers and theologians and explained in many ways. Nevertheless, many Greek Fathers, as seen in Petavius (*De Trinitate* VII, c. 7), called the Holy Spirit an image, a seal, and a natural image of the Son. But if this were said of the Holy Spirit with the same property by which the notion of image belongs to the Son, it could not be shown why the Holy Spirit is not also a Son. Therefore, it must be noted that for the proper notion of an image, three things are required:

a) It is required that there be a likeness to that of which it is said to be the image. This first requirement is indeed necessary but by no means sufficient. For an image corresponds to its exemplar or archetype as its correlate; but between these two, there is a relation of derivation of the image from the archetype, since the notion of imitation is inherent in the image; hence, neither can one be called the image of the other where there is no such relation of derivation between two similar things, much less can the archetype be called the image of what is derived from it.

b) Therefore, it is required that the image be derived from its archetype, that is, from that of which it is said to be the image. "Every image is like that of which it is the image; but not everything that is like something is also its image; as in a mirror or a painting, because they are images, they are also like; but if one is not born from the other, neither can be called the image of the other. For an image is so when it is expressed from something" (Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram Imperfectum*, n. 5). Therefore, if these two (likeness and derivation) are present, what is derived and similar to another can, in a less strict sense, be called the image of its principle. Thus, from that manner of speaking of the Greek Fathers, who call the Holy Spirit an image and a natural image and seal of the Son, their faith in the procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son is rightly demonstrated.

c) However, for the proper notion of an image, not just any derivation suffices; but it is necessary that the very mode of derivation or

procession by its formal notion tends to express a likeness. Hence, from what we have said about generation, it is evident that, in the proper sense, a natural or substantial image cannot exist except through generation. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is not, in the proper sense, an image of the Father and the Son, especially when compared with the notion by which the Son is the image of the Father. For the Son is the image of the Father not only by the most perfect likeness, which, while preserving the distinction of persons, consists in the numerical identity of nature with all absolute perfection (see above, Thesis XVI), but also by the mode of procession, because the Word is expressed formally as a substantial likeness of the Father. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 35 (1).

(1) I believe no one will find difficulty in the fact that we seem to explain generation from the notion of image and, conversely, the proper notion of a natural image from generation. For these two mutually imply each other, and depending on which is considered more evident, one is demonstrated from the other. Moreover, we do not simply explain one from the other, but both from the mode of procession, which in its formal notion tends to express a likeness.

3°. Related to the appellation of image is the fact that the Holy Spirit is called by some Fathers the Word of the Son, and by St. Basil (*Contra Eunomium* V, p. 305) and St. Cyril (*Thesaurus* V, Part I, p. 344), the mind of the Son. These names can be understood in two ways: **a)** in such a way that they signify the procession and the mode of procession through the formal notion of the intellect, and thus, from the very

mode of procession, the comprehension and representation of all eternal reasons and ideas. In this proper sense, only the Son is the Word, and in the same relative signification, the expressed mind of the Father (see above, Thesis XXVI). **b)** The terms "Word" and "mind" (proceeding) can be used only to signify procession without determining the mode, that is, such that the appellation is not derived from the mode of procession but from the proclamation of truth ad extra. Thus, those Fathers call the Holy Spirit the Word and the mind (expressed) of the Son because He proceeds from Him and teaches all truth and does not speak from Himself (as if existing without a producing principle); but whatever He hears (by proceeding), He speaks. "Since the Holy Spirit is the mind of the Son, according to the blessed Paul who says: 'We have the mind of Christ,' He will entirely speak and arrange those things which the Son Himself, whose mind He is, does. Therefore, He affirmed that the Spirit will say nothing of Himself, as if He had said: 'I am the one who speaks again'; just as if the mind in a human were to say about the word proceeding in it: 'It will not speak from itself, but whatever it hears, it will speak'… The same must be thought of the Holy Spirit. For since He is the mind of Christ, He speaks to the disciples all that is in Him, not by a will proper to Himself, nor teaching by a will foreign to Him in whom and from whom He is, but as naturally proceeding from His essence (*hos ek tes ousias autou physikos proion*) and having His entire will as well as His operation" (St. Cyril, loc. cit.). See Petavius, *De Trinitate* VII, c. 7, n. 5 sqq.

What needed to be said about the individual persons, we have now covered in this treatise; for without them, the Trinity in its entirety, the processions, and the mode of processions could not be explained. However, one topic remains, both in itself and due to the polemical reasons of great importance, which we now undertake.

SECTION III. ON THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

CHAPTER I. ON THE IMMANENT PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT FROM THE FATHER AND THE SON AS REVEALED IN THE SACRED SCRIPTURES

THESIS XXXII. The procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son is demonstrated from the clear doctrine of the Scriptures.

« The procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son as well as from the Father is demonstrated from the manifest doctrine of the Son Himself recorded in the Scriptures (John 16:13 seq.); also from the relation of the Spirit to the Son indicated in many places, no differently than He is the Spirit of the Father. »

I. Most clearly, the Son declares not only the relation of the Holy Spirit to Himself but also the reason for this relation in John 16:13–15, in such a way that, by the very fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, He is said to proceed equally from the Son, because, although the Father is not the Son, all perfections and formal notions (except being Father and being Son, or, what is the same, except the generation of the Word and the formal notion of the Word) are entirely common and one in the Father and the Son, and thus there is also in both one power or one act of spirating the third person through the communication of one essence.

"When He, the Spirit of truth (*to Pneuma tes aletheias*), comes, He will teach you all truth; for He will not speak from Himself, but whatever He hears, He will speak; and He will announce to you the things to

come. He will glorify Me, because He will take from what is Mine and announce it to you. All that the Father has is Mine; therefore I said, because He will take from what is Mine and announce it to you." The Spirit of truth, *to Pneuma tes aletheias*, teaching all truth, is Himself the absolute truth, *he aletheia*, about which there is no need to speak now; for the divinity of the third person is here presupposed.

1°. Now, the Spirit of truth "will not speak from Himself, but whatever He hears, He will speak"; indeed, this is given as the reason and explanation why He is the absolute truth: He will teach all truth, for He will not speak from Himself. These words about a divine person evidently cannot have any other meaning than that His speaking, teaching, and absolute wisdom are not from Himself, that is, not uncommunicated; but they are communicated to Him by another divine person, who is the principle of His origin. For this hearing and learning in a divine person can signify nothing other than the communication of wisdom, which is identified with the divine essence. In the same way, the Son demonstrates His procession from the Father: "He who sent Me is true; and what I have heard from Him, I speak in the world; and they did not know that He was calling God His Father" (John 8:26, 28; cf. 7:16; 12:49–50); "The Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He sees the Father doing; for whatever He does, the Son does likewise; for the Father loves the Son and shows Him all that He Himself does" (John 5:19).

2°. If it is certain, and cannot be denied without perverting the divinity of the person and the entire economy of the mystery, that the person from whom the Holy Spirit is said to hear is the principle of His procession communicating the essence, it remains only to inquire who that person is.

a) It is evident that it is the Son from whom the Spirit of truth, speaking nothing from Himself, is said to hear. Although this were not expressly stated, it would already be clear from the very purpose of the discourse; for in these words, Christ gives the reason why and how His doctrine and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit are necessarily one, as St. Cyril of Alexandria excellently notes (*Thesaurus* V, Part I, p. 350; cf. *In Johannem* XI, T. IV, p. 930): "Lest anyone suspect that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit might sometimes not be according to His mind, He clearly shows that, since He is the Spirit of the Son, He will also administer words from the Son… as if honey, from its natural quality, were to say: it will impart nothing to the sense of those tasting it from itself, but it will take from what is Mine."

b) Also with express words, the Son declares Himself to be the one from whom the Holy Spirit hears, and hears by proceeding from Him. "He will glorify Me, because He will take from what is Mine." Here, first of all, the absurd distortion of some more recent Greeks must be rejected, who interpret *ek tou emou* as "from My Father." Such a sense could not underlie the phrase, since the name of the Father does not precede it, and it is clearly excluded by what follows. For "Mine" (*to emon* or *ta ema*) is repeated in the plural: "All that the Father has is Mine (*ta ema esti*); therefore I said, because He will take from what is Mine (*ek tou emou lambanei*);" where it is evident that "Mine" and "what is Mine" do not refer to the Father but designate what is in the Son, communicated by the Father (1).

(1) See in Bessarion's *Golden Opuscula*, the dissertation on the Procession of the Holy Spirit, p. 241, where he shows that, even considering grammar alone, the pronoun *ek tou emou* cannot refer to the Father.

c) Moreover, all the Fathers, even the Greek ones, understood that what is signified in the neuter gender is what is in the Son, not in the masculine gender referring to the Father. "The Spirit takes from the Son (*ek*

tou Huiou lambanei), and He says, 'He will take from what is Mine'" (Athanasius, *Ad Serapionem*, ep. I, n. 20). "The Spirit does not join the Word to the Father; but rather the Spirit takes from the Word (*alla mallon to Pneuma para tou Logou lambanei*)… He (the Son) gives to the Spirit (*didōsi tō Pneumati*), as it will be said, and whatever the Spirit has, it has from the Word (*kai hosa echei to Pneuma, para tou Logou echei*)" (*Oratio III Contra Arianos*, n. 24). "The Spirit proceeds from Me (*par' emou hormatai*); but when I say from Me, I also signify from the Father, for Mine are those things which are the Father's; therefore, understand in this way that 'He will take from what is Mine'" (Apollinarius, in Corderius's *Catena*, p. 396). "'He will take from what is Mine,' that is, what I have said, He will say… He will speak what is Mine" (Chrysostom, *In Johannem*, hom. 78, al. 77, n. 2). "Since the Spirit is consubstantial with the Son and proceeds through Him in a manner befitting God (*kai tropō theoprepōs di' autou*), having all His most perfect power and efficacy in all things, therefore He says: because He will take from what is Mine. It is therefore entirely beyond reproach and calumny if the Spirit is said to take anything from the Only-Begotten; for since He naturally proceeds through Him, as His proper Spirit, with all the divine attributes He perfectly possesses, He is said to take what is His" (*proiōn gar di' autou physikōs, hōs idion Pneuma autou, meta pantōn hōn echei teleiōs, lambanein legetai ta autou*) (Cyril, *In Johannem*, T. IV, p. 929–930). Thus, without any doubt, the words "He will take from what is Mine" signify taking from what belongs to the Son.

3°. He does not only take from these things insofar as they are in the Father, which is another cavil of the schismatics, but formally insofar as they are in the Father and the Son.

a) The same reasons that prove that the taking is signified as from what belongs to the Son also prove that it is signified as taking from what belongs to the Son formally. For it concerns what is internal to the person, where if "taking from what is Mine" does not signify taking from what is Mine as Mine and taking from Me, but one may introduce such glosses without any foundation in the words themselves, what interpretation of either Scripture or human speech would remain safe?

b) Although the Holy Spirit equally glorifies the Father, the Son, and Himself, here, through the phrase "because He will take from what is Mine," the immediate reason is given why He glorifies the Son; and thus, it must necessarily be understood as taking from the Son.

c) Christ gives the reason why the Holy Spirit takes from Him, although He had just said that He proceeds from the Father (John 15:26). By this very fact, namely, that He proceeds from the Father, He takes in the same way and thus proceeds from the Son. For since all that the Father has (except the sole formal notion of Father) is numerically the same as the Son's, among these things common to the Father and the Son, He expressly teaches that the power and act of communicating all things to the Holy Spirit, that is, of spirating the Holy Spirit through the communication of the essence with all absolute perfections, is included. "All that the Father has is Mine; therefore I said, because He will take from what is Mine." This statement of Christ the Lord, in the form of an enthymeme, can be resolved into a syllogism: All that the Father has is Mine; but the Father has the power of a principle, so that the Holy Spirit takes from what is the Father's; therefore, the same power of a principle is also Mine, so that the Holy Spirit takes from what is Mine. "Therefore, He took from the Son, and all that the Father has is the Son's, which the Holy Spirit took, because He proceeds not from the Father alone, nor from the Son alone, but from both together" (Fulgentius, *Contra Fabianum*, fragm. 17, p. 612).

d) Hence, when the holy Fathers intend to express the personal character of the Holy Spirit in the very words of Scripture, they often combine these two from John 15 and 16: "The Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and takes from the Son (or from what belongs to the Son, or what is the Son's)" (Athanasius, *Ad Serapionem*, ep. I, n. 20; Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechesis* XVI, n. 24; Epiphanius, *Ancoratus*, n. 67, 73; *Haereses* LXIV, n. 4; Didymus of Alexandria, *De Spiritu Sancto* [in St. Jerome's translation], n. 34; Hilary, *De Trinitate* VIII, n. 20; Ambrose, *In Lucam* VIII, n. 66; James of Sarug, in Assemani, *Bibliotheca Orientalis* I, p. 302; Syriac liturgies of St. Dionysius, Marutha, Xystus, in Renaudot, *Liturgiae Orientales*; other Fathers).

4°. One difficulty remains, which the Photian heretics use as their principal argument to evade the force of this and other testimonies. It can be said, namely, that this passage does not speak of the immanent and eternal procession of the Holy Spirit but of His operation in time and ad extra. For it is not said that the Holy Spirit takes a communicated essence, but that He takes from the doctrine of Christ, and that in the future, namely, for the time of inspiration in the Apostles and assistance in the Church, and thus according to an operation ad extra.

Such objections, which propose that the mission, emanation, or any taking of one divine person from another (unless perhaps it concerns the Son incarnate according to His assumed humanity) exclude an internal procession, these objections of the schismatics, I say, demonstrate that they pervert the very notion and the entire mystery of the Holy Trinity. In one word, we could respond that whatever and however one divine person (having only one nature) is said to take or rather receive from another divine person, it cannot be said or conceived without perverting the entire mystery unless an internal procession is presupposed. For God can take nothing to Himself from another, except insofar as one person is related to another by origin; but this origin is through the communication of the divine essence itself. Nevertheless, let us consider the words of Christ the Lord individually.

a) It is evident that the discourse is not only indeterminately about an operation ad extra, but at least it expresses the operation of the Holy Spirit in such a way that it is communicated by the Son. This is shown both by the negative statement: "He will not speak from Himself"; and by the affirmation: "Whatever He hears, He will speak, He will take from what is Mine and announce it to you." But just as action in the divine persons is nothing other than the divine essence itself (with respect to what is ad extra), so the communication of operation from one person to another is nothing other than the communication of the essence or divine nature. Hence, the Son also demonstrates His procession from the Father from the unity of action, which is communicated from the Father to the Son, as we said earlier.

b) What that "Mine" is, from which the Holy Spirit is said to take, can be inquired in two ways: what it is *formally* and according to a distinction of reason, and what it is *identically* and *really*. In the formal signification, a distinction must again be made between what is internally communicated to the divine person and what, from this, passes to the creature. In this last signification, that "Mine" is the announcement of doctrine and the doctrine itself: "He will announce to you the things to come"; "He will take from what is Mine and announce it to you." To this transient action corresponds and is presupposed in the divine person an immanent wisdom and knowledge, and this immanent wisdom is said to be taken by the Spirit of truth from the Son, the truth; for only in such a manner of taking can one divine person hear from another person. Therefore, in the formal signification, that "Mine" which the Spirit of truth is said to take, communicated by the Son, is absolute wisdom with respect to the doctrine to be inspired and

announced ad extra. But indeed, absolute wisdom, identically and really, is the divine essence itself. See John the Theologian in the Council of Florence (*Hardouin* IX, p. 255, 258).

Hence, we have seen that the Son declares His procession from the Father through the knowledge and wisdom communicated to Him by the Father. "This is, 'The Father taught Me' (John 8:26), that is, by generating Me as knowing, He gave Me to be, so by generating He gave Me to know" (Augustine, *In Johannem*, tract. XL, n. 5). So too, for the Holy Spirit, this is to know by hearing from the Son, and by taking from what is the Father's and the Son's, which is to be by proceeding from the Father and the Son. "He will not speak from Himself, because He is not from Himself; but whatever He hears, He will speak; He will hear from Him from whom He proceeds. For Him, to hear is to know, and to know is to be; as discussed above. Therefore, because He is not from Himself, but from Him from whom He proceeds, from whom He has His essence, from Him He has knowledge; from Him, therefore, is His hearing, which is nothing other than knowledge. But from whom the Son has that He is God, for He is God from God, from Him He certainly has that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him; and thus, the Holy Spirit, that He proceeds also from the Son as He proceeds from the Father, He has from the Father Himself" (Augustine, *In Johannem*, tract. XCIX, n. 4, 8; cf. *Contra Sermonem Arianorum*, c. 23). Most worthy of reading is Didymus, *De Spiritu Sancto*, n. 36–37, in St. Jerome's translation.

c) From what has been said, it is clear how the future tense form, "He will hear," "He will take," is to be understood. The hearing and taking immanent to the divine person is eternal with respect to a temporal effect ad extra. If, therefore, it is considered as immanent and eternal, without succession, it always was, is, and will be, and thus every temporal thing, when it exists, coexists with it. In this sense, we said elsewhere that the Son is eternally generated by the Father even when, according to His humanity, He is born of the Virgin and rises from the dead. Hence, of eternity, no time is properly past, present, or future, but in some sense, past, present, and future can be stated, insofar as times in their succession coexist with unchangeable eternity (see *Treatise on God*, Theses XXXI, XXXII). Thus, also of the eternal immanent taking of wisdom and essence with respect to a future effect ad extra, the future tense can be used: "He will hear," "He will take," and "He will announce"; by which it is not signified that the hearing and taking then begin, but that He hears and takes even then when the effect ad extra first really exists. In one word: The Holy Spirit eternally hears and takes from the Son with respect to an effect in time, which, when Christ was speaking, was still promised as future; therefore, the hearing and taking, which is eternal and thus also exists then when the effect exists, could be stated in the form of the future tense on account of this operation and this future effect ad extra.

For the Greek Fathers who, from this testimony of John 16, teach the procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son, see meanwhile Petavius, *De Trinitate* VII, c. 6.

II. The Holy Spirit is relatively said to be the Spirit of another person; for in an absolute signification, the name "Spirit" and "Holy" is not proper to one but entirely common to the three persons (Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, c. 11). Therefore, insofar as the name is proper to the third person, distinguishing Him from the other persons, it is taken relatively, just as all other personal names in the Holy Trinity, so that "Spirit" (*Pneuma*) is the same as "spirated" or "spiration" (*pnoē*), and thus expresses a relation of origin to that person and a procession or being spirated from the person of whom He is said to be the Spirit (cf. above, p. 365).

Athanasius, in his book *De Trinitate et Spiritu Sancto* (which is also published as Book XII *De Trinitate* among the works of Vigilius of Thapsus in an ancient Latin translation preserved for us, and is unhesitatingly judged by the Maurists to be a genuine work of Athanasius), excellently explains this relative signification: "God sent the Spirit of His Son into our hearts. Seeing also the Only-Begotten breathing on the face of the Apostles and saying, 'Receive the Holy Spirit,' we are taught that the Spirit is the spiration of the Son, remaining in His own life and substance, and we understand that He is neither begotten nor a creature from the Son… But the Spirit is not begotten from Him, because He is not His Word; but to call the Spirit a creature, far be it! Yet we have been taught from the holy Scriptures that He is the spiration of the Son of God, and we call both the Spirit and the Son a source" (Athanasius, loc. cit., n. 19). The same calls the Spirit "the spiration and good odor of the Son" (*pnoē, eudia tou Huiou*) (*Ad Serapionem*, ep. 1, n. 23–24; ep. 3, n. 3). Augustine explains this most clearly: "Our faith is to believe and confess that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God; yet we do not call Him who is the Son the Father, nor Him who is the Father the Son, nor Him who is the Spirit of the Father and the Son either Father or Son. For by these appellations is signified their relation to one another, not the substance by which they are one. For when the Father is named, He is named only as the Father of a Son, and the Son is understood only as the Son of a Father, and the Spirit, according to what is referred to something, is of someone spirating, and the spirating one is certainly the one spirating the Spirit… But the Holy Spirit is said in a certain proper (hypostatic) way, according to His relation to the Father and the Son, that He is their Holy Spirit" (Augustine, *Epistle* 238, al. 164, n. 14–15, to Pascentius; *De Trinitate* V, n. 12). Likewise Fulgentius: "The Father is begotten by none, the Son is begotten by the Father, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. The Father is not for Himself but for the Son; the Son is not for Himself but for the Father; the Spirit is of someone spirating; therefore, He is referred to the Father and the Son. Thus, these relative names constitute the Trinity; but the essential names are in no way tripled" (Fulgentius, *Ad Felicem Notarium de Trinitate*, c. 2; *Epistle* 14, n. 9, to Ferrandus the Deacon). In the profession of faith of the Council of Worms (1), this is proposed: "We believe the Holy Spirit—proceeding from the Father and the Son—to be the Spirit of both… He is called the Spirit not of the Father alone nor of the Son alone, but of both the Father and the Son. In the relative names of the persons, the Father is referred to the Son, the Son to the Father, the Holy Spirit to both" (Mansi, *Concilia* XV, p. 868).

(1) This was held as a "general council," namely of all Germany, in the year 868; nor does it seem that the Fathers polemically addressed the heresy of Photius, which, although it began to be promulgated at this time in 867, but they simply issued a profession of the Catholic faith.

(2) The Greek Catholics Beccus, Bessarion (*Golden Opuscula*, p. 141, 245), Jerome Donatus (*Mai, Scriptores Veteres Nova Collectio* VII, Part II, p. 59), all

(Apostle), He is not His. Therefore, the Spirit is from God and is the Spirit of God; but the Son, since He is from God (the Father), is not now the Son of the Spirit Himself (*tou Pneumatos* is or is said to be), nor is this relative sequence reversible" (because, namely, the person of whom He is said to be the Son or the Spirit is understood to proceed from that person). Basil: "The Apostle has clearly shown that the Holy Spirit shines forth through the Son, naming Him the Spirit of the Son just as He is the Spirit of God; and he called Him the mind of Christ, just as He is the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. 2:11) (*Contra Eunomium* V, T. I, p. 305). Likewise, Cyril: "Just as He is the proper Spirit of the Son, naturally existing in Him and proceeding through Him, so too He is (the Spirit) of the Father" (Cyril, *In Joannem* I, X, p. 910; *Epistle*

17, Synodical to Nestorius, T. V, Part II, Epistles, p. 74). Then St. Maximus: "The Holy Spirit, just as He is by nature according to essence the Spirit of God and the Father, so too is He according to essence the Spirit of the Son, as proceeding essentially from the Father through the Son who is begotten" (Maximus, *In Scriptura, Quaestiones* 63, *Opera* T. I, pp. 238–239, cited also in Beccus, *Opuscula Aurea*, p. 117). For Augustine, the terms are synonymous, whether the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son or is said to proceed from the Son. "Nor can we say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son; for it is not in vain that the same Spirit is called both the Spirit of the Father and the Spirit of the Son" (Augustine, *De Trinitate* IV, n. 29; XV, n. 47; *Contra Maximinum* II, c. 14, n. 1, and often elsewhere). "Since the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of both the Father and the Son, not as any creature that belongs to both the Father and the Son, but as living and powerful with both, and eternally subsisting from that which the Father and the Son are" (St. Leo the Great, *Sermon on Pentecost* I, c. 3; cf. *Sermon* 2, c. 2; *Epistle* 15 to Turribius, c.; and Vigilius of Thapsus [or another], *Contra Varimadum* II, c. 12). So too St. Fulgentius: "Hold most firmly and in no way doubt that the same Holy Spirit, who is the one Spirit of the Father and the Son, proceeds from the Father and the Son. For the Son says: 'When the Spirit of truth comes, who proceeds from the Father,' He taught that He is His Spirit; for He Himself is the truth" (Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum* c. 11; *De Incarnatione ad Scarilam* n. 3).

They have: "*ek tou Patros legetai kai ek tou Huiou einai proslambanetai*." We will discuss this reading below; meanwhile, note that Petavius's argument is mistaken (*De Trinitate* VII, c. 5, n. 12), where he thought the reading *tou Huiou einai proslambanetai* should be preferred because it is followed by the citation from the Apostle: "If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not His."

Certainly, no one could deny, except most absurdly, and even the Photians must admit, that in the expressions "Spirit of God" (Matt. 3:16; Rom. 8:9, 14; 1 Cor. 2:10–11), "Spirit of the Lord" (Luke 4:18; Acts 5:9; 8:39; 2 Cor. 3:17–18), and "Spirit of the Father" (Matt. 10:20), it is signified that He is spirated from God, from the Lord, from the Father. If they dared to deny this, they would be refuted by the Scriptures themselves, where the meaning of this appellation "Spirit of God" is explained by the definition: "The Spirit who is from God," *to Pneuma to ek tou Theou* (1 Cor. 2:11–12). Yet, no less than "Spirit of God" and "Spirit of the Father," the proper designation of the third person is in relation to the Son: "Spirit of the Son" (Gal. 4:6), "Spirit of Christ" (Rom. 8:9; 1 Pet. 1:11), "Spirit of Jesus Christ" (Phil. 1:19), "Spirit of Jesus" (Acts 16:7). And truly, this appellation, as equally proper and in the same form of speech, is conjoined with the other, "Spirit of God." "You are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if indeed the Spirit of God dwells in you; but if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not His" (Rom. 8:9). If the three designations are compared, in the first ("Spirit of God" or "Spirit of the Lord"), the name of God and Lord presents every divine person who is not the Holy Spirit Himself as the principle of the Holy Spirit; thus, the complex proposition is resolved into two others by distinguishing the persons included in the name of God and Lord: "Spirit of the Father," "Spirit of the Son." By the same reasoning, creation is sometimes attributed indistinctly to God and the Lord, and sometimes, by distinguishing the persons, to the Father, the Son, or the Spirit, or conjointly to the three persons (see Thesis XII). Therefore, just as the three persons are one creator, because they operate ad extra not as distinct but as one, with one creative power, which is the divine essence; so too the Father and the Son are one spirator, insofar as they are one in essence under the formal notion of spirative power, that is, of love producing love. When it is said "Spirit of God," one principle of spiration is signified, and a distinction of the persons who spirate, or who are the principle of spiration, is supposed. When it is said separately "Spirit of the Father" and "Spirit of the Son," one spirating person is explicitly signified, and the other is

implicitly supposed. For He is the Spirit of the Father as communicating the spirative power also to the Son, and the Spirit of the Son as having the communicated spiration from the Father, in the same way as we said elsewhere, that by ascribing an absolute attribute or operation ad extra to one person, the other persons are not excluded but included.

Thus, the expression "Spirit of God" must be resolved conjointly, not disjunctively, into two: "Spirit of the Father" and "Spirit of the Son," or into a copulative proposition: "Spirit of the Father and the Son." "The Holy Spirit, who is equally from God and is God; for He is the Spirit of God, and the Spirit of the Father and the Spirit of the Son, not according to any composition, as in us there is soul and body, but as the middle between the Father and the Son, third in appellation from the Father and the Son" (Epiphanius, *Ancoratus* n. 8). "Since the Holy Spirit dwelling in us makes us conformable to God, and truly also proceeds from the Father and the Son; it is manifest that He is of the divine essence, essentially in it (as His own) and proceeding from it (as from the Father and the Son, as from a principle)" (Cyril, *Thesaurus* p. 585).

THESIS XXXIII. Demonstration of the same truth from the necessary order of origin of the persons and from the mission of the Spirit by the Son.

« The same procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son is demonstrated from the revealed internal order of the persons, which can only be an order of origin; and likewise from the mission of the Holy Spirit, which, necessarily presupposing the internal procession of the sent person from the sender, is from the Son just as it is from the Father. »

I. The order of the divine persons is delivered in the Scriptures themselves as entirely fixed and certain, wherever the three divine persons are enumerated according to their internal necessary relations: "in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" (Matt. 28:19); "the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit" (1 John 5:7); and, beginning with the third person as if from the other extreme: "the same Spirit, the same Lord, the same God" (1 Cor. 12:4–6). Regarding this passage of the Apostle, St. Basil observes that an ontological order is not reversed, but it exhibits "our relation; for when we receive gifts, first the distributor comes to us, then we think of the sender (the Son), then we lead our thought to the source and cause of the goods" (to the first person, who is not from another and from whom the other persons are) (Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto* c. 16, n. 39). "Thus, the way to the knowledge of God is from the one Spirit through the one Son to the one Father. And conversely, the essential goodness and holiness according to nature and royal dignity flow from the Father through the Only-Begotten to the Spirit" (ibid., c. 18, n. 47; cf. St. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* V, c. 36, n. 2).

Moreover, the Christian profession, expressed in all creeds, in solemn liturgical formulas, and in the universal preaching of the Church, does not allow doubt about this ontological and intrinsically necessary order of the persons. "Let them learn that the Spirit is pronounced in the same way with the Lord (the Son), just as the Son is pronounced with the Father. For the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is similarly set forth. Thus, just as the Son is related to the Father, so too the Spirit is related to the Son according to the order of the words delivered in baptism. But if the Spirit is joined to the Son, and the Son to the Father, it is clear that the Spirit is also joined to the Father. Yet there is one Holy Spirit,

Himself also singularly declared, joined through the one Son to the one Father, and through Himself completing the glorified and blessed Trinity above all" (Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto* c. 17–18, n. 43, 45). "He who has understood the Father has understood Him in Himself and has also comprehended the Son in His understanding; but he who has apprehended the Son has not separated the Spirit from the Son; but he has expressed in himself the faith united by the identity of essence, of the three who are consequently ordered, but united according to nature (*akolouthōs men kata tēn taxin, synechomenōs de kata tēn physin*)" (ibid., *Epistle* 38, al. 43, n. 4).

1°. In this internal and necessary order "of consequence" (*akolouthia kata tēn taxin*), as Basil calls it, considered in itself together with the numerical unity of nature and all absolute perfections in the three persons, the revealed procession of the third person is implicitly contained as from the first so also from the second. For a real order "of consequence" in God signifies two things: a real distinction through relations of origin, and a determinate origin of the consequent from the precedent in the manner in which precedent and consequent can be said in God. For: **a)** if there is no real distinction, a real order cannot be conceived, which signifies the connection of several distinct things according to some principle of unity; but in God, as previously demonstrated, there is no real distinction except according to relations of origin. Hence, **b)** the order in the divine persons, because it is an order of origin, is analogous to succession. Lest this be misunderstood, it must be understood that the three are not such that it is indifferent which person is called the first, which the second, and which the third; for then there would not be a relation of origin of one person to another as to its principle, and thus the real distinction and consequently the order itself would be removed. But the first person is the Father, the second the Son, the third the Holy Spirit; nor can the Son and the Holy Spirit be called two second persons, nor can the Spirit be called the second and the Son the third person (1).

(1) "Because of those who confuse everything and do not preserve the doctrine of the Gospel, it is necessary to declare this also, that those must be avoided who openly oppose piety by inverting the consequence of the persons (*tēn akolouthian*) delivered to us by the Lord, placing the Son before the Father and the Holy Spirit before the Son. For the immovable and inviolable consequence must be preserved, which we received from the very voice of the Lord saying: 'Go… in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit'" (Basil, *Epistle* 125, al. 78, n. 3). When the Fathers prohibit numbering in God a first, second, and third, as Basil himself does in *De Spiritu Sancto* n. 45, in the very place where he most defends the fixed order of the persons, they only exclude, against the Arians, a numbering of first, second, and third according to a distinction and diversity of nature or according to a priority of reason in the thing (*in quo*), that is, if one person, e.g., the Father, is conceived with an objective precision of the person immanently related to another, e.g., the Son, as we explained above. See Basil, *Contra Eunomium* I, n. 20, T. I, p. 234.

But this internal order, that the Son is the second person and the Spirit the third, can only exist from the mode of procession, because only from this is there an order in the divine persons. Therefore, in some way, the procession of the second person is prior to that of the third person; but there can be no priority among the divine persons except a priority of "from whom" (*a quo*), that is, except a relation of principle and proceeding from the principle (see above, p. 387). Therefore, in the very fact that the Holy Spirit is presented in Scripture as the third person in order, it is contained that the first and second are prior by a priority of "from whom" (which is the only priority in divine things), that is, the first and second are the principle of the third person (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 48, a. 3).

In other words, this is explained as follows: From the internal necessary order delivered in the Scriptures, the generation of the Son is presupposed to the procession of the Holy Spirit; but the Son, by being generated, has all perfections and formal notions communicated from the Father except paternity, and in all things is one with the Father except in the formal notion of Father and Son, by which alone the two persons are distinguished from each other; therefore, the Son has from the Father the communicated nature also under the formal notion of spirative power (or of love producing love as an immanent term), and thus He is no less one with the Father as the principle of the Holy Spirit than He is one with the Father as God.

2°. To this very point, the holy Fathers, especially the Greek ones, referred that fixed order of the persons, namely, that just as the second person is related to the first, so the third is related to the second by a relation of origin. St. Athanasius declares the order of the Trinity thus: according to the analogies delivered in the Scriptures, the Father is light, the Son is splendor, the Holy Spirit is illumination, whence "we can also perceive the Holy Spirit in the Son, in whom we are illuminated"; likewise, the Father is the fountain, the Son the river, the Holy Spirit the water; the Father is wise, the Son is wisdom, the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of wisdom, etc. "Since, therefore, there is in the Holy Trinity such an ordered connection (*systoichia*) and unity, who would dare to separate either the Son from the Father or the Spirit from the Son or from the Father Himself?" If, therefore, it is asked, "how, when the Spirit is in us, the Son is said to be in us, and similarly, when the Son is in us, the Father is also said to be in us; or how, when the Trinity is fully present, the Trinity is designated in one?"—such hesitation can be healed by faith, and also by the aforementioned examples of image, splendor, fountain, river, substance, and figure. For just as the Son is in the Spirit as in His own image, so too the Father is in the Son… so that we believe there is one sanctification that is from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit… For since the Son is one, who is also the living Word, it is necessary that there be one perfect and full sanctifying and illuminating living power and gift (*energeian autou kai dōrean*), which is said to proceed from the Father (*ek tou Patros legetai ekporeuesthai*), because it shines forth from the Word, which is acknowledged to be from the Father (*dia tou Logou tou ek tou Patros homologoumenou eklampsei*), and is sent and given (*apostelletai kai didotai*) (Athanasius, *Ad Serapionem* I, n. 19–21).

Indeed, just as the Son is the Word of the Father, so the Holy Spirit is the power and gift of the Son. Certainly, not only the charisms of the Holy Spirit but His very person is called and is the power and gift of the Son, as is evident from the entire context and especially from the epithets "sanctifying," "illuminating," and "living power." Moreover, just as the Son is called the power of God (1 Cor. 1:24, and frequently in the Fathers) and the Word of God by reason of His eternal procession from God the Father with a relation ad extra (Augustine, *Quaestiones 83*, q. 63), so the Spirit is the power and gift of the Son by reason of His eternal procession with a relation ad extra (Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, c. 14–15). Hence, Athanasius joins both relations, of which the second cannot exist without the first, saying that He shines forth eternally, and this relation is manifested in the temporal mission and gift. Certainly, the holy Doctor, understanding the internal procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, most correctly concludes against the Arians that, by the very fact that the Son has all things communicated from the Father, the Spirit proceeds also from the Father. But this inference would be utterly absurd if he had understood, in the sense of the schismatics, a temporal mission without procession from the Son; for it would be as if someone said: because the Apostles are sent by the Word, which is acknowledged to be from the Father, therefore they can be said to proceed from the Father. In this inference, procession from the Father could only signify a temporal mission from the Father as from the Son; and thus, Athanasius would have

undermined the very thing he wished to demonstrate against the Arians, namely, the procession of the Spirit also from the Father and from the essence of the Father, since from a mere mission by the Son, nothing else could be inferred than the same mission also from the Father. Furthermore, note that the very word Athanasius uses, *ek tou Logou eklampsei*, in its meaning signifies internal procession, just as it is used by the Fathers for the generation of the Son (e.g., *eklambanein* in Basil, *Epistle* 38, al. 43, n. 4; *ekphainein* in Nazianzen, *Oratio* 5, n. 9, and Cyril, *In Joannem*, p. 987; *apolambanein* in Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, n. 19; *ekphanein* in Basil, *Contra Eunomium* V, p. 306). Certainly, no one understood a mission considered separately from internal procession, as the Photians consider it only in its external work and effect, when a divine person is said to shine forth (*eklambanein*) from a person.

Athanasius argues: **a)** the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son in the same sense that the Word is called the Word of the Father; but the Word is called the Word of the Father relatively by reason of origin, namely, the Word proceeding from the Father; therefore, in the same relative sense, He is called the Spirit of the Son. Hence, if this designation "Spirit of the Son" does not signify procession through the communication of the divine nature, it follows that neither does the appellation "Word of the Father" signify procession through the communication of the nature. Thus, Athanasius argues from the parity of the names "Spirit of the Son" and "Word of the Father," by which both signify the order and relation of a person to a person as to its principle, that either both or neither signify procession through the communication of the divine substance. The Pneumatomachians deny this of the Spirit of the Son, whom they call a creature, and therefore they cannot profess it of the Word of the Father; or conversely, if they profess it of the Word of the Father, they cannot, except absurdly, deny it of the Spirit of the Son. Thus, from the immanent procession of the Spirit from the Son, which is signified by the name "Spirit of the Son," Athanasius demonstrates consubstantiality, but it never occurred to him that consubstantiality without procession is signified by this name. **b)** Finally, just as other Fathers, so too Athanasius assumes what the Pneumatomachians most contended, that the Son is the principle of the Holy Spirit; but while they contended that He is the principle through creation, Athanasius, with the others, insists on the dogma that the Holy Spirit no less proceeds from the substance of the Son than the Son Himself is from the substance of the Father.

Similarly, St. Basil, in *Contra Eunomium* V, establishes this proposition: "Just as the Son is related to the Father, so the Spirit is related to the Son." In this declaration, the holy Doctor might seem to affirm not only the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son but also the same mode of procession as that of the Son from the Father; but his purpose must be noted, which was to demonstrate the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, and by this very fact from God, that is, from the Father and the Son, as they are one; but he did not find it necessary to give the intimate reason why this procession is not generation, and thus why the Holy Spirit is not the Son of the Son. To this proposed question, in which he evidently presupposes as Catholic doctrine the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son through the communication of the nature, he responds only with two points: **a)** in the Scriptures, He is not called the Son of the Son, although the Holy Spirit is from the substance of the Son; **b)** He is not called Son but Spirit, so that the processions in the internal life of God are understood to be concluded with the procession of the Spirit, lest, if what proceeds from the Son were a Son, this second Son would seem to postulate a third Son, and so on to infinity. "Just as the Son is related to the Father, so the Spirit is related to the Son. Therefore, He is indeed the Word of God (the Father), but the Spirit is of the Son. Hence, He is of God. But the Word is the Son, and the Word of the Son, since it is the Word, is not called the Son of God. Why then is the Spirit not called the Son of God? Not because He is not from God through the Son

(*ek tou Theou dia tou Huiou*), but lest the Trinity be thought a multitude, as if it would seem to have Sons from Sons, as happens among men. But you say: if the Son is the image of God and the Spirit the image of the Son, or if the Son is the Word of God and the Spirit the Word of the Son, why is the Spirit not called the Son of the Son? If we remain silent, as those who do not wish to inquire curiously into the things of God, do you think the glory of the divine Spirit is diminished because the appellation of Son is not applied to Him? You may ask about adoption. For we also become sons through the Spirit, but not as if the Spirit Himself were called a Son even by adoption. We respond for ourselves as best we can. We say, therefore, that if anyone had said a Son from the Son, he would have brought the Trinity of deity into suspicion of a multitude among men who heard this. For it was easy to suspect that, if a Son were begotten from a Son, another would again be begotten from this one, and again another… Therefore, the Apostle openly preached that the Spirit is from God, saying, 'We have received the Spirit who is from God' (1 Cor. 2:12); and he made it manifest that He shines forth through the Son (*dia tou Huiou ekpephēkenai*), naming Him the Spirit of the Son just as the Spirit of God, and calling Him the mind of Christ just as the Spirit of God, just as there is also the spirit of man (1 Cor. 2:11); but he avoided calling Him the Son of the Son" (Basil, *Contra Eunomium* V, T. I, pp. 304–305).

Now, I ask, who, consenting to the Photian heresy, ever so anxiously sought or could seek subtle reasons why the Spirit of the Son is not or is not called the Son of the Son? In that opinion, the only reason is utterly evident: because the Spirit does not have His origin from the Son. But the holy Fathers, without doubt holding the fixed order of the persons through relations of origin, and thus that the consubstantial Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son through the communication of the nature, felt a significant difficulty and found it necessary either to confess simply that it is unknown to us or to inquire more subtly into the reasons why the Spirit is not the Son of the Son, about which, as Basil here, so Augustine and others often dispute. Indeed, even the Arians themselves, unless they had clearly understood the doctrine of the Church about the procession of the Spirit from the Son through the communication of the nature, could not even have proposed that question; for in the Photian opinion, one could only ask why the Spirit is not the brother of the Son, but in no way why He is not the Son of the Son.

Most eloquently, St. Gregory of Nyssa, Basil's brother, from the very order—that the Son must be understood before the Holy Spirit—declares that priority in God cannot be anything other than by reason of principle and proceeding from the principle, and therefore, just as the Father is presupposed to the Son by the order of principle, so the Son (with the Father) is presupposed to the Holy Spirit proceeding from Him by the same reason of principle (priority of "from whom"). After demonstrating that the generation of the Son from the Father does not exclude the eternity of the Son, because the Father is prior to the Son eternally generated not by duration but only by the reason of an eternally generating principle, he descends to declaring the same about the Holy Spirit. "The same is our doctrine about the Holy Spirit, recognizing a difference only in order (between the persons). For just as the Son is joined to the Father, and, having His being from Him, is not posterior in existence; so too the Holy Spirit depends on the Only-Begotten, such that only in thought, according to the reason of principle, is the Son presupposed to the hypostasis of the Spirit (*epinoia monē kata ton tēs aitias logon proüporoumenou tēs tou Pneumatos hypostaseōs*). For temporal dimensions have no place in eternal life, so that except for the reason of principle, the Holy Trinity is distinguished by nothing in itself" (Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* I, p. 164).

Even more clearly, the same Gregory, from the common Catholic doctrine, delivers the order of the persons thus: that the second is from the first alone, where he supposes the meaning of the name "Only-Begotten" as begotten from one; but when the first and second persons are presupposed, by this very fact, he says, the third is indeed from the first, but only through the second, and therefore only the Son is from the Father alone, but the Holy Spirit, according to the reason of principle and proceeding from the principle, is from the Father through the Son, and thus not from one but from two persons. "We do not deny the difference according to principle and principate (*kata to aition kai aitiōnon*), in which alone we admit that one is distinguished from another, because we believe one to be the principle and another to be from the principle. And of that which is from the principle, we again consider another difference; for one is immediately (and without a medium) from the first, but another through that which is immediately from the first, so that the property of the Only-Begotten remains unambiguous in the Son, and it is not doubtful that the Spirit is from the Father, while the interposition of the Son (between the Father and the Spirit) both preserves the property of the Only-Begotten and does not remove the Spirit from His natural relation to the Father" (Gregory of Nyssa, *Ad Ablabium, Quod Non Sint Tres Dii*, T. II, p. 45; cf. above, p. 159).

II. The Holy Spirit is said to be sent just as from the Father so from the Son. "I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete—the Spirit of truth"; "The Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in My name" (John 14:16, 26). "When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father"; "If I do not go away, the Paraclete will not come to you, but if I go, I will send Him to you" (John 15:26; 16:7). The words of Christ are so clear that even the Photians do not deny that the Holy Spirit is sent also by the Son, but they refuse to acknowledge that the mission itself necessarily presupposes the eternal procession of the sent person from the sender; indeed, they misuse this distinction between eternal procession according to the being of the person and mission or procession in time according to an effect ad extra to falsely interpret the holy Fathers when they speak of the procession of the Holy Spirit.

To dispel the darkness obscured by their cunning arts, the operation ad extra, and especially the conferral of supernatural gifts, must be distinguished from the mission of the divine person Himself. For although the mission of a person includes supernatural effects ad extra and the conferral of gifts (if it is a mission for sanctifying souls), this effecting and conferral of gifts, considered simply and in itself, is not the mission of the person. Insofar as the effect is considered as of God qua God, it is one, or by appropriation as of God the Father, no mission of a person can be conceived; but for this to be understood, it is necessary that the supernatural effect be referred to a person proceeding from another, from whom He is said to be sent. Thus, the mission of a divine person is necessarily determined to a person with the ascription of a twofold relation: namely, first, a real and eternal relation to the sending person as to the principle of the sent person, and then a relation to the actual existence of the supernatural effect in time (cf. St. Thomas, above, p. 191).

Against the Arians, to demonstrate that the sent is not less than the sender, Augustine sometimes considers only the efficiency ad extra, and in this way, considering the mission incompletely, he improperly says that a person is sent also by Himself, because, for example, the Son effected the assumption of flesh by one operation with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit effected the form of a dove by one operation with the Father and the Son. But we are dealing with mission properly so called, as it is presented in the Scriptures, and through which Augustine also completes or corrects that

prior consideration. For the present purpose, it only needs to be declared what we said about the real relation of the sent to the sender.

First, when a person is said to be sent by a person, a real distinction between the sender and the sent is demonstrated; for no one is properly sent by himself. Hence, the Fathers frequently use this doctrine of the mission of persons to refute the Sabellians (Petavius, *De Trinitate* VIII, c. 1, n. 1). Moreover, mission in creatures, from which, like other terms, this name is first taken, includes some authority of the sender over the sent, whether in the proper sense of command, or in an improper sense of counsel, or generically of the will's transmission from one to another. Hence, necessarily, in its transference to divine persons, the name retains not the same but an analogous signification; for if all analogy is excluded, the revelation about the mission of one divine person from another would remain entirely without intelligible sense for us (cf. Thesis XIX). Now, authority, superiority, dignity (*axiōma*) of one person over another, or the transmission of will, or, as Basil calls it, irradiation (*ekphansis*), in divine things is uniquely and can only be conceived according to origin as of a principle over what proceeds from the principle, unless perhaps the incarnate person is considered formally as man according to His assumed nature.

Hence, it is because the Father, who proceeds from no person (*anarchos, agennetos*), is never said nor can be said to be sent by another person. The Son, considered according to His divinity, is sent only by the Father, but with the incarnation supposed, formally as man for the offices of the Redeemer, He is said to be sent also by the Holy Spirit: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon Me, because He has anointed Me to preach the gospel to the poor; He has sent Me" (Luke 4:18). "Which Christian does not know that the Father sent and the Son was sent? For it was not fitting for the generator to be sent by the one He generated, but for the generated to be sent by the generator; yet this is not an inequality of substance but an order of nature (of nativity), not that one was prior to the other, but that one was from the other. But if you do not wish to assent to this rule, that wherever you read in the authority of divine utterances that the Son seems to be shown as less than the Father, you either take it as said according to the form of the servant, in which He is truly less than the Father, or as said to demonstrate that one is from the other; if, I say, you do not wish to assent to this most correct rule, you will certainly not say that the true Son of God is of the same substance as the Father if you do not say that He is of the same substance as the Father" (Augustine, *Contra Maximinum Arianorum* II, c. 14, n. 8).

Thus, regarding the signification of personal relations, it is to be understood in almost the same way when a person is said to be sent by a person

when Christ, the Son of God, says: "because the Father is greater than I" (John 14:28). The Fathers, of course, teach that this designation of "greater" can be understood in two ways: either that the Father is said to be greater than the Son considered according to His human nature, and thus not only the Father but also the Holy Spirit is greater than the Son, indeed even the Son Himself according to His divine nature is greater than Himself insofar as He is man and "emptied Himself" (Augustine, *In Joannem*, Tractate 79, n. 2; cf. Phil. 2:7); or that the Father is said to be greater than the Son considered according to His divine nature, and in this way, nothing else can be understood except the notion of principle in the Father prior to the begotten Son (cf. above, p. 156). Now, according to this same notion, mission, if referred to Christ as man, expresses authority properly so-called, and can be attributed both to the Father and to the Holy Spirit, and even, in a less proper sense, to the Son Himself; but if it refers to the person considered

according to the divine nature, it necessarily indicates the dignity (*axiōma*) of principle in the sending person and the relation of procession in the sent person.

For this reason, since the Holy Spirit, who is only of the divine nature, is shown to be sent equally by the Son as by the Father, not separately from the Father and separately from the Son, but by both insofar as they are one, by this very fact the Son, together with the Father, is declared to be the principle of the immanent and eternal procession of the Holy Spirit, because the procession of the sent person from the sending person is the primary presupposition and, as it were, the root of the mission.

Therefore, Athanasius, as we saw earlier, connects the procession (*eklampsin*) and the mission of the Holy Spirit from the Son. Likewise, Cyril says: "It is necessary to confess that the Spirit is of the essence of the Son; for as naturally existing from Him and sent by Him into creation (*ek autou kata physin hyparchon kai eis tēn ktisin par' autou pempomenon*), He works renewal" (*Thesaurus*, p. 358). Most clearly, after Augustine, the Latin Fathers explain this intimate connection of mission with procession. "The Son is sent by the Father, not the Father by the Son, because the Son is born from the Father, not the Father from the Son; similarly, the Holy Spirit is also read to be sent by the Father and the Son, because He proceeds from the Father and the Son" (Fulgentius, *Contra Fabianum*, Fragment 29). "Behold, here the Paraclete, whom the Father sends in the name of the Son, the Son Himself sends from the Father. He sends the Spirit of truth from the Father; therefore, He sends His Spirit from the Father, for He Himself is the truth. The Father sends Him in the name of the Son, because He is the one Spirit of the Father and the Son; the Son sends Him from the Father, because He proceeds from the Son just as He proceeds from the Father; and this same Spirit of the Father is also the Spirit of truth" (ibid., Fragment 27).

Indeed, speaking more precisely, mission ad extra should be called a manifestation of the procession ad intra. The difference is this: mission is understood as eternal procession with the connotation of a term and a supernatural operation ad extra; procession, however, does not of itself have this connotation. Thus, there can be eternal procession without mission, but there cannot be, nor can it be conceived, a mission of a person according to the divine nature without His eternal procession from the sender. Thus, the Word could be eternally generated by the Father without the Father creating through the Word, and without the Word being sent into the world; but no operation of the Father through the Word, nor mission of the Word (according to the divine nature), can be conceived without understanding the eternal procession of the Word from the Father; for these expressions say nothing other than the eternal procession itself with the connotation of manifestation ad extra, which occurs in time.

The same applies to the procession of the Holy Spirit as gift and as capable of being given (*donabile*). "Just as, therefore, the Father generated, the Son is generated; so too the Father sent, the Son is sent… For just as for the Son to be born is to be from the Father, so for the Son to be sent is to be known to be from Him. And just as for the Holy Spirit to be the gift of God (to be capable of being given by His property) is to proceed from the Father, so to be sent is to be known to proceed from Him. Nor can we say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son; for it is not in vain that He is called the Spirit of the Son… Therefore, when He says, 'the Spirit of the Lord' and 'whom I will send to you from the Father,' He shows that the Spirit is of the Father and the Son. That the Son is not lesser because He is sent by the Father, nor the Holy Spirit lesser because both the Father and the Son sent Him, I think has been sufficiently demonstrated. For whether on account of a visible creature (on account of an effect ad extra) or rather on account of the commendation of the principle, these things in the Scriptures are not

understood as posited on account of inequality or disparity or dissimilarity of substance; for even if God the Father had wished to appear visibly through a subject creature, it would be most absurd for Him to be said to be sent either by the Son whom He generated or by the Holy Spirit who proceeds from Him" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Book IV, n. 29–32). "The mission of the Holy Spirit itself is the procession by which He proceeds from the Father and the Son. Thus, just as the Spirit is said to be sent because He proceeds, so too the Son is not unfittingly said to be sent because He is generated" (Gregory the Great, *Homilies on the Gospel*, Homily XXVI, n. 2).

This unity of procession and mission, as it is in God Himself, is declared by Hugh of Etherianus from the eternity and immutability of God. "Although the Apostles and prophets received the Spirit from Christ in time, the Son of God did not begin to have the Spirit in time, nor did the same Spirit begin to go forth from the Son at some point in time. Indeed, from the days of eternity, just as the Son is generated from the Father, so the Spirit goes forth from both and is sent by both eternally. As far as they (the Father and the Son in themselves) are concerned, before all ages they send and give (spirating the Spirit to be sent and given); but when there are those worthy of the gift or mission, they are said to begin to send or give (the existence of the term ad extra begins)… Therefore, it may not be inappropriate if the procession of the Holy Spirit, eternally flowing from the Father and the Son, is more commonly called mission or gift or something similar with regard to the receiving creatures" (Hugh of Etherianus, *Contra Graecos*, Book III, c. 18).

Most beautifully, Cardinal Bessarion concludes the argument: "The power of sending, which is in the Father and the Son, according to which both send the Holy Spirit, as even our people (the Greeks) confess, is either the same in the Father and the Son or different. But if it is different, there will clearly be a greater and a lesser, and consequently the missions will be diverse, and therefore there will neither be one power and potency nor one operation of them. Therefore, it is not different but the same (power of sending). But in the Father, the power of sending the Spirit is simultaneous with the power of spirating Him; for the Father always spirates the Holy Spirit and, spirating, sends Him. Therefore, the Son also, together with the power of spirating and producing Him, sends Him, and thus the Son is also the producer of the Holy Spirit" (Bessarion, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, among *Opuscula Aurea*, p. 237).

Therefore, even if the Photians were to maintain that the expressions of the Greek Fathers, by which they say the Holy Spirit flows forth, springs, proceeds, shines forth, or appears (*procheisthai*, *anaphlyzein*, *proienai*, *eklampein*, *pephēnai*) from the Son or through the Son, immediately designate mission and procession ad extra, they would gain nothing; for this procession ad extra includes as its foundation the procession ad intra, or rather, if we speak theologically, mission is the very procession ad intra with the added signification of supernatural efficiency ad extra (see Jerome Donatus, Book IV, c. 4, in Emmanuele Mai, *Scriptorum Veterum Nova Collectio*, Vol. VII, Part II, p. 125 ff.).

In much the same way, we saw earlier (pp. 166–169) that some ancient Fathers speak of the generation of the Son in the creation of the universe, that is, of the manifestation of the Son eternally generated. Moreover, the Greek Fathers also in many places speak in such a way that their words must necessarily be understood in an immediate sense of the eternal immanent procession of the Holy Spirit, such that He physically, essentially, according to nature, shines forth, appears, springs, or proceeds from the Son or through the Son, or from the essence of the Son (*physikōs*, *ousiōdōs*, *physei*, *kata physin*, *ek tēs ousias tou Huiou*) (Epiphanius, *Haereses* 62, n. 4; *Ancoratus*, n. 7; Cyril, *De Adoratione*, Book I, p. 9; *Thesaurus*,

pp. 345, 354, 358; *In Joannem*, p. 126; Maximus, *Quaestiones* 63, *Opera*, Vol. I, pp. 238–239, also cited by Patriarch Beccus, *Opuscula Aurea*, p. 117). But we will have occasion to speak of the Fathers below.

THESIS XXXIV. Explanation of the dogma affirming that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father.

« From the foregoing, it follows that in the words of Christ affirming, "the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father" (John 15:26), not only is the Son not excluded, but, when compared with the complete doctrine of the Scriptures, it most clearly includes the Son as one principle with the Father of the Holy Spirit, which, moreover, is more expressly indicated in this very passage, when it is said that the Son sends the Paraclete from the Father. »

I. If the expression "who proceeds from the Father" is considered alone by itself, it affirms and declares the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father, which all Catholics believe and confess; however, it is not an expression that excludes procession also from the Son, but rather includes it.

1°. If the words "the Spirit proceeds from the Father" are considered in isolation from the entire remaining doctrine of the economy of the Holy Trinity, as if materially by themselves, they teach that the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit, but they do not teach under what formal notion He is the principle, whether He is the spirator insofar as the Father is one with the Son, or insofar as He is distinguished from the Son. Thus, it is most truly said, "the Spirit of the Father"; but the Spirit is of the Father not insofar as the Father is distinguished from the Son, but insofar as He is one with the Son; and therefore, the relation expressed by these words "Spirit of the Father" is not proper to the Father alone but is common to the Father and the Son, though not common to the Holy Spirit, to whom the Father and the Son are opposed through that relation. Hence, it is no less truly, nor in a different sense, said to be the Spirit of the Son than the Spirit of the Father (Thesis XXXII). Therefore, just as it would be absurd to infer from the fact that He is called the Spirit of the Father that He is of the Father alone, such that He is not equally the Spirit of the Son, so too the Photians absurdly argue that because the Holy Spirit is said and believed to proceed from the Father, He does not equally proceed from the Son. Indeed, as St. Thomas (Summa Theologica I, q. 36, a. 2, ad 1), Patriarch Beccus (*De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, c. 12, ed. Allatius, p. 331 ff.; and in *Dicta Sanctorum*, *Opuscula Aurea*, ed. Arcudius, p. 155), and Bessarion (*Epistola Generalis ad Graecos*, ibid., p. 341) rightly observed, even if it were written—which it is not—that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, it should not be understood as excluding procession from the Son. For it is a general principle often emphasized by the Fathers that, except for the relations of origin opposed to one another and therefore really distinct, through such exclusive particles, one divine person is not opposed to another, but God is opposed to creatures. "Many things are said to belong to the Father alone, yet the Son does not lack any of them, since it is written somewhere: 'to the only wise God, immortal, invisible, true' (1 Tim. 1:17). And so Paul says that the Father alone is wise, yet the Son is no less naturally the same as the Father, even though some things are predicated of the Father alone; for all that is in the Father naturally and necessarily is equally communicated to the Word proceeding from Him" (Cyril, *Thesaurus*, p. 142; cf. Thesis III, Corollary 2; and see the general principle in the words of Chrysostom cited above, p. 243).

2°. If the revealed doctrine concerning the unity and distinction between the divine persons is kept in view, the procession of the third person, whether from the first or the second, necessarily includes procession from both. For whatever belongs to one person is understood to be common to all divine persons because of the unity of essence and complete simplicity, except for the sole formal relative notion by which one person is the principle of another: "all things are one where the opposition of relation does not intervene" (above, p. 188). But the Father, by spiration, is not the principle of the Word; or, in other words: the Father, under the formal notion of generating, is related to the Son as principle to the one proceeding from Him, but under the formal notion of spirating the Holy Spirit or producing love by loving, He has a relation of principle only to the Holy Spirit, not to the Son. Therefore, by this very fact, the Father as spirator is distinguished not from the Son but from the Holy Spirit. Thus, when the Father is named as the one from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds, the Father is understood as the principle of the Holy Spirit, not by the property by which He is distinguished from the Son, but insofar as the Father and the Son are one in the spirative power or in the love producing subsistent love; just as when the Father is called creator, He is understood as creator insofar as He is one with the Son and the Holy Spirit in creative power.

II. In the very words, "whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father" (John 15:26), the Son is shown to be one with the Father, insofar as the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit proceeding from Him. This is demonstrated first from what was said in the previous thesis, where we showed that the mission of one divine person by another is a manifestation of the procession of the sent person from the sender, and that procession ad intra is the necessary foundation of mission ad extra. Now let the proposed words be specifically examined.

1°. In the first clause, "I will send to you from the Father," the mission of the Holy Spirit ad extra is expressed, and the principle of this mission is declared to be the Father and the Son—the Son directly, the Father indirectly: "I will send from the Father"; just as elsewhere the Father is stated directly, the Son indirectly: "whom the Father will send in My name" (John 14:26). Likewise, elsewhere only the Father is expressed as sending, or only the Son: "the Father will give you another Paraclete" (John 14:16); "if I go, I will send Him to you" (John 16:7). In these passages, therefore, when the Father is mentioned, the Son is understood as the principle of mission; when the Son is mentioned, the Father is understood; the Father as communicating to the Son, the Son as having the communicated power and act of mission from the Father. Hence, the propositions "the Father sends," "the Son sends," "the Father sends in the name of the Son," "the Son sends from the Father" are contracted into the complex proposition: "God has given His Holy Spirit to us" (1 Thess. 4:8; 2 Cor. 1:22; 5:5); just as we saw that the appellations "Spirit of the Father" and "Spirit of the Son" are together comprehended by the other, "Spirit of God."

Therefore, the Son sends the Holy Spirit from the Father with one power, with one mission common to the Son with the Father, and thus the Father and the Son are one principle of mission. Now, why this is a mission from the Father is given by the definitive declaration and necessary foundation in the second clause: "who proceeds from the Father." Therefore, there would not be, nor could there be, a mission of a divine person from the Father unless He proceeded from the Father. But the mission of the Holy Spirit from the Son is one and the same. Therefore, the necessary foundation, without which the mission could not be, is one in the Son sending as in the Father, namely, the power and act by which they spirate the Spirit to be sent and sent with one mission common to both.

Where it is said, "the Father will give you the Paraclete" (John 14:16), the Father is understood as simultaneously communicating the act of mission to the Son, which even the Photians cannot deny without falling into Arian heresy. This communication of mission is explicitly expressed in our first clause: "I will send from the Father." Therefore, when in the second clause, "who proceeds from the Father," the foundation of the mission is declared, the Father is necessarily understood as communicating to the Son the very same foundation of the mission, which the Son in the first clause is said to have from the Father, that is, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as communicating to the Son both the mission and the power and act of spiration. And thus, the Spirit proceeds from the Father formally as from the one having the Son, and by this very fact as communicating the act of spiration to the Son. (1) "He did not say, 'whom the Father will send from Me,' as He said, 'whom I will send from the Father'; clearly showing that the Father is the principle of the whole divinity, or, if it is better said, of the deity. Therefore, He who proceeds from the Father and the Son is referred to Him (as to the primordial principle) from whom the Son is born" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Book IV, n. 29).

(1) There are not lacking learned men who think that there is a different mode of signification when it is said that procession is *para tou Patros* and when it is said *ek tou Patros*. Thus, in this passage, they say, the procession *para tou Patros* is procession from that which is in the Father and with the Father; but this is also the Son. What is said is certainly true, but I do not think the mode of demonstration from the difference between the particles *para* and *ek* is solid.

2°. Assuming what we said in the previous thesis about the relative signification of the name "Spirit of Christ" or "Spirit of the Son," we can show that just as here the mission of the Holy Spirit by the Son is connected with procession from the Father, elsewhere, in reverse order, the mission from the Father is connected with procession from the Son. "God (the Father) has sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts" (Gal. 4:6). Clearly, for Paul, in the subject "God the Father," the Son is included; for the donation or active mission is one for both; likewise, in the predicate "the Spirit of His Son," the relation of the Spirit to the Father is included; for as He is the Spirit of the Son, so He is of the Father. Therefore, the full sense of the Apostle's words is: God the Father, and therefore the Son with the Father, sent the Spirit of His Son and by this very fact the Spirit of the Father. Hence, also in the words of Christ according to John, in the first clause, the Son is expressly shown to be one with the Father as the principle of mission, or the mission is expressed as through the Son from the Father; but in the second clause, the relation of the Spirit to the Father is explicitly declared ("who proceeds from the Father"), and the relation to the Son is included; just as, conversely, in Paul, the relation to the Son is explicitly declared ("sent the Spirit of His Son"), and the relation to the Father is included.

As for the co-signification, so to speak, of the Son with the Father, another saying of Christ, though concerning a different matter, can be compared with our passage: "that they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent" (John 17:3). Here, in the appellation "the only true God," the Son is not excluded but included as the only true God (cf. above, Thesis III, Corollary 2), yet for greater clarity, the Son is still conjoined in the same order with the Father. In the same way, also in the words we are dealing with, "the Spirit proceeds from the Father," the Son is already included with the Father as the principle of the Spirit, and this is still more expressly signified by joining the Son with the Father in the same relation to the Holy Spirit: "I will send to you from the Father."

Therefore, when it is said that the affirmative revelation, that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, is equivalent to the exclusive claim that He proceeds from no other, a distinction is necessary: that affirmation is an exclusion of all who are not one with the Father, I concede; it is an exclusion of another divine person from the notion of principle of the Holy Spirit, I distinguish: it is an exclusion of the person who proceeds by spiration, that is, the Holy Spirit, I concede; it is an exclusion of the person pre-understood, who is not distinguished from the Father by spiration, that is, the Son, I deny. Unless this were so, and if the objection of the schismatics were valid, it would have to be said that the other divine persons are excluded whenever the Father is individually named or whenever any divine attribute is predicated of Him; and thus, ultimately, all this schismatic wisdom is reduced to an Arian principle.

Why the Son explicitly refers the procession of the Holy Spirit to the Father, although the notion of principle is common to the Son with the Father, is for the same reason that He is accustomed to refer all His own to the Father: namely, so that the Father may be understood as the principle without principle (*aitia prokatarktike*), the original source of the Trinity, from whom the Son also has, by generation, both the essence with all perfections and the spirative power (or the essence under the formal notion of spirative power and love producing love). "Why, therefore, does the Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son, yet the Son said, 'proceeds from the Father'? Why, do you think, except that He is accustomed to refer to the Father even what is His own? Hence, there is that saying, 'My doctrine is not Mine, but His who sent Me' (John 7:16). If, therefore, His doctrine is understood here, which He nevertheless said is not His but the Father's, how much more must it be understood there that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Him, where He said 'proceeds from the Father' without saying, 'does not proceed from Me'? But from whom the Son has it that He is God—for He is God from God—He certainly has it from Him that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from Him; and thus, that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, as He proceeds from the Father, He has from the Father Himself" (Augustine, *In Joannem*, Tractate 99, n. 8).

He explains the same reason still more thoroughly elsewhere: "It is not in vain that in this Trinity the Word of God is called only the Son, nor the gift of God only the Holy Spirit, nor the one from whom the Word is generated and from whom the Holy Spirit principally proceeds, only the Father. I added 'principally,' because the Holy Spirit is also found to proceed from the Son; but this too the Father gave to Him, not to Him already existing and not yet having it; but whatever He gave to the Only-Begotten Word, He gave by generating. Thus, He generated Him such that the common gift would also proceed from Him, and the Holy Spirit would be the Spirit of both" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Book XV, c. 17, n. 29; see also ibid., c. 26, n. 47; *Contra Maximinum*, Book II, c. 5).

(1) The argument of the Council of Worms (868) is entirely correct, as it deduces the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son from the equality of the persons and the communion of all attributes, about which the learned Hefele (*History of the Councils*, Vol. IV, p. 555) seems to doubt.

CHAPTER II. On the Same Procession Declared in the Tradition of the Holy Spirit.

THESIS XXXV. Demonstration from the Explicit Doctrine of the Fathers.

« The constant faith and preaching of Christian antiquity concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son as from one principle is demonstrated both from the explicit doctrine and Catholic understanding of the holy Fathers, both Western and Eastern. »

Up to the middle of the fourth century, the opposition from heretics and, consequently, the defense, more industrious exposition, and more insistent preaching of the Catholic Church concerning the mystery of the Holy Trinity seemed almost restricted to the persons of the Father and the Son; concerning the person of the Holy Spirit, however, a simple faith according to the doctrine of Scripture and apostolic tradition prevailed in the Church without direct controversy, and therefore also without more subtle explanations. For although heretics fighting against the Word of the Father were, by necessary consequence, also blasphemous against the Spirit of the Father and the Son, the direct and explicit opposition and defense revolved around the Word, the eternal Son of the Father. For it was persuaded both by Catholic teachers and by heretics that if the Catholic faith concerning the personal distinction of the Son, His generation from the substance of the Father, and His consubstantiality were overthrown (if that were possible), the entire doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and specifically the person of the Holy Spirit, would simultaneously be subverted; conversely, with the traditional faith concerning the Father and the Son confirmed, the faith in the Spirit of the Father and the Son would be secure, or at least could easily be defended against heresies based on the principles established by universal consensus in the prior controversy. In the creed set forth by the Nicene Fathers against the Arian heresy, after a distinct exposition of the doctrine concerning the Father and the Son, there follows simply the profession of faith in the Holy Spirit: "*pisteuomen… kai eis to Pneuma to Hagion*" (We believe… and in the Holy Spirit), without further declaration. Hence, St. Basil says of the Nicene definition: "Here, indeed, the rest is fully

defined accurately, partly to correct what had been attacked, partly to forestall what was foreseen as likely to arise; but the doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit was set forth in passing (*en paradromē keitai*), and it did not seem to require any investigation, because at that time this question had not yet been raised, but the belief concerning Him (the Holy Spirit) was held without deceit in the minds of believers (*asypēboleuton enyparchein tais pisteuontōn psychais tēn peri autou gnōmēn*). Gradually, however, with the progress of impiety, the evil seeds, which were first sown by Arius, the author of the heresy, and then fostered by those who wickedly adopted his errors, grew to the ruin of the Churches, and the consequence of impiety (*kai hē akolouthia tēs asebeias*) broke out into blasphemy against the Spirit" (Basil, *Epistle* 125 [al. 78], n. 3). Similarly, Gregory Nazianzen professes the Nicene faith, but explains more distinctly: "what was there said in passing (*ellipōs*) about the Holy Spirit, because this question had not yet been raised" (*Epistle* 2 to Cledonius, Vol. II, p. 94). (1)

Nevertheless, Athanasius rightly observes that for the simple faith, which has not yet been proposed to be defended against attackers, the profession in the apostolic creed, taken from the Scriptures themselves, suffices, whereby we believe in one God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit: "nor did the Nicene Fathers allow the Holy Spirit to be believed alien from the Father and the Son, but rather they glorified Him together with the Father and the Son in the one faith of the Holy Trinity, because there is one deity in the Holy Trinity" (Athanasius, *Epistle to Emperor Jovian*, Vol. I, p. 582).

(1) Gregory Nazianzen also speaks of the progress of understanding concerning the doctrine of the Holy Spirit: "The Old Testament, he says, openly proclaimed the Father, the Son more obscurely; the New Testament openly revealed the Son, indicated the divinity of the Spirit; but now the Spirit dwells among

us, showing us a clearer manifestation of Himself" (*Oration* 31 [al. 37], n. 26). But lest Gregory be misunderstood, two points must be noted. First, the holy Doctor distinguishes three periods after the coming of Christ: before Christ's resurrection, or (as he says) the beginning of the Gospel; from the resurrection to the ascension into heaven; and after the ascension. By the term "New Testament," in contrast to the Old Testament and to the state of Christ already glorified at the right hand of the Father, he means here the time of Christ dwelling on earth with His Apostles; hence, he says, the revelation concerning the Holy Spirit was not clear to the understanding of the disciples and the faithful before Christ's ascension into heaven, and this is among the teachings that the Apostles were not yet able to bear (*ibid.*, n. 27). Second, Gregory speaks in the hypothesis of his adversaries, which he then shows to be false (*ibid.*, n. 29), that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit's divinity is not contained in the Scriptures; but even if this were true, the dogma would still be demonstrated from apostolic preaching and tradition.

I. Now, in this stage of simple faith in the Holy Spirit as the third person to be glorified together with the Father and the Son, the Spirit of the Father and the Son, who proceeds from the Father and receives from the Son, since all that belongs to the Father belongs to the Son, who is sent by the Father and the Son—it would not be surprising if a more distinct explanation of the mode of procession were not yet found, since no adversary had yet pressed the issue. Certainly, an "insistent preaching" and, as it were, a polemical defense of the procession from the Father and the Son is not to be expected; and thus, with regard to this point, some progress in Catholic understanding can easily be admitted (cf. above, p. 147), "so that what was previously believed simply would afterward be believed more diligently, what was previously preached more slowly would afterward be preached more insistently, what was previously held more securely would afterward be cultivated more carefully" (Vincent of Lérins, *Commonitorium*, n. 32). Nevertheless, already in the third century, in the doctrine concerning the distinction of the divine persons, the Greek Fathers explicitly declare the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son, evidently in the causal sense (*aitiōtikōs*) of the particles *ek* or *para* and *dia*, just as operations ad extra are said to be from the Father through the Son.

Origen (*Commentary on John*, Book 2, n. 6) says that just as all things are said to be made by God the Father through the Word, so too the Holy Spirit is not unbegotten (*agenēton*) but is generated (*genēton*) and begotten (*gennēton*) through the Word, though He excels above the order of all things that were made; therefore, because He does not proceed from the Father alone, the Holy Spirit is not the Son. "But the only-begotten (generated from the Father alone, as Gregory Thaumaturgus, Basil, and Nyssen also interpret the name 'only-begotten') is by nature the Son from the beginning, to whom the Holy Spirit is necessarily related, since the Son hypostatically supplies the Holy Spirit, not only that He might exist, but that He might be wise, intellectual, just, and whatever He must be understood to be according to the communication of the notions of Christ, which were mentioned earlier." (1) He then objects to himself that the doctrine stating that the Holy Spirit has existence through the Word (*to Pneuma genēton on dia tou Logou gegonenai*) seems to contradict the fact that in some Scriptures the Holy Spirit is placed before Christ, and Christ is said to be sent by the Holy Spirit. Origen's response is the same as we gave above (p. 435), that in these passages the reference is to Christ according to His human nature (*Origen, Works*, Vol. IV, pp. 60–63).

(1) "Of the Only-Begotten alone is He by nature the Son from the beginning, to whom the Holy Spirit is related (*krēsin echein*), as it is supplied (*diakonountos*) by His hypostasis, not only that He might exist (*eis to einai*), but that He might be wise, rational, just, and whatever He must be understood to be (*noein*),

according to the communication of the aforementioned notions of Christ" (this, other Fathers said, is that the Holy Spirit is the perfect image of the perfect Son).

Likewise, Dionysius of Alexandria, a disciple of Origen: "The Son is not separated from the Father… but the Spirit is in the hands of both, who cannot be separated from the sender (the Father) nor from the bearer (the Son)" (cited by Athanasius, *De Sententia Dionysii*, n. 17, Vol. I, p. 255). Then Apollinarius: "We confess one true God… one Son, God from true God… and one Holy Spirit by nature and truth, sanctifying and deifying all, who exists from the substance of God through the Son (*Pneuma hyparchon ek tēs ousias tou Theou di' Huiou*)… but we profess all things created by God through the Son (*di' Huiou*) in the Holy Spirit" (cited by Leontius in *Spicilegium Romanum*, Cardinal Mai, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 148–149).

Even more explicitly, another disciple of Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgus, expounds the doctrine in the divinely handed-down creed, which we mentioned above (p. 141), although schismatics attempt to conceal or pervert its genuine sense. First, in the creed, the personal characteristics of the Father and the Son are declared: "Perfect generator of the perfect, the Father of the only-begotten Son, one Lord, alone from the alone, God from God, figure and image of the deity." If this is the proper characteristic of the Son, that He alone is from the Father alone, it follows that the Holy Spirit is not from the Father alone, but from the Father through the Son, as Origen, Gregory's teacher, and later, more clearly, Basil, Nyssen, and Epiphanius (*Haereses* 73) argued. Indeed, the doctrine of Gregory's creed concerning the Holy Spirit is this: "One Holy Spirit, having substance from God, and who appeared through the Son; perfect image of the perfect Son… perfect Trinity… Therefore, the Son has never been lacking to the Father, nor the Holy Spirit to the Son, but the same Trinity, unchangeable and immutable, always exists" (in the Latin translation by Rufinus, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, Book VII, c. 25). The variant reading, as it now exists in Greek, does not change the doctrine itself but only its mode of expression, in that "who appeared through the Son" now has, in Greek, an addition that, not without reason, Lequien considered foreign to the simplicity of that ancient age and suggestive of the ingenuity of a schismatic Greek attempting to introduce some obscurity: *dia Huiou pephēnōs tois anthrōpois* ("who appeared through the Son to men"). The words *pephēnai*, *ekphanein*, *eklampein*, and the like, used by the Fathers in a twofold sense for the eternal generation of the Son, and thus, when simply stated, must be understood of immanent processions, especially since they are often predicated of the Holy Spirit with the added determination *ousiōdōs* (essentially), *physikōs* (naturally), or *ek tēs ousias* (from the substance) (Thesis XXXIII). This, however, does not prevent the same words from being used or understood in context to refer to mission ad extra, which presupposes and manifests internal procession. Therefore, if we read with Rufinus and Pope Hadrian I (who cites Rufinus' translation, *Epistle to Charlemagne*, Mansi, Vol. XIII, p. 760): *en Pneumati hagio ek Theou tēn hyparxin echon, kai dia Huiou pephēnōs* ("one Holy Spirit, having existence from God, and who appeared through the Son"), the Son is understood according to His divine nature, and thus the name "God" stands for the Father; then the direct and clearest sense is this: the Spirit has existence from the Father, as the primordial principle, in such a way that He also shines forth through the Son. But if the Greek addition is admitted, there is indeed another mode of signification, but the signification of procession itself will be less clear. For in this reading, the first clause deals with procession, the second directly with mission. Now, this appearance of the Holy Spirit to men through the Son, whether you understand it through the Son according to His divinity or through the Son according to His humanity, namely through His merits and intercession, as He Himself said: "I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete" (John 14:16). If the former is meant, in the second clause, the Spirit is understood

to have appeared or been sent through the Son, as the Son is one with the Father; for He is equally sent by the Father. Hence, even in the first clause, the Spirit is said to have existence from God the Father, insofar as He is one with the Son; all the more so because, according to the doctrine of the Fathers, mission from a person presupposes procession from the same person, as was demonstrated (Thesis XXXIII). But if you assume that in the second clause the Son is introduced according to His humanity, then in the first clause, the name "God" itself, from what precedes, is understood as the Father and the Son, one God. For this profession immediately precedes, that the Son, God from God, is one God with the Father, and it immediately follows: "one Spirit, having existence from God" (as God, the Father and the Son, was previously described). In any case, however you interpret the two clauses, it is clear that the procession from the Son is included in them, both from what precedes, because the Son alone is from the Father alone, and much more from what follows. For just as the generation of the Son from the Father is confirmed because He is "the image of the deity," namely the image of the Father through the communication of deity, so too the reason why the Spirit shines forth through the Son is declared, that the Spirit is the perfect image of the perfect Son; as Gregory's teacher Origen had said, the Holy Spirit has all the notions or perfections of the Son from the Son Himself. And what the Fathers afterward, Athanasius, Basil, and others, said—that there is such an order and relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son as there is of the Son to the Father—this Gregory expressed when he said: just as the Son has never been lacking to the Father, so the Holy Spirit has never been lacking to the Son.

But a clearer demonstration of the Church's faith concerning this point of doctrine must be sought from the subsequent age, when, as Augustine says, "many things pertaining to the Catholic faith, when stirred up by the cunning restlessness of heretics, were considered more diligently, understood more clearly, and preached more insistently" (*City of God*, XVI.2). As soon as those fuller declarations and defenses—not indeed of the procession per se, but of the procession from the substance and in the substance of God—became necessary to vindicate the divinity and consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son against heretics, we see in the doctors of both the East and the West a most explicit and unambiguous doctrine concerning the internal order of relations among the persons, the unity of the Father and the Son insofar as they are the principle of the Holy Spirit, and the relation of origin of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son—in one word, the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son; and this, as I said, long before a directly opposed heresy required a special investigation of this dogma. Therefore, this entire exposition of the traditional doctrine, given without a polemical purpose, all the more evidently presents evidence of universal consensus and common faith.

II. Concerning the explicit, universal, and insistent preaching of the dogma among the Latin Fathers, especially from the time when more abundant monuments survive, that is, from the fourth and fifth centuries onward, it is abundantly clear.

1°. Already the most ancient among the ecclesiastical writers who wrote in Latin, Tertullian, in the second century and the beginning of the third, expounds this doctrine. "Everything that proceeds is not for that reason separated. But where there is a second, there are two; and where there is a third, there are three. For the third is the Spirit from God and the Son, just as the third from the root is the fruit from the shoot, and the third from the fountain is the stream from the river, and the third from the sun is the ray from the beam. (1) Yet nothing is alienated from its source, from which it derives its properties. Thus, the Trinity, flowing down from the Father through interconnected and united degrees, does not contradict the monarchy and protects the state of the economy" (*Against Praxeas*, c. 8). "I do not derive the Son from

anywhere else but from the substance of the Father… Let this be said also for the third degree, because I believe the Spirit is from nowhere else but from the Father through the Son" (*ibid.*, c. 4).

(1) It is easily granted that "the third Spirit from God and the Son" immediately signifies order, not procession. But Tertullian uniquely establishes order in the Holy Trinity in the origin of one from another: "what proceeds from another is second to that from which it proceeds." Moreover, he explicitly declares the Spirit to be the third because, presupposing the generation of the Son, He proceeds from the Father and the Son, just as the fruit from the root and the shoot, etc. (cf. Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book VII, c. 8, n. 2).

2°. After the middle of the fourth century, Hilary, although in his books *On the Trinity* he almost exclusively focuses on the consubstantiality of the Son and treats the Holy Spirit very briefly and only incidentally, nevertheless clearly teaches that, along with the divinity of the Holy Spirit, the procession from the Father and the Son is handed down in the Scriptures and must be believed. "Concerning the Holy Spirit, it is necessary neither to be silent nor to speak, but to confess Him as He is from the Father and the Son, His authors." Citing the testimonies of Scripture in which He is called the Spirit of God, the Spirit who is from God, the Spirit of the Son, the Spirit of Christ, he resolves the threefold question of the Arians: "When they say, through whom is He, and why is He, or what is He (the Spirit)? If our response displeases those who say: 'through whom all things are, and from whom all things are' (that the Holy Spirit is from Him, i.e., from the Son through whom all things are, and from the Father from whom all things are), and because He is the Spirit of God (what He is), the gift of the faithful (why He is in relation ad extra), let the Apostles and Prophets also displease them" (*On the Trinity*, Book II, n. 29). "May I worship You, our Father, Your Son together with You, and may I be worthy of Your Holy Spirit, who is from You through Your Only-Begotten" (*ibid.*, Book XII, n. 67; cf. n. 55). He deliberately shows the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son to demonstrate the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son (*ibid.*, Book VIII, n. 20). First, in n. 19, he compares the two statements: "who proceeds from the Father" and "whom I will send from the Father," where "the Son shows His power in that He sends." Then he continues that the question is by no means open but is defined by Christ Himself with the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. "Nor do I now, in this matter, obstruct the freedom of understanding as to whether they think the Paraclete Spirit is from the Father or from the Son, for the Lord has not left this uncertain. (1) For under the same words, He spoke thus: 'When the Spirit of truth comes… He will not speak on His own… because He will take from Mine and announce it to you. All that the Father has is Mine; therefore I said, He will take from Mine and announce it to you' (John 16:12–15). Therefore, He receives from the Son, who is both sent by Him and proceeds from the Father. And I ask whether it is the same to receive from the Son as to proceed from the Father. But if it is believed to differ between receiving from the Son and proceeding from the Father, certainly it will be considered the same and one to receive from the Son as to receive from the Father. (2) For the Lord Himself says: 'because He will take from Mine and announce it to you; all that the Father has is Mine; therefore I said, He will take from Mine.' What He will receive, whether it is power or virtue or teaching, the Son said must be received from Him, and again this signifies that it must be received from the Father. For when He says that all that the Father has is His, and therefore He said that it must be received from Him, He teaches that what is to be received from the Father is still received from Him, because all that is the Father's is His. This truth has no diversity, nor does it differ from whom it is received, what is given by the Father is referred as given by the Son… That they (the Father and the Son)

are one, the signification of the same divinity through generation and nativity in both is shown, since what the Spirit of truth will receive from the Father, the Son confesses is to be given by Him." (3)

(1) That is, I do not, by injury and my own judgment, obstruct the freedom of understanding that the Arians arrogate to themselves, but the Lord Himself, by His clear doctrine, removes this freedom. So, a little later, he calls it "the freedom of impious understanding." From what was said above, it is abundantly clear that the Arians thought it free to deny the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father, and thus the procession through the communication of nature from the Father and the Son; hence, I do not know what cause of hesitation there was for the editor Constantius, who says in a note to the text that "from these and the following words of Hilary, it could seem that the controversy about the procession of the Holy Spirit had already been raised." Indeed, a controversy had been raised, but in the Arian sense concerning procession from the substance of the Father, not in the Photian sense concerning procession from the Son.

(2) Hilary's sense is: to receive from another and to proceed, in divine matters, signify the same. But if the adversaries call this into doubt, he proves in another way that in the words of Christ, the communication of substance from the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit is declared, since the Holy Spirit is said to receive from the Father as He receives from the Son, and this because all that is the Son's is the Father's; and thus, the Spirit receives from the Father and the Son, insofar as they are one.

(3) That the Son says, "all is Mine" and "all is the Father's" and "He will take from Mine," Hilary shows again is the divine essence itself (*On the Trinity*, Book IX, n. 73).

3°. In a similar way, from the words of Christ, "He will take from Mine," other Fathers teach and emphasize the communication of nature from the Son as from the Father to the Holy Spirit: Marius Victorinus (contemporary with Hilary), *Against the Arians*, Book I (*Bibliotheca Maxima*, Vol. IV, p. 257); Ambrose, *On the Holy Spirit*, Book II, c. 12, n. 18; Leo the Great, *Sermons on Pentecost*, Sermon I, c. 3; Sermon II, c. 5. "'If I do not go away, the Paraclete will not come to you.' Therefore, these two, one from the other: the Holy Spirit from the Son, just as the Son from God; and consubstantially, the Holy Spirit also from the Father. That all three are one, the Father is not a silent silence but a voice in silence (i.e., the Father is not sterile but fecund with the Word), the Son is already the voice, the Paraclete is the voice of the voice: 'When the Spirit of truth comes, He will guide you into all truth; for He will not speak on His own,' for Christ is the truth; 'but whatever He hears, He will speak… because He will take from Mine…' Therefore, He says: 'He will take from Mine,' because one motion, that is, the acting action (divine life), is Christ and the Holy Spirit; and the first is to live, and from Him who is to live, to understand; to live is Christ, to understand is the Spirit. (1) Therefore, the Spirit receives from Christ, Christ Himself from the Father, and therefore the Spirit also from the Father. All things, therefore, are one, but from the Father" (Marius Victorinus, *loc. cit.*).

(1) Here you see the Holy Spirit presented as the Word of the Son, which occurs also in other Fathers, as explained above (pp. 368, 369, 410, 429, 430).

4°. Since St. Augustine's purpose was to explain the entire doctrine of the Holy Trinity according to the Catholic faith more distinctly, he differs from his predecessors only in that he more insistently and industriously, with arguments drawn from the words of Scripture and reasons from the internal economy of the mystery, proposes and illustrates the traditional faith and Catholic understanding of the procession

of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. It would not be necessary to cite testimonies of the holy Doctor here, since many have already been described above, and his doctrine on this point is otherwise well-known. For he not only teaches the procession from the Father and the Son in particular texts; but the relation of the Father and the Son, insofar as they are one principle of the Holy Spirit, the generation of the Son through the communication of both the essence and the one spirative power, the unity of love in the Father and the Son for the production of subsistent love as an immanent term—these, I say, in Augustine constitute an essential element in the very notion of the Trinity, without which the origin, distinction, and consubstantiality of the divine persons cannot be rightly understood; and they are repeated by him in all places where he expounds the Catholic concept of the mystery per se. But as other Fathers, so too Augustine sometimes specifically addresses the controversy against the Arian Pneumatomachians, who, denying that there are three consubstantial divine persons, regarding the third person, were accustomed to express their heresy by conceding that the Son is from the Father but denying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, claiming instead that He was created by the Son. Thus, in this specific controversy, Augustine, like other Fathers and the Second Council (Constantinople I, 381), to vindicate the divinity of the Holy Spirit in direct opposition to this heresy, insists on this article of the Catholic faith, that no less than the Son, the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Father.

Now, appealing to this doctrine of Augustine and other Doctors concerning the procession from the Father as from the principle, source, and root of the Holy Trinity (*archē*, *prokatarktikē aitia*, *koryphē*, *pēgē*, *rhiza tēs theotētos*), which is certainly common to all Catholics and without which the procession from the Son in the Catholic sense could not be understood, Macarius Bulgakov brazenly dares to write to his Russians that all those Fathers, and specifically Augustine and Fulgentius, denied and directly rejected the Catholic doctrine (1) that the Holy Spirit must be believed to proceed from the Father and the Son. To put into perspective the unheard-of audacity with which this man, celebrated among his own as a bishop and famed for theological erudition, mocks the ignorance of his followers, let us briefly summarize Augustine's doctrine, though it is already sufficiently clear from what was said above.

(1) "Augustine and Fulgentius directly reject this doctrine" (Macarius, *loc. cit.*). You will find citations of Augustine's passages, in which this direct rejection of the Catholic doctrine is supposed to be contained, no less fraudulent than this assertion itself. For he refers to truncated testimonies (*De Trinitate*, Book IV, c. 20, n. 29; *Contra Maximinum*, Book II, c. 14, n. 1; *De Trinitate*, Book II, c. 3; *Epistle* 170 [al. 66], n. 5), in which, if only the words cited by Macarius are considered, nothing else is said than that the Father is the source of the whole deity and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father; but if they are read in their entirety, especially in the first two, it is most explicitly declared how the Father is the source and how the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, namely because the Father generated such a Son, and by generating gave to Him that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Him.

a) The Holy Spirit, insofar as His name is proper to the third person, is a relative name signifying the one spirated by that divine person of whom He is said to be the Spirit. In the divine revelation of the Scriptures, it is contained that the Spirit is both of the Father and of the Son; and thus, it must be believed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. This doctrine is emphasized by Augustine in many places, some of which we described in Thesis XXXII, n. II, from *Epistle* 238 to Pascentius and *De Trinitate*, Book IV, n. 29. He repeats the same in *De Trinitate*, Book V, c. 11, n. 12; Book XV, c. 26, n. 45; *Sermon* 214 (the third on the handing over of the creed), n. 10; *In Joannem*, Tractate 99, n. 6–8. In this last passage, as is his custom in sermons to the people, he institutes, as it were, a dialogue with his

listeners: “Here someone might perhaps ask whether the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son? For the Son is the Son of the Father alone, and the Father is the Father of the Son alone; but the Holy Spirit is not the Spirit of one of them but of both.” He proves this from the Scriptures (Matt. 10:20; Gal. 4:6; Rom. 8:11): “And there are many other testimonies by which it is clearly shown that He is the Spirit of both the Father and the Son, who in the Trinity is called the Holy Spirit. Why, therefore, should we not believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, since He is also the Spirit of the Son?” (*In Joannem*, Tractate 99, *loc. cit.*). He expresses the same without that dialogic form in *De Trinitate*, Book IV, n. 29, which we will soon describe.

b) The Holy Spirit hypostatically, or as the holy Doctor is accustomed to say, properly is and is called the common goodness, holiness, charity of the Father and the Son, or even “the communion of the Father and the Son,” and by this same personal character, He is the gift, that is, eternally capable of being given (*donabilis*) by the Father and the Son. Augustine explains all this explicitly in many places, and they cannot be understood except from the procession from the Father and the Son (*Sermon* 71, n. 18, 29; *City of God*, XI, c. 24; *De Trinitate*, V, n. 12; VI, n. 7, 11; XV, n. 27, 29, 31, 37, 50). “According to the holy Scriptures, the Holy Spirit is neither of the Father alone nor of the Son alone, but of both, and therefore He intimates to us the common charity by which the Father and the Son love each other (as charity subsisting, produced through one common love of the Father and the Son). It is not in vain that in this Trinity the Word is called only the Son, nor the Gift of God only the Holy Spirit, nor the one from whom the Son is generated only the Father. Thus, He generated Him such that the common Gift would also proceed from Him

if, therefore, one of these three (Father, Son, Holy Spirit) is properly to be called charity, what could be more fitting than that this be the Holy Spirit? (*De Trinitate*, Book XV, n. 27, 29). See the other cited passages.

c) To seek some understanding of this procession from faith, Augustine illustrates it through the acts of the created spirit, which, given faith, present a certain image of the Most Holy Trinity. For just as love proceeds from memory and understanding (from the mind already informed by habitual knowledge and from the word of the mind) as from a parent and offspring, so too, in some way, it is understood that substantial love, the Holy Spirit, proceeds from the Father and the Word. Read *De Trinitate*, Book XV, n. 41, 43, 47, 50: “The love of man, proceeding from knowledge (from the mind and from already formed thought) (1), and joining memory and understanding, as something common to parent and offspring, from which it is understood to be neither parent nor offspring, has in this image some, though very unequal, likeness to the Holy Spirit” (n. 43). See the passages cited in Theses XXVI and XXXI.

(1) This, in the same place, n. 47, is called “the love of the knower, which proceeds from both, that is, from the knowing mind and the generated notion, as from parent and offspring.”

d) Augustine most diligently explains the unity of the Father and the Son in the spiration of the third person, namely, that just as the divine essence and every perfection, so too the spirative power and (what in God is the same) the spiration itself is in the Father uncommunicated, but in the Son, the same numerically one spirative power and spiration is communicated by the Father through generation. Therefore, the Father is the source of the Trinity, from the Father “the Holy Spirit proceeds principally,” that is, as from the primordial principle, which Augustine often also calls the *authority* or *reason of the*

author, i.e., the primordial origin in the Father. This doctrine, common to Augustine and the other Fathers, without which the procession of the third person from the first and second as from one principle could not stand, certainly pertains to the Catholic faith, since it contains nothing other than that the Son, the second person, is generated by the first person, the Father, in the unity of essence and the spirative power producing the third person, the Holy Spirit, or, as Augustine says, that "the Son, from whom He has that He is God, for He is God from God, certainly has from Him that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Him." Now, this point of Catholic doctrine—that the Father is the source of the Trinity, and that not only the Son but also the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father—Macarius' perfidy tears away from the other connected points and, suppressing the contexts, proclaims that Augustine and the other Fathers "directly reject" the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. Let us hear the holy Doctor of the Church.

To the question of the Arian Maximinus, why the Holy Spirit is not the Son if, according to Catholic doctrine, He is from the substance of the Father, Augustine resolves it with this one reason: that the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father but also from the Son, and therefore His procession is not through generation; yet this itself the Son has from the Father. "From the Father is the Son, from the Father is the Holy Spirit, but the former is begotten, the latter proceeding; therefore, the former is the Son of the Father from whom He is begotten, but the latter is the Spirit of both, since He proceeds from both. But for this reason, when the Son spoke of Him, He said, 'He proceeds from the Father,' because the Father is the author of His procession, who begot such a Son and, by begetting, gave to Him that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Him. For if He did not proceed also from Him, He would not have said to His disciples, 'Receive the Holy Spirit,' and by breathing on them would not have given Him, openly showing by breathing what He was giving secretly by spirating (1). Therefore, if He were born, He would not only be born from the Father or only from the Son, but certainly from both; and thus, without doubt, He would be called the Son of both. And so, because He is in no way the Son of both, it was not fitting that He be born from both (2). But what the difference is between being born and proceeding, who can explain, speaking of the most excellent nature? It is enough for us, therefore, that the Son is not from Himself but from Him from whom He is born; the Holy Spirit is not from Himself but from Him from whom He proceeds; and because He proceeds from both, as we have already shown, hence He is called the Spirit of the Father (citing Rom. 8:11) and the Spirit of the Son (Rom. 8:9) (1); for there are not two Holy Spirits, as if there were individual spirits of each, but rather one Spirit of the Father and the Son" (*Contra Maximinum*, Book II, c. 14, n. 1).

(1) Augustine distinguishes two things: *spirare* (to spirate) and *dare* or *mittere* (to give or send). Spiration is eternal, and therefore He also spirates when He sends in time; nor does He send except by spirating, because (as Augustine teaches with other Fathers, cf. Thesis XXXIII, n. II), mission in time is itself the manifestation of eternal procession. Moreover, it is most evident that eternal spiration and procession are treated here, both in themselves and from what Augustine immediately adds.

(2) This reason, why procession is not generation, Augustine often recalls: namely, that generation cannot be conceived except from one Father, but the Holy Spirit proceeds not from the Father alone but from the Father and the Son. If the holy Doctor had held the Photian opinion, he could not even have thought of such a reason for the distinction between nativity and procession. See the passages cited in Thesis XXXI.

Who would believe that any Photian would dare to appeal to this passage? Nevertheless, Macarius cites this very testimony twice, from which he claims to demonstrate that Augustine directly rejected the

Catholic doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. But he transcribes only the first part up to the words "the latter proceeding"; then, with ellipses, suppressing the rest, he concludes his citation with the final words: "the Holy Spirit is not from Himself but from Him from whom He proceeds," in which he carefully notes that it says "from Him" in the singular, not "from Them" in the plural (2); but he again omits the following words. Good God! This man in many places dares to accuse Western doctors of fraud in citing testimonies!

(2) Here is the entire Macarian citation: "It is from the Father that the Son is; it is also from the Father that the Holy Spirit is; but the Son is begotten, and the Spirit proceeds… it is not from Himself that the Holy Spirit is; He is from Him (and not from Them) from whom He proceeds" (*Contra Maximinum*, Book II, c. 14, n. 1). So Macarius, pp. 380, 412. Regarding the singular number, not only did Augustine, the greatest among great theologians, see, but even all beginners easily understand that in the context it is more theologically said in the singular, "from Him from whom He proceeds," to express that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit; just as in works *ad extra* (as we will soon see Augustine employ this comparison), because of the unity of the principle, we theologically say: the world was created by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; it is not, therefore, from itself, but from Him from whom it is created. Just as *ad extra* there is one creator, not three creators, so *ad intra* there is one spirator, not two spirators. But to perceive the full perfidy, read Augustine's context: "from Him from whom He proceeds; and because He proceeds from both."

The same doctrine, as in the cited passage, is repeated in *De Trinitate*, Book IV, n. 29, that the Father is the principle not only of the Son but also of the Holy Spirit, and in this sense of the whole deity; for although the Holy Spirit proceeds by one and the same procession from the Son as from the Father, the Father remains "the principle of the whole deity," because the spirative power in the Son is not from Himself but communicated by the Father, the same power that is in the Father from Himself and originally. "Just as to be born is for the Son to be from the Father, so to be sent is for the Son to be known to be from Him. And just as for the Holy Spirit to be the gift of God is to proceed from the Father, so to be sent is to be known to proceed from Him (1). Nor can we say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son; for it is not in vain that the same Spirit is called the Spirit of the Father and the Son. Nor do I see what else He meant when, breathing on the faces of the disciples, He said, 'Receive the Holy Spirit.' For that bodily breath was not the substance of the Holy Spirit, but a demonstration through a fitting signification that the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father but also from the Son… Therefore, when the Lord said, 'whom I will send to you from the Father,' He showed that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and the Son; and even when He said, 'whom the Father will send,' He added, 'in My name.' Yet He did not say, 'whom the Father will send from Me,' as He said, 'whom I will send to you from the Father'; clearly showing that the Father is the principle of the whole divinity, or, if it is better said, deity (2). Therefore, He who proceeds from the Father and the Son is referred to Him from whom the Son is born" (*De Trinitate*, Book IV, n. 29).

(1) The Catholic dogma concerning the Holy Spirit, the holy Doctor describes most fully in the connection between procession and mission, as between the eternal relation and its temporal manifestation, so that the mission of a person by a person in the Most Holy Trinity, by the very nature of the matter and according to the doctrine of the Fathers, demonstrates the procession of the sent from the sender, see Thesis XXXIII, n. II. What is then said, "for the Holy Spirit to be the gift of God is to proceed from the Father," is understood from the common declaration of the Fathers and especially Augustine,

that the reason for the gift is the personal character of the Holy Spirit, because He proceeds through love as *donabilis* (capable of being given), not as the second person through intellect as begotten. "He came forth not as born but as given; and therefore He is not the Son"; "eternally the Spirit is a gift, but temporally given" (*De Trinitate*, V, 14, 17). We will discuss this further in Thesis XLVI.

(2) Macarius (*loc. cit.*) also brings forth this testimony, by which he claims to demonstrate that Augustine directly rejected the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. Persuaded, however, that his disciples would never read Augustine's own book, he begins the citation with the words: "Therefore, when the Lord said, 'whom I will send to you from the Father,'" and concludes it with the final words: "the Father is the principle of the whole divinity, or, if it is better said, deity," omitting not only all the preceding but also the immediately following words: "He who proceeds from the Father and the Son is referred to Him from whom the Son is born," in which anyone can see most clearly explained and defended that very doctrine whose denial the Photian dares to impose on the holy Doctor with his frauds.

In the final chapters (c. 17–27) of Book XV of *De Trinitate*, he describes the dogma most fully, in which the absurd objections that Macarius is accustomed to oppose to the most explicit testimonies cannot even be contrived by a Photian, that the discourse among the Fathers is only about consubstantiality or about the temporal procession, i.e., the mission of the Holy Spirit, and not about the eternal procession of the same Spirit from the Son as from the Father. What then the most candid man is accustomed to suspect about almost all testimonies, that they were corrupted and interpolated by the Latins, let him rather say that the Fathers, and especially Augustine, never existed in the world; for this would be no more foolish nor less credible to the people than that. Meanwhile, let us hear Augustine: "He who can understand the generation of the Son from the Father without time, let him understand the procession of the Holy Spirit from both without time. And he who can understand in what the Son said, 'as the Father has life in Himself, so He has given to the Son to have life in Himself' (John 5:26), that He begot Him without time, so that the life that the Father gave to the Son by begetting is coeternal with the life of the Father who gave it; let him understand that as the Father has in Himself that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him, so He has given to the Son that the same Holy Spirit proceeds from Him, and both without time; and that the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father, so that it is understood that what also proceeds from the Son is from the Father to the Son. For if whatever the Son has, He has from the Father; He certainly has from the Father that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him. Therefore, how could the Son not most absurdly be called the Son of both, since just as generation from the Father without the beginning of time and without any mutability of nature gives essence to the Son, so procession from both without any beginning of time, without any mutability of nature, gives essence to the Holy Spirit? For the Father alone is not from another; but the Son is born from the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father, and, with the Father giving without any interval of time, proceeds commonly from both. Therefore, He is not begotten from both, but proceeds from both as the Spirit of both" (*De Trinitate*, XV, n. 47). Then, in n. 48, Augustine himself transcribes several things from his Tractate XCIX on John, or as he says, "what I taught in a certain sermon to the ears of the Christian people through the testimonies of the holy Scriptures, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both; but speaking to the faithful, not to unbelievers," from which tractate we cited several things above in Thesis XXXIV and elsewhere.

e) In what we have described, it has already been most clearly shown by what reason the Father, communicating, and the Son, having the communicated spiration as one, are by that very fact one principle of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, Augustine still teaches this explicitly in so many words. There

appears in the holy Doctor an inquiry and a certain hesitation, not about the matter itself but about the name of the principle. For *principle* is said with respect to creation; thus, the three persons are one principle of creation. If then *principle* is also applied in the Trinity with respect to generation, the Father is the principle of the Son. But since the Holy Spirit is neither created nor begotten, it is asked whether the name *principle* is rightly applied also with respect to this procession, which is not through generation but through spiration, which Augustine calls *giving*, insofar as the Holy Spirit proceeds as a gift or (as he explains elsewhere) as charity. "He proceeds from eternity, but because He proceeded in such a way as to be *donabile* (capable of being given), He was already a gift, even before there was anyone to whom He could be given… For eternally the Spirit is a gift, but temporally given." Now, if the Father is called the principle of the Holy Spirit by reason of this procession or eternal giving, by that very fact this principle is one, the Father and the Son. "God is said to be one principle with respect to creation, not two or three principles. But with respect to one another in the Trinity, if the begetter is a principle to what it begets, the Father is a principle to the Son, because He begets Him. But whether the Father is also a principle to the Holy Spirit, since it is said, 'He proceeds from the Father' (John 15:26), is no small question. For if this is so, He will not be a principle only to what He begets or makes, but also to what He gives. Here also that question becomes clear, as far as it can, which often troubles many: why the Holy Spirit is not also the Son, since He too comes forth from the Father, as it is read in the Gospel. For He came forth not as born but as given; and therefore He is not called a Son, because He was neither born as the Only-Begotten nor made so as to be born into adoption through God's grace, as we are… If, therefore, what is given has as its principle Him from whom it is given, because it did not receive from elsewhere that which proceeds from Him (1), it must be confessed that the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, not two principles; but just as the Father and the Son are one God, and with respect to creation one creator and one Lord, so with respect to the Holy Spirit they are one principle; but with respect to creation, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one principle, just as one creator and one Lord" (*De Trinitate*, V, n. 14, 17; cf. *Contra Sermonem Arianorum*, n. 19).

(1) The Father and the Son do not give, and thus spirate, the Holy Spirit from elsewhere but from their own substance; therefore, they are the principle from which the Holy Spirit proceeds.

5°. St. Fulgentius teaches and defends the same doctrine in all the points we noted from Augustine most clearly. But here we will condense everything into a few points, yet sufficiently to show with what fidelity Macarius claimed that Fulgentius directly rejected the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son (1). From many testimonies, we will select three in which the holy Doctor of Ruspe proposes a certain series of articles of faith: *De Fide ad Petrum*; *De Trinitate ad Felicem*, c. 2; *Contra Fabianum*, fragment 36.

(1) Macarius (*loc. cit.*) proves this assertion with no other words than these of Fulgentius: "Holding to the rule of apostolic faith… we confess that the Holy Spirit is nothing other than God, neither diverse from the Son nor from the Father (Macarius' translator renders the sense Sabellian: 'not distinct from the Son and the Father'), nor confused in the Son or the Father. For He is one and the same Spirit of the Father and the Son, wholly proceeding from the Father, wholly consisting in both, nor divided in individuals, because He is inseparably common to both" (*Contra Obiectiones Arianorum*, at the end, p. 63). That these two are synonymous for Fulgentius—"Spirit of the Father and the Son" or "Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son"—we have already seen in Thesis XXXII, and it will become clear again from what follows. But the procession from the Father, which Fulgentius, like other Fathers, defends directly against

the Arians here, cannot be understood by Catholics except as procession from the Father insofar as the Father is one with the Son, as we will soon hear from Fulgentius himself.

In the book *To Peter on Faith*, he expounds "forty chapters firmly pertaining to the rule of true faith, so that if anyone wishes to contradict not only all but even individual ones, he may appear as a heretic and an enemy of the Christian faith, and thus anathematized by all Catholics" (n. 85). Now, among these chapters of faith, the eleventh is this very one: "Hold most firmly and in no way doubt that the same Holy Spirit, who is the one Spirit of the Father and the Son, proceeds from the Father and the Son. For the Son says, 'When the Spirit of truth comes, who proceeds from the Father,' where He taught that He is His Spirit, because He Himself is the truth. That the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son, prophetic and apostolic doctrine commends to us" (*loc. cit.*, n. 52). In the book *Against Fabianus*, there is an explanation of the individual articles of faith as they are proposed to be believed "in the symbol of the Christian faith (Apostolic), in whose brevity the whole sum of Christian belief consists; yet a right mind of the believer is necessary, lest what he hears for the effect of salvation, he himself wishes to twist to the punishment of death." Now, in the article "I believe in the Holy Spirit," Fulgentius declares to the Arian what faithful Catholics believe and profess: "We confess that we believe in the Holy Spirit, who is the one Spirit of the Father and the Son, proceeding from the Father and the Son, naturally remaining in the Father and the Son (immanent procession), having the origin of divinity from the Father and the Son (having origin in His divine hypostasis through the communication of the divine nature), having naturally the truth of one deity with the Father and the Son" (*loc. cit.*, p. 655). To the Catholic notary Felix, he declares "how one ought to believe in the Holy Trinity, which is God, or how one can defend the Catholic and orthodox faith against the errors of heretics." For this purpose, he expounds nothing other than what is necessarily to be believed by Catholics. "Receive the faith," he says, "in which you were once reborn, believing in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." This faith, narrated by Fulgentius in words very similar to those in the Athanasian Creed, embraces not only the consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son but no less the procession of the same from the Father and the Son, the profession of which he repeats and emphasizes four times in a few sentences. "The Father is begotten by none, the Son is begotten by the Father, the Holy Spirit is proceeding from the Father and the Son… The essence of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is not diverse; for if it were, neither would the Son be truly begotten by the Father, nor would the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son. But because the Son is true, that is, begotten from the essence of the Father, the Holy Spirit is also true, proceeding from the Father and the Son. But if the Son or the Holy Spirit were of another kind (nature) than the Father, neither would the Son truly be the Father's, whom a differing essence makes foreign; similarly, the Holy Spirit would not proceed from the Father and the Son, which it is madness to say, because Holy Scripture manifests with faithful narration that the Son is begotten from the Father and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father" (1) (*loc. cit.*, p. 330).

(1) Nothing could be said more splendidly than what Fulgentius here draws from the innermost depths of theology and proclaims as the necessary and universal profession of faith. By the very fact, he says, that the Holy Spirit is believed to be consubstantial with the Father and the Son, He must also be believed to proceed from the Father and the Son; for consubstantiality in the Trinity cannot come from elsewhere than that one essence is communicated from the Father through generation to the Son, and from the Father and the consubstantial Son to the third person, the Holy Spirit. In the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father is contained that the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father also proceeds from the Son, because if the Son did not have communicated from the Father the same spirative power, He would not be of the

same nature as the Father, He would not be consubstantial with the Father. Because the Son is true, he says, begotten from the essence of the Father, and thus having the whole essence of the Father, therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds not from the Father alone but from the Father and the Son. Hence, whoever believes the Son to be consubstantial with the Father understands that the Father with the Son is one principle of the Holy Spirit; and thus also understands that when in Scriptures or in the Catholic profession it is said that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, by this very fact it is said from the Father insofar as He is one with the Son, namely, that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. This is what Fulgentius says: to say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father and the Son is madness, because Scripture manifests with faithful narration that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father.

See other no less clear passages in Fulgentius *Against Fabianus*, fragment XVIII, p. 602; XXV, p. 610; XXVII, pp. 611–612; XXIX, p. 626; XXXV, p. 652; *Epistle* 14 to Ferrandus the Deacon, n. 9, 28; *On the Incarnation to Scarila*, n. 3–4.

6°. Pope Hormisdas, after the extinction of the Acacian schism, expounded to Emperor Justin the universal faith concerning the mystery of the Trinity and the Incarnation. In the doctrine of the Trinity, these are to be believed: "God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit, an undivided Trinity. And yet it is known that it is proper to the Father to beget the Son, proper to the Son of God to be born from the Father equal to the Father, proper to the Holy Spirit to proceed from the Father and the Son under one substance of deity. Also proper to the Son of God, that according to what is written, in the last days the Word became flesh and dwelt among us" (*Epistle* 79 to Emperor Justin).

(1) Mansi (Vol. VIII, p. 521) found in one Lucca codex the last two sentences, from the words "proper to the Holy Spirit" etc., manifestly disturbed by a scribe's error, so that the entire sense and context are perverted. For in that codex, it was written by the first hand: "it is also known that it is proper to the Holy Spirit; but proper to the Son of God, that according to what is written," etc. Rightly, therefore, in that same codex, "an ancient and almost contemporary hand" restored the genuine reading, which we have given in the text, and which already in the early ninth century Theodolphus of Orléans had in *On the Holy Spirit* and, in the same century, Aeneas of Paris in *Against the Greeks*, c. 54 (Migne, Vol. CV, p. 269; CXXI, p. 711). The matter is so clear in itself that this scribe's error would not deserve mention, except that the schismatic Macarius here too, as in countless other places, wished to offer ridiculous spectacles to his people. He himself translates the fraud of Catholic theologians who cite Hormisdas' passage, saying they do not attend to "the observation of great importance made by Mansi, who compared the passage with handwritten codices" (Macarius, p. 398). But Mansi found that disturbance of the text not in codices but in one Lucca codex, nor is his observation of any importance, except perhaps to note some discrepancy of a codex from others. What Macarius adds, that Adam Czernicovius saw in one Hamburg codex "the same primitive text (namely, that devoid of sense) restored," we disregard, since that man, devoted to the Photian heresy, seizing and mixing everything, square with round, deserves no more trust than Macarius, nor can we know whence or how that restoration occurred in the Hamburg codex, and finally, however it crept in, the text manifestly bears a scribe's error.

7°. The bishops of Africa, in their profession of faith to King Huneric, as we said above (p. 49), similarly declare: "the unbegotten Father and the Son begotten from the Father and the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son (1) we believe to be of one substance or essence" (Victor Vitensis, *History of the Vandal Persecution*, Book III, n. 1, ed. Ruinart, p. 48).

(1) Ruinart testifies that this "and the Son" (*et Filio*) is found both in printed editions and in manuscript codices of the *History of the Vandal Persecution*, except for one Laon codex and another Colbertine codex, in which it is written by another hand, and also the Rhenanus edition. Hence, it is truly astonishing how this lacuna crept into the editions of the Councils (Hardouin, Vol. II, p. 858; Mansi, Vol. VII, p. 1143). In Africa, indeed, in the year 484, fifty years after Augustine's death, the profession of the procession from the Father and the Son could not but be common, since the holy Doctor, who had such great authority both in the universal Church and especially in Africa, not only defended this faith in individual testimonies but also demonstrated in all his deeper explanations that it is intimately connected with the entire economy of the mystery of the Trinity. Hence, we see Vigilius of Thapsus, one of the 461 bishops who signed the profession to King Huneric, clearly declare the same consensus of the faithful. To the Arian objection: "Show the Holy Spirit, whence He draws His origin, whom you profess neither as unbegotten like the Father nor begotten like the Son"; Vigilius responds: "The certain and manifest origin of the Holy Spirit is the Father and the Son, who is believed by the faithful neither as unbegotten with the unbegotten nor begotten with the Only-Begotten; but that He is the Spirit of the Father (and the Son) is proved by the words of the sacred Scriptures (citing various testimonies where He is called now the Spirit of the Father, now of the Son: Gal. 4:6; Phil. 1:19; 1 Pet. 1:10)… and in many places of divine Scripture He is called the Spirit of the Father and the Son" (*Contra Varimadum*, Book II, c. 12; cf. Thesis XXXII, n. II). No less clearly, in his books *On the Trinity*, Vigilius emphasizes the same: "As two pieces of wood joined together, cast into the furnace of fire, and from the two pieces of wood an inseparable flame proceeds; so from the power of the Father and the Son proceeds the Holy Spirit, having the very power of deity" (*On the Trinity*, Book VIII, p. 268). At the very time of the Vandal persecution, as the Maurists believe, a sermon was given to catechumens (among Augustine's works, Vol. VI, *On the Symbol*, Sermon 2), in which the same exposition of the article on the Holy Spirit is found: "the same Spirit of the Father and the Son, proceeding from the Father and the Son." Shortly after Huneric's time, St. Fulgentius (as we have seen) in the same Africa handed down the profession of faith to be held most firmly and common to all Catholics, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. And this same thing is repeated in several places in the letters of Ferrandus, a deacon of Carthage, in the same era. Where he opposes the Catholic faith to Arian doctrine, he says: "Catholics, on the contrary, confess that God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit are of one essence… and, wishing to prefer none to another, they understand that the Son is born from the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son" (*Epistle* 4, n. 1 to Eugippius; see *Epistle* 5, n. 2 to Severus; *Epistle* 7, n. 12 to Regina). Therefore, although no dogmatic difficulty could be imagined if the African bishops in their defense of the Catholic faith to Huneric and the Arian Vandals had directly named only the procession from the Father to demonstrate the divinity of the Holy Spirit, which was the main point of dispute, as we see done often by other Fathers and by these same bishops below (n. 2); nevertheless, the common faith and insistent preaching of the dogma, especially in Africa, the manner of disputation observed there by other Fathers of the same time against the Arians, and finally the authority of the codices demonstrate that the reading retained by Ruinart is the genuine one.

8°. In the year 447, the Council of Toledo (II) was held under the command of Pope Leo the Great against the Priscillianists, among whose errors, as reported to him by Bishop Turribius of Astorga, the Pope designates this: "They assert that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one and the same person, as if the same God (namely, the same hypostasis) is now called Father, now Son, now Holy Spirit; and not (as the Catholic faith must be believed) that one is He who begets, another He who is begotten, another

He who proceeds from both" (*Epistle* 15, c. 1). Furthermore, in that Council, a "rule of Catholic faith against all heresies and especially against the Priscillianists was issued, which the bishops of Tarragona, Carthage, Lusitania, and Baetica made, and with the precept of Pope Leo of the City of Rome sent to Bishop Balconius of Galicia." In this symbol, there is explicitly the profession: "We believe in one God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—the Father is not the same as the Son, but has a Son who is not the Father… The Paraclete Spirit is also, who is neither the Father Himself nor the Son, but proceeding from the Father and the Son. Therefore, the Father is unbegotten, the Son is begotten, the Paraclete is not begotten but proceeding from the Father and the Son" (1) (Hardouin, Vol. I, p. 993).

(1) There is no doubt that this symbol with the particle *Filioque* was adopted by the Fathers of the Council in the year 447, nor do I see why the learned Hefele (*History of the Councils*, Vol. III, p. 289) says that it is denied by Ceillier (Vol. XIV, p. 625). The doubt indicated by Ceillier and others is only whether this formula was already issued in the First Council of Toledo in 400 and repeated in 447, or whether it was first composed in this later year (see Ballerini, *Works of St. Leo*, Vol. II, pp. 1374 ff.). The same symbol was formerly attributed to St. Augustine and was Sermon 129 *On the Time*, rejected in the Maurist edition to the appendix (Vol. V, Sermon 233). In the codex of canons and constitutions of the Apostolic See published by Quesnel, it appears as chapter 40 (*Works of St. Leo*, ed. Ballerini, Vol. III, p. 282) under the title: "Booklet of Augustine on the Catholic Faith Against All Heresies." In this edition of the codex of Constitutions, the *Filioque* is omitted; but the reading in the Council of Toledo has no doubt, and in the same way, the *Filioque* is found in the editions of Augustine's Sermons. This also agrees with the "Symbol of Damasus" (on which see Constantius, *Appendices to the Letters of the Roman Pontiffs*, p. 102). The Ballerini suspect that the symbol was first issued in the First Council of Toledo in 400 without the declaration of the *Filioque*, and that this, with Pope Leo leading, was added in 447 (*Works of St. Leo*, Vol. III, p. 951).

In the Third Council of Toledo of the bishops of Spain and Narbonne Gaul under King Reccared in the year 689, a profession of faith against the Arian heresy was proposed by the king, in which it is said: "The Holy Spirit is equally to be confessed by us and preached to proceed from the Father and the Son, and to be of one substance with the Father and the Son." In the Constantinopolitan Creed itself, which, together with the Nicene formula and the Chalcedonian definition, the king subscribed with his own hand, the declaration of faith is inserted: "in the Holy Spirit… proceeding from the Father and the Son." The king's profession was received with joyful acclamations by the entire Council, and the same, with 23 anathemas, was repeated and subscribed by the bishops, clergy, and elders of the Gothic people converted from the Arian heresy. In the third anathema, it is declared: "If anyone does not believe or has not believed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and has not said that He is coeternal and coequal with the Father and the Son, let him be anathema." Furthermore, at the king's request, the Council decreed "that all the churches of Spain and Galicia should observe this rule, that at every time of the sacrifice before the communion of the body or blood of Christ, according to the custom of the Eastern regions, they should unanimously recite the most holy symbol of faith with a clear voice" (namely, according to the formula recited there) (Hardouin, Vol. III, pp. 469 ff.).

To this must also be referred the explicit profession of the Council of Hatfield of all the bishops of England under Theodore of Canterbury (a Greek by birth) in the year 680 (Mansi, XI, p. 176); and also the Athanasian Creed, which is known to have been in public use already in the seventh century, as evidenced by the canons of Autun issued under St. Leodegar in 676 or 677 (1), and which, based on

certain arguments, scholars have proven to have existed already at the beginning of the sixth century (2). Whoever, therefore, may be the author of this creed, it is certain that long before the controversy arose, it was the public profession of faith of the clergy and the Catholic people, in which it is said: "The Holy Spirit, from the Father and the Son, is neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding."

(1) In Canon I, it is decreed: "If any priest, deacon, subdeacon, or cleric does not recite without fault the creed that the Apostles handed down, inspired by the Holy Spirit, and the faith of St. Athanasius the Bishop, let him be condemned by the bishop."

(2) See Joseph Antelmi on the Athanasian Creed; the Ballerini, Observations on Quesnel's Dissertation XIV (*Works of St. Leo*, Vol. III, p. 954 ff.); Merati (*in Zachariae's Thesaurus*, Vol. III, p. 415 ff.); cf. Papebroch (*Response to the Exhibition of Errors*, Vol. II, art. 13, §4).

Other Latin Fathers, such as Gregory the Great, Eucherius, Vigilius of Thapsus, Gennadius, Avitus of Vienne, Paschasius the Deacon (unless he is Faustus of Riez), and others, can be found in Petavius, Book VII, c. 8, n. 5 ff.; Lequien, Damascene Dissertation I, n. 4, 10, and among others.

The consensus in this explicit profession of doctrine is such that, according to the principles of Catholic tradition we have demonstrated elsewhere, it could not have been derived from anything other than written or handed-down revelation and its legitimate explanation. Therefore, according to these same principles, even from the consensus of the Western Fathers alone, it must be held as certain that it could not have been the case that the churches and Fathers of the East, by common consensus, followed an opposing doctrine (cf. above, pp. 147–148). If the doctrine of the Easterners were not explicit, and their manner of speaking ambiguous or less clear, the only consequence would be that their opinion should be explained by the explicit, clear, and common doctrine of the Westerners and thus brought into conformity with the Catholic understanding. If schismatics deny these principles, they contradict the greatest holy doctors of the East, close off the path to reconciling the Eastern Fathers among themselves, particularly in the doctrine of the consubstantial Trinity, and—what is most pernicious of all—they subvert the entire economy of Catholic tradition. Cf. Bessarion, *Golden Treatise*, p. 213; and what the Greek bishops confessed at the Council of Florence (Hardouin, IX, p. 390).

III. The Doctrine of the Greek Fathers on the Procession of the Holy Spirit

But the doctrine of the Greek Fathers on the procession of the Holy Spirit is no less explicit and consistent than that of the Westerners, which could already be evident from the testimonies briefly cited above, but it must be demonstrated separately. Here, however, we will limit ourselves to those testimonies in which they teach, in so many words, the procession from the Father and the Son, or the procession from the Son as from the Father, addressing later the other principles and explanations of these same Fathers, by which they not only proclaim this dogma but also declare and illustrate it more distinctly.

1°. St. Athanasius

Against the Arians, who, while denying the consubstantiality of the Son, did not yet directly dispute the nature of the Holy Spirit, Athanasius demonstrates the divinity of the Word from the very revealed procession of the Holy Spirit from the Word. "The Son does not become a partaker of the Spirit to be in the Father; nor does He Himself receive the Spirit, but rather imparts Him to all. Nor does the Spirit join

the Word to God the Father, but rather the Spirit receives from the Word… The Son is in the Father in one way, and we, that we may be in Him, attain it in another way. Unless perchance, as always, they dare to say even now that the Son, through participation in the Spirit and through good deeds, has attained to be in the Father. But to admit this even in thought is utterly impious. For He Himself, as has been said, gives to the Spirit (or gives the Spirit), and whatever the Spirit has, He has from the Word… He wills that we receive the Spirit, so that through the Spirit of the Word, who is in the Father, we too may appear to become one through the Spirit in the Word, and through Him (the Word) in the Father… We are considered to become one in the Father and the Son through the Spirit dwelling in us, who is in the Word, which (the Word) is in the Father" (1) (*Against the Arians*, Discourse III, nn. 24–25).

(1) "For He (the Word), as it is said, gives to the Spirit (or gives the Spirit), and whatever the Spirit has, it has from the Word… For since the Word is in the Father, the Spirit is given from the Word, He wills that we receive the Spirit, so that… having the Spirit of the Word who is in the Father, we too may appear to become one through the Spirit in the Word, and through Him in the Father… We are considered to become one in the Son and in the Father, through the Spirit being in us, which is in the Word, which is in the Father."

Athanasius thus demonstrates the divinity of the Word from the fact that, according to the Scriptures, it is not the Holy Spirit who sanctifies the Word and joins it to God the Father through a participation in divinity, as the Arians conceded the Son could be called God; but rather, the Holy Spirit Himself, whom the adversaries did not yet dare to explicitly deny as God, has all that He has, and thus His own divine nature, from the Word, which is the very definition of procession through the communication of nature. Hence, the Word does not receive from the Holy Spirit to be God in that Arian sense, but the Holy Spirit is God, being from the God-Word, and in this sense, the Spirit is in the Word as in His principle, and the Word is in the Father likewise as in His principle through the communication of nature, as Athanasius says elsewhere: "The property of the Holy Spirit to the Son is the same as the property of the Son to the Father."

In a somewhat reverse order, in his *Letters to Serapion*, Athanasius argues against those Semi-Arians, whom he calls "Tropici." For they conceded that the Son is true God but claimed that the Holy Spirit is a creature of the Son, not through the communication of the divine nature, and therefore not proceeding from the Father. Against them, the holy Doctor shows that the Spirit proceeds from the Son through the communication of all the perfections that belong to the Son, and thus, if the Son is true God, the Holy Spirit is also true God; and therefore, just as He proceeds from the Son, so too He proceeds from the Father, since all that belongs to the Son belongs to the Father.

Although Serapion had requested a doctrine solely about the Holy Spirit, Athanasius devoted the entire second letter to demonstrating the divinity of the Son. He gives the reason for this at the beginning of the third letter. Since the Spirit has all things from the Son, just as the Son has all things from the Father, the divinity of the Son is the foundation from which the divinity of the Holy Spirit is demonstrated. For however much you show from the Scriptures that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, unless it is established that the Son is God, it will not be established that the Spirit of the Son is God. But if the Son is true God, which the adversaries did not deny, by that very fact, His Spirit is demonstrated to be true God, because He receives from the Son all that belongs to the Son. "For the Lord says: 'The Paraclete will not speak of Himself, but whatever He hears, He will speak, for He will take from Mine and announce it to you'; and

likewise, when He breathed, He gave Him from Himself to the disciples, and thus the Father poured Him out, as Scripture says, upon all flesh; therefore, it is rightly and deservedly that I have first treated and written about the Son of God, so that from the knowledge of the Son (from whom, namely, the Spirit hears and receives, and from whom He is given), we may also attain a correct knowledge of the Holy Spirit. For we will find that the property of the Son to the Father is the same as the property of the Spirit to the Son. And as the Son says: 'All that the Father has is Mine,' so we will find that all these things are also in the Spirit through the Son. And as the Father showed the Son, saying, 'This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased,' so the Spirit is of the Son: for, as the Apostle says, He sent the Spirit of His Son" (1). Then follow testimonies in which He is called the Spirit of the Son as well as of the Father. "Therefore, if the Son, because of His property to the Father and because He is the proper offspring of His substance, is not a creature but consubstantial with the Father, so too the Holy Spirit will not be a creature because of His property to the Son, and because He is given to all from Him, and what He has belongs to the Son" (2) (*Letter to Serapion*, 3, n. 1).

(1) In the preceding letter, he says, we learned that the Son proceeds from the Father not by creation but by the eternal communication of one nature: "If He is a fountain, if He is light, if the Father is God, it is certainly impious to say that the fountain is dry, or the light without splendor, or the Father without the Word… Whatever we understand to be in the Father, there is no doubt that the same is in the Son, since the Lord Himself says: 'All that the Father has is Mine'" (*Letter to Serapion*, 2, n. 2). Now he says that the same property exists of the Holy Spirit to the Son: just as all that the Father has is in the Son through communication from the Father, so these same things are in the Holy Spirit through communication from the Son. Hence, just as by reason of eternal origin, the Son is said to be and is of the Father, so the Spirit is said to be and is of the Son.

(2) "For when we know the property of the Son to the Father, we will find that the Spirit has the same to the Son, and as the Son says, 'All that the Father has is Mine,' so we will find that all these things are also in the Spirit through the Son; and as the Father showed the Son, saying, 'This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased,' so the Spirit is of the Son… Therefore, if the Son, because of His property to the Father and because He is the proper offspring of His substance, is not a creature but consubstantial with the Father, so too the Holy Spirit will not be a creature, even if someone foolishly says so, because of His property to the Son and because He is given from Him."

Again, a little further on, the procession is declared in another way. "The Holy Spirit is called and is the ointment and the seal… This ointment is the breath of the Son… Moreover, insofar as He is the seal, He expresses the Son, so that what is sealed has the form of Christ… If the Spirit is the good odor and form of the Son, it is clear that the Spirit is not a creature, since the Son, existing in the form of the Father, is not a creature" (1) (*Letter to Serapion*, 3, n. 3). Elsewhere: "The Son breathed the Spirit on the face of the Apostles, saying, 'Receive the Holy Spirit,' so that we may learn that the Spirit, who is given to the disciples, is from the fullness of divinity; for in Christ, as the Apostle says, 'the whole fullness of divinity dwells bodily.'" In the Scriptures, the Holy Spirit is called water in many places. "Therefore, David says: 'For with You is the fountain of life, and in Your light we shall see light.' For he knew that with the Father, the Son is the fountain of the Holy Spirit" (2) (*On the Incarnation Against the Arians*, n. 9).

(1) “The Spirit is called and is the ointment and the seal… For this ointment is the breath of the Son… and the seal expresses the Son… If the Spirit is the good odor and form of the Son, it is evident that the Spirit is not a creature, since the Son, existing in the form of the Father, is not a creature.”

(2) “For the Son, being with God the Father, is the fountain of the Holy Spirit.” Note that all these things in *On the Incarnation* are brought forth by Athanasius to demonstrate that “the Spirit is of the same deity and power as the Father and the Son.” But these arguments prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit if being from the fullness of the Son’s divinity and being from the Son as from a fountain signify an internal procession through the communication of nature, as the words indicate; but they prove nothing at all if they signify only an external mission, as the Photians distort them.

2°. St. Epiphanius

In his *Ancoratus*, which he wrote primarily to declare the Catholic faith concerning the Holy Spirit, Epiphanius frequently proposes this dogma. “The Father is unbegotten… the Son is begotten… the Holy Spirit is eternal, not begotten, not created, not a brother, not an uncle, not a grandfather, not a grandson, but the Holy Spirit from the same essence of the Father and the Son; for He is God… He is not called by the name of the Son nor by the name of the Father, so that the names proper to one alone are not common, except the name God (which is common to the three); for indeed, in the Father is the name God, in the Son the name God, in the Holy Spirit the name of God and God (3), for He is the Spirit of God, the Spirit of the Father, and the Spirit of the Son, not according to some composition, as in us there is soul and body (as if the Spirit of the Father and the Spirit of the Son were called as it were the soul of the Father and the Son), but He is in the midst of the Father and the Son, from the Father and the Son, the third in name (4) (as a distinct hypostasis); for He says, ‘Go… teach… in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit’” (*Ancoratus*, n. 8).

(3) This passage is most certainly to be punctuated and understood thus, although in the editions, even that of Petavius, the punctuation and interpretation differ.

(4) “The Holy Spirit is eternal, not begotten, not created… but from the same essence of the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit… in the midst of the Father and the Son, from the Father and the Son, the third in name.”

The same doctrine is most explicitly repeated in *Ancoratus*, nn. 70, 71, 72, which passage Epiphanius himself transcribed again in *Against Heresies*, LXXIV, nn. 7–8. “If God and the Father is light, the Son is light from light… God is entirely Wisdom; therefore, the Son is Wisdom from Wisdom… But the Spirit is from both, Spirit from spirit; for He is God… But someone will say: ‘Do we then posit two Sons, and how is He the Only-Begotten?’ But rather, who are you to contradict God? For if (the Father) calls Him the Son who is from Him, but the Holy Spirit who is from both, which things, understood by the saints through faith alone, are clear, illuminating, have lucid power, and in the faith of the light maintain harmony with the Father Himself (with the doctrine of faith concerning the Father). Hear, whoever you are, that the Father is truly the Father of the Son, entirely light; and the Son is truly the light of the Father, light from light… and the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of truth, the third light (hypostasis) from the Father and the Son” (1) (*Against Heresies*, LXXIV, n. 1). Furthermore, the same holy Doctor explicitly explains the words of Scripture, “He will take from Mine” (John 16:14–15), concerning the procession of the Holy

Spirit from the Son. “Christ is believed to be God from God from the Father, and the Spirit from Christ or from both, as Christ Himself says: ‘who proceeds from the Father,’ and ‘He will take from Mine’” (*Ancoratus*, nn. 67, 72; *Against Heresies*, LXXIV, n. 10). “The Spirit is always with the Father and the Son… proceeding from the Father and receiving what is the Son’s, not alien from the Father and the Son, but from the same essence and from the same deity, from the Father and the Son, subsisting always with the Father and the Son as the Holy Spirit” (*Against Heresies*, LXII, n. 4). In the same way, he interprets the designations Spirit of Christ, Spirit of the Son (*Ancoratus*, nn. 8, 72).

(1) “If God and the Father is light, light from light is the Son… but the Holy Spirit is from both, Spirit from spirit… For He calls the Son who is from Him, but the Holy Spirit who is from both, understood by the saints through faith alone… the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of truth, the third light from the Father and the Son.” What is rightly read here as “the Holy Spirit from both, Spirit from spirit,” in *Ancoratus*, n. 70, from which Epiphanius himself transcribed the entire passage, is corrupted in our Basel and Petavian editions: “the Holy Spirit from both, Spirit from the Father.”

Epiphanius, therefore, without any doubt, held among the dogmas “understood by the saints through faith” the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son: “the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son” (*Ancoratus*, 8); “from the same essence of the Father and the Son” (ibid., 7); “from the Father and the Son” (ibid., 71); “from the Father and the Son” (ibid., 72); “from the Father and from the Son” (*Against Heresies*, 74, n. 10); “from both” (ibid., n. 7); “from Christ or from both” (*Ancoratus*, 67), etc. He found this faith in the profession of the Eastern churches, as is further evident from the creed related by Epiphanius, which we will describe below in a more appropriate place.

3°. St. Cyril of Alexandria

Cyril frequently hands down the same doctrine through various ways of speaking and arguments. For now, however, we seek only his explicit words. After saying that the Spirit is the Spirit of truth, the Spirit of the Son, who is the truth, and that the Son gives the Holy Spirit as His own Spirit, he adds a declaration: “Will not someone, therefore, with the highest justice think, or rather rightly believe, that the Son, as one to whom the natural goods of God the Father are essentially common, has the Holy Spirit in the same way as the Father is understood to have Him; not as something drawn from outside, for it is foolish and mad to think so; but as each one of us holds his own spirit within himself and sends it forth from his innermost depths? For this reason, Christ bodily breathed, signifying that just as the spirit proceeds bodily from the human mouth, so too the Spirit proceeds from the divine essence in a manner befitting deity, who is from Him (Christ the Son)” (1) (*Commentary on John*, p. 810). Almost the same, if possible, he repeats even more clearly in the *Thesaurus*: “The Spirit that blessed Moses affirms God breathed into man, the same Christ, renewing it in us, breathed into His disciples after the resurrection from the dead… Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit, dwelling in us, makes us conformed to God, but proceeds from the Father and the Son, it is clear that He is of the divine essence, essentially in it (communicated to Him) and proceeding from it (insofar as it is in the Father and the Son as the principle by which)” (2), just as breath proceeds from man (*Thesaurus*).

(1) “That of the natural goods of God and the Father, being essentially a partaker, the Son has the Spirit in the same way as the Father is understood to have, not as something external or from outside… but as each one of us holds his own spirit within himself and sends it forth from his innermost depths. For this reason,

Christ bodily breathed, showing that just as the spirit proceeds bodily from the mouth of man, so too from the divine essence, in a manner befitting God, the Spirit proceeds from Him."

(2) "But He proceeds from the Father and the Son, it is clear that He is of the divine essence, essentially in it and proceeding from it.

proceeding from the human mouth, even if this example is humble and unworthy of so great a reality; for God surpasses all things" (*Thesaurus*, p. 345).

"He (the Son) calls the Spirit of truth, that is, His Paraclete; for the Holy Spirit is not understood as alien from the essence of the Only-Begotten, but proceeds naturally from it, being no different from Him as regards the identity of nature, although He is understood to exist in His own subsistence… 'He will not speak of Himself'… for the Spirit is, as it were, my mind… 'And He will announce future things to you'; as if He were saying: 'This will be a sign to you, that the Spirit is entirely from My substance, and, as it were, My mind'" (1) (*Commentary on John*, pp. 925–926).

(1) "For the Holy Spirit is not understood as alien from the essence of the Only-Begotten, but proceeds naturally from it, being no different from Him as regards the identity of nature, even if He is understood to exist in His own subsistence… This will be a sign to you, that the Spirit is entirely from My substance, and, as it were, My mind."

"John infers unfailing equality in all things of the Son with the Spirit, who is His proper Spirit and proceeds from Him according to nature" (τὸ ἴδιον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν προϊὸν πνεῦμα; cf. above, pp. 427, 438) (*Commentary on John*, p. 126) (2).

(2) Macarius fraudulently translates παρ' αὐτοῦ προϊὸν as "the Spirit poured out by the Son" (p. 561, 405). But Cyril did not say δι' αὐτοῦ ἐκχυόμενον, but rather that the Spirit is from the Son, from the Father and the Son, proceeding from the essence of the Son, proceeding according to nature. No less absurdly does this Photian explain ἴδιον τοῦ Υἱοῦ as "belonging to the Son, His parent" (p. 371). But the Fathers declare that the Spirit, that is, the one breathed forth, is proper to the Son because He is from Him and from His essence.

"We say that the Spirit receives from the Father and the Son what belongs to them (λαμβάνειν τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐκ τε τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ τὰ αὐτῶν), not as if He at some time lacked the knowledge and power inherent in them and only then began to have them when He is thought to receive; for the Spirit is always wise and powerful, indeed He is wisdom and power itself, not by some participation but by His nature." Then follows Cyril's familiar comparison of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son with the procession of fragrance from spices (cf. above, p. 364) (*Commentary on John*, p. 941).

Here, as with Athanasius, you have not only the assertion of the dogma but also a lucid explanation of what procession is: namely, the communication of all that belongs to God, that is, the essence with its absolute perfections, from the Father and the Son into the Holy Spirit.

"If the Son dwells in us through the Spirit… how is His Spirit not like Him and from Him (ὡς αὐτός τε καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ), having all His power?" (*Dialogue VI on the Trinity*, Vol. V, Part I, p. 598). "Insofar as Christ is God and from God and the Father, the Spirit is His proper Spirit, and in Him,

and from Him (ἴδιον αὐτοῦ τε, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐστι), as is understood also of God and the Father. But insofar as He became man and like us, He is said to have received the Spirit imparted" (*On Joel*, Vol. III, p. 228).

After the meaning in which Cyril, in his ninth anathema, had called the Holy Spirit proper to the Son was misrepresented by Theodoret, the holy Doctor, at the Council of Ephesus itself, explained those words of the anathema thus: "The Only-Begotten Word of God, having become man, nevertheless remained God, and is all that the Father is, excepting only paternity, having the Holy Spirit as His proper Spirit, who is from Him and essentially inherent in Him" (because, namely, the procession is immanent, ἴδιον ἔχων τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐσιωδῶς ἐμπεριέχον αὐτῷ Πνεῦμα ἅγιον) (Mansi, Vol. V, p. 16). The same explanation was already most clearly contained in the letter with the anathemas to Nestorius: "Although the Spirit (there, n. 10) exists in His own hypostasis and is considered in Himself, insofar as He is the Spirit and not the Son; nevertheless, He is not alien from Him (the Son). For He is called the Spirit of truth, and Christ is the truth; and He is poured forth from Him (Christ the Son) just as He is also from God the Father (1)… Since He is the Spirit of Him who is the power and wisdom of the Father, that is, the Son, He Himself (the Spirit) is also wisdom and power in Himself" (Mansi, Vol. IV, p. 1079).

(1) "For He is called the Spirit of truth, and Christ is the truth; and He proceeds from Him, just as He surely also proceeds from God and the Father."

Indeed, from Him who is the power and wisdom of the Father through generation, that is, from the Son, just as from the Father, so the Holy Spirit is poured forth, such that He Himself is the same power and wisdom, and thus one power and wisdom is communicated from the Father to the Son, and from the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit. All this clearly proclaims not the mission but the generation of the Son, and not the mission of the Holy Spirit, as Macarius and other Photians falsely claim, but His immanent procession.

Since Cyril gave explanations of the anathemas at the request of the Fathers, and the same Fathers, having heard the explanations, approved them at the Council itself (2) and subsequently at the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Ecumenical Councils and the Lateran Council under Martin I, and all the Fathers approved and regarded them as the very creed of the Council of Ephesus (see *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis XX), it can only be shamelessly denied that great weight of authority was added to the otherwise common doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son; although the Council certainly intended directly to define not this but another dogma, that of the hypostatic union of the Incarnate Word.

(2) It is certain that Cyril's letter with the anathemas was approved by the Fifth Council and those following; but Garnerius contends that this letter was not received synodically at the Third and Fourth Councils (Works of Marius Mercator, Vol. II, p. 340). But certainly, at the Fifth Council, there seems to have been the persuasion that the anathemas themselves were approved by both the Ephesine and Chalcedonian Fathers (see Mansi, Vol. IX, nn. 329, 341). The Lateran Council under Martin I simply calls them "the creed of the two hundred Fathers at Ephesus" (Mansi, Vol. X, p. 1039). Hence, the testimony of Ibas in his letter to Maris (Mansi, Vol. VII, p. 243), complaining that the chapters of Cyril were accepted by the condemners of Nestorius, cannot so easily be accused of falsehood with Garnerius.

4°. Testimony of St. Basil the Great

The famous testimony of St. Basil, from which both at the Council of Florence and elsewhere the clear doctrine of the ancient Greek Fathers has always been demonstrated by Catholic Greeks against schismatics, is as follows. At the beginning of Book III *Against Eunomius*, Basil cites the saying of the heretic: "Since we have learned from the saints that the Holy Spirit is third in dignity and order (ἀξιώματι καὶ τάξει), we believe He is also third in nature." In refutation, Basil, as read by Catholic Greeks, states: "What necessity is there that, if the Spirit is third in dignity and order, He should also be third in nature? For in dignity (ἀξιώματι), He is second to the Son, as having His being from Him, and receiving from Him and announcing to us, and entirely depending on that cause (the Son), as the doctrine of piety teaches (1); but to say He is third in nature, we have neither been taught from the holy Scriptures, nor can it be logically inferred from the foregoing (that He is third in order and dignity of origin). For just as the Son is second in order from the Father, because He is from Him; and in dignity, because He is His principle and cause, in that He is His Father, and because through Him is the approach and access to God and the Father; yet He is by no means second in nature, because the deity in both is one. So too, although the Holy Spirit is second in order and dignity from the Son, it does not follow that He is of an alien nature" (*Basil, Against Eunomius*, Book III, n. 1).

(1) "For what necessity is there that, if the Spirit is third in dignity and order, He should also be third in nature? For in dignity, He is second to the Son, as having His being from Him, and receiving from Him and announcing to us, and entirely depending on that cause, as the doctrine of piety teaches." Cf. Basil, *Letter 38* (alias 43), n. 4.

More recent manuscripts and editions omit the words, "as having His being from Him and entirely depending on that cause," reading instead: "For in dignity, He is second to the Son, as perhaps (ἴσως) the doctrine of piety teaches." Further below, where it says, "although the Holy Spirit is second in order and dignity from the Son," they add the restrictive particle: "so that we entirely concede this" (ἵνα καὶ ὅλως συγχωρήσωμεν). The reading, as we have described it, is genuine and consequently the other is corrupt, as demonstrated both by internal arguments and by the authority of manuscripts by Patriarch Beccus (*On the Holy Spirit*, nn. 1–3, *Greek Orthodox*, Vol. I, pp. 226 ff.; c. 2, p. 252); Bessarion (*On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, *Golden Treatise*, pp. 169 ff.); Allatius (*On the Consensus*, Book III, c. 1, p. 891); Petavius (Book VII, c. 3, nn. 14 ff.); Maranus (*Preface to Vol. III, Works of St. Basil*, §3) (1).

(1) Maranus rightly complains that editors, especially his predecessor Garnier in preparing the Maurist edition of Basil's works, did not restore this passage, which is so certainly genuine.

Bessarion recounts that at the Council of Florence, in which he played a significant role, six manuscripts were produced: three belonging to the Archbishop of Mytilene, one to the Latins (brought to Constantinople by Cardinal Cusanus), one to the Greek Emperor, and the last to the Patriarch. In the first five, the reading stood complete, as defended by the Catholics; only in the last, and indeed a more recently written one, was the alternative reading found, which Mark of Ephesus preferred. Bessarion continues: "After the holy synod was concluded, upon our return to Constantinople, when I resolved to examine nearly all the manuscripts of those sacred monasteries, I found that all those written more recently and after the great controversy (after the schism was confirmed) had the passage cut out; but those of older handwriting and from before that great dispute, all of them, no fewer than the corrupted ones, remained sound and intact." In the monastery of Christ the Savior, he found "something worthy of tears and admiration." In a most ancient manuscript, "a man bold in spirit but even bolder in hand used

iron against the parchment to scrape away the truth (1), yet the matter did not succeed for him; for while the place is empty and the syllables half-appear, they both accuse his audacity and nonetheless clearly express the truth." In another manuscript, the passage was blotted out with ink, but later restored by the hand of Demetrius Cydones.

(1) Joseph of Methone reproaches Mark of Ephesus for similar attempts by some Greeks at the Council of Florence (apud Allatius, *On the Consensus*, Book III, c. 1).

5°. Testimony of St. Gregory of Nyssa

Another passage, commonly cited by all Greek apologists (from *Sermon III on the Lord's Prayer*), is the one I described above (p. 420). Catholic Greeks, such as Beccus, Bessarion, and others, read it thus: "Since it is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit not to be unbegotten, lest any confusion be thought in this matter, it is necessary again to show the unconfused difference in their properties, so that what is common (that they are not unbegotten, ἀγέννητοι) is preserved, and what is proper is not confused (that the Son proceeds differently from the Holy Spirit from the principle). For the Only-Begotten Son is named by holy Scripture as from the Father, and in this the doctrine of faith establishes His property; but the Holy Spirit is said to be from the Father and is testified to be from the Son (καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς λέγεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ εἶναι προσμαρτυρεῖται). For, it says, 'If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not His.' Therefore, the Spirit, while being from God, is also the Spirit of Christ; but the Son, who is from God, is neither said to be nor is of the Holy Spirit; nor is this relative consequence mutual" (apud Beccus, *Golden Treatise*, p. 141). In our editions of Gregory's works (Vol. I, p. 758, Paris 1615), the entire passage is missing; now we have the lacuna filled by Cardinal Mai (*Scriptores Veteres*, Vol. VII, p. 6). The reading in the manuscripts, even those brought to light by Mai, varies. More recent books, with the particle ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ excised, read: τὸ δὲ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς λέγεται, καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ εἶναι προσμαρτυρεῖται, which reading Petavius also judged preferable (Book VII, c. 3, n. 13). But the reading καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ εἶναι προσμαρτυρεῖται exists in the Vatican manuscript, which, according to Mai, precedes the era of Photius by two centuries; in another eleventh-century manuscript, Mai observed that the particle ἐκ, originally written, was erased by a correction (Cardinal Mai, *New Library of the Fathers*, Vol. IV, pp. 40 ff.). Catholic Greeks, as I said, Beccus, Calecas, Bessarion, Jerome Donatus writing to the Greeks, etc., not only consistently read ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, but Bessarion (*Golden Treatise*, p. 246) also testifies that the particle ἐκ is found in older manuscripts and is missing only in more recent ones. Furthermore, there exists a document, authentically drawn up before Patriarch Beccus and nine other bishops, with princes present, in which the Referendarius of the Church of Constantinople confessed to having scraped away the particle ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ with iron from the manuscript of the great oeconomus Xiphilinus. He did not consider, as it is added there, "that other books had also been examined for this purpose, and that they too contained the full reading of the particle ἐκ and escaped corruption" (apud Allatius, *On the Consensus*, Book III, c. 1, pp. 893 ff.). On both passages of Basil and Gregory, see also Hugo Laemmer (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum Orthodoxorum*, Vol. I, pp. 27 ff., 38 ff.).

In truth, whether the testimony of Gregory or the above-described testimony of Basil is read in either way, even allowing the more recent and less explicit reading, it is nonetheless clearly demonstrated, both from these passages and from other places in Basil and Gregory, that their opinion is that the Holy Spirit is understood to proceed from the Son as from the Father, because He is third in order and thus in origin, and because, in relation to origin, He is the Spirit of the Son. Hence, at the Council of Florence, in

sessions 20 and 21 (Hardouin, Vol. IX, pp. 226 ff.), although John the Theologian of the Latins insisted against Mark of Ephesus on proving the genuineness of the reading he cited from Cardinal Cusanus' manuscript, he equally showed, from other passages and even from the reading defended by Ephesus, that Basil's opinion on the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son is by no means ambiguous. See what we cited above (pp. 424, 429, 431).

6°. Testimony of Eastern Fathers Writing in Syriac and Arabic

We will briefly mention the doctrine of the Easterners who wrote not in Greek but in Syriac or Arabic. Renaudot mentions a most ancient Florentine Syriac manuscript (1) containing the canons of the Synod of Seleucia in Mesopotamia, held under Isaac of Seleucia and his brother St. Marutha, celebrated by 40 bishops around the year 410. In its second canon, a profession of faith is contained, which, among other things, says: "We confess the living and Holy Spirit, the living Paraclete from the Father and the Son" (Mansi, Vol. III, p. 1168; Renaudot, *Liturgiae Orientales*, Vol. II, pp. 272, 274; Assemani, *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, Vol. III, Part II, n. 235). Now we have the Syriac text itself, transcribed by the distinguished Professor Lamy of Louvain from a Paris manuscript (*Revue Catholique de Louvain*, March 1860, p. 168).

(1) Muratori, who published a Latin translation of these canons from the Ambrosian Library, does not seem to have noticed Renaudot's testimony about the "700-year-old Syriac manuscript"; otherwise, he would not have raised suspicion that some forger might have deceived the good faith of Cardinal Federico Borromeo with that Latin document. Now, with the Syriac text published, all suspicion is removed.

Assemani (*loc. cit.*) also cites words from the Chaldean Office, where, at Matins for the Sunday of the Annunciation, a profession of faith in one God is read, who is "the eternal Father who has no Father, from Him the Son who has no Son, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds from them" (2).

(2) [Syriac text: "the eternal Father who has no Father, from Him the Son who has no Son, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds from them."]

From the Jacobites, Patriarch Dionysius III, in the mid-tenth century, a time between Photius and Cerularius, in a synodal letter to Menna, Patriarch of the Copts, explicitly professes the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son: "The Father has existence from no one but exists unbegotten, and the Son is begotten from the Father from eternity, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son" (3) (Assemani, *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, Vol. II, pp. 131–132).

(3) [Syriac text: "The Father has existence from no one but exists unbegotten, and the Son is begotten from the Father from eternity, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son."]

Further testimonies from the catechesis of the Monophysites and other documents are found in Abraham Ecchellensis (Mansi, Vol. II, pp. 1704 ff.). Testimonies for the faith of the Armenians are found in Gabriele Avedichian of the Mechitarist Congregation (*Dissertation on the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son*, Venice, 1824).

The opinion of the Eastern communities, which, though separated from the Catholic Church by other errors, do not pertain to the Photian schism, was excellently expounded under Pope Paul V by the Chaldean Archimandrite Adar, based on the principles of true theology. He said that, assuming the dogma

of consubstantiality—that the Father and the Son are one—in the very profession of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father, the profession of the procession from the Son is implicitly contained and understood. Therefore, when the Photians deny this, they pervert the true notion of consubstantiality and fall into a kind of Semi-Arianism. The Chaldean thus most clearly testified to the consensus of the Easterners with the Roman Church in this dogma and the dissent of the Photian heresy. "Concerning the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father, as the Easterners confess, and the Fathers of the great Church of Rome, who profess that He proceeds from the Father and the Son, both sides acknowledge the truth. And one true testimony suffices for true believers, namely, that voice which came from the mouth of the most beloved Jesus: 'I and the Father are one'… If they are one and not two (in essence), what division is there between the voice we confess, namely, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and that He proceeds from the Father and the Son? Behold, they are one and not two, and there is no division between them… Concerning the Holy Spirit, He said: 'He will take from Mine and announce to you; all that My Father has is Mine.' And if there is no division between the incomprehensible persons of the hidden deity… who will ever place a distinction between the voice, 'The Spirit proceeds from the Father,' and 'The Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son'? But the Easterners say that He proceeds from the Father because they know that the Father possesses nothing except what the Son has, nor the Son except the Father, as they learned from the living Son, who said to the Father: 'All that I have is Yours, and what You have is Mine.' And the Fathers of the great (Roman) Church wish to show that the Son is in no way inferior to the Father, and therefore they say that the saving Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and their profession is undoubtedly true" (Assemani, *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, Vol. III, Part II, p. 234).

We will conclude this exposition of the doctrine of the Fathers with the words of the great Bessarion in his dogmatic oration (Hardouin, Vol. XI, p. 368): "Remember, therefore, that the Fathers must necessarily be thought to agree with one another, and we cannot say or think otherwise if we wish to be Christians and preserve the principles of faith. For the Latin Fathers most clearly and explicitly teach that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and that the Son, like the Father, is His principle. Then we have shown that the Eastern Fathers, no less than the Western ones, say the same, since some say the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son (of which we will soon speak), others say He is from the Father and the Son and from both, and thus they clearly teach that He is also from the Son. Teaching thus, they agree with the Latin Fathers and all say the same, as they speak in one and the same Spirit."

Thesis XXXVI. On the Catholic Sense of the Formula, 'The Holy Spirit Proceeds from the Father through the Son'

The formula, more frequently used among the Greek Fathers, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, expresses the same dogma entirely, as is manifestly clear both from the words themselves and from their explanation by the Fathers themselves. Secondly, in this manner of speaking, the procession from the Father is signified as from the primordial principle communicating the spirative power also to the Son, and the procession through the Son as from the one who has the spirative power communicated by generation; hence, the saying of St. Maximus and St. John Damascene, who alone among all the holy Doctors seem to deny the procession from the Son while asserting the procession through the Son, is reconciled with the Catholic dogma.

I. The Common Teaching of the Greek Fathers

By common consensus, the Greek Fathers teach that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. Schismatics are forced to concede this, but they substitute alien senses to the proposition, torn from its contexts, with sophistical evasions that could only be devised by those foolishly resisting the evident truth. No one has better summarized all that must be said here than Bessarion in chapter 6 of his excellent dogmatic oration, which he delivered to his fellow Greeks at the Council of Florence and later translated into Latin (Hardouin, Vol. IX, pp. 335 ff.).

We will first discuss the formula itself and the meaning of the prepositions *ex* (from) and *per* (through); then, the more explicit declarations of the Fathers.

1°. The Formula Itself

If the expression is considered in itself, no one denies that it indicates the Father as the principle of the eternal procession, and the Holy Spirit as the term proceeding: the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. But when a principle or cause is introduced by the particle *a* or *ex* and the term or effect is added, and thus the statement is directly causal, that which is interposed indirectly under the particle διὰ (*per*, through) always and necessarily has the character of a principle or cause, whether formal or efficient. This must first be clarified, from which the unity and distinction of the twofold formula in question will be understood.

a) Distinction Between Formal and Efficient Causes

If the subjects governed by the particles *a* and *per* are not distinct hypostases, the latter will indicate the formal reason of the cause or something reducible to the formal reason; for example, the world is created by God through His omnipotence, the true is understood by man through the intellect, the good is desired through the will. If the subjects are distinct hypostases and the term is an effect, the particle *per* designates an efficient cause, but in creatures, a subordinate one to the principal cause; for the principal cause acts through a subordinate cause, e.g., a work is produced by the worker through an instrument. In applying this to God, this meaning is modified according to the nature of the subject; for in divine persons, subordination can only be of origin according to the dignity (ἀξίωμα) of the principle before the one proceeding from the principle. Hence, in the universal biblical and ecclesiastical manner of speaking, all works *ad extra* are said to be from the Father through the Son; where, although there is one nature and thus one principle of operation and one indistinct operation, a distinction between the persons is indicated, such that the numerically one nature and operative power and operation is communicated from the Father to the Son. Thus, the particles *a* and *per* signify one and the same causality but also co-signify the dignity of the principle in the person from whom, as from the primordial fountain, the operation proceeds, and the origin in the person through whom it is said to operate (cf. above, pp. 163, 200). Therefore, although it can equally be said separately that all things are created through the Father and all things are created from the Son, it could not be said without absurdity that all things are created from the Son through the Father, because, as I said, in this conjunction, beyond the causality, which is one for the Father and the Son, the communication of nature and operative power from one person to another is simultaneously signified.

St. Basil discusses the meaning of such particles at length against the Arians in *On the Holy Spirit*, chapters 2–8. "That the Father creates through the Son, among other things, he says, does not show an imperfect operation of the Father nor a weak power of the Son; but it declares the unity of will (the substantial will, which is the divine essence itself), so that the particle *per* has the confession of the primordial cause" (1) (*On the Holy Spirit*, c. 8, n. 21).

(1) "So that the voice through Him has the confession of the primordial cause." The Father, namely, without a principle and the fountain of the entire Trinity (προκαταρκτική αἰτία), is said to create through the Son, insofar as He communicates the will and operation identified with the essence to the Son, not by commanding but by generating, "as it were, the irradiation of some form in a mirror" (ὡς εἴ τινος μορφῆς ἔμφασις ἐν καθόπτρῳ).

Chrysostom summarizes the same doctrine of Basil in *Homily V* (alias IV) *on John*, nn. 2–3. Explaining the words, "All things were made through Him," he shows that the particle *per* does not signify a "diminution" (ἔλαττωσιν), as the Arians thought, but expresses the one dignity of the creative operation of the Son with the Father. Nevertheless, he says, "If it is said 'through Him,' this is placed for no other reason than to prevent anyone from suspecting the Son to be unbegotten" (1) (*loc. cit.*, n. 2).

(1) "And lest it be thought that the Son is unbegotten, it is said through Him, not as something different."

So too, Cyril, speaking directly of the mission of the Holy Spirit, declares that by saying the Father sends through the Son, it is indicated that the Father and the Son are one principle of mission, yet preserving the distinction between the Father who generates and the Son who is begotten, as in Paul it is said of the Father, "from whom all things," and of the Son, "through whom all things"; and therefore, when the Father is said to send separately, the Son is understood with the Father, and vice versa, the Father with the Son. "The Father is in the Son, and the Son is in the Father. Therefore, the Paraclete or Holy Spirit is not given separately by the Father and separately by the Son; but rather, He is given to the saints from the Father through the Son; and therefore, when the Father is said to give, the Son gives through whom all things are; when the Son is said to give, the Father gives from whom all things are" (*Commentary on John*, p. 810). See Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Book IV, n. 29 (above, pp. 459–460).

Now, if the term is not an effect but a person proceeding from the substance, that is, through the communication of nature, the meaning of the particles "from the Father through the Son" is not destroyed but modified according to the nature of such a procession. Just as in works of efficient causality, e.g., in creation, the particle "through the Son" signifies a cause no less than "from the Father," and indeed one cause with the co-signification of the distinction of persons, because the Father communicates the creative power to the Son; so too in this *ad intra* procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son, both particles retain the force of causality (αἰτιώδης); but just as the particle "from the Father" no longer signifies an efficient cause but the principle of spiration (as even the schismatics concede), so the particle "through the Son" signifies the same principle with the co-signification of the distinction of the persons of the Father and the Son, because the power and act of spiration is communicated from the Father to the Son, and thus the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. Therefore, just as in creation "from the Father through the Son" does not signify different causes but one cause, yet two persons and the origin of the Son from the Father are signified; in the same way, in the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son, one principle of procession is shown, because, as there is one essence, so

there is one spirative power, yet two persons are shown, whose essence is also under the formal aspect of the spirative power, but such that the Father is the principle without a principle (προκαταρκτική αἰτία), while the Son is not a principle without a principle but one principle with the Father of the Holy Spirit, just as He is one God and creator with the Father, insofar as by generation He has all things communicated that belong to the Father (except paternity), and thus also the spirative power. For the Father and the Son are no more distinguished by spiration than by deity or absolute attributes, since there is no distinction between them other than through the formal aspect of paternity and filiation (1).

(1) Macarius (p. 387) calls this explanation of the formula—from the Father as the fountain and primordial principle through the Son by reason of the communication from the Father, or (as Augustine says) that the Spirit proceeds principally (προκαταρκτικῶς) from the Father, because the Father, by generating, gave to the Son that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from Him (as one who is one with the Father)—a "sophistical subtlety" of Western theologians. He presents their opinion thus: "Here is the substance of their response. The Father is the primary cause of the Holy Spirit… but the Son is the secondary cause, the principle dependent on the primitive principle, the Father… Thus, the ancient Doctors… do not deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds at the same time from the Son as a secondary cause or dependent principle." But, good man! No Catholic theologian ever taught this Arian heresy that the Son is a secondary cause of the Holy Spirit; but they teach with Scripture and the Fathers that, just as in essence and every perfection, so too in the power and act of spiration, the Son is one with the Father (ἐν τῷ ἑνί), with the sole difference that all that the Father has uncommunicated, the Son has the same communicated from the Father; and therefore, the Father is the primordial principle, while the Son, through the communication of essence and spiration, is one principle with the Father, not a secondary cause or different from the Father. In this dogma, no other "subtlety" is found except the mystery of the generation of the Son from the Father and of consubstantiality: from the substance of the Father, the Son is consubstantial, the first and second persons are one God, one spirator; yet the first person, as the fountain of deity (as the Fathers say), is also the fountain of spiration.

b) Unity and Distinction of the Two Formulas

From what has been said, it is clear that the difference between the statement that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son and the other, that He proceeds from the Father and the Son, lies not in the reality signified but in the manner of signifying the same reality. In the latter manner of speaking, the declaration of the unity of the principle is directly intended, but the order of origin between the Father

and the Son, although it is contained in the very names, is not explicitly expressed with regard to the spiration itself, which is communicated to the Son by the Father. In the former manner of speaking, however, the intention is to directly signify the order of origin between the two spirating persons, that the Father is the primordial fountain (*προκαταρκτική αἰτία*), from whom, just as the essence, so too the spirative power is communicated to the Son; the unity of the principle, however, is not explicitly contained in the particles *from the Father through the Son*, but rather in the signification of the subject (God the Father and God the Son). Therefore, the Western Fathers, in their solemn formula, where they state the procession *from the Father and the Son*, directly proclaim against the Arians the unity of essence and spiration, and include the distinction of persons against the Sabellians; the Eastern Fathers, in their more frequent formula of the procession *from the Father through the Son*, directly proclaim the distinction and order of the spirating persons to exclude Sabellianism and to repel the accusation,

repeatedly leveled by the Arians, of confusion of persons, while simultaneously including the unity of the principle against the Arian heresy. Compare what we said about the Western formula: "one substance in three persons," compared with the Eastern formula: "one essence in three hypostases" (above, p. 120, note).

Moreover, we have seen that the Eastern Fathers also embrace the formula *from the Father and the Son*; nor are there lacking Latins who equally accept the other formula, *from the Father through the Son*, and who, indeed, no less explicitly assert the procession principally from the Father, in the same sense in which the Eastern Fathers call the Father the primordial principle (*προκαταρκτική αἰτία*) (above, pp. 460, 456 ff.). Clearly, although the Son is also a principle *ad intra* (*ἀρχή*), He is not without a principle (*ἄναρχος*), and therefore, in comparison with the Father, He is neither *προκαταρκτική* [primordial] nor *ἄναρχος* [without principle]; rather, only the Father is *ἄναρχος* and the *προκαταρκτική αἰτία*, the Son is a principle (*ἀρχή*), and the Holy Spirit *ad intra* is not a principle of another person. This was most beautifully expressed by Gregory Nazianzen (*Oration 42*, alias 32, n. 15): "The one without a principle (*ἄναρχος*) is the Father, the principle (*ἀρχή*) is the Son, and that which is with the principle (*μετὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς*) is the Holy Spirit; but the nature of the three is one, namely God. The union, however, is the Father, from whom and to whom those who proceed in order are referred" (1).

(1) [Greek text: Ἄναρχος μὲν ὁ Πατὴρ, ἀρχὴ δὲ ὁ Υἱός, καὶ τὸ μετὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον… οὐσία δὲ τοῖς τρισὶ μία, Θεός. ἕνωσις δὲ ὁ Πατήρ, ἐξ οὗ καὶ πρὸς ὃν ἀνάγεται τὰ ἑξῆς.]

2°. Context and Teaching of the Fathers

If the very contexts of the Fathers are examined and the manner in which they teach the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son, no room for doubt remains regarding their meaning and their agreement with the Western Fathers.

a) They do not merely state the procession *from the Father through the Son* in a simple manner, but directly declare that their discourse concerns the immanent and eternal procession of the person of the Holy Spirit, which is through the Son, and thus not only about the mission *ad extra*. For they say that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son essentially, according to the essence, by nature, naturally. See the testimonies cited above, p. 438.

b) They describe this very procession, what it is: namely, that the nature is communicated from the Father through the Son to the Holy Spirit. "Just as we know the property (relation) of the Son to the Father to be, so too we find that the Holy Spirit has the same to the Son; and just as the Son says, 'All that the Father has is Mine' (clearly through the immanent origin of the Son from the Father), so too we find that all these things are in the Spirit through the Son (therefore, by the same reason, through immanent origin)" (1) (Athanasius, *Letter 3 to Serapion*, n. 1). "Natural goodness, essential holiness, and royal dignity flow from the Father through the Only-Begotten to the Spirit" (Basil, *On the Holy Spirit*, c. 18, n. 47). "Since the Spirit proceeds naturally (*φυσικῶς*) through the Son as His proper Spirit, with all that He perfectly possesses, He is said (in Scriptures) to receive what belongs to the Son" (Cyril, *Commentary on John*, pp. 929–930).

(1) [Greek text: Οἷαν γὰρ ἐγνώκαμεν ἰδιότητα τοῦ Υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα, ταύτην καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα πρὸς τὸν Υἱὸν εὑρήσομεν, καὶ ὡς ὁ Υἱὸς λέγει, πάντα ὅσα ἔχει ὁ Πατὴρ ἐμά ἐστιν, οὕτως ταῦτα πάντα διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ εὑρήσομεν ὄντα καὶ ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι.]

c) Declaring the procession of the Spirit from the Father through the Son, they say that, according to the order of origin among the divine persons, the Son is the intermediary between the Father and the Holy Spirit, such that the Son alone is from the Father alone, but the Spirit is not from the Father alone but from the Father through the Son; and therefore, the Son is immediately from the Father, while the Spirit is through Him who is immediately from the Father. Hence, they say there is an order among the persons, such that "by thought alone, according to the notion of principle, the Son is understood to precede the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit" (Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, Book I, p. 164); the Father is the cause (*αἴτιον*) of the Holy Spirit, "but through the intermediary Word" (*διὰ μέσου δὲ τοῦ Λόγου*) (Maximus, *Questions and Doubts*, q. 34); and in this sense, the personal character proper to the Holy Spirit is that "He is manifested after the Son and with Him, and the Son manifests the Spirit through Himself and with Himself" (Basil, *Letter 38*, alias 43, n. 4). But we will treat this doctrine of the Fathers separately below.

d) All the comparisons by which the holy Doctors frequently illustrate the procession of the Spirit from the Father through the Son present the Holy Spirit as proceeding equally from the Son, such that they simultaneously show that the spirative power is in the Son, communicated by the Father. "The Father is the sun, the Son the ray, the Spirit the splendor"; "the Father is the fountain, the Son the river, the Spirit the stream"; or "the Father is the spring, the Son the fountain, the Spirit the water"; "the Father is the root, the Son the shrub, the Spirit the fruit"; "the Son is the flower, the Spirit the fragrance from the flower" (Cyril, *Dialogue VI*, p. 598); "the Son is honey, the Spirit the sweetness"; "the Son is fire, the Spirit the heat"; "the Son is water, the Spirit the refreshment"; "the Son is the mouth of the Father, the Spirit the breath from the mouth"; "the Son is the mind of the Father, and the Wisdom of the Father and the truth of the true Father, the Spirit is from the mind and the Spirit of Wisdom and the Spirit of truth"; "the Son is life, the Spirit is the power (*ἐνέργεια*) of the Son Himself." See citations throughout the above, cf. also Em. Hergenröther, *Animadversiones in Photii Mystagogiam*, § II, n. 6 (Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, Vol. 102, p. 422).

From all this, it is manifest how unjustly Mark of Ephesus at the Council of Florence refused to subscribe to the definition to which the other Greek bishops consented along with the Latins: "This holy universal Council approving, we define that this truth of faith be believed and received by all Christians, and thus all profess that the Holy Spirit is eternally from the Father and the Son, and has His essence and subsistent being from the Father and the Son together, and proceeds from both eternally as from one principle and by a single spiration; declaring that what the holy Doctors and Fathers say, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, tends to this understanding, that by this it is signified that the Son also, according to the Greeks indeed as a cause (*αἰτία*), but according to the Latins as a principle of the subsistence of the Holy Spirit (*ἀρχὴν τῆς τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ὑπάρξεως*), just as the Father. And since all that belongs to the Father, the Father Himself gave to His Only-Begotten Son in generating Him, except being the Father, this very thing—that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from Him—the Son also has eternally from the Father, by whom He is eternally begotten" (Hardouin, Vol. IX, pp. 422, 986).

II. Historical Context and Misinterpretations

From this more frequent usage among the Greek Fathers of distinguishing the order of the persons of the Father and the Son in the very doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit, and from their zeal to always explicitly declare the Father as the primordial fountain of the Trinity (*κορυφή, ῥίζα, πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, ἄναρχος ἀρχή, προκαταρκτική αἰτία*), it came about that, from the seventh century, some Greeks thought that the signification of the term *cause* or *principle* (*αἰτία*) and the particle *ἐκ* (from), at least where it concerns internal processions, was already determined to designate only the Father, who is the primordial principle (*προκαταρκτική αἰτία*) (1). Given this premise, it could indeed be said that neither is the Son a cause (*αἰτία*) or primordial principle of the Holy Spirit, nor does the Holy Spirit proceed *from the Son*, but only, according to the formula determined in the sense we have described, *from the Father through the Son*. This manner of understanding the expressions of the ancient Fathers, though certainly too exclusive, does not yet contain any dogmatic error in itself; however, it could provide, and in fact later did provide, schismatics with an occasion for error, or rather a pretext to cloak their error in the very dogma. Two Greek writers, one from the seventh century and the other from the eighth, adopted the terms *αἰτία* and *ἐκ* in this sense.

(1) Comparing the three persons with one another, even the more ancient Fathers, or in their works *ad extra*, attribute the *αἴτιον* to the Father, as Nazianzen says (*Oration 34*, alias 24, n. 8): "God in three greatest things, in cause, creator, and perfecter (*αἴτιον, δημιουργός, τελειωτής*), namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." See Gregory Protosyncellus (Hardouin, Vol. IX, p. 649). Cf. what we said above, p. 200.

At the Council of Florence, the Greeks produced a fragment from a letter of St. Maximus to Marinus, a priest of Cyprus (Hardouin, Vol. IX, p. 306; *Works of St. Maximus*, Vol. II, pp. 68 ff.; from the translation of Anastasius the Librarian, in Gallandius, Vol. XIII, p. 38; cf. Anastasius' letter to John the Deacon, ibid., p. 31; Lequien, *Damascenica*, Dissertation I, n. 10) (2).

(2) Already at the Council of Florence and thereafter, not only the Latins but also some Greeks doubted the authenticity of this letter. Cf. Bessarion, *Dogmatic Oration*, c. 6 (Hardouin, Vol. IX, pp. 349, 351).

There, Maximus reports that the Constantinopolitans reproached only two things in the synodal letters of the Roman Pontiff, by whom they were condemned: one "concerning the divine incarnation, that he wrote that the Lord, as man, is without the sin of the first parent" (*ἄνευ τῆς προπατορικῆς ἁμαρτίας*) (1); the other, pertinent to our matter, they accused because "he said that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son" (*ἐκπορεύεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον*) (2).

(1) From the response of the Romans, which Maximus subsequently reports, it is clear that the Monothelites distorted the Pontiff's statement, as if he had removed only the sin committed by external act from Christ, but not admitted an impeccable will. For those heretics were accustomed to infer from the impeccability of the will that there was not two wills in Christ but one (see *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Scholion to Thesis XL). Therefore, when the Pontiff taught two wills in Christ, they distorted this to mean as if he had denied that Christ's will was impeccable. Hence, responding to this accusation, the Romans say: "Christ does not have sin even according to the mind (*κατὰ νοῦν ἔχειν ἁμαρτίαν*), in which Adam seems first to have fallen." Lequien (Vol. II) and others seem not to have rightly understood the sense of this Monothelite accusation.

(2) It is truly laughable that the Photian Macarius (p. 597) dares to assert that the Constantinopolitans reproaching the Roman Pontiff's synodal letter were not Monothelite heretics but Catholics. As if Constantinople, under the emperors Heraclius and Constans II, under the bishops Sergius, Pyrrhus, and Paul, had not been separated from the Catholic Church by Monothelite heresy and schism, against which heresy St. Maximus fought for nearly forty years until his martyrdom, alongside the Roman Pontiffs John IV, Theodore, and Martin I. "I," he said, "have no doctrine of my own, but the common doctrine of the Catholic Church. I do not communicate with the throne of Constantinople, because the holy four Councils rejected it through those nine chapters that were made in Alexandria (by Cyrus, approved by Sergius of Constantinople), and through the *Ecthesis* issued in this city under Sergius' authority (by Emperor Heraclius), and through the *Typos* recently promulgated (by Emperor Constans, at the urging of Bishop Paul of Constantinople)" (*Acts of Maximus*, nn. 6, 13). Indeed, in the very letter to Marinus, he does not conceal the heresy of the Constantinopolitans: "For they, on account of those things for which they are justly reproached, have not yet offered any satisfaction, nor have they abrogated what they themselves introduced" (ibid.).

In the first place, regarding the manner of speaking, [the Romans] responded that the Fathers, and then St. Cyril, said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. As for the matter itself, they said they were not unaware that the Father is the *αἰτία*, namely the principle without a principle, both of the Son through generation and of the Holy Spirit through procession (*ἐκπόρευσις*, active spiration, as Anastasius translates). But when it is said that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, it is understood as a procession from the Father through the Son, such that the active spiration is communicated from the Father to the Son, and thus all that belongs to the Father is also the Son's, and the Son is truly consubstantial with the Father, which consubstantiality would be destroyed if the act of spiration communicated by the Father were denied to the Son. "And first, they [the Romans] brought forth the consonant testimonies of the Latin Fathers, and furthermore, also those of Cyril of Alexandria from his sacred work written on the holy Evangelist John; from which they showed that they do not make the Son a cause (*αἰτία*) of the Holy Spirit; for they know the Father as the one cause of the Son and the Holy Spirit, the one through generation, the other through procession (*κατὰ τὴν ἐκπόρευσιν*); but that He proceeds through Him [the Son], they signified, and by this means they demonstrated the unity of essence and complete equality" (1) (Maximus, loc. cit.). Thus, it can truly be said, as Anastasius the Librarian (*Letter to John the Deacon*, Gallandius, Vol. XIII, p. 31) states about St. Maximus: "He teaches both us and the Greeks that the Holy Spirit proceeds in one sense and does not proceed in another sense from the Son," namely, He does not proceed from the Son as from the first person through uncommunicated spirative power, but He proceeds through the Son, who is the second person and therefore, with the spirative power communicated by the Father, is one principle with the Father of the Holy Spirit (2).

(1) [Greek text: Ἐξ ὧν οὐκ αἰτίαν τοῦ Υἱοῦ ποιούντας τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ ἁγίου ἀπεδείκνυον· μίαν γὰρ ἴσασιν Υἱοῦ καὶ Πνεύματος τὸν Πατέρα αἰτίαν, τοῦ μὲν κατὰ τὴν γέννησιν, τοῦ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐκπόρευσιν· ἀλλ' ἵνα δι' αὐτοῦ προϊέναι δηλοῖ, καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ συνάφες τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἀπαράλλακτον παραστῆσωσιν.] Jacobus Pitzipios (*L'église orientale*, Rome, 1855, p. 30) here adds much to the Greek text as if it were Maximus', which, however, is not his, but perhaps taken from the apology of some Catholic Greek (cf. Bessarion, *Dogmatic Oration*, Mansi, Vol. XXXI, p. 923; cf. p. 594) or collected from I know not where.

(2) If Anastasius truly used the words to John the Deacon that are now read there, they are rightly called by Petavius (*Book VII*, c. 17, n. 12) "insipid and contrary to the opinion of the Latins, and not consonant

with Maximus' teaching." According to the current reading, Anastasius says: "St. Maximus suggests that the Greeks unjustly accuse us, when we say that the Son is not the cause or principle of the Holy Spirit, as they think, but knowing the unity of the substance of the Father and the Son, as He proceeds from the Father, so we confess that He proceeds from the Son, understanding, of course, the mission, piously interpreting, instructing those skilled in both languages toward peace, namely teaching both us and the Greeks that the Holy Spirit proceeds in one sense and does not proceed in another from the Son, signifying the difficulty of expressing the property of one language in another." These words are so arranged that Anastasius, closer to Photius in friendship than was fitting, seems to have wished to excuse even his error in faith, manifestly distorting the doctrine of the Church into an alien sense. Indeed, if what Em. Hergenröther (*Photius*, Vol. II, Book V, §3) argues is true, Anastasius' authority for rightly judging the cause and doctrine of Photius is undermined; thus, Macarius (p. 387) vainly appeals to this friend of his Photius. Nevertheless, it seems probable to me, as Combefisius conjectures, that Anastasius wrote not *missionem* but *emissionem*; then, indeed, his sense carries no suspicion. Nor can I easily persuade myself that the Librarian so perverted the manifest doctrine of the Roman Church, the opinion of Maximus, and his own words, with which, in the translation of Maximus' letter, about which he writes here to John, he rightly interpreted *ἐκπόρευσις* as *emissionem*.

Moreover, where St. Maximus directly sets forth his own opinion, "he clearly teaches that the Holy Spirit is naturally the Spirit of the Son, just as He is naturally the Spirit of the Father, and thus the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son is the same as that to the Father, because He proceeds essentially from the Father through the Son, ineffably" (1) (*Questions*, 63, *Works*, Vol. I, p. 238). He repeats the same with the same words in the solution to question 53 of the doubts addressed to the king of Achrida (Bulgaria); but there, after the words "essentially from the Father through the Son, ineffably proceeds," to further clarify the internal procession, he adds: "Therefore, no section or division can be conceived in any way, as if either the Father without the Son (because He is eternally generated) or the Son without the Spirit (because He eternally proceeds) is understood (*οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἡ τοῦ Πατρὸς χωρὶς τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐπίνοια, ἢ τοῦ Υἱοῦ χωρὶς τοῦ Πνεύματος*); but there is a certain ineffable and incomprehensible unity and distinction in these" (ibid., p. 671). No less clearly, in a passage cited a little earlier, he explains the matter through a comparison. He asks why the Father and Christ cannot be called the Holy Spirit's, when, just as we do not call the Son the cause or principle of the Holy Spirit, as they think, "but knowing the unity of the substance of the Father and the Son, as He proceeds from the Father, so we confess that He proceeds from the Son." His response is: "Just as the mind is the source of the word (the internal word expressed in the mind), so too it is the source of the spirit (the voice), but through the intermediary word; and just as we cannot say that the word (the internal word) has its origin from the voice, so too we cannot say that the Son is of the Holy Spirit (because, namely, the Spirit has its origin from the Son). We call Him the Spirit of the Son; but not vice versa, because the Son does not proceed from the Spirit" (1) (*Questions and Doubts*, q. 34, ibid., p. 313). Compare the doctrine of Augustine described above, p. 408.

(1) [Greek text: Ὥσπερ ἔστιν αἴτιος τοῦ λόγου ὁ νοῦς, οὕτως καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, διὰ μέσου δὲ τοῦ λόγου· καὶ ὥσπερ οὐ δυνάμεθα εἰπεῖν τὸν λόγον εἶναι τῆς φωνῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸν Υἱὸν λέγειν τοῦ Πνεύματος.]

From these same principles, the sense of St. John Damascene is also understood, who is the other eighth-century author denying that the procession is said to be *from the Son*, but constantly affirming that it is *from the Father through the Son*. For Damascene says (*Orthodox Faith*, Book I, c. 8): "We do not say that the Father is from anyone, but we call Him the Father of the Son; likewise, we do not call the Son a

cause (2) or Father, but rather that He is both from the Father and the Son of the Father. Finally, we say that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Spirit of the Father; but we do not say the Spirit is from the Son, yet we call Him the Spirit of the Son; for, as the divine Apostle says, 'If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not His'; and we profess that He appeared through the Son and is communicated to us (3). For He breathed, it says, and said to His disciples: 'Receive the Holy Spirit.' Just as in the sun there is both the ray and the splendor; for it [the sun] is the source of the ray and the splendor, and through the ray the splendor is communicated to us" (Damascene, loc. cit.). That he includes the eternal procession in saying that the Spirit appeared through the Son is shown both by the Scriptural testimonies and the analogy he uses; for from these, the Fathers are accustomed to demonstrate the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit through the Son (cf. above, pp. 450, 452, 473). See also his *Homily on Holy Saturday*, n. 4 (*Works*, Vol. II, p. 817).

(2) *αἴτιον*, others *ἀναίτιον* [without cause].

(3) [Greek text: Καὶ δι' Υἱοῦ πεφανερῶσθαι καὶ μεταδίδοσθαι ἡμῖν ὁμολογοῦμεν.]

Moreover, Damascene himself often clearly declares the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit through the Son. "I know only the superessential Father, who is the abyss of the Word, the generator of the Word, and through the Word the producer of the Holy Spirit, who manifests the hiddenness of the deity, the manifesting power of the Father's Spirit, proceeding from the Father through the Son, proceeding from the Father; for no motion (*ὁρμή*, vital motion, or act of will, cf. Marius Victorinus, above, p. 453) is without the Spirit. And He is the Spirit of the Son, not as proceeding from Him, but as proceeding through Him from the Father; for the Father alone is the cause (*αἴτιος*)" [primordial] (1) (Damascene, *On the Divine Names*, *Works*, Vol. I, p. 148). He has similar statements in *Dialogue Against the Manichees*, n. 5, p. 432; *Letter to Jordan*, n. 28, p. 497. In the latter place, he repeats what St. Basil had said (above, pp. 429–430): "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son and the Word; not, however, in the manner of filiation (*οὐχ ὡς υἱός*); for if the Spirit were the Son of the Son, He would also have a Son, and that one another, and so on to infinity." These clearly show that Damascene understood the procession through the Son as through a producing principle of the Holy Spirit; for he could not otherwise have said: if the procession from the Father through the Son (which he confesses and teaches) were in the manner of filiation, it would follow that the Spirit is the Son of the Son. Read Bessarion, *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, pp. 261 ff. (in *Golden Treatises*); and in his *Dogmatic Oration* (Hardouin, Vol. IX, pp. 350 ff.) (2).

(1) [Greek text: Πατὴρ διὰ Λόγου προϊόντος ἐκπορευομένου Πνεύματος… καὶ Υἱοῦ Πνεῦμα, οὐχ ὡς ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ὡς δι' αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευομένου· μόνος γὰρ αἴτιος ὁ Πατήρ.]

(2) It is true that the question of Damascene's opinion is hermeneutical, not dogmatic; yet I can hardly think that St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 36, a. 3) would have so easily conceded error in Damascene if he could have seen the demonstrations of subsequent Greek theologians Beccus, Demetrius Cydones, and Bessarion. See de Rubeis, *Dissertation I*, c. 7, nn. 6 ff., on the life of George of Cyprus, pp. 109 ff. That Damascene is not that monk John who, at the beginning of the ninth century, stirred up controversies against the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, see Lequien (*Damascenica*, I, nn. 13–16).

Thesis XXXVII. On the Comparison of the Relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son with the Relation of the Son to the Father

The Catholic doctrine of the Greek Fathers, in agreement with the Latin Fathers, shines forth most clearly from the comparison they make between the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son and the relation of the Son to the Father; for: 1° they teach that the Son alone is from the Father alone and immediately from the Father, but the Holy Spirit has His origin not from the Father alone but through the Son; 2° they describe the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son with all the same names and expressions by which the relation of the Son's origin to the Father is expressed, excepting almost only the designation of Son, begotten, and generation.

I. The Distinguishing Character of the Persons

As a distinguishing character of the person of the Son, it is handed down by the Fathers that He alone is from the Father alone, that is, proceeding from the one person of the Father. Hence, they say that the personal character of the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the property of the Son by this very fact, that the Spirit no longer proceeds from the Father alone but from the Father through the Son. St. Basil, where he deliberately sets forth the notions distinguishing the persons, beginning with the third, speaks thus: "Since the Holy Spirit depends on the Son (*ἐξαρτᾶται τοῦ Υἱοῦ*), with whom He is indivisibly conceived, and has His being as depending on the Father as His cause (*αἴτιον*), from whom He proceeds; this is the notional character of His hypostatic property, that He is manifested after the Son (cf. above, Thesis XXXIII) and with Him, and has His subsistence from the Father. The Son, however, who manifests the Spirit proceeding from the Father through Himself and with Himself, shines forth alone as the Only-Begotten from the unbegotten light" (2) (*Letter 38*, alias 43, n. 4).

(1) Macarius sensed that here the origin of the Holy Spirit from the Son is clearly taught; for in no other sense, without Arian heresy, can a divine person be said to depend on another person. Hence, the Photian corrupted the text in his version: "the Holy Spirit is united to the Son" (Macarius, pp. 381, 406). But *ἐξαρτᾶσθαι τινός* or *ἐκ τινός* never means to be united or one with another; rather, it means to depend, to have origin from another, from which, if the origin is according to nature, unity or consubstantiality follows.

(2) [Greek text: Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα… τοῦ Υἱοῦ μὲν ἐξαρτᾶται, ᾧ ἀδιαστάτως συγκαταλαμβάνεται, τῆς δὲ τοῦ Πατρὸς αἰτίας ἐξημμένον ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ὅθεν καὶ ἐκπορεύεται, τοῦτο γνωριστικὸν τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἰδιότητος σημεῖον ἔχει, τὸ μετὰ τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ γνωρίζεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὑφιστάναι. Ὁ δὲ Υἱὸς ὁ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον Πνεῦμα δι' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ γνωρίζων, μόνος μονογενῶς ἐκ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου φωτὸς ἐκλάμπων.]

has a community in the property of notions with the Father or with the Holy Spirit. But He who is God above all (the Father, see above, p. 184), has a certain principal mark of His hypostasis, that He alone has being as Father and subsists from no cause" (Basil, *Letter 38*, alias 43, n. 4).

We have a commentary on this doctrine of Basil from his brother Gregory of Nyssa, both in *Against Eunomius*, Book I, and in his *Letter to Ablabius*, in the passages described above, p. 461. There, Gregory

clearly teaches that the distinction between the divine persons, specifically between the Son and the Holy Spirit, is only by reason of principle, that one has its origin from another; thus, the Holy Spirit depends on the Son in the same sense that the Son has His being from the Father. Then, the difference between the procession of the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father is taught to be this: that the second person, the Son, is from the first person immediately (*προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου*), that is, with no other person interposed, and therefore the Son is the Only-Begotten, that is, begotten from the one first person; in contrast, the Holy Spirit, the third person, is indeed from the first person but not immediately, that is, not from the first person alone, but through the second from the first, or, as Nyssenus says, with the second person interposed, as Basil had said regarding the manifestation of the Holy Spirit "through the Son." In another place, Nyssenus declared the same through a comparison. He says the Trinity is "like one flame distinguished in three lamps, but in such a way that we suppose the first flame to be the cause of the light of the third, by communication through the middle light, kindling the last" (1) (that is, the Father is the principle of the third person, because through the second person, the Son, He communicates the same nature to the third person, the Holy Spirit) (Gregory of Nyssa, *Oration on the Holy Spirit*, n. 6, ed. Cardinal Mai, *Vitae Patrum Nova Bibliotheca*, Vol. IV, Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, Vol. XLV, p. 1307). Hence, both Gregory and Basil say that: a) the Son alone is from the one person (*τὸ μονογενές ἐκ τοῦ μόνου μονογενῶς ἔκλαμψαν*), for the Spirit is no longer from one but from two persons. Whence, b) as Nyssenus says, the third person is also from the first but from the first through the second as intermediary (*ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου διὰ τοῦ προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου, τῆς τοῦ Υἱοῦ μεσιτείας τὸ Πνεῦμα τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα συνάψει… αἰτίαν τοῦ τρίτου φωτὸς εἶναι τὴν πρώτην φλόγα ἐν διαδοχῇ διὰ τοῦ μέσου τὸ ἄκρον ἐξάψασαν*). This is what Basil said above, p. 424: "the royal dignity through the Only-Begotten reaches the Spirit" (*τὸ βασιλικὸν ἀξίωμα διὰ τοῦ Μονογενοῦς ἐπὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα διικνεῖται*).

(1) [Greek text: Ὥσπερ ἔαν τις ἡ τρεῖς λαμπάδας διῃρημένην ἔχειν τὴν φλόγα, αἰτίαν δὲ τοῦ τρίτου φωτὸς νομίζωμεν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην φλόγα ἐν διαδοχῇ διὰ τοῦ μέσου τὸ ἄκρον ἐξάψασαν.]

This same thing Athanasius had said: "The Spirit is said to proceed from the Father because He shines forth from the Word, which is acknowledged to be from the Father" (*Against the Arians*, Oration III, n. 24); and Basil: "The Spirit is conceived indivisibly with the Son, and the Son manifests the Spirit proceeding from the Father through Himself and with Himself, shining forth alone as the Only-Begotten" (*Letter 38*, alias 43, n. 4).

To me, certainly, through this comparison of Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory between the relation of the Son to the Father alone as to His principle, and the relation or, as they say, the dependence of the Holy Spirit not from the Father alone but from the Father through the Son and with the Son interposed (*τῆς τοῦ Υἱοῦ μεσιτείας*), it seems no less clearly, and in part even more distinctly, proposed that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, than when it is simply taught by Epiphanius, Cyril, and other Fathers, and by Basil and Gregory themselves (above, pp. 477 ff.), that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, having His being from the Son as from the Father.

It remains only to clarify what this interposition (*μεσιτεία*) of the Son between the Father and the Holy Spirit is, and in what sense the procession mediated from the Father should be understood. If the procession from the Father were said to be mediated in the sense that the Son is from the Father and then the Holy Spirit from the Son alone, this would indeed be a most grave error, subverting the entire economy of the Holy Trinity and coinciding ultimately with the heresy of the Pneumatomachi, who in this

way asserted the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son alone, and by this very fact either explicitly denied the unity of nature of the three persons or, given those principles, could no longer consistently defend it. Therefore, the Fathers, who directly opposed this very heresy to declare the unity of nature, would be absurdly understood in that sense.

Nor is the genuine sense of those expressions obscure. Just as the nature, so too all operation *ad extra* is one, indistinct, and common to the three persons; nevertheless, the Father is called the primordial cause, the Son the operator, the Holy Spirit the perfecter; the Father is said to operate through the Son in the Holy Spirit. All these expressions presuppose the indistinct unity of operation and declare only the distinction among the persons, that the nature, and thus the power and operation, is in the Father uncommunicated, in the Son communicated by the Father, in the Holy Spirit communicated by both. So too, spiration *ad intra* is one, common to the Father and the Son, but communicated from the Father to the Son. Hence, just as the three persons do not create insofar as they are distinct, but insofar as they are one God and thus one creator, so too it could not be said without Gnostic or Arian error that God the Father is the creator only mediately through the Son; similarly, the Father and the Son, not insofar as they are distinct, but insofar as they are one in nature under the formal aspect of spirative power or fruitful love, spirate the Holy Spirit, and thus are one spirator; nor, therefore, is the Father any less an immediate principle of the Holy Spirit than the Son.

But if it is not the spiration itself, one and common, but the distinction and order of the persons who spirate that is considered, the Father does not spirate the Holy Spirit except with the generation of the Son presupposed. For the Holy Spirit, in the fixed ontological order, is the third person, not the second simultaneously with the Son, and therefore the Son, eternally generated, is presupposed to the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit. Since, therefore, in the order of origin, the generation of the Son from the Father alone is understood first, by attending to this order, it can rightly be said that the Son is "immediately from the first" (*προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου*); and since the Father does not spirate the Holy Spirit except with the communication of the spirative power in the generated second person presupposed, therefore, again by reason of this order of persons, it can rightly be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds "through Him who is immediately from the first" (*διὰ τοῦ προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου*). (See the manner of conceiving above, Thesis XXVI, n. I; XXVII; XXIX, n. II.) (1).

(1) "When in spiration the Father and the Son are two spirators insofar as they are one in spirative power, we can speak of the act of spiration by comparison either to the spirators themselves or to the principle of spiration, as the power by which spiration occurs. But if we consider the principle itself, namely the spirative power, since in this the Father and the Son are not distinguished, it cannot be said that spiration is from the Father mediated by the Son; but if we consider the spirators themselves, who are distinct and according to this provide the supposit for spiration, then there is an order of nature (origin), because the Son is from the Father, and the Holy Spirit is from both the Father and the Son. Hence, Richard (Victorinus, *On the Trinity*, Book V, c. 7) says that generation in the divine is immediately from the Father, but the procession of the Holy Spirit is in some way mediate and in some way immediate: immediate with respect to the spirating power, which is one in the Father and the Son, and again immediate with respect to the supposit of the Father, which is immediately the principle of the procession, because He Himself, along with the Son, spirates; but mediate, insofar as the Son, who spirates, is from the Father" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, dist. 12, q. 1, a. 3).

Hence it is understood how in these passages the Son is said to be the intermediary between the Father and the Holy Spirit, while elsewhere the Holy Spirit is frequently proclaimed by the Fathers as the intermediary between the Father and the Son (*Πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἐν μέσῳ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ*, Epiphanius, *Ancoratus*, n. 8). Namely, if the order of persons is considered, the Son, the second person, is the intermediary between the first, from whom He is generated, and the third, which proceeds only with the Son presupposed and from the Father through the Son; thus the Fathers say, "not the Word through the Spirit, but the Spirit through the Word is joined to the Father, because He receives from the Son" (Athanasius, *Against the Arians*, Oration III, n. 24). But if the one spiration, common to the Father and the Son, or the one love of the Father for the Son and the Son for the Father, whose immanent produced term is the Holy Spirit, is considered, the subsisting love, the Holy Spirit, can be said, and is said by the Fathers, to be the intermediary between the Father and the Son, and in the same sense is called by Augustine and other Fathers "the unity of both" (above, pp. 366, 367, 455), by St. Bernard "the common kiss of the Father and the Son, the imperturbable peace, the firm bond" (above, p. 364), and "because He proceeds from both, the indissoluble bond of the Trinity" (St. Bernard, *Sermon 3 on Pentecost*, n. 2).

II. Application of Names Denoting Origin

In Scripture and the Fathers, there are many names of the Son of God relative to the Father, which directly signify His origin from the Father and indirectly signify the mode of origin through generation; thus, He is called the Word, Wisdom, figure (*χαρακτήρ*), image, power, splendor of the Father. There are other names that directly and expressly signify the mode of procession through generation, such as the names Son, Only-Begotten, generation. Now, all those former names are transferred by the Fathers, especially the Greek ones, to signify the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son, where it is clear, and indicated by the Fathers themselves, that only the direct signification of origin is retained, with the signification of the mode of origin set aside. But because this cannot be done with the names mentioned in the second group, they remain proper to the second person alone, who is generated, and are never used to express the relation of the Holy Spirit.

a) The Fathers teach as a general principle: "The Spirit has such an order and such a nature toward the Son as the Son has toward the Father" (1) (Athanasius, *Letter 1 to Serapion*, n. 21; Basil, *Against Eunomius*, Book V, *Works*, Vol. I, p. 304).

(1) [Greek text: Τοιαύτην δὲ τάξιν καὶ οὐσίαν ἔχοντος τοῦ Πνεύματος πρὸς τὸν Υἱόν, οἷαν ὁ Υἱὸς ἔχει πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα (Athanasius); ὅτι ὡς ὁ Υἱὸς πρὸς Πατέρα ἔχει, οὕτως Πνεῦμα πρὸς Υἱόν (Basil).]

b) Specifically, then, excepting, as I said, the names Son, begotten, Only-Begotten, which remain proper to the second person due to the peculiar mode of procession through generation, the Greek Fathers apply all the other designations denoting the relation of the Son's origin to the Father, or the Son's procession from the Father, to express the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son.

The Son is the Word, the expressed mind (*ὁ νοῦς*) and reason of the Father (above, pp. 165 ff.); similarly, the Holy Spirit is called by St. Basil and Cyril the Word of the Son, the mind of the Son (above, pp. 410, 460). The Son is the image of the Father, the figure (*χαρακτήρ*) of His substance; in turn, the Holy Spirit is called by Gregory Thaumaturgus, Athanasius, Basil, and Cyril the image of the Son, the natural image, the seal of the Son's nature, the form of the Son (2) (above, pp. 409, 427, 447, 471). The Son is the

splendor of the Father, light from light; the Holy Spirit is the splendor of the Son, the third light (pp. 427, 473). Likewise, the Son is the face of the Father as His expression; in turn, the Holy Spirit is called the face of the Son (Cyril, *Commentary on John*, p. 787, see Petavius, *Book VIII*, c. 7, n. 7). The Son is called the Wisdom and power of the Father; the Holy Spirit is called by Athanasius (*To Serapion*, I, n. 25) and Cyril (*Dialogue VII*, p. 593) the Spirit of Wisdom and power, like fragrance from a flower, the living power of the living Son. The Son, both in *Wisdom* 7:25 and by the Fathers (above, p. 289), is described as "the vapor (*ἀτμίς*) of the power of God and a certain emanation of His brightness"; similarly, by Cyril (*Thesaurus*, p. 338), the Holy Spirit is said to proceed "from the essence of the Son as vapor from water" (*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ ὥσπερ ἐξ ὕδατος ἀτμίς*).

(2) [Greek text: Σφραγὶς τὴν μορφὴν Χριστοῦ ὑποδείκνυσα… μορφὴ τοῦ Υἱοῦ (Athanasius, *To Serapion*, I, nn. 23, 24; III, n. 3).]

Regarding the Son's consubstantial relation to the Father as His principle, many Fathers understand Christ's saying: *The Father is greater than I* (John 14:28). "He did not say 'better than I'… but 'greater,' not in some magnitude or time, but because of His birth from the Father Himself" (Athanasius, *Against the Arians*, Oration I, n. 58). Yet the same Athanasius, in the same sense of origin, declares in the same place, n. 50, that the Son is greater than the Holy Spirit. Speaking as the Son of Man before the Jews, he says, Christ indicated that the Holy Spirit is greater than Himself considered according to His humanity; but "showing His divinity and majesty to His disciples, no longer signifying Himself as less than the Holy Spirit, but greater and equal" (1), He gave the Holy Spirit and said: *Receive the Holy Spirit* (John 20:22).

(1) [Greek text: Οὐκ ἔτι ὡς μικρότερος τοῦ Πνεύματος ἑαυτὸν, ἀλλὰ μείζονα καὶ ἴσον σημαίνων.] Although the editor Maurinus (Montfaucon) omitted the word *μείζονα* (greater), he admits that it exists in all manuscripts and editions except one codex, one catena (where it is noted in the margin), and the Latin translation of Peter Nannius. The word is certainly genuine, both from the authority of the codices and editions (even Patriarch Beccus had the same reading, see *On the Union of the Church in Orthodox Greece*, Vol. I, p. 137), from the context, and from the greater difficulty of the reading *μείζονα καὶ ἴσον*, which no one would have inserted, but someone could easily have wished to correct, as I have no doubt Nannius attempted.

Certainly, when these things are said to express the order of the Son to the Father, no one doubts that the relation of origin and the procession of the Son from the Father are signified; therefore, when the Greek Fathers transfer all these same terms to describe the order of the Holy Spirit to the Son, they can signify nothing other than the procession from the Son.

c) Hence, Eunomius and other Arians objected, and the Fathers themselves ask, if all these things are no less truly said of the relation of the Spirit to the Son than of the relation of the Son to the Father, why is the Holy Spirit not the Son of the Son? This very question would be absurd unless both the heretics understood and the Fathers held as fixed and certain the Catholic doctrine in the sense that the Son is the principle of the Holy Spirit. The Fathers also make this most clear in their response; for they do not respond by denying the premise, namely that the Son is the principle of the Holy Spirit; but rather, they emphasize that the reason the Spirit is not the Son of the Son is not due to a lack of procession, "not that the Spirit is not from God through the Son, as the Word of the Son and the image of the Son" (Basil, above, p. 430); "not begotten, not called by the name of Son, but nevertheless the Holy Spirit is from the

same essence of the Father and the Son" (Epiphanius, *Ancoratus*, nn. 7, 8); "the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, not, however, in the manner of filiation" (Nazianzen, Damascene, *Letter to Jordan*, n. 28; cf. Athanasius, *To Serapion*, I, n. 25; Gregory, *Oration 31*, alias 29, nn. 7–9); indeed, they say that no other reason need be given than that in Scripture and the whole of revelation, the proceeding Spirit is not called Son; or they give the reason that He proceeds not from one but from two, whereas a son, even in human terms, is not of two (as Augustine often argues); or generally, they say that besides generation, there exists another mode of procession, and because the Spirit proceeds in this other mode, not in the manner of filiation, He is neither the Son of the Son nor called such (loc. cit.).

Thesis XXXVIII. On the Sense and Manner in Which the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father Was Explicitly Declared in Opposition to the Pneumatomachi

When the Arians and Semi-Arian Pneumatomachi affirmed that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father by communication of the divine essence but is a creature produced by the Son or through the Son, 1° the holy Doctors of the Church, whether individually or in Councils, had to directly declare the procession from the Father and deny that production through the Son which the heretics introduced; having demonstrated both points, they not only do not deny the procession from the Son as from the Father by communication of the divine nature, but they assume this procession from the Son as a consequence that must also be conceded by their adversaries. Therefore, 2° the doctrine of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret on this point seems to be explained in a Catholic sense, where, in opposition to the Macedonian sense, they deny that the Holy Spirit has His existence from the Son or through the Son.

I. The Pneumatomachi Heresy

For some time after the Council of Nicaea, many departed from the faction of the Arians, who expressly denied the divinity of the Son, yet were unwilling to embrace the Catholic faith defined in the Council; they said they confessed the Son as true God, similar in substance to the Father (*ὁμοιούσιος*), but refused to call Him consubstantial (*ὁμοούσιος*) with the Father. From these Semi-Arians arose the Pneumatomachi, also called Macedonians after their leader, who transferred the explicit and direct attack on the mystery of the Holy Trinity to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. They conceded that the Son is begotten from the Father and therefore is God from God; but they denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father by substantial procession, and therefore denied that He is God; instead, they taught that the principle of the Holy Spirit is the Son by creative production. Without ambiguity, Eusebius had already proposed this opinion: "Indeed, only the one God and Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ can be called such; the Son, however, is the Only-Begotten God, who is in the bosom of the Father; but the Paraclete, the Spirit, is neither God nor Son, since He did not receive generation from the Father as the Son did; but He is one of those things made through the Son, since all things were made through Him, and without Him nothing was made" (*On Ecclesiastical Theology*, Book III, c. 6). This very heresy is condemned by Athanasius, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, and other Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries. "They pretend to profess the faith defined by the Fathers at Nicaea, but in reality, they deny it, perverting the watchword of consubstantiality (*τὸ ὁμοούσιον*), and the same ones blaspheme against the Holy Spirit, saying that He is a creature and something made, produced through the Son" (*καὶ ποίημα διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ γεγενῆσθαι*) (Athanasius, *To Emperor Jovinian*, n. 1). This was also the opinion of the

Arians themselves, with the sole difference that they openly said, "the Son is a creature of the Unbegotten, but the Paraclete is of the Only-Begotten" (Eunomius, cited by Basil, *Against Eunomius*, Book II, n. 33). Basil responds to Eunomius, among other things: "No power (*ἐνέργεια*) of the Son is divided from the Father, nor is there anything of reality in the Son that is alien to the Father; for He Himself says, 'All that is Mine is Yours, and Yours is Mine'; how, therefore, does Eunomius attribute the cause of the Spirit to the Only-Begotten alone?" (ibid., n. 24). See Ambrose, *On the Holy Spirit*, Book I, c. 2; Damasus, *Letter to Paulinus*, n. 3, ed. Coustant, pp. 511, 518; Philastrius, *On Heresies*, 67, 68.

In this doctrine of the heretics, three points can be distinguished: a) the Holy Spirit is not from the Father, and therefore is not God; b) the Holy Spirit is from the Son or, what they hold as equivalent, through the Son; c) He is from the Son by creation. The heretics directly and primarily intended the first point; they assumed the second as clear from the Scriptures and admitted by the Catholics themselves; but to make it consistent with their heresy, they understood it in a distorted sense, as a procession of the Spirit from the Son by creation, which we call the third point of the heresy. The proper reasoning of their errors required an opposed manner of exposition and defense of the Catholic faith. What the Fathers primarily aimed at in that controversy was the demonstration of the deity of the Holy Spirit, and therefore the demonstration of His procession from the substance of the Father. The second point, that the Spirit is from the Son, the holy Doctors never simply denied; rather, from this common principle, they inferred that the Spirit, because He is from the Son, is also from the Father. But the sense in which the Catholic Doctors and the heretics understood the procession from the Son was vastly different. The Catholics, in their faith in the divinity of the Holy Spirit, saw that the procession from the Son is not by creation but from the substance of the Son, and they understood this procession to be equally from the substance of the Father and the Son, which is one; the heretics, on the other hand, in denying the procession from the Father, excluded procession from the substance of the Son and included procession from the Son by creation.

Thus, we say, as far as the present matter is concerned, this was the state of the question and the manner of disputing against the Pneumatomachi. The holy Fathers always assert the procession of the person of the Holy Spirit from the Son (in the generic sense that the Spirit is from the Son) as a dogma and a common principle for both parties (cf. Bessarion, *Dogmatic Oration*, Hardouin, *Concilia*, Vol. IX, p. 353). From there, they proceed to the exposition of the Catholic faith and the refutation of the double error by which the heretics taught that the Spirit is not from the Father and is from the Son by creation, in three ways.

1°. From the common principle that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, they infer and demonstrate that He necessarily also proceeds from the Father, both from the inherent order of relations, because the Son Himself is from the Father, and from the explicit doctrine of Scripture, because just as He is called the Spirit of the Son, so too He is called the Spirit of the Father and the Spirit of God. This argumentation is found everywhere among the Fathers, the principal defenders of Catholic doctrine in that controversy—Athanasius, Basil, Nyssenus, Cyril. Lest we pile up testimonies, let us recall only those cited in the preceding theses. "He is the Spirit of the Father, who is called the Spirit of the Son, since the Son Himself says: 'The Spirit of truth' (that is, of the Son, according to Athanasius and many other Fathers), 'who proceeds from the Father'" (Athanasius, *To Serapion*, Letter 3, n. 1). "He is said to proceed from the Father because He shines forth from the Word, which is acknowledged to be from the Father" (ibid., Letter 1, n. 20). "The Word of God is the Son, but the Word of the Son is the Spirit… and since the Word is the Son's, it is therefore God's (the Father's)" (Basil, *Against Eunomius*, Book V, p. 304). "The

Holy Spirit is said to be both from the Father and is confirmed by testimony to be from the Son; for if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not His: therefore, the Spirit is from God and is the Spirit of God" (Gregory of Nyssa, *Sermon III on the Lord's Prayer*). "As He is the proper Spirit of the Son, existing naturally in Him and proceeding through Him, so too of the Father" (Cyril, *Commentary on John*, p. 910), etc. Moreover, to prove that the mode of procession is by communication of nature, not by creation, they assume, besides the procession of the Spirit from the Son, another principle conceded by the Semi-Arians, that the Son proceeds from the Father not by creation but as God from God. With this established, they show from the Scriptures that the order of the Spirit to the Son is the same as that of the Son to the Father, and therefore the procession of the Spirit from the Son is by communication of nature; thus, if the adversaries confess that the Son is truly God, they must also confess that the Holy Spirit is God. So Athanasius (*To Serapion*, Letter 1) and Basil (*Against Eunomius*, Book V) (1) and elsewhere.

(1) From this manner of argumentation, some began to doubt whether the last two books, IV and V, *Against Eunomius* are genuine works of Basil. But Maranus rightly notes that this manner of disputation proves nothing other than that Basil added these books as an appendix, in which, besides Eunomius, he had in view the then-prevalent Pneumatomachi Semi-Arians (*Works of St. Basil*, Vol. III, *Life*, c. 43, n. 7).

In this solemn manner of disputation by the Fathers, two points are especially noteworthy, which could remedy, if anything could, the intolerably sophistic ingenuity of schismatics. First, what the heretics suppose and the Fathers assume as a common and certain principle among all Christians is the procession of the person of the Holy Spirit from the Son, that is, that the very person of the Spirit has His existence and being from the Son; it is not about gifts, mission, or effects of the Holy Spirit *ad extra*, which are said to be also from the Son. Nor is the procession said to be also from the Son or from the substance of the Son only in the sense that (as schismatics absurdly claim) the Spirit is consubstantial with the Son; for the Pneumatomachi deny this consubstantiality, while the Catholics demonstrate consubstantiality from substantial procession as its reason and cause, in the same way that they demonstrate from the generation of the Son that He is consubstantial (*ὁμοούσιος*) with the Father. The second point, most worthy of note, is that in this long and most serious battle for the Catholic faith against the Pneumatomachi, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son was assumed by the Fathers as most evident, needing no polemical demonstration, although they often confirm and illustrate it abundantly from places in Holy Scripture. For they directly intend to demonstrate the procession from the Father and thence the divinity of the Holy Spirit, and for this demonstration, they assume the procession from the Son as a principle generically conceded by the adversaries themselves.

2°. Second Mode of Disputation

The second mode of disputation is that the Fathers, while deliberately demonstrating the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father, which was the direct issue in question, simultaneously connect the procession from the Son as something included and easily understood from it. To the argument of the heretics that the Holy Spirit is either the Son of God or a creature, we have heard the response of St. Basil: "Why is the Spirit not called the Son of the Son? Not because He is not from God through the Son, but so that the Trinity is not thought to be an infinite multitude (in which there would be sons from sons). Therefore, the Apostle clearly preached that He is from God, saying, 'We have received the Spirit who is from God'; and he made it manifest that He shines forth through the Son, naming Him the Spirit of the Son just as of God, and calling Him the mind of Christ just as the Spirit of God" (Basil, *Against Eunomius*, Book V, p. 305).

“Since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, it is manifest that He is of the divine essence, proceeding essentially in it and from it” (Cyril, *Thesaurus*, p. 345). To this point, nearly all the testimonies cited above could be brought forward, where we presented the explicit doctrine of the Fathers.

3°. Context of the Controversy and Conciliar Definitions

In the state of the question as we have described, especially when the aim of the Church was not to refute by argumentation but only to condemn errors authentically through the direct opposition of Catholic doctrine, as in the creeds and definitions of Councils, there was no need for an explicit declaration of the procession from the Son; rather, the direct opposition required only the profession of the two points denied by the Pneumatomachi: namely, the profession of the procession from the Father and the divinity of the Holy Spirit. Thus, the Second Ecumenical Council, held in the year 381 against the Pneumatomachi, declared the profession of the Nicene Creed, “We believe in the Holy Spirit,” with this second formula directly opposed to that twofold error: “We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceeds from the Father, who with the Father and the Son together is worshiped and glorified, who spoke through the prophets,” or, retaining the Greek construction, as Dionysius Exiguus translates: “We believe… in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of life, proceeding from the Father, to be worshiped and glorified with the Father and the Son, who spoke through the holy prophets” (1).

(1) [Greek text: πιστεύομεν… καὶ εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον, τὸ Κύριον τὸ ζωοποιόν… τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, τὸ σὺν Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ συμπροσκυνουμένον καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον, τὸ λαλῆσαν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν.]

Thus, in this creed, the Fathers explicitly define the dogma against the first point of the heretics, that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father: “who proceeds from the Father.” To the second twofold point, that the Spirit proceeds from the Son and proceeds as a creature, they oppose only the profession of divinity: “in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Giver of life, who with the Father and the Son together is worshiped”; by this very fact, therefore, they accept the second part, namely the procession from the Son, as most true, provided it is understood as a procession befitting God (*θεοπρεπῶς*), as St. Cyril says (*Commentary on John*, p. 929). The matter is manifest if attention is given to the nature of the heresy to which the creed is opposed. We described this earlier from the testimonies of the Fathers, and Patriarch John Beccus declares it in the same way. The question of the schismatics was: “Why did the holy Fathers of the Second Council, explaining the sacred Nicene Creed, expressly affirm the divinity of the Holy Spirit; but regarding His procession, they said, in accordance with the Gospel, ‘who proceeds from the Father,’ and did not add ‘also from the Son’?” Beccus responds, among other things: “The most true reason why the holy Fathers did not add the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit is this: because the heretics (those very ones against whom the creed is opposed) said and believed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son alone” (Beccus proves this sense of the heretics from the testimony of St. Basil and Justin, Bishop of Sicily). “Therefore, the heretics asserted that the Spirit proceeds from the Son and not from the Father. But the holy Fathers explicitly preached in the creed what the heretics denied, saying: ‘who proceeds from the Father’; for the procession from the Son the heretics conceded, and there was no controversy with them on this point” (Beccus, *Among the Golden Works*, p. 155 ff.).

Moreover, it is sufficiently clear from the doctrine and testimonies of the Fathers we have cited that the profession of the procession from the Father was understood to include the procession from the Son, such

that the Father and the Son are one in spiration. Indeed, we learn from Epiphanius that in many churches of the East, a fuller explanation was customarily added to the Constantinopolitan Creed, in which explicit mention was made that the Holy Spirit, just as He proceeds from the Father, is also to be believed to be from the Son. For after setting forth the formula of the creed, which we said is the same as the Constantinopolitan, Epiphanius presents another, slightly more explicit one (cf. *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis XVII), about which he speaks thus: "You (in the Church of Suedra in Pamphylia) and we and all orthodox bishops, and in short the entire holy Catholic Church, against the rising heresies, in accordance with the faith of those holy Fathers (he means the Nicene Fathers) set forth earlier, thus enjoin, especially to those approaching the holy baptism, that they profess and say: 'We believe in one God,'" etc. In this creed, the Constantinopolitan profession concerning the Holy Spirit is declared thus: "And in the Holy Spirit we believe, who spoke in the Law, preached in the prophets, descended to the Jordan, speaks in the Apostles, dwells in the saints. Thus we believe in Him, namely that He is the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of God, the perfect Spirit, the Paraclete Spirit, uncreated, who proceeds from the Father and receives and is believed to be from the Son" (1) (*Ancoratus*, n. 121, p. 124). In what sense the Spirit is said to receive from the Son according to John 16:14–15 is declared by another clause: "is believed to be from the Son" (*ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ πιστευόμενον*). Thus, in this creed, which in the fourth century in the East was intended for the instruction of catechumens and the confirmation of the faithful against the devices of heretics and was used in many churches, we have an explicit declaration: the Spirit proceeds from the Father and is believed to be from the Son by revealed faith and to be professed by all. Furthermore, this profession is in a creed that is presented as a fuller and uncontroversially accepted explanation of the simpler formula: "who proceeds from the Father"; therefore, in this very formula, both pastors and faithful understood and explicitly professed the procession from the Son as not excluded but included.

(1) [Greek text: Οὕτως δὲ πιστεύομεν ἐν αὐτῷ, ὅτι ἐστὶ Πνεῦμα Ἅγιον, Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ… ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ λαμβανόμενον καὶ πιστευόμενον.] The phrase *ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ λαμβανόμενον* (for *λαμβάνον*, which is from John 16:14–15, *ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λαμβάνει*, I conjecture to be corrupted from *ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ λαμβανόμενον*).

II. Examination of Theodore, Nestorius, and Theodoret

Having already set forth the nature of the controversy and considered the manner of disputation of the holy Fathers against the Pneumatomachi, this seems the appropriate place to examine whether and in what sense certain ecclesiastical writers of that era, when that heresy was prevalent, denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds or is from the Son. Up to the eighth century, there is no trace of such a denial in any document that should not be considered heretical or suspect by both Photians and Catholics. Nevertheless, those named as the first to deny the procession from the Son are Theodore of Mopsuestia and his disciples Nestorius and Theodoret, when the latter was defending Nestorius's cause. We could, without loss, concede these as the first beginnings and origins of the Photian heresy; for neither by the authority of men whose very names or at least writings are infamous under the anathema of the entire Church, nor by the silence of the Church when such a denial was first heard, will the common sense and consensus ever be weakened, which is most clearly evident from the entire manner of speaking and disputation of the holy Fathers concerning the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son, as to the Father, both in that very time and in the preceding and following ages. The silence of the Church, in the hypothesis we are discussing, would be attributed to this alone: that while the entire attention and effort of the Fathers and Councils was solely directed to proscribing the heresy denying the incarnation of the Word and the hypostatic union of God

and man, an error casually introduced in an entirely different dogma, about which no controversy had yet been heard and therefore no special investigation instituted, was then passed over by the Fathers without direct opposition or explicit condemnation, lest attention be diverted from the principal object, as the adversaries would have greatly desired, to another matter. Therefore, it is not any necessity for defending Catholic doctrine or dogmatic reasoning, but the need to uncover the truth in the history of dogmas, or rather of heresies, that leads us to examine the sense in which these three, or rather two, writers of the fifth century denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds or is from the Son. However, since very serious and numerous scholars entirely believe that Theodore, and consequently Nestorius and Theodoret (at least while he favored Nestorius), preformed this heresy, which Photius later spread and confirmed in his faction, we wish everything we will say in this part of theological history to be presented as a matter of investigation and subject to the judgment of readers.

1°. Theodore and Nestorius

The opinion of Theodore and Nestorius (1) is derived not from elsewhere but from a creed presented by the presbyter Charisius to the Council of Ephesus, which was condemned by this and subsequent Councils and Fathers, specifically for the Nestorian heresy concerning the incarnation of the Word contained therein. This profession had Theodore as its author, but it was used by Nestorius and his followers to propagate their heresy, as we have sufficiently discussed in the *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis XXIV. In the first part of the creed, which deals with the Trinity and pertains to the present question, the text is as follows. First, there is a brief exposition of the faith concerning the Father and the Son, entirely orthodox; then follows a much longer and manifestly polemical declaration concerning the Holy Spirit in this manner: "And in the Holy Spirit (we believe), who is from the substance of God, yet is not the Son; He is truly God existing in essence, as being of the same essence as God and the Father, from whom He is according to essence; for, as (the Apostle) says, 'We have not received the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God,' separating Him from all creation and joining Him to God, from whom He is according to essence by a peculiar reason and distinct from all creatures, which we believe to be from God not according to essence but by the causality of creation; and we neither believe Him to be the Son, nor to have received existence through the Son" (1) (*Mansi*, Vol. IV, p. 1348). It is further professed that the Father is a perfect person, and the Son likewise, and in the same way the Holy Spirit (2), retaining the doctrine of piety, that we do not believe the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit to be three differing essences, but one, to be acknowledged by the identity of deity.

(1) [Greek text: Καὶ εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον, τὸ ἐκ τῆς Θεοῦ συγχάνων οὐσίας, οὐχ Υἱόν, Θεὸν δὲ ὄντα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ὡς ἀληθῶς, ὂν τῆς οὐσίας, τοιαύτης ὡς ἔστιν ὁ Θεὸς καὶ Πατήρ, ἐξ οὗπερ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστίν. Ἡμεῖς γάρ, φησίν, οὐ τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου ἐλάβομεν ἀλλὰ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ Θεοῦ, τῆς μὲν κτίσεως ἀποχωρίζων ἁπάσης, Θεῷ δὲ συνάπτων, ἐξ οὗπερ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶν ἰδιάζοντι λόγῳ παρὰ πᾶσαν τὴν κτίσιν, ἣν οὐ κατ' οὐσίαν ἀλλ' αἰτίᾳ δημιουργίας ἐκ Θεοῦ νομίζομεν εἶναι, καὶ οὔτε Υἱὸν νομίζομεν εἶναι οὔτε διὰ Υἱοῦ τὴν ὕπαρξιν εἰληφός.]

(2) There is no reason here to suspect Sabellianism, as with the author of the book attacked by Facundus of Hermiane (*Facundus*, Book III, c. 5).

In this exposition, no one fails to see that the author of the creed had in view and directly opposed the doctrine of the Pneumatomachi of that era. As we showed earlier, they denied the procession of the Holy

Spirit from the Father and thus simultaneously denied His divinity; this twofold point, as the holy Fathers had defended, so too Theodore primarily sets forth and strongly urges. Indeed, lest any doubt remain about the purpose of the creed in this part, it is evident that it specifically targets the peculiar mode of argumentation of the Pneumatomachi. We saw this mode of peculiar sophism described by St. Basil: the Holy Spirit, they said, if He is from the substance of God, is thereby the Son; but if, as the Catholics themselves confess, He is not the Son, it remains that He is a creature. To this very dilemma, the creed in question opposes the Catholic doctrine with sentences and almost the same words as those used by Basil (*Against Eunomius*, Book V), Gregory Nazianzen (*Oration 31*, alias 37, nn. 7–11), and others. The heretics derived another peculiar mode of argumentation, to which Origen gave occasion (above, p. 446), from the words of John 1:3: "All things were made through Him," among which they said the Holy Spirit was included. Thus report Basil (*Against Eunomius*, Book V, p. 308), Ambrose, Philastrius, and Damasus in the places cited at the beginning of this thesis. Therefore, they said, just as all other things created, the Holy Spirit received existence from the Son and through the Son. Now, whoever sets forth the contradictory proposition to this: "The Holy Spirit did not receive existence through the Son," does not universally deny the procession of the Spirit from the Son, but only denies the reception of existence in the sense of the adversaries, that is, production by creation. Therefore, since this first part of the creed, especially the profession concerning the Holy Spirit, from its entire structure and the peculiar mode of its statements, clearly targets the Eunomian and Semi-Arian heresy and is directly opposed to it, there is no reason to understand this final clause otherwise than as contradictory to the heresy against which it is directed; and thus as denying the reception of existence in the manner affirmed by the Pneumatomachi, but not in the sense in which all the Fathers of this era, in this same controversy against the heretics, assumed and most clearly taught the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. Not without reason, therefore, did Emmanuel Calecas (*Bibliotheca Maxima Patrum*, Vol. XXVI, p. 409) judge this creed orthodox in this part concerning the Holy Spirit, believing Nestorius to be its author; nor could Garnerius call Calecas's interpretation forced (*Works of Marius Mercator*, Vol. II, p. 256) except by neglecting the state of the question and the most common mode of disputation of the Fathers against the Pneumatomachi in the fourth and fifth centuries.

That Theodore, whom we have most certainly demonstrated elsewhere (*Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis XXIV) to be the author of this creed, was orthodox in the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, Cardinal Mai now clearly holds and contends after the publication of his commentaries on the epistles of Paul, although he considers the creed in question heretical in this very doctrine and thus not to be attributed to Theodore (*Spicilegium Romanum*, Vol. IV, p. 525). On Romans 8:11, Theodore comments thus: "If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not His… but if the Spirit of Him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you… First saying 'the Spirit of Christ,' (the Apostle) again says, 'the Spirit of Him who raised Christ dwells in you,' proceeding from Christ to the Father, manifestly teaching this, that the Spirit, even from the Son, is not alien to the paternal deity (1); and for those (the Son and the Spirit of the Son) who have one power, their essence is also entirely coeternal with the Father. For fittingly he says that with the Holy Spirit dwelling and sin being mortified, rewards are proposed to those who strive, the first and greatest of which will be the resurrection from the dead." I do not indeed affirm that these words immediately and clearly state: "the Spirit is from the Son," although the most eminent editor seems to have understood the passage thus, when he adds this note: "Note the testimony, sufficiently clear, I hope, concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, especially if compared with another of Nyssenus published by me" (*Scriptura Veterum*, Vol. VII, p. b).

But to refute the Pneumatomachi, whose doctrine we know from the above, Theodore argues thus: Paul teaches that the Spirit of the Son, by the very fact that He is of the Son, is also the Spirit of the Father (proceeding from Christ to the Father). But the Spirit is of the Son because He is from the Son, as the Pneumatomachi concede and contend; He is, however, from the Son in such a way that there is one power, and hence one essence, which is proved because the Spirit dwells in the just and is the cause of the remission of sin and glorious resurrection. Now, Paul teaches that He is the Spirit of the Father in the same way as He is the Spirit of the Son. Therefore, just as He is of the Son because He is from the Son in unity of power and essence, so He is from the Father in unity of power and essence, since otherwise, with the adversaries, the Pneumatomachi, conceding that the power and essence of the Father and the Son are one. Therefore, considering the doctrine that Theodore opposes, the sense of the words, "Paul manifestly teaches that the Spirit, even from the Son, is not alien to the paternal deity," ultimately amounts to this: from the Son, who is not alien to the paternal deity and whose Spirit He is, the Spirit has, so that He too is not alien to the paternal deity (*ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα οὐκ ἀλλότριον τῆς πατρικῆς θεότητος ἐστὶ*). In the same way, we saw above (pp. 505–506) that the holy Fathers of that era also assume the procession from the Son as an argument to demonstrate against the Pneumatomachi the procession from the Father and the divinity of the Holy Spirit. Rightly, therefore, could Cardinal Mai infer from this passage Theodore's agreement with the Fathers fighting against the Pneumatomachi.

(1) [Greek text: Χριστοῦ προϊὼν εἰς τὸν Πατέρα, οὐκ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἀσαφῶς διδάσκων, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα οὐκ ἀλλότριον τῆς πατρικῆς θεότητος ἐστὶ.]

However, I do not conceal that others dissent from this interpretation, whether that of Cardinal Mai or ours, among whom is Cardinal Hergenröther (*Photius*, Vol. I, p. 687).

2°. Theodoret

The passage commonly cited to show that Theodoret simply denied the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son is found in his attack on Cyril's anathemas, at the ninth anathema. When St. Cyril there said that the Holy Spirit is the proper Spirit of Jesus Christ, Theodoret, indeed acting unjustly and sophistically in that entire attack, cast suspicion as to whether Cyril perhaps meant the Spirit as proper to the Son in a Macedonian sense, namely that He is not from the Father but only from the Son, and that in such a way that He is not of the same essence as the Father and the Son. Theodoret indicates this most unjust opinion or rather calumny in his letter to the monasteries against Cyril (which was read in the fifth session, fifth act), where, speaking of that ninth anathema of Cyril, he says: "He blasphemes also against the Holy Spirit, saying, not according to the Lord's word, that He proceeds from the Father, but that He is from the Son; this is the fruit of Apollinarius's seed and approaches the malignant cultivation of Macedonius" (*Works of Theodoret*, Vol. V, p. 62, ed. Garnerius). With this suspicion already constructed, he attacks the ninth anathema thus: "If indeed he said that the Spirit is proper to the Son and of the same nature with Him and proceeding from the Father, we will confess and accept the statement as pious; but if he says that He has existence from the Son or through the Son (1), this we will reject as blasphemous and impious. For we believe the Lord saying: 'The Spirit who proceeds from the Father,' and the most holy Paul similarly saying: 'We have received the Spirit who is from God'" (*Works*, Vol. IV, p. 718).

(1) [Greek text: Εἰ δὲ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἢ διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχον, τοῦτο ὡς βλάσφημον ἀπορρίψομεν.]

It pertains to the "malignant cultivation of Macedonius." Elsewhere, Theodoret says more distinctly: "According to the execrable heretics, the Holy Spirit is created from God through the Son" (*διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ δεδημιουργῆσθαι*, *On Romans 8:11*). Thus also St. Cyril understood Theodoret's calumny. For in his apology for this anathema written against Theodoret, he first insists on the dogma directly at issue, that Jesus Christ, God and man, is one hypostasis; the Holy Spirit is proper to Him, through whom He performed miracles as through His own, not an alien, power. Then, a) indignantly, he rejects the calumny that he ever thought the Holy Spirit not consubstantial with the Father and the Son: "For that the Holy Trinity is consubstantial, of one power and operation, we learned, after all, through your discourse, but we have been most fully taught from the divinely inspired Scripture." b) Against the other calumny, that he was suspect with the Macedonians of denying the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father when he said in the anathema that the Holy Spirit is proper to Jesus Christ the Son, he responds: "The Holy Spirit is proper to Him (Jesus Christ the Son) just as, of course, also to God and the Father; for He operates through the Spirit, as the Father does, so also He Himself (John 10:32; 14:10; Matthew 12:28)… referring the operation through the Spirit to Himself and to the Father because of the identity of essence" (*Mansi*, Vol. V, p. 58). Therefore, Cyril understood those words of Theodoret: "That the Spirit has existence from the Son or through the Son, we reject as blasphemous," to mean nothing other than that a calumny was being constructed against him, as if with the Macedonians he had said the Holy Spirit was created by the Son, and thus with those same heretics had denied that the Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and proceeding from the substance of the Father; but he did not understand Theodoret's words as if he had called the common doctrine of all the Fathers of that and the preceding era concerning the procession of the Spirit from the Son and through the Son blasphemous.

From these things, let a judgment now be made, in passing, about the intolerable sophism of the schismatics who say that Cyril, at Theodoret's admonition, retreated from the opinion concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. To say nothing of the fact that the holy Father, in works written after Theodoret's calumnies, most clearly professes the procession from the Father and the Son (see Lequien, *Damascene Dissertation*, I, nn. 5–6): let the apology of the anathema alone be examined. He had said the Holy Spirit

proper to the Son; Theodoret raises suspicion that perhaps he said this in a sense approaching the "malignant cultivation of Macedonius," namely that the Spirit proceeds from the Son alone and is not consubstantial with the Father and the Son. Cyril, in his apology, rejects the first calumny of denied consubstantiality; then, within a few sentences, he repeats five times what he had said in the anathema, that the Holy Spirit is proper to Jesus Christ, the Son of God; but to repel the suspicion that he thought the Spirit proceeds from the Son alone, he adds that He is proper to the Son in the same way as He is proper to the Father. Here, he clearly presupposes that even his adversary understands "proper" to be said relatively in terms of procession. This, Cyril himself further explicitly declared for good measure. After the apology written against Theodoret before the Council of Ephesus (see Garnerius, *Works of Marius Mercator*, Vol. II, p. 132), in the Council itself, at the request of the Fathers, he explained his anathemas. There, regarding what he said in the ninth anathema, that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, performed divine signs (miracles) through His proper Holy Spirit, he explains thus: "The Only-Begotten Word of God, having become man, remained God even so, and is all that the Father is, except only that He is not the Father; and having the Holy Spirit, who is from Him and essentially inheres in Him, as His proper Spirit, He performed divine signs" (1). Thus, Cyril says, the Spirit is proper to the Son because He is from Him by an immanent procession and communication of essence. He proves this from the fact that the Son has

all things in common with the Father except the formal aspect of paternity; therefore, the Holy Spirit is from the Son just as from the Father, insofar as the Father and the Son have one common power of spiration.

(1) [Greek text: Ἄνθρωπος γεγονὼς ὁ μονογενὴς τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος ἔμεινεν καὶ οὕτω Θεός, πάντα ὅσα καὶ ὁ Πατήρ, πλὴν μόνου εἶναι Πατήρ, καὶ ἴδιον ἔχων τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐσιωδῶς ἐμμένως αὐτῷ Πνεῦμα Ἅγιον ἐνεργεῖτο τὰ θεοσημεῖα.]

However, although the sense we have shown seems to be that of Theodore and Theodoret, we do not therefore deny that their manner of speaking on this matter is obscure, from which it appears that in their minds there was not yet a clear and distinct notion of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son as from the Father, insofar as the Father and the Son are one in spiration. Nevertheless, this defect of a deeper understanding of the dogma is far different from its explicit denial, and in that era, when no subtler polemical investigation was yet necessary, it could be excused. But at the same time, it is manifest how greatly the holy Doctors, with secure and clear faith and explanation of the innermost mysteries of the Holy Trinity in the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son—Athanasius, I say, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Epiphanius, Cyril, not to mention the Latin Fathers, Hilary, Augustine, Leo, Fulgentius, and others thereafter—surpassed these men, who, though learned, deviated from sound doctrine in certain points due to an overly confident intellect.

Thesis XXXIX. On the Opposing Arguments of the Photians

Thesis: *The Photians, for their doctrine in which they deny that the Son, together with the Father, is one principle of the Holy Spirit, have absolutely no testimony from either Scripture or Tradition. Insofar as they attempt to evade the universal doctrine among both Greek and Latin Fathers, they employ manifest sophistries.*

In this thesis, we examine the foundations upon which the schismatics rely to confirm their dogma, so that, in comparison with the truth we have demonstrated thus far, not only may their weakness be understood, but from the utter emptiness and sophistical nature of the arguments to which they resort, the light of Catholic doctrine may shine more brightly. By the nature of the matter, there ought to be two classes of arguments: positive and direct arguments, and polemical ones. For first, they would need to demonstrate that their dogma is contained in revelation; then, they would need to demonstrate it in comparison with the doctrine of the Catholic Church, that is, they would need to refute the arguments by which we show the Catholic doctrine to be contained in the universal preaching of the Church. Indeed, the skirmishes of the schismatics can be reduced to this twofold order. Therefore, we will first speak of the positive arguments they use or could use to demonstrate their dogma, then of the polemical attack by which they assail the foundations of the Catholics.

I. Positive Arguments of the Photians

The doctrine in question can be considered in two ways: a) that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father; b) that He proceeds from the Father alone, excluding the Son, such that He does not proceed from the Father and the Son insofar as they are one in the power and act of spiration. Regarding the former, there

was controversy with the Arian and Semi-Arian Pneumatomachi, and this is most evident from the Scriptures, the definitions of Councils, the constant and universal doctrine of all Christian antiquity, and the intimate economy of the Trinity as proposed in revelation. Therefore, the affirmation that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father does not contain the doctrine that Catholics deny and that the schismatics must defend as their peculiar dogma by which they differ from Catholics; rather, the doctrine by which they oppose Catholics and which they attempt to defend with their arguments against Catholics is entirely different, namely that which is expressed in the second point, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father in such a way that He does not proceed simultaneously from the Son. As long as they only demonstrate the affirmation that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, their arguments are invincible and common to all Catholics against the Pneumatomachi; but they are entirely irrelevant to proving the truth of the doctrine whose defense they have undertaken against Catholics. In a similar way, the Arians and Sabellians evidently demonstrated from the Scriptures that there is one God and that the Father is this one true God; but this affirmation was not the point by which they differed from Catholics. Rather, the Arians needed to demonstrate that the Father is the one true God in such a way that the Son is not the same one true God; the Sabellians, however, needed to show that the Father is the one true God in such a way that the Son, by not being distinguished in nature, is also not distinguished in hypostasis from the Father.

1°. In fact, by the very evidence and upon examining the disputations of the schismatics, it is clear to the eyes that their entire positive demonstration of their dogma ultimately reduces to this one and only point: to propose and elaborate from Scripture, from the definitions of Councils, and from the consensus of the Fathers the doctrine affirming that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. But this dogma, most fully attested from the sources of revelation and acknowledged by all Catholics, neither explicitly states, as is evident in itself, nor implicitly contains in any way the peculiar doctrine by which the schismatics dissent from the Catholic Church. For certainly, from this article of faith, that the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit, it no more follows that the Son is not one principle with the Father of the same Spirit than it follows from our belief that the Father is God, the creator of heaven and earth, the sender of the Holy Spirit, etc., that the Son is not one with the Father as God, creator of the universe, and principle of the mission of the Holy Spirit, which the schismatics themselves cannot deny without falling into Arian heresy.

In truth, Macarius, who in our age has turned all the arguments of the schismatics to his own use and adorned them in the most effective form he could, in his entire lengthy treatise on the procession of the Holy Spirit demonstrated nothing other than this one point: that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. From the Scriptures (p. 127 ff.), he produces and can produce no testimony other than this: “The Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father” (John 15:26). But this was not what needed to be demonstrated; rather, a testimony is sought in which it is said that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, of which kind none exists. As for what he then attempts (p. 330 ff.) to twist into a foreign sense the texts of Scripture in which it is said that the Spirit receives all things from the Son, is the Spirit of the Son, and is sent as from the Father so also from the Son—this device, even if all his fabrications were conceded, would not constitute a positive demonstration of the Photian dogma, which we are now seeking. For even if we conceded, as we have shown to be utterly false, that the Scriptures do not contain the doctrine of the procession of the Spirit from the Son, it would wrongly be inferred from this, as Macarius and the Photians generally contend, that this doctrine is not true or revealed; rather, the only consequence would be that neither the negation, as is evident, nor the affirmation, as we would concede for the sake of

argument, can be drawn from the Scriptures; and thus, Tradition, which even the Photians acknowledge, or at least ought to acknowledge by their principles, as a treasury of revealed doctrine, must be consulted. Indeed, Macarius, since he could not fail to see that the Photian exclusion lacks any scriptural argument, attempted the art of demonstration from Tradition, as the doctrine is preserved in the monuments of Christian antiquity. Here, he often repeats in his own words the thesis to be demonstrated: the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. But in the testimonies he compiles over nearly fifty pages (pp. 345–390) from creeds, Councils, and Fathers—though sometimes torn from context, occasionally fraudulently truncated, or distorted by false interpretation—there is no trace of that procession from the Father alone to which they are brought to prove; rather (if we except three from Damascene, Maximus, and Theodoret, whose sense we discussed in their places), in all of them, only the Catholic thesis is stated: the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father; the Father is the source and principle not only of the Son but also of the Holy Spirit. But to propose this most certain truth as proof of the Photian dogma, by which they assert that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone and not from the Son (as the Father and the Son are one) against the Catholic profession, is, as I said earlier, as if the Arians had peddled the proof of the truth that the Father is God and God is one as a demonstration of their heresy, by which they denied that the Son and the Holy Spirit are God. The matter is so evident in itself that Macarius and the other Photian theologians seem to have wished to impose on their followers with a heap of citations irrelevant to the purpose rather than to establish a proof. For what indeed can they do when they promise to prove the consensus of antiquity with their doctrine through testimonies, and no testimonies are available for it, but only for the uncontroversial dogma of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father?

Hence also in the Council of Florence, where before the union the Greeks, with all their collected strength, attempted to prove their opinion, Bessarion testifies that the entire force of their demonstration ultimately reduced to this one argument and that no other was available: “We put forward the argument, beginning with the Apostles themselves and all the sacred Councils, and we used the sayings of these and all the Eastern Saints, by which it is shown, not indeed that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son—for we have no such saying, as you yourself know, except that single one of Damascene, where he says, ‘We call Him the Spirit of the Son, but we do not say from the Son’; but in all other sayings, it is only shown that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, not that He does not proceed from the Son. Having brought forward these, we thought we had demonstrated that it is false that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. But the Latins gave one common response to all these: that all are true, and they believe the same. For they too believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father; for this is not contrary to their dogma. For that He proceeds from the Father is neither contradictory nor contrary to that He proceeds from the Son. For if one were contrary to the other, then affirming one would necessarily negate the other; but now nothing prevents both that proceeding from the Father is true and that proceeding from the Son is true. Just as if we say the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father, and someone else says the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son, both are true, and one does not contradict the other. Therefore, if the Saints had said that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone or does not proceed from the Son, there might be some reason to say that we (Catholics) believe falsely; but since no one ever said either of these, that which is said to proceed from the Father does not negate the procession from the Son” (Bessarion, *On the Holy Spirit*, *Golden Works*, pp. 208, 294; cf. Hugo Etherianus, Book II, cc. 16 ff.).

Now, since it is most true that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and in this very fact, as we showed in Thesis XXXIV, the procession from the Son is implicitly contained, who, being consubstantial with the Father, is one with the Father in all things where there is no opposition of relation; therefore, the

Church could for many centuries profess in the creed against the Pneumatomachi the procession from the Father without explicit mention of the procession from the Son, and it could permit the Greeks to use the same form of the creed in the Council of Florence itself, after they had publicly and authentically declared their faith in the procession from the Father and the Son. Moreover, what is implicit in the twofold dogma (of the procession from the Father and the unity of the Son with the Father in all things except paternity and filiation, together with the revealed order of the persons) we saw is explicit in the Scriptures themselves and in the Catholic understanding, and declared and sanctioned by explicit profession in the ecclesiastical preaching of the East no less than the West. What, therefore, could be more absurd and impudent than to wish to exclude this entire consensus and profession of the procession from the Father and the Son through a statement, indeed most true, of the procession from the Father, in which that prior and more distinct profession is already implicitly contained?

2°. As for those very few documents in which it is said in some sense that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son or has not received existence from or through the Son, even if all that the schismatics desire were conceded, nothing could ever be concluded from them other than these two things: that the beginnings of the Photian heresy were connected with Nestorianism, and that one or another Catholic doctor was in error, to whom no solemn definition was yet known nor was the sense of the dogma sufficiently clear before a more diligent polemical investigation. Many Catholic theologians entirely concede both; but how, I ask, will the Photians demonstrate the divine Tradition of their dogma from these? Indeed, how could these obscure or weaken the common consensus of the Eastern and Western Churches in the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, and in that consensus the Catholic Tradition and explanation? Moreover, if we proceed not by concessions for the sake of argument but from the truth of the matter, there is absolutely no document before the Photian schism in which the negation of the procession from the Son in the sense peculiar to the schismatics is stated, at least none that the schismatics themselves should not acknowledge as heretical or suspect for other reasons. Such condemned documents, in which it is in some sense denied that the Holy Spirit has received existence from or through the Son or proceeds from the Son, are the creed of Theodore adopted by the Nestorians, Theodoret's contradiction against Cyril's anathemas, and the Monothelites' attack on the synodical letter of the Roman Pontiff (1), the value and sense of which we discussed in Theses XXXVI and XXXVIII. As for what should be thought of the sophistical distortion of the schismatics when they dare to assert that Cyril and the Council of Ephesus approved Theodoret's negation in the Photian sense, insofar as the Holy Spirit is said to have received existence from or through the Son, this is clear from what was said on pp. 517 ff. See the work of Leo Allatius entitled *Vindiciae Synodi Ephesinae et S. Cyrilli*.

(1) In the eighth century, the Iconoclasts also seem to have raised some question about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son; but since the documents are lacking, we cannot know with certainty in what sense the controversy was held. We only know that Constantine Copronymus, the fierce Iconoclast, sent legates to Pepin, king of the Franks; and in the assembly held at Gentilly in the year 767, "a question was debated between the Greeks and the Romans concerning the Trinity, whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as from the Father, and concerning sacred images" (*Mansi*, Vol. XII, p. 677; Lequien, *Damascene Dissertation*, I, n. 12; Hefele, *History of Councils*, Vol. III, § 341). Perhaps the dispute was only about the manner of speaking, whether the Holy Spirit should be said to proceed from the Father through the Son or from the Father and the Son. Thus, ten years after the Council of Gentilly, Pepin's son Charlemagne criticized the formula of Tarasius, Patriarch of Constantinople, who in a

distinguished confession read and approved in the Second Council of Nicaea said: "I believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of life, proceeding from the Father through the Son" (*ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς διὰ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορευόμενον*, *Mansi*, Vol. XII, p. 1121). For Charlemagne wished that the Holy Spirit be said to proceed not from the Father through the Son, but from the Father and the Son. However, Pope Hadrian, in a letter to King Charlemagne, demonstrates with many arguments that Tarasius's profession is orthodox, and just as operations *ad extra* are certainly of the Father and the Son, they are rightly said to be done by the Father through the Son, so too the procession of the Holy Spirit is said by many Eastern and Western Fathers to be from the Father through the Son (*Mansi*, Vol. XIII, pp. 760 ff.).

The only trace of an attack on the procession from the Son before Photius is found at the beginning of the ninth century, but in such a way that from the contradiction of that one fanatical man, the consensus of the East and West in the common faith is evident. Latin monks residing on the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem added the particle *Filioque* to the creed, as they had heard it sung in the palatine chapel of Charlemagne. A certain Greek monk, John, because of this addition and other differing ceremonies in the sacred liturgy, began to stir up such troubles against the Latins that no small danger threatened them from the ignorant populace; and indeed, that Greek monk seems to have attacked not only the insertion in the creed but the dogma itself. The Latins appealed to the Patriarch and the entire clergy of Jerusalem and to Pope Leo III himself. The priests of Jerusalem wrote them a "charter of faith," and "the archdeacon himself (the Latin monks relate in a letter to the Pope) in the church of Saint Constantine ascended with us to the pulpit and read that charter to the people, and we, your servants, anathematized every heresy and all who said that the holy Apostolic See of Rome held heresy." Thence, some of the Latins were sent with commendatory letters from Thomas, the Patriarch (a Greek, of course), to Pope Leo, from whom they requested "that he deign to send a most certain mandate." Leo wrote a profession of faith "to all the Eastern Churches," in which it is said: "We believe… the Holy Spirit proceeding equally from the Father and the Son… the Holy Spirit, full God, proceeding from the Father and the Son," etc. Thus, those troubles were settled in the East. From all this, it is manifest that there was no dissension concerning the dogma itself between the Eastern and Western Churches. On this occasion in the West, a legation was sent from the Council of Aachen to Pope Leo III to seek sanction for the insertion of the particle *Filioque* in the creed during the liturgy, about which we will say something shortly. On those Jerusalem troubles, see Lequien, *Damascene Dissertation*, I, nn. 13–18.

Among Catholic writers, we have seen only two, one from the seventh century and one from the eighth, who can be brought forward, not to prove anything against the common consensus of the others, but to be explained and reconciled with the rest. St. Maximus confesses that the doctrine of the holy Fathers demonstrates the procession from the Father and the Son; he declares, however, that this does not deny that the Father alone is the primordial source of the Trinity, and with respect to the order of the persons, the formula by which the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father and the Son has the same sense as that by which He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son (see above, Thesis XXXVI, n. II). The only one among all is John Damascene in the eighth century, who used this manner of speaking, denying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but in such a way that he constantly taught that He proceeds from the Father through the Son. But what, I ask, would the adversaries gain if we admitted that St. Damascene, with no solemn definition yet preceding or known to him, and without having considered the consensus of all Western Doctors or sufficiently compared the opinions of Eastern Doctors in this question, erred because he paid more attention to the words materially considered than to the reality expressed by those Fathers who more frequently say the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son

(*ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς διὰ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορευόμενον*)? To seek the demonstration of a dogma from one Doctor against the common doctrine of the others is absurd; but to persist in that same denial even after the question has been most fully clarified is most impudent and impious. Moreover, from the truth of the matter, it is clear from the very clear words of Damascene himself that he teaches the same doctrine as the other Fathers, that the Son, by the spirative power communicated by the Father, is the principle of the Holy Spirit, who therefore proceeds from the Father through the Son, as has been and will be demonstrated by Greek Catholics and other theologians (see above, loc. cit.).

II. Polemical Arguments of the Photians

Whoever carefully examines the arguments by which the schismatics attack the Catholic dogma will find a significant confirmation of it; for all those arguments not only fail to overturn or weaken the Catholic proof but are manifest sophistries invented by men who, unwilling to admit their defection from the doctrine of antiquity, attempt to envelop the clear and manifest sense of the words and sentences of Scripture and the Fathers in darkness with empty fallacies. You have them faithfully set forth and duly refuted by Hugo Etherianus (*Bibliotheca Maxima*, Vol. XXII, pp. 1201 ff.); Beccus (*On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, cc. 4 ff.; *On the Union of the Orthodox Church in Greece*, Vol. I, pp. 164 ff.); Bessarion (*On the Holy Spirit to Alexius Lascaris* and *Dogmatic Oration*); and other Greeks cited by Petavius (Book VII, cc. 15–18) and much more copiously by Cardinal Hergenröther (*Animadversiones ad Mystagogiam Photii*, Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, Vol. CII). All these evasions can be reduced to roughly the following summary:

1°. When the Fathers teach that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son and is from both, the schismatics respond in one of two ways: either the discourse is not about eternal procession but about temporal mission, or it is not the person but the gifts of the Holy Spirit that are said to be from the Father and the Son.

2°. They say that the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father as a hypostasis, but is not said to be from the substance of the Son (*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ*); this, however, means nothing other than that the Spirit is consubstantial with the Son. They explain this such that "from the substance of the Son" does not signify the principle of procession from which the Holy Spirit is, but rather, as it were, a formal cause, that the Spirit is God from the same substance from which the Son is God.

3°. They more carefully note that the Greek Fathers do not say that the Holy Spirit *ἐκπορεύεται* (proceeds), which word properly expresses the notional character of the Holy Spirit, but use other words: *προϊέναι* (go forth), *ἐκλάμπειν* (shine forth), *λαμβάνεσθαι* (be received), *προχεῖσθαι* (be poured forth), *ἀναβλύζειν* (spring forth) from or through the Son. All these, they say, are understood not of the internal procession, which is *ἐκπόρευσις*, but of the gifts of the Holy Spirit or His mission *ad extra*.

4°. That the Greek Fathers with common consensus teach that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, the schismatics interpret in four different ways. The Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, i.e., He proceeds from Him who is Father through the Son or by the generation of the Son; or the Spirit is said to be from the Father through the Son because the Father, formally as Father, is immediately related to the Son, but to the Holy Spirit is related not as Father but as spirator (*προβολεύς*); and thus, in naming the Father, we first conceive in our mind the Son from the Father and then the Holy Spirit from

the spirator, and in this sense alone, they say, Basil and Nyssen say that the Son is immediately from the Father, but the Spirit is not immediately but through Him who is immediately from the Father and with the Son interposed. If these do not satisfy, another device is at hand; for, they say, the particle *διά* (through) in the divine persons is equivalent to *with*, and thus the procession of the Holy Spirit with the Son from the Father and the consubstantiality of the Son and the Spirit are signified. They seriously prove this with the words of St. Basil (*On the Holy Spirit*, c. 8), cited by us on p. 484, in which he says that from the manner of speaking in Scripture, that the Father creates through the Son, the "unity of will" is shown. If you laugh at this too, as it is indeed ridiculous, there remains a final refuge, that common trope of the Greeks, that "from the Father through the Son" refers not to the person of the Holy Spirit but to His gifts proceeding.

5°. Further, in the sacred Scriptures, where Christ Himself teaches in John 16:14–15, "The Spirit of truth will receive from Me," Photius says this must be understood as: "He will receive from My Father" (see Hugo Etherianus, Book II, cc. 18 end and 19; Bessarion, *On the Holy Spirit*, p. 241; Petavius, Book VII, c. 19, n. 1; Hergenröther, *Animadversiones*, § II, n. 9). The other point, that the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son just as of the Father, they say pertains not to procession but only signifies that the Spirit, due to consubstantiality, is not alien to the Son; or even that He is called the Spirit of the Son because He is sent by the Son in time. But mission, since it is only an operation *ad extra*, in no way presupposes procession, and therefore the Son is said to be sent by the Spirit no less than the Spirit by the Son in the Scriptures; indeed, according to Chrysostom, even the Father is said to be sent by the Son and the Holy Spirit.

6°. To these interpretive devices, they add theological reasons from the very nature of the mystery of the Trinity. If the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, there are two principles of the Holy Spirit; and thus, either each principle is perfect, in which case there would be two processions and two Holy Spirits proceeding, or if there is one procession from two principles, the Father alone would not be sufficient and thus would be an imperfect principle supplemented by the Son as a concurring and partial principle. But if the Father and the Son are said to be one principle, they are contracted into one person, and thus the Latins fall into Sabellianism. Furthermore, whatever is in the Trinity is either common or proper, as the reality itself and the holy Fathers frequently teach. Therefore, spiration is either proper to the Father or common to the three persons, and thus, according to the doctrine of the Latins, the Holy Spirit would proceed from Himself; "and thus the Holy Spirit," says Photius, "would be simultaneously cause and caused, which is more monstrous than the fables of the Gentiles" (apud Beccus, *Orthodox Greece*, Vol. I, p. 166). Moreover, the "Bishop of Nicomedia" (1) (along with others) exclaims: "If the Son is from the Father, but the Spirit is from the Father and the Son, the Spirit is surely a grandson of the Father, because among us too a grandson is immediately from the one from whom he is derived, but through a mediator from the grandfather" (apud Hugo Etherianus, Book I, c. 17). Macarius (p. 415) repeats the same in his own words; he adds, however…

(1) Besides this "Nicomediensis," whose name he does not specify, Etherianus in his books names among the schismatics Photius, Theophylact, Nicetas of Constantinople and Thessalonica, and Nicholas of Methone.

another inextricable absurdity, the meaning of which Macarius himself does not seem to have understood (at least if he wrote as it appears in the French translation, p. 417). He says that Western doctors, beyond acknowledging the unity of essence and the Trinity of persons, "introduce a duality, since they teach that

the Father and the Son are one eternal and indivisible principle in relation to the Holy Spirit, and that the Holy Spirit Himself is constituted as a second [principle], insofar as He proceeds from that principle (the Father and the Son as they are one in the power and act of spiration)" (1). Macarius seems to have wished to slightly modify the sophism that Photius concocted in his *Mystagogia*, n. 12; but in doing so, he stripped it of all intelligible meaning. Photius, as is typical of nearly all his followers, assumes that Catholics admit the Father and the Son as a twofold principle of the Holy Spirit; "but," he says, "when this principle without principle and preeminent is torn into a duality by the impious, this division will proceed with even greater temerity to a triplicity of principle (namely, it will be asserted that the Holy Spirit is a third principle), since otherwise, in the preeminent, indivisible, and one nature of the deity, a Trinity rather than a duality shines forth" (2). He claims, in other words, that if not only the Father is asserted to be the principle but the Son is a second principle, from both of whom the Holy Spirit proceeds, there will be no reason why the Holy Spirit should not be called a third principle, such that just as a third person proceeds from two persons, a fourth person might proceed from three, and further persons ad infinitum.

The response to all these points is fully contained in what has been said previously. It is sufficient to have read the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers that we have cited to make it evident to anyone that in the first five points [of the Photian arguments], not an interpretation of the testimonies that is even superficially probable is offered, but an entirely different and contrary doctrine is proclaimed. As for what is said in the sixth point, it is nothing other than an *ignoratio elenchi* (a fallacy of missing the point), or deductions based on a perverse exposition of Catholic doctrine.

(1) "Western doctors acknowledge unity and Trinity, but at the same time they introduce a duality; for they teach that the Father and the Son form an eternal and indivisible principle in relation to the Holy Spirit, as its principle, but that the Holy Spirit, in relation to Them, forms a second, insofar as He proceeds from this principle."

(2) [Greek text: Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄναρχον καὶ πρὸ πάντων καὶ ὑπερέχον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀσεβῶν εἰς δυάδα διαιρεῖται, ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη διαίρεσις εἰς τριάδα προελεύσεται, πῶς γὰρ οὐχὶ τριάδος ἡ κατάστασις τῆς θεότητος πῶς τὸ τριαδικόν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ δυαδικόν ἀναδείκνυται.]

Therefore, since there is neither need nor necessity to refute these at greater length, we will address each point very briefly.

Ad 1°: Not to mention the evident doctrine of the Latin Fathers, Epiphanius, Cyril, and the other Greek Fathers in all the cited passages in Thesis XXXV clearly speak of the internal relations of the divine persons, not of gifts or mission *ad extra* (external mission). Although it is certainly a consequence of the immanent eternal procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son that the mission of the Spirit is also from the Father and the Son, and created gifts come from the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Moreover, they teach that the Holy Spirit, the third divine person, is from the Son just as from the Father: "The Father is light, the Son is light from light, but the Spirit is from both, Spirit from Spirit; for the Spirit is God" (Epiphanius). "The Holy Spirit is proper to the Son, who is in Him and from Him, just as this is understood also of God the Father" (Cyril). See the rest there.

Ad 2°: When the Nicene Fathers deemed it sufficient to define that the Son is from the Father, the Arians twisted this to their error, claiming that He is from the Father through creation. To exclude this heresy, the Fathers established the most effective formula, that the Son is from the substance of the Father (*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός*). Thus, procession is understood as a communication of essence, and the Son is taught to be consubstantial with the Father. Now, what the Arians taught concerning the relation of the Son to the Father, the Pneumatomachi later repeated concerning the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son, namely that the Holy Spirit is from the Son and through the Son by a creative act. To exclude this same error, the holy Fathers expressed the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son with the same formula by which the Council of Nicaea expressed the relation of the Son to the Father. Thus, they not only said that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, from the Father and the Son, but to declare the procession through the communication of the same nature and substance, they defined that the Spirit is from the substance of the Son, from the very substance of the Father and the Son (*ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας Πατρός καὶ Υἱοῦ*). See the cited passages. Therefore, without any doubt, just as the definition of the Son's generation from the substance of the Father expresses both the principle *quod* (namely, the person producing, in generation the Father, in spiration the Father and the Son) and the principle *quo* (namely, the essence, *οὐσία*, through whose communication the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit occur), so too the procession of the Holy Spirit from the substance of the Father and the Son expresses the same. It follows, of course, that the cause, as it were formal, by which the Holy Spirit is God, is the very communicated one nature of the Father and the Son, which we express by confessing that the Holy Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the Son. See what we said about the Nicene definition in Thesis VIII, n. II.

Ad 3°: It is responded: a) The Fathers use these same terms to express both the generation of the Son and the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father. "The Spirit has all things eternally, as the Spirit of God and shining forth from God (*ἐκλάμπων*), having the principle itself as its source and springing forth from it (*πηγάζων*), springing forth from God (*πηγάζων*), subsisting in Himself" (St. Basil, *Against Eunomius*, Book V, Vol. I, p. 322). See above, p. 428, in the note, cf. Petavius, Book VII, c. 18, nn. 7–8. b) Not only do the Fathers say that the Holy Spirit shines forth, appears, etc., from the Son or through the Son, but in contexts where they clearly speak of internal relations, they say He shines forth, appears, etc., from the Father and the Son or from both, where, just as shining forth, emanating, etc., from the Father is nothing other than the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit, so too it cannot be understood otherwise with respect to the Son. For example, Cyril proves that the Holy Spirit is of the divine essence because "He proceeds (*προϊέναι*) from the Father and the Son" (above, pp. 423, 474); Athanasius says the Holy Spirit is the one sanctifying and illuminating power of the one Son, "which is taught to proceed (*ἐκπορεύεσθαι*) from the Father, because it shines forth (*ἐκλάμπει*) from the Word, which is confessed to be from the Father" (above, p. 427). c) If these words of emanation, shining forth, etc., express the internal relation of the person of the Holy Spirit, they necessarily signify the same as procession. Indeed, the Fathers themselves very frequently and clearly declare that they understand an immanent emanation, saying that the Spirit shines forth, emanates, proceeds from the Son and through the Son *οὐσιωδῶς* (essentially), *κατὰ φύσιν* (according to nature), etc., as we indicated above, p. 438. Indeed, they define the very reality of this eternal emanation, saying that "essential goodness and holiness according to nature and royal dignity emanate (*ἐκπίπτει*) from the Father through the Only-Begotten into the Spirit" (Basil); and in the same sense, they say the Spirit proceeds from the Son such that whatever perfection the Spirit has, He has from the Son (Athanasius, Cyril, above, pp. 414, 415, 424).

Ad 4°: The absurdity of all these distortions is understood from what was said in Thesis XXXVI.

Ad 5°: We have sufficiently defended the doctrine of Scripture, both in itself and through the explanation of the Fathers, in Theses XXXII–XXXIV. Regarding Photius's fabrication, see Bessarion, *On the Holy Spirit*, p. 241, where he demonstrates that it is not only contrary to the manifest context of Christ's discourse and the interpretation of the Fathers, but also contradicts the very words "He will receive from Me" (*ἐκ τοῦ ἐμοῦ λήψεται*), even when considered solely grammatically. Generally, on the Photian fallacies by which they attempt to evade the clear testimonies of Scripture, see also Hergenröther, *Animadversiones*, § II, n. 9 ff.

Ad 6°: In what is said about the common and proper, they assume as conceded and as a principle of demonstration what Catholics deny as heresy and demonstrate to be contrary to Scripture and the universal doctrine of the Fathers, and what the schismatics would wish to prove. No clearer *petitio principii* (begging the question) could be committed. Certainly, even the schismatics concede that spiration is not a property constituting a person, for otherwise a quaternity of persons would be introduced. But from the nature of the mystery of the Trinity in Scripture and the doctrine of the Fathers, the properties constituting persons are indeed unique to each person; if, however, it is affirmed that active spiration is proper to the Father alone, this is the same as saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, which is precisely what the schismatics must prove. Therefore, all the points of doctrine from Scripture and ecclesiastical preaching by which we have demonstrated the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, or from the Father through the Son, in the same way demonstrate that active spiration is common to the Father and the Son, not to the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit is produced through this common spiration of the Father and the Son. Thus, the assertion that active spiration is proper to one person is as contrary to Scripture and the Fathers as the denial of the procession from the Father and the Son is shown to be. Therefore, if "property" in the strict sense means what is proper to one person, we deny that active spiration is a property; if "property" is taken in a broader sense, meaning a relation *ad intra* (internal) and not common to the three persons, spiration can be called a property that does not constitute or distinguish the Father and the Son from each other but distinguishes both from the third person, of whom they are one principle through one common spiration. Cf. Thesis XXV, n. I, and the scholion there, p. 357.

All the other things produced by the schismatics as theological reasons are based on ignorance or dissimulation of the true doctrine concerning the distinction and unity among the divine persons. Certainly, if the foundations on which the objection about two principles, the imperfection and division of spiration, or the confusion of the persons of the Father and the Son rest were applied to operations *ad extra*, such as creation or the mission of the Holy Spirit, which even the schismatics are forced to admit are one and common to the Father and the Son; if the Photians applied these principles in these matters, they would fall into Sabellianism to avoid introducing three principles and three partial and imperfect operations, or into Arianism or tritheism to avoid confusing the persons by admitting one principle of creation or mission. They might say that the reason for the procession of a divine person is entirely different from that of operations *ad extra*. We know there is an infinitely different reason; but with respect to the unity and distinction between the Father and the Son and the perfection of each person, it is entirely the same, as Augustine already noted, whether it concerns creation or eternal spiration. If the spirative power, by which the Father and the Son are not related to each other, cannot be one and the same in number common to both persons without the distinction arising from generation alone being removed and

the persons being confused; or if the spirative power cannot be in two distinct persons without either being imperfect in each or the persons being divided such that there are two spirators and two principles; the very same applies to the creative power or the power of mission. For the one creative or missionary power and act in number cannot be admitted in distinct persons without that unity removing the distinction; or if the persons remain distinct, that power will be imperfect in each, or it will be separated such that there are as many principles of creation or mission as there are creating or sending persons. Since all these are not only heretical but also astonishingly absurd, the Photian principles fabricated to attack the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son as one principle of the same Holy Spirit are understood to be equally heretical and absurd.

As for what is then objected about a grandfather and grandson, this is the blasphemy of the Pneumatomachi frequently refuted by the Fathers. Just as the Photians, assuming procession from the Father, say the Holy Spirit would be a grandson if He also proceeded from the Son, so the Semi-Arian Pneumatomachi, assuming procession from the Son, drew the same conclusion if, according to Catholic doctrine, the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Father and from the substance of the Father and the Son, from the Father through the Son. The reason why the Photian and Semi-Arian inference is absurd is clear from all that has been said and is explained by the Fathers: because the divine persons are not divided (according to the Arian and tritheistic fabrication), as if the Father first generated the Son, and then the Son alone generated the Holy Spirit; but just as the divine persons create the universe by one creative power in number, so the Father and the Son, by one spirative power in number and thus as one principle, spirate the Holy Spirit: "not a grandfather, not a grandson, but the Holy Spirit from the same substance of the Father and the Son" (Epiphanius, above, p. 472).

Finally, in the Macarian trifles about some duality that Catholics are said to introduce beyond the unity of essence and the Trinity of persons, one is at a loss for what to respond; so utterly senseless and devoid of any meaning are they. There is no duality where there is no real distinction, and no real distinction can be conceived in the one God except in relatives by reason of real procession, namely between the principle and the one proceeding from the principle. Hence, the Father and the Son are really distinguished from each other solely by generation, by which the Son proceeds from the Father, but by spiration, by which the Son is not produced, they are no less one than they are in essence and in any absolute attribute or operation *ad extra*. By this one common spiration, or what is the same, by this one producing love, they are the principle of the Holy Spirit, who, proceeding from the Father and the Son as from His principle, is really distinguished by the relation of procession itself, but has the same essence in number communicated by the Father and the Son. There is, therefore, one divine essence uncommunicated in the Father as the first person, the source and primordial principle of the Holy Trinity; communicated by generation from the Father in the Son, the second person; communicated by the Father and the Son through one common spiration in the Holy Spirit, the third person; and thus there is an unmultipliable unity of essence and a Trinity of persons. The duality is nothing other than that the Son and the Spirit are not persons from themselves but proceed from their principle, and thus there are two processions; and that in the number three, two are also contained, a duality which I think even Macarius would not deny. St. Gregory of Nyssa excellently expressed all this: "Just as being without principle (*ἄναρχον εἶναι*) pertains only to the Father and cannot be applied to the Son and the Spirit, so conversely, being from a principle (*ἐξ αἰτίας εἶναι*), which is proper to the Son and the Spirit, cannot by its nature be understood in the Father. But since not being unbegotten (*τὸ μὴ ἀγέννητον εἶναι*) is common to the Son and the Spirit, lest any confusion be thought in the subject, it is necessary to find in their properties an unmingled difference

(*ἀσύγχυτον διαφορὰν*), so that both the common (being from a principle) is preserved and the proper (to each) is not confused. For the Only-Begotten Son is said by sacred Scripture to be from the Father, and in this the sacred doctrine establishes His property; but the Holy Spirit is said to be from the Father and is testified to be from the Son as well" (see Thesis XXXV, n. III) (1). "For if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not His" (Gregory of Nyssa, *Sermon 3 on the Lord's Prayer*). Thus, it is common to the two persons, but proper in comparison with the first person, that they are not without principle (*ἀναρχίτως*); therefore, it is necessary to find in these two persons what is proper and distinguishing to each. Gregory of Nyssa knows no other distinction than that the Son is from the Father alone, while the Holy Spirit is not from the Father alone but, according to the doctrine of the Scriptures, from the Father and from the Son (2), or (in another more recent reading) the Spirit from the Father and the Spirit of the Son, which, according to the constant explanation of the Fathers, signifies exactly the same (Thesis XXXII, n. II).

(1) [Greek text: Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄναρχον εἶναι μόνον τοῦ Πατρὸς ὄν, τῷ Υἱῷ καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι ἐφαρμόζεσθαι οὐ δύναται, οὕτως τὸ ἐξ αἰτίας εἶναι, ὅπερ τοιόν ἐστι τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος, τῷ Πατρὶ ἐφαρμόζεσθαι φύσει οὐκ ἔχει. Κοινοῦ δὲ ὄντος τῷ Υἱῷ καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι τοῦ μὴ ἀγεννήτως εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ τις σύγχυσις περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον θεωρηθῇ, πάλιν ἔστιν ἀμικτὸν τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἰδιώμασιν αὐτῶν διαφορὰν ἐξεύρειν, ὡς ἂν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν φυλαχθῇ, καὶ τὸ ἴδιον μὴ συγχυθῇ. Ὁ γὰρ μονογενὴς Υἱὸς ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς παρὰ τῆς ἁγίας γραφῆς ὀνομάζεται, καὶ μέχρι τούτου ὁ λόγος ἵστησιν αὐτῷ τὸ ἰδίωμα, τὸ δὲ Ἅγιον Πνεῦμα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς λέγεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ εἶναι προσμαρτυρεῖται.]

(2) The property of the Son with respect to the Holy Spirit is that He is alone from the alone (*μόνος ἐκ μόνου*), or proceeds alone (*μονογενῶς*), or proceeds alone from the Father (*μόνος προϊέναι ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς*), as not only Nyssa frequently teaches, but also Origen (*On John*, Book 2, n. 6), Gregory Thaumaturgus (in his creed), Basil (*Letter 38*, alias 43, n. 4), Epiphanius (*Haereses*, 73, p. 382); but the Spirit is not from the Father alone, but from the Father through the Son, or from the Father and the Son, or from both, or from the Father such that He simultaneously receives from the Son, such that He is simultaneously the Spirit of the Son, such that He depends in origin on the Son, such that He has all His perfections from the Son, all of which expressions from the Greek Fathers are cited in the preceding theses.

From these things just said and often demonstrated elsewhere, Photius's calumnies about two principles, the Father and the Son, also remain refuted. For just as the three persons, because they are one in nature, are not understood as three Gods but one God, so the two persons, which are no less one in spiration and production of the third person than in nature, are not two principles but one principle and one spirator in relation to the other person. The third person proceeds through this one spiration (the principle *quo*) from two persons, which are two not by spiration but by generation alone, distinct from each other (the principle *quod*); and thus both are also distinguished from the third proceeding person through the same one spiration.

As for what concerns the notion of principle in the Holy Spirit, about which Photius and perhaps also Macarius speak, we know from revelation that in God there are only two immanent processions. But faith, illuminated by revelation, can also seek some understanding of why in the infinite Spirit there is only one infinite Word proceeding from the paternal mind, and, given the generation of the Word, only one infinite subsisting love proceeding through the one love of the Father and the Son (see Thesis XXVIII, n. II).

Indeed, the more attentively the proofs for the Photian doctrine are considered, which ultimately reduce to the affirmation of procession from the Father, freely conceded by Catholics and more laboriously defended against the Arians; and the more sincerely the arguments of the schismatics against the Catholic dogma are examined, all of which are based partly on dissimulation or manifest distortion of testimonies from Scripture and Tradition, partly on false assumptions and calumnies; the firmer and more illustrious the Catholic truth stands and presents itself to the eyes of all who are willing to judge without preconceived obstinacy drawn from poisoned sources.

Hence, in the ecumenical Council of Florence, as long as the Greeks, persisting in error, tried to resist the manifest truth, Bessarion testifies that they were reduced to such straits that they were forced either to most foolishly claim that the testimonies of all the Fathers were corrupted or to accuse their doctrine entirely of error. "The Latins, proceeding from another principle, over many consecutive days brought forth many and varied arguments demonstrating that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, relying on sacred Scripture and easily drawing from it the subsumptions of their proofs. Finally, they brought forth the sayings of the Fathers, in which the truth of this dogma is shown with manifest and clear words. They produced not only the testimonies of Western but no less those of Eastern Doctors as well. To these, we had no response except that they were spurious and corrupted by the Latins. They produced our Epiphanius clearly teaching in many places that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son; we responded that they were adulterated. They read the statement of the great Basil from his books *Against Eunomius* (Book III, n. 1), which I mentioned before; it seemed to us interpolated. They brought forth the doctrine of the Western Saints; our entire defense was that everything was spurious, and nothing else (*πᾶσα πάντων ἀπολογία τὸ νόθον, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον*). For many days, therefore, considering and consulting among ourselves what we should respond to these, we found no response other than this. But this, in turn, seemed to us entirely absurd and not good; first, because from the consequences and antecedents it was clear that this was the sense of the doctrine of the Saints; then, since very many and very ancient codices had it thus, we could not object to them as interpolated. And since we could produce no book, neither written in Greek nor in Latin, that had it otherwise than the Latins had produced, how could we rightly object against them?... We could not bring forth other Saints saying the contrary, we could in no way show that the Western Saints taught otherwise elsewhere, we were entirely unable to prove by natural reasons that they had spoken falsely; since, therefore, we saw that no reasonable cause remained to us, we fell silent. Nevertheless, there were not lacking those who had another response at hand, namely that the Western Saints had erred and were deceived in this. But this manifestly undermines our faith entirely; for if our faith depends on the doctrine of the Saints (consenting in the doctrine of faith), but they erred concerning the truth, the faith is overturned. Therefore, the union with the Latins rightly followed, and all, with no force compelling them, as God is witness, consented. Those who were unwilling to consent were those two, no more" (1), who suffered no force in their freedom and remained in their opinion" (Bessarion, *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, pp. 221 ff., cf. p. 207).

(1) Besides Mark of Ephesus, who among the Greeks present at the Council refused to subscribe, Archbishop Eugenius Cecconi taught me from a Florentine codex that it was the Bishop of Stauropolis, who in the catalogue of metropolitans prefixed to the first session is called Isaiah, and in the mentioned codex is celebrated with this eulogy: "a man ignorant of letters, to whom nothing at all is certain."

Thesis XL. On the Distinction of the Son and the Holy Spirit by the Relation of Origin Alone

Thesis: *Since it is most certain that in divine realities there can be no real distinction except according to the relation of principle and the one proceeding from the principle, the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be distinct persons unless one proceeded from the other.*

Almost all Scholastic theologians, at *Sentences* Book I, distinction 11, and at St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 36, a. 2, treat at length, though often not without some obscurity, the question of whether, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would nevertheless be distinguished from Him. Even after the Council of Florence, some respond affirmatively; however, the far more common and true opinion, based on theological arguments, is (2) that there can be no distinction between the divine persons, and thus also between the Son and the Holy Spirit, except by reason of the principle and the one proceeding from the principle.

(2) Claudius Frassen in his *Scotus Academicus* establishes the thesis: "Even if, per impossibile, the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would nevertheless be really distinguished from Him. This is the opinion of the Doctor (Scotus) and all his disciples" (*Tract. III, disp. III, a. 2, q. 2, n. 4*). Some theologians do not spare censures against this opinion, because John, the theologian of the Latins, at the Council of Florence (session XVIII) used the argument against the Greeks that if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not be distinguished from Him. Ruiz, saying he wishes to avoid the extremes of excessive severity and excessive indulgence, calls Scotus's opinion "neither probable nor safe in faith" (*disp. 68, sect. 5, n. 45*). But Viva rightly warns (*disp. V, q. 6, n. 6*): "One must entirely abstain from these censures, both because Innocent XI, by virtue of holy obedience, forbids in the decree on confirmed theses that any censure be applied, and because the sacred Congregation, by order of Paul V, declared the doctrine of Scotus to be immune from censures and decreed that no censor of books should dare to prohibit what is certainly drawn from Scotus" (cf. Vasquez, *disp. 147, c. 3*; Francisco de Lugo, *disp. 17, c. 3, n. 20*).

The proposed question cannot be understood as concerning objective reality but as concerning our way of conceiving and proving; I would almost say the question is not ontological but dialectical. For in reality itself, it is established through the infallible revelation of the depths of God that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as well with the intimate and absolute necessity and exigency of the divine nature and life; the Holy Spirit proceeds, I say, from the Son with the same necessity by which He exists, by which the Son exists, by which the Father exists, by which God is who He is. Therefore, in this sense, the response to the proposed question would be that from an absurdity follows an absurdity: if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not exist; indeed, the Son would not exist, because the Word is spirating the Holy Spirit with the same necessity by which He is the Word; and if He does not spirate, He is not the Word. The same must be said of the Father, who generates the Word by communicating the spirative power and is one principle of the Holy Spirit with the Word with the same necessity by which He is the Father. In this sense, therefore, there could no longer be a question of the distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son, but "with the divine entity changed, all contradictions follow, and the entire order of things is overturned," as Pallavicinus says (*Book VIII, c. 60, n. 449*). Thus, those older theologians who considered this entire question useless and absurd understood it.

But the state of the question is far different. The Photians agree with Catholics that the Holy Spirit is really distinguished from the Son, but they deny that He proceeds from the Son; and by this very fact, they affirm that beyond the relation of origin of one person from another, another reason for real distinction must be admitted in divine realities, namely a different mode of procession, such that, although both persons proceed from the Father alone, one proceeds by generation as the Son, the other by spiration as the Holy Spirit. The question, therefore, is whether it can be demonstrated either immediately from revelation or from those things that are evidently understood about God by reason and noted about the persons by revelation, that there can be no real distinction in God except through the relation of origin by which the divine persons are really distinguished and constituted. If this can be demonstrated, the inference and consequence will be true and evident: the Holy Spirit is a person really distinct not only from the Father but also from the Son; therefore (since all agree that the Son does not proceed from the Holy Spirit and according to the internal revealed economy of the Holy Trinity), the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son; and thus, conversely, if it is denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, the real distinction of the Son and the Holy Spirit is virtually denied. This is the dialectical sense we mentioned of the proposition: if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not be really distinguished from Him. Some Catholic theologians, as we said, deny this, because they think that beyond the relation of origin of one person from another, there is still another reason for real distinction, namely relations not opposed but diverse and disparate; nevertheless, these same theologians certainly confess what is of faith, that the Holy Spirit is actually distinguished from the Son also by the relation of origin. The schismatics, on the other hand, both deny that the persons are distinguished solely by the relation of origin and affirm that the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son solely by a disparate relation or a different mode of proceeding from the Father, and in no way by procession also from the Son. In one word, therefore, the question of whether, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would still be really distinguished from Him, reduces to this more general question: whether the divine persons are really distinguished from each other solely by relations of origin, by which one proceeds from another. This question is certainly not useless or devoid of sense but is most opportune, both generally for a clearer understanding of the economy of the Trinity and particularly for understanding the relation between the Son and the Holy Spirit, and, if the affirmative response is proven true, for demonstrating the procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son, as John the theologian, with the agreement of others, used this argument at the Council of Florence, session XVIII, and Bessarion in his *Dogmatic Oration*, c. 6.

Moreover, regarding the truth to be held as a theological principle, that in God all things are one where there is no opposition of relation, which is constituted in the very origin of one person from another (above, p. 188), there can be no doubt after all that has been demonstrated throughout the preceding concerning the unity and distinction in God.

°. Indeed, in God, although many perfections and formal reasons (*rationes formales*) can be distinguished by the consideration of the mind, in reality, all are one without real distinction, except insofar as there is the formal reason of a principle producing *ad intra* (internally) and of the one proceeding from the producing principle. This is true not only of absolute attributes but also of formal relative reasons. Thus, not only are essence, wisdom, goodness, etc., one most simple Being (*Esse*) without real distinction, because one does not really proceed from another; but also essence, generation, and active spiration are in the same way one without real distinction for the same reason, because neither do generation and spiration proceed from the essence, nor does spiration proceed really from generation. However, the Father, under the formal reason of Father, is really distinguished from the Son, under the formal reason of Son, and

indeed solely under this formal reason, insofar as one is the principle and the other is really proceeding from the principle by way of generation (*per modum geniti*). In all other formalities (*formalitates*), the Father and the Son are one. In the same way, as is evident, we must understand the unity and distinction of the spirating principle (*spirans*) and the one proceeding by spiration.

The foundation of this matter is divine simplicity, which coincides with the infinite perfection of God (see *Treatise on God*, Thesis XXVII). Because, namely, the most simple essence of God is the total fullness of being (*entis ad perfecti*), we can indeed consider that essence under various reasons of perfections and relations, yet all these are the divine essence itself and are in no way really distinguished from one another, except solely insofar as there is a real procession of one from another. Under this formal reason of one proceeding relatively to another as its producing principle, they are constituted as *alius et alius* (one and another, i.e., distinct persons), but not as *aliud et aliud* (one thing and another thing, i.e., distinct in essence).

Therefore, just as the infinity of perfection would be removed and perfections would be posited as limited if absolute perfections, e.g., wisdom and power, were assumed to be really distinct—since neither would then encompass the total fullness of perfect being—so too the same limitation would be introduced if a real distinction were posited in God between disparate relations (*relationes disparatae*), as they are called, i.e., relations that are not relations of origin of one from another. For example, if in the Father, generation and spiration, one of which does not arise from the other, were posited as really distinct from each other. For such formalities are relations only in order to their produced term (*terminum productum*)—generation to the Son, spiration to the Holy Spirit. Compared to each other, however—by the very fact that they do not have the reason of principle and proceeding from a principle—they are no longer relations to one another but, if it is permissible to speak thus, follow the law of absolute attributes (*absoluta*). Thus, they are really entirely one, just as divine intellection (*intellectio*) and volition (*volitio*) are one, which are in themselves absolute and only relative to their intrinsically produced term, namely, to the Word and to the Holy Spirit.

2°. Hence, when the holy Fathers declare that there is no real distinction in God except by reason of relations, they always mean relations to one another (*ad invicem*), namely, relations of principle and the one proceeding from the principle. "Just as the Son is united to the Father, having His being from Him… so too the Holy Spirit depends on the Only-Begotten, such that by thought alone, according to the reason of principle, the Son is understood to precede the subsistence of the Holy Spirit… and thus, except for the reason of principle (*τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς λόγο*), the Holy Trinity is in itself distinguished by nothing (*οὐδενὶ διακρινόμενου πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἀσυγχύτως ἔχειν*)" (Gregory of Nyssa, above, p. 481). In all other respects, says Gregory Nazianzen, the divine persons are entirely one, because there is one God; but the distinction and the distinct names arise solely "from the difference of relation to one another (*τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλα σχέσεως διάφορον αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν κληθέντων πεποίηκε*)" (*Oratio* 31, alias 33, n. 9). Augustine and other Latin Fathers frequently emphasize this. "We have said elsewhere that those things said properly in that Trinity as pertaining to individual persons are those said relatively to one another (*relative ad invicem*), such as Father and Son and the gift of both, the Holy Spirit… But what is said of each individually is not said of the three plurally but of the one Trinity itself" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VIII, n. 1). Hence, even for the relations themselves, by which alone there is real distinction, they simply say principle and that which is from the principle (*τὸ αἴτιον καὶ τὸ αἰτιατόν*). Thus, Gregory of Nyssa: "Confessing the unchangeable unity of nature, we do not deny the distinction according to that which is principle and from

the principle (*τὴν κατὰ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ αἰτιατόν διαφοράν*), in which alone we admit one is distinguished from another, because we believe one to be the principle, the other from the principle." But since both the Son and the Holy Spirit are from a principle (*ἐξ αἰτίας*) and are not unbegotten (*ἀγέννητοι*), and this is common to them, by which they would not be distinguished from one another, Gregory likewise places the distinction between them in the relation of origin, because the Son is from the Father alone, while the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, or through the Son (above, p. 494).

Moreover, just as the name *Son* expresses a relation to the Father and is thus distinguished from the Father by the relation of origin, so too the name *Spirit* is relative, as if it were said "proceeding by spiration" (*πνεῦμα*). See Thesis XXXII, n. II. Therefore, it is said relatively that the Spirit is *of someone* (*Spiritus alicuius*), and by this relation, as being *of someone*, i.e., proceeding by spiration from another, He is constituted as distinct from that other. For this reason, in Scripture and among the Fathers, it is synonymous to say that He is the Spirit of the Father and the Spirit of the Son, i.e., spirated by the Father and the Son, and that He proceeds from the Father and the Son, as we showed in the cited place. Hence, unless He were relatively the Spirit of the Son (*πνεῦμα τοῦ Υἱοῦ*), i.e., spirated by the Son, the Spirit would be relative only to the Father and not to the Son. Compared to the Son, therefore, He would be a spirit in an absolute sense (*significatione absoluta*), not relative to the Son. But a spirit said non-relatively to the Son is not a person distinct from the Son. For in this hypothesis, the proceeding love (*charitas*) would be said relatively only to the Father and produced by the Father alone, but in no way would it be relative to the Son or produced by the Son. But this would be really the same and the same person as the wisdom produced or generated by the Father alone, i.e., the Word. The person distinct from the Son is only He who in Scripture is revealed as the Spirit of the Son (*Spiritus Filii*), i.e., spirated by the Son, and the love produced by the Son's act of love (*dilectio*).

Since these things are so, the real distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit comes from nothing else than that one is the principle, the other proceeds from Him as from His principle. Therefore, whoever denies the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, by that very fact removes the reason for the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit, which in divine realities is none other than the relation of origin of one from another. Just as the Father and the spirator are not two persons but one, because the formal reason of generating (*generans*) and spirating (*spirans*) are not opposed to each other by the origin of one from another and thus are not really distinguished, as we said earlier; so too, in the assumed hypothesis, the reason of proceeding by generation and by spiration would not be opposed to each other, and thus they would not be really distinguished from each other. Consequently, there would not be two really distinct proceeding persons, but the proceeding person as the expressed term of both intellection and volition would be one. Therefore, in this twofold truth—that the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct persons, and that the distinction between divine persons comes only from relations of origin of one from another—is implicitly contained the truth that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son just as from the Father, and that the Father and the Son, by active spiration, are not distinguished from each other but are really distinguished from the Holy Spirit by the spiration proceeding from them. The first proposition is explicitly revealed, as the schismatics confess with us; the second proposition is demonstrated against them both from the common doctrine of the Fathers and from certain principles concerning the unity and simplicity of divine perfection in the persons, which are constituted as distinct solely by relations.

3°. The only difficulty requiring some clarification is that the holy Fathers often derive the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit from the different mode of procession itself. Namely, the Son

proceeds by generation, while the Holy Spirit proceeds by another different mode, which can be called spiration or, retaining the name, as it were, generically, procession. "The difference of emanation (*τὸ διάφορον τῆς ἐκφάνσεως*) caused their distinct names" (Gregory Nazianzen, *Oratio* 31, n. 9). "The Holy Spirit goes forth not as born but as given, and therefore He is not called the Son, because He is not born as the Only-Begotten" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, V, c. 14). And indeed, Pallavicinus calls this objection difficult: "In fact, passive spiration is not only distinguished from active spiration but also from filiation; therefore, even if active spiration (in the Son) were removed, there would still remain a sufficient distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son" (Pallavicinus, *loc. cit.*, n. 454).

But: a) The Fathers derive the difference of procession, from which arises the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit, from this very root, as it were: that the Son proceeds alone from the alone (*μόνος μονογενῶς*), while the Holy Spirit proceeds not from the Father alone but from the Father through the Son (Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, etc., see p. 535, note 2). Gregory Nazianzen, in the very passage cited and objected to, places "the difference of emanation" (*τὸ διάφορον τῆς ἐκφάνσεως*) in the relation to one another (*καὶ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλα σχέσεως*). b) There are two very different questions: whether, if there were no opposition of relation between the Son and the Holy Spirit, they would nevertheless be really distinguished from each other; and whether, given the procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son and thus given the opposition of relation and the real distinction of the two persons, each person proceeds in a different mode, such that one is truly the Son of the Father, the other is not the Son of the Son, as the Fathers say (above, pp. 428 ff.), or the Son of the Father and the Son. To the first question, we have demonstrated that the response must be negative; the second question has been demonstrated to have an affirmative response from the manifest doctrine of Scripture and the Fathers (Theses XXX, XXXI).

In this second sense, Augustine speaks in the cited testimony, which Frassen used to try to prove his thesis. Whenever Augustine inquires how the divine persons, and thus also the Son and the Holy Spirit, are distinguished from each other, he always responds, as we said at the beginning, that there can be no real distinction in divine realities except from relation to one another (*ad invicem*). In the cited passage, however, he does not treat of distinction but presupposes it and even states that it arises from the fact that the Spirit proceeds as a gift (*per modum doni*), i.e., by love (*per dilectionem*), from both the Father and the Son. For Augustine's question there is whether, although the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as given and not as born, the Father and the Son can truly be said to be the principle of the Holy Spirit. He affirms: "It must be confessed that the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, not two principles; but just as the Father and the Son are one God and, relative to creation, one creator and one Lord, so too relative to the Holy Spirit, one principle; but relative to creation, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one principle, just as one creator and one God." Incidentally, he then notes that because the Spirit proceeds as given and not as born, He does not have the reason of a Son, not as if this were in itself the reason for distinction from the only Son, but that, with the distinction already presupposed, from this mode of procession by love (*per dilectionem*), it is clear why the Spirit does not also have the reason of a Son and thus there are not two Sons.

From these things, the response to the objection proposed as "difficult" is also clear. Passive spiration (*spiratio passiva*) is really distinguished from filiation solely because there is an opposition of relation, i.e., because the Spirit is spirated by the Son; for without this real procession of one from another, there is no real distinction in divine realities. In other words: the reason of the Son (*filiatio*) is identified in the Son with active spiration (*spiratio activa*), and therefore filiation, insofar as it is simultaneously active

spiration, is the principle of procession and is opposed to the reason of the spirated (*spiratus*) or passive spiration (*spiratio passiva*), and thus one is really distinguished from the other. But if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, there would be no opposition between procession by way of generation and by way of spiration, and therefore there would be no real distinction between these two reasons, just as in the Father, generation and active spiration are not really distinguished. See St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 10, a. 5, and Petavius, Book VII, c. 9.

Thesis XLI. On the Profession of the Procession Also from the Son Inserted into the Creed

Thesis: *It is the natural and perpetual right of the infallible ecclesiastical magisterium to propose Catholic doctrine in formulas and creeds; therefore, it is evident both from the nature of the matter itself and from history that in the Council of Ephesus and subsequent councils, heretical creeds were indeed proscribed, and it was also forbidden to produce private creeds to be substituted for public ones; but the contention of Mark of Ephesus and his followers is absurd, who claim that on account of the insertion of the Filioque into the Creed, even if the truth of this profession is assumed, the Latins are guilty of violating canons and corrupting the Creed of faith.*

Before the Council of Florence proceeded to the disputation on the truth of the procession from the Father and the Son (*Filioque*), in the first fourteen sessions (from II to XV) held at Ferrara, the Greeks most stubbornly contended that it was unlawful (*nefas*) to add the *Filioque* particle to the Creed, regardless of the dogma itself, and thus even if what is expressed by those words were true and revealed. Bessarion prudently advised his fellow Greeks that, according to the order required by the matters themselves, they should first address the truth of the doctrine, whether the Holy Spirit truly proceeds from the Father and the Son. For, he said, "once the falsity of the dogma is shown, the question of not adding it will no longer have a place." But if the matter were argued in reverse order, claiming that, even assuming the truth, the addition to the Creed is illicit: "it would be shown," he says, "to be an infirm proposition, and it is ridiculous to think that it is not permissible to add truth to the Creed" (Bessarion, *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, pp. 185, 187). Nevertheless, they persisted in their once-adopted position; and, as could not have been otherwise in such a manifest matter, they were so defeated, as Bessarion testifies (ibid., p. 207), "that, having nothing to respond, they fell silent; for what could anyone impudently respond against such great truth?"

The only argument by which the Greeks initially persuaded themselves that such an incredible thing could be proven was the decree of the Council of Ephesus, Act VI. Charisius, a presbyter, brought to the Ephesian Fathers a creed of Theodore of Mopsuestia, which manifestly contained the Nestorian heresy and was used by Nestorius's supporters, and which the Quartodecimans of Lydia had been ordered to subscribe to (cf. above, pp. 511 ff.). When the Fathers heard "the exposition of impious dogmas reduced to the form of a creed," as Peter, the chief of the notaries, called it, they issued this sentence: "The holy synod has defined that no one is permitted to produce, write, or compose another faith (*ἑτέραν πίστιν*) besides that defined by the holy Fathers gathered with the Holy Spirit at Nicaea. Those who dare to compose another faith, or to produce or offer it to those wishing to convert to the acknowledgment of the truth, if they are bishops or clerics, the synod has decreed that bishops are to be alien to the episcopate, clerics to the clerical state; if they are laypeople, they are to be anathematized. Likewise, if any are found,

whether bishops, clerics, or laypeople, to hold or teach the things contained in the exposition presented by the presbyter Charisius concerning the incarnation of the Only-Begotten Son of God, or the wicked and perverse dogmas of Nestorius, which are also appended, they are to be subject to the sentence of this holy and universal synod; namely, a bishop is to be removed from the episcopate and deposed; a cleric is likewise to fall from the clerical state; if a layperson, he too is to be anathematized, as stated above" (Mansi, *Tome* IV, p. 1362).

If we believe the Photians, the Ephesian Fathers so consecrated and immutably fixed the very words of the Nicene Creed that they deprived the Church itself of the right to propose the same truths more explicitly in the Creed or to insert other revealed truths into the same profession of faith. Let us examine this incredible claim first theologically, then historically.

1°. If the matter is considered theologically and in itself: a) Regarding the determination of the Creed or the solemn formula by which the Catholic faith is expressed, some things are of unchangeable divine law, others are subject to the disposition of the Church. It is of divine law that nothing be inserted into the Creed to be believed that is contrary to or beyond revealed faith. The Church does not create the truths of faith but infallibly guards, explains, defines them in their true sense against manifold forms of error, and proposes them as revealed to the faithful; hence, if propositions were inserted into the Creed, which is proposed as a certain complex of revealed truths to be professed with divine faith, that are not only contrary to the faith and thus heretical but also beyond the faith, i.e., not contained in revelation, the faith itself would thereby be violated.

b) In this very duty of guarding, explaining, and more strictly defining the truths of faith is contained the right and, according to the necessity and opportunity of the matter, the duty of the Church to establish creeds of faith; that is, to determine which of the revealed truths and in what verbal form should be comprehended and explicitly professed in such tokens of Catholic profession in direct opposition to emerging errors. This right and duty is intrinsic to the divine and infallible magisterium through the assistance of the Spirit of truth. Therefore, it belongs to the Church no less in later times than in earlier ones, and this by the very nature of the matter in question; not by some mutable disposition or law, but by the divine essential property and native constitution of the Church itself. It is therefore repugnant to the nature and character of the divinely instituted magisterium that, by a decree forbidding "producing another faith" (*aliam fidem proferre*), the Church should have deprived itself of the right to propose revealed truths, even those not hitherto explicitly contained in the Creed, to the faithful in a distinct creed or to insert them into a pre-existing formula, according to the nature of the matters and the errors opposed. Thus, the decree prohibiting "producing another faith" must necessarily be understood either as a decree of faith proscribing creeds alien to the Catholic profession, or as declaring that the right to determine the formula of the solemn profession of faith belongs not to individuals but solely to the universal and supreme magisterium in the Church.

Both these rights were violated by Theodore, in whose condemnation this decree was issued; for that creed was both contrary to divine faith and, by that very fact, was both initially composed and later offered by Nestorian presbyters to those wishing to convert from the heresy of the Quartodecimans, without and against the authority of the Church. The former, namely that heretical creeds be proscribed, was certainly in the direct intention of the Council; for the condemnation directly regarded the creed infected with Nestorian heresy, and thus the caution and threat of penalties pertained to creeds of that

kind, which were contrary to or beyond the Nicene faith. As for what the apostate Theophanes Prokopowicz says, that this Catholic interpretation is ridiculous, it is he himself who is laughable. For he says that inserting things contrary to the faith into the Creed could have been prohibited by the Council because that was already illicit in itself; and because the Church establishes its canons for Catholics, not for heretics any more than for Mohammedans. If Theophanes thought this, he ought to have considered all canons of faith "ridiculous"; for in them, heresies and heretics, whether present or past, are always condemned no less than prevented for the future with the threat of anathema and penalties: "If anyone says [this or that heresy], let him be anathema." As for what Theophanes adds, that for bishops and clerics corrupting the Creed, only the penalty of deposition is threatened, and thus they remain members of the Church, he could have read in the same context that the same deposition was decreed for followers of the Nestorian heresy. Indeed, in the very sentence against the heresiarch Nestorius, the holy synod expressed only removal from the episcopate and from the entire priestly college (*ἀλλότριον ἔσεσθαι τοῦ τε ἐπισκοπικοῦ ἀξιώματος καὶ παντὸς συνλόγου ἱερατικοῦ*); and in the proclamation of the sentence to the clergy and people, the Fathers of the Council simply say: "Nestorius has been removed from the priesthood" (*πεπαυται τῆς ἱερωσύνης*) (Mansi, ibid., pp. 1295, 1303). Yet, according to the nature of such a cause, the sentence of deposition also included expulsion from the communion of the faithful, as could easily be shown by many other examples, and at Ephesus, this was expressly declared by the legates of the Holy See, especially by Bishop Arcadius in his "interpretation of the deposition" (Mansi, ibid., p. 1298).

Let it remain, therefore, as we said, that the Ephesian Fathers primarily intended to prevent the corruption of the Nicene Creed. In this very act, however, as a means to an end, another point was included, which we indicated. Namely, the composition of creeds for public use by individuals, whether bishops, other clerics, or laypeople, was prohibited, insofar as this matter pertained to safeguarding the integrity of the faith from the danger of perversion. Hence, with such danger excluded, the Council, without any censure, ratified the creed that Charisius offered for himself to attest his orthodoxy, even though it did not fully correspond in words to either the Nicene or Constantinopolitan formula (Hardouin, *Tome* I, p. 1515).

2°. What we have said is no less evident from the history of the creeds.

a) By the inherent authentic right of teaching, the Church, through the Nicene Synod itself, established a creed of the Catholic faith in direct opposition to the Arian heresy. Just as the Photians contend that the form of the Creed is fixed such that it is not lawful even for the Church to profess the true faith in other words, so too the Arians, from a similar sophism, complained that the Nicene Fathers had defined the faith in formulas other than those recorded in sacred Scripture. But the holy Fathers constantly asserted this right and duty of the Church to declare and define the revealed faith in tokens directly opposed to emerging errors. See Athanasius, *De Decretis Nicaenis*, nn. 18–21, 32.

In the Second Council, several additions were made to the Nicene Creed, particularly concerning the Holy Spirit, against the Pneumatomachi (above, p. 508). Would anyone say that the Constantinopolitan Fathers issued "another faith" (*aliam fidem*) against right and law? On the contrary, it has always been said that the Nicene faith was explained by the Second Synod and more strictly defined against new errors, and the creed thus augmented was held by the universal Church with the same degree of infallible authority as the Nicene Creed itself had been sanctioned.

Here, however, it should be noted that the creed which the Ephesian Fathers decreed must be retained and against which they proscribed other creeds was not the Constantinopolitan but entirely the Nicene: "No one is permitted to produce another faith besides that defined by the holy Fathers gathered with the Holy Spirit at Nicaea." Hence, if the creed in question at Ephesus had not only been reiterated as a positive norm of the true faith, as we say, but, considered materially, had been sanctioned as the only legitimate formula, as Macarius and other Photians try to persuade; in this hypothesis, I say, from the Ephesian decree, only the Nicene formula would be legitimately usable, while the Constantinopolitan would at least have been excluded from public use and proscribed. Consequently, nothing else could be professed in the Creed about the Holy Spirit, for example, except this one thing: "We believe in the Holy Spirit," as it is in the Nicene Creed. But this is utterly absurd, both in itself and from the history of the creeds. Therefore, the Photian hypothesis about the meaning of the Ephesian decree is absurd.

In the subsequent Councils IV, V, VI, and VII, not only were the Nicene and Constantinopolitan creeds recited, but also the sanctions of all preceding councils against the new errors of the Nestorians, Eutychians, Monothelites, and Iconoclasts, and the letters of Cyril, Leo, Agatho, etc., were adopted. Then, in relation to all these preceding definitions of faith, it is added in almost the same words used by the Ephesian Fathers: "The holy and universal synod (Chalcedon, Constantinople II, III) has defined that no one is permitted to produce, write, compose, hold, or teach another faith. Those who dare to compose another faith or to offer another creed to those wishing to convert to the acknowledgment of the truth, if they are bishops or clerics, are to be alien to the episcopate or the clerical state; if they are monks or laypeople, they are to be anathematized" (Hardouin, *Tome* II, p. 455; *Tome* III, pp. 202, 1402; *Tome* IV, pp. 454, 455). Therefore, the councils, under the name of *faith* (*fides*), comprehend not only the formula of the Nicene or Constantinopolitan Creed but all definitions of faith. Thus, when they define that no one may dare to compose or hold another faith, they cannot be understood in the Photian sense, as if they deprived the Church itself of the right to conceive and declare the true faith in other words; for in this sense, the Church would be prohibited not only from issuing a new creed but also from issuing new definitions of truth against new errors, which is evidently

absurd and would involve all the Councils in manifest contradiction, since each, in this sense, would both have composed another faith and prohibited its composition. Therefore, it is absolutely certain that, just as with the subsequent Councils, so too with the Ephesian definition, identical in all, "that no one may dare to compose another faith," pertains in no way to prohibiting the explication of the faith, whether in the Creed itself or outside it, when done by the authentic magisterium of the Church. Rather, both from the very nature of the Church and the purpose of the Creeds, and from the manifest contexts of the Councils, in that definition, insofar as it is dogmatic and immutable, first and directly, heretical doctrines are proscribed; secondly, it serves as a restraint against the abuse of proposing creeds of faith by the arbitrary will of individuals, whether bishops or others, neglecting or bypassing the formulas solemnly sanctioned by the Church and adopted for universal use. See Cardinal Julian's demonstration in the Council of Florence (Hardouin, *Tome* IX, p. 1 sq.).

b) What we have said—that the immutability of the Creed was neither decreed nor could have been decreed in the Photian sense—is most fully confirmed and illustrated by other historical records.

Eutyches, in the so-called Robber Synod of Ephesus under Dioscorus, interpreted the decree of the Third Council (Ephesus) entirely in the Photian sense, claiming that he adhered to the Nicene profession and

that it was not permissible either to subtract from or add anything to it. “This faith,” he said, “was confirmed by the earlier holy and universal synod here (at Ephesus), presided over by Cyril… and it issued a definition that whoever adds or subtracts anything from it (or, in another reading, invents; Greek version: *τὸν πρὸς ταύτην προστιθέντα τι ἢ ὑφαιροῦντα*) or teaches [otherwise], is subject to the condemnations then written.” The same sense was defended by Dioscorus and his Egyptian bishops in the Council of Chalcedon: “No one accepts addition, no one accepts subtraction; let what was established at Nicaea be held.” But the Catholic bishops protested. “He lies; there is no such definition, no such rule,” said Eusebius of Dorylaeum. Diogenes of Cyzicus explained: “He deceitfully cited the synod of the holy Fathers; for it accepted additions on account of the perverse understanding of Apollinaris, Valentinus, and Macedonius, and those like them” (Mansi, *Tome* VI, p. 631 sq.).

This appeal of Dioscorus to the Ephesian decree was directed against the dogmatic letter of St. Leo, which they claimed proposed a new creed. Hence, the Council of Chalcedon itself, in its address to Emperor Marcian, declared the meaning of that Ephesian decree. First, the Fathers note the complaint of the adversary, who accuses Leo’s letter, “asserting that it is not permissible for anyone to expound the faith beyond the Fathers who harmoniously convened at Nicaea” (*ὡς οὐκ ἔξον εἶναι λέγειν, ἑτέραν πίστιν παρὰ τὴν ἐν Νικαίᾳ τῶν Πατέρων γενομένην*). They respond, however, that the Nicene profession is indeed to be held “as in the principal place” according to the law of the Church, and it is handed down to catechumens. Further, they say, if heretics did not disturb the path of piety with their innovations, “it would be fitting for the sons of the Church to devise nothing beyond what is declared in the Creed.” But against the new errors of heretics, “it is necessary for us also to refute their perverse inventions with salutary additions (or, in another reading, oppositions), not as if introducing something new to piety, as though something were lacking to the faith, always seeking something further, but as devising what is judged salutary against what they have innovated” (*ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμᾶς ταῖς αὐτῶν ἐπινοίαις ἀντιτάττειν τὸν ἔλεγχον, οὐχ ὡς τι λείπον τῇ πίστει καινοεργοῦντας ἀεὶ πρὸς εὐσέβειαν, ἀλλ’ ὡς τοῖς παρὰ ψευδῶν καινοτομουμένοις ἐπινοοῦντας τὰ προσήκοντα*). They then show that explications of the truth against new errors were inserted into the Creed itself, vindicated by the definitions of the Councils and the declarations of the holy Fathers. Such explications, however, were never absolutely concluded in such a way that new definitions and professions of faith could not be opposed by the teaching Church to new heresies. “If anyone thinks that those who desire to defend the faith according to their ability should stop at this point, he ought especially to promulgate this precept to heretics, restraining them from attacking, not turning pastors away from protection. For every law prohibits the unjust from committing offenses, not judges from exercising authority (*πᾶς γὰρ νόμος τοῖς πονηροῖς ἀπαγορεύει τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, οὐ τοὺς κριτὰς ἀπείργει τῆς ἐξουσίας*). Otherwise, let the unteachable be taught, for even now it is permissible, when ambiguity arises in a question, to adapt our confession to the interpretations of the Fathers” (*ἄλλως τε μανθανέτωσαν, ὡς καὶ νῦν ἔξεστιν, ἀμφιβολίας προκύψεως, ταῖς τῶν Πατέρων ἑρμηνείαις τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐπικυρῶσαι ὁμολογίαν*) (Mansi, *Tome* VII, p. 455 sqq.).

With the very words by which the Ephesian decree is explained in the Council of Florence and by Catholic theologians, Cyril’s successor in the episcopal see of Alexandria in the sixth century, Eulogius, had already spoken, in words preserved for us by Photius himself in his *Bibliotheca*. The calumny that Dioscorus’s followers brought against Leo’s letter at Chalcedon was later repeated by the Monophysites against the Chalcedonian Synod itself, “that it had set forth a definition, which was entirely prohibited by the first Synod of Ephesus.” The Monophysites, no less than the Catholics, saw that the Council of Chalcedon (as we have shown was done in other synods) had set forth its definitions as explications of the

Creed and with equal authority to the Creed. Hence, Eulogius does not respond to the adversaries' objection drawn from the Ephesian decree, as the Photians claim, by saying that the Chalcedonian Fathers changed nothing in the Creed but rather decreed its immutability anew; rather, he bases his entire defense against the Monophysite calumny on explaining the genuine sense of the Ephesian decree, namely, that additions contrary to the Nicene faith were proscribed, but by no means those congruent with that faith, which both the nature of the matter and the perpetual tradition and custom of the Church demonstrate have always been permissible. For if this were not so, the Ephesian Fathers would have condemned both the Second Ecumenical Council and themselves, since they too added new definitions by professing the Creed. "If, according to their delusion, the (Ephesian) Synod entirely prohibited producing another definition, it would have passed a sentence of condemnation against itself before others. For by issuing this very decree (on the immutability of the Creed), it defines what no one before it had defined (i.e., the decree itself would involve a contradiction). Moreover, its definition is of one hypostasis, which earlier synods had not defined. Certainly, according to what these deluded ones say, it condemns the synod of the 150 holy Fathers held at Constantinople (the Second Ecumenical Council); for this, by proscribing the Pneumatomachi, adapted the doctrine of the divinity of the Holy Spirit to the Nicene definition with a congruent addition. But if the preceding Councils are not liable to reproach for their additions, neither can subsequent ones be condemned in similar cases. Thus, folly confuses and perverts all things. For the Ephesian Synod entirely prohibited expounding another faith, whose dogmas are contrary to the Nicene Synod; but it itself added the exposition of the dogmas preserved in that (Nicene Synod) as the times required, and both the nature of things and the tradition of the Church are always recognized as approving this" (*ναὶ οὖν καὶ τὴν ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει τῶν ρν΄ ἁγίων Πατέρων, ἣν οὗτοι λέγουσι, κολάζουσα, τὸν Πνευματομάχον γὰρ αὕτη, καθαιροῦσα, τῷ κατὰ τὴν Νίκαιαν ἐκφωνηθέντι ὅρῳ τὴν περὶ τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος θεολογίαν προσαρμόσας συνήρμοσε… καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐν Ἐφέσῳ σύνοδος, πίστιν μὲν ἑτέραν, ἣν ἐναντία τὰ δόγματα τῇ τὴν ἐν Νικαίᾳ καθιερωμένην συνόδῳ, παντελῶς ἐκτίθεσθαι ἐκώλυσεν· ἀκριβῶν δὲ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ σωζομένων δογμάτων ἔκθεσιν, ἅπερ ὁ καιρὸς ἀπῄτει, προσέθηκεν αὐτή, καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἡ φύσις διδάσκουσα καὶ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ὁρᾶται τοῦτο ποιούσα διὰ παντὸς ἡ παράδοσις*) (Eulogius, in Photius's *Bibliotheca*, cod. 230; Migne, *Tome* CIII, p. 1049).

Let him be blind who does not see that, when it comes to the authority by which legitimate additions are made, both Catholics and heretics considered additions to the Creed and other definitions of faith in the same sense.

Very similar things are said by St. Maximus against the Monophysite accusers of the Chalcedonian Synod "on account of the words added to the Nicene definition" (Migne, *Tome* XCI, p. 258–259).

c) Indeed, long before the Photian times, we see that, along with the proclamation of the immutable definitions sanctioned in the Ephesian and subsequent Councils, the explication of the Constantinopolitan Creed by the addition of the *Filioque* particle was simultaneously joined. It was so certain and established that such an adaptation of our confession with the interpretations of the Fathers, as the Council of Chalcedon says, is not an addition or subtraction that was proscribed in the Councils against heretics.

The "general council" of Hatfield in England, held in 680 under Archbishop Theodore (a Greek by birth), issued a profession of faith in which, among other things, the following is found: "We accept the holy and universal five synods of the blessed and God-pleasing Fathers (each is enumerated)… and the synod held in the city of Rome in the time of the most blessed Pope Martin… We accept and glorify our Lord Jesus

Christ as they glorified Him, neither adding nor subtracting anything… glorifying God the Father without beginning, and His Only-Begotten Son generated from the Father before the ages, and the Holy Spirit proceeding inexpressibly from the Father and the Son, as proclaimed by those we mentioned above, the holy Apostles, prophets, and teachers; and we all subscribe who, with Archbishop Theodore, have expounded the Catholic faith" (Mansi, *Tome* XI, p. 176).

Deliberately, St. Paulinus of Aquileia, in the Council of Friuli in 796, declares the sense of the Ephesian decree, namely, that by the term "addition and subtraction," which is proscribed, is by no means meant a further explication of the Nicene faith inserted even into the Creed itself, but only the perversion of that faith. According to this declaration, proven there by an extensive disputation, the same synod not only adopted the Creed with the *Filioque* particle, as had long been customary to recite in the realms of Charlemagne, in which the province of Aquileia was included; but it also adds a more extensive exposition of that same faith, which, with the profession of the procession from the Father and the Son repeated twice, is ordered to be retained in its entirety in memory. With incredible audacity, Adam Zoernikaw (Czernikow), Theophanes Prokopowicz, and Macarius Bulgakov dare to cite St. Paulinus and his Council with truncated texts to demonstrate that the Fathers of Friuli, based on the Ephesian decree, absolutely declared the insertion of the *Filioque* particle into the Creed prohibited. Therefore, it will be worthwhile to examine the text itself a little more carefully.

Paulinus, with his synod, addresses only the dogmatic question, namely, whether the Ephesian decree absolutely proscribes "another exposition of faith," and he says that it does not prohibit a true explication of the faith, as the schismatics later contended in the Council of Florence and as Macarius and others now obstinately maintain; but the decree must be understood as referring to an exposition contrary to the Catholic faith. However, he does not touch on the disciplinary aspect, which Pope Leo III considered a decade later along with the dogmatic aspect; but, like other bishops and theologians familiar to Charlemagne, the Fathers of Friuli complied with the king's desire, who strongly urged the recitation of the Creed with the *Filioque* explication. To the difficulties raised by the Romans, which were disciplinary and not dogmatic, the Fathers of Friuli, like Charlemagne's associates generally, responded only on the dogmatic aspect, in which all Catholics truly agreed, namely, that in itself and absolutely, neither by the Ephesian decree nor by any other, is the insertion of a truth of faith prohibited or could be prohibited. Hence, their declarations do not indeed hold against the disciplinary practice of the Roman Church at that time, which was contrary, as Pope Leo later explained; but they contain an excellent exposition of the Ephesian decree against the later absurd interpretations of the Photians.

First, Paulinus indicates the opposition of the adversaries, who, appealing to the Ephesian decree, said that it is not permissible to compose another faith, i.e., another creed, and therefore the insertion of the *Filioque* particle should not be admitted. He responds, however, that "another faith" means a faith contrary to the truth, such as that of Nestorius and Eutyches, but not an explication of the truth. He proves this by the insertions made in the Creed by the Fathers of the Constantinopolitan Council. From this, he infers that, by the same right, the explicit profession of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son was added by later generations.

"I profess that I promised to speak more plainly about the mystery of the holy and admirable Trinity… On account of the various errors of heretics and the diverse suspicions of certain simple people, I do not consent to compose or teach another faith, but that which, handed down by the holy Fathers, all ages have

sincerely received. For I know that it was sanctioned in certain synodal acts (Ephesian and Chalcedonian) to refute indeed new and manifold heresies, especially on account of the deceitful and false pestilence of Nestorius or Eutyches, not to call it a faith but rather a perfidy (*non fidem dicam sed potius perfidiam*), that it is not permissible for anyone to teach or compose a creed of another faith. But far be it from us, and far be it from every faithful heart, to compose or teach a creed or faith otherwise than they established; but according to their sense, we have decreed to hand down for exposition, and have ordered to be committed to memory, that [exposition of the faith] and the very text of the Creed, so that, according to the Apostle, the man of God may be suitable for every good work, prepared" (*quatenus iuxta Apostolum idoneus sit homo Dei, ad omne opus bonum paratus*). (Note: Here, Paulinus understands the Nestorian creed presented by Charisius and condemned at Ephesus and in subsequent Councils, against which the decree on not composing another faith is directly opposed. Macarius (*Introduction à la Théologie orthodoxe*, p. 582) cautiously suppresses this; and what Paulinus calls "a creed of another faith," he translates as *un autre symbole de foi*. Paulinus further explains that another or differently composed creed is what must be far from every faithful heart. Do the schismatics perhaps command that revealed truths of faith be far not only from the formula of the Creed but also from every faithful heart?)

"Indeed, it is not to add or subtract in the matter of faith to think rightly according to their sense and to supply their subtle understanding by exposition; but to add or subtract is to think deceitfully against their sacrosanct sense in another way, with cunning evasion, and to compose a perverse dogma with a confused style, and thus with an impious mouth to presume to prattle boastfully rather than to teach" (*enimvero non est in argumento fidei addere vel minuere ea, quae a ss. PP. bene salubriterque sunt promulgata, secundum eorum sensum recte sentire, et exponendum eorum subtile supplere ingenium; sed addere vel minuere est subdole contra sacrosanctum eorum sensum, aliter quam illi, callida tergiversatione sentire, et confuso stilo perversum dogma componere, ac per hoc impio ore potius iactanter garrire quam docere praesumere*).

Thus far, he has explained what it is and is not to compose or teach another faith. The proof follows by comparing the Constantinopolitan Creed, which, though augmented by explications, does not contain another faith than the Nicene, whose faith the Constantinopolitan Fathers wished to remain inviolate forever. "For we read that the venerable work (the Creed) was composed by very many Catholic men and worshippers of the Churches of God, indeed in different words and with a differently sounding pen, but it is proven to express harmoniously the same sense and the same understanding of inviolate faith in one document of assertion. For if the venerable series of the Nicene Creed is reviewed, nothing else concerning the Holy Spirit can be found promulgated in it except in this way: 'and in the Holy Spirit' (*et in Spiritum Sanctum*)." He then shows that the mere enumeration with the Father and the Son in the Nicene Creed sufficiently teaches that the Holy Spirit is God, "as was later taught by the 150 holy Fathers (of the Second Council), who testified that the faith of the Nicene Creed remains inviolate forever. Yet they supplied, as if expounding their sense, and profess to believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Life-giver, proceeding from the Father, to be adored and glorified with the Father and the Son. For these and the other things that follow are not contained in the sacred dogma of the Nicene Creed."

Now, from these premises, Paulinus infers what he especially aimed to defend, namely, that the explicit declaration of the procession from the Father and the Son (*Filioque*) had rightly been inserted long ago in many particular Churches against heretics who said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. Concerning this dogma, Charlemagne himself, to whom Paulinus sent the acts of his synod and dedicated

them, as it were, and no less the bishops and theologians in his realms, showed themselves very solicitous; and sometimes they ascribed the contrary heresy, which was later confirmed by Photius, even to the orthodox Orientals who professed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. This is clearly evident from the *Carolingian Books* (Book III, ch. 3 and 8), from Alcuin's *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, from the letter of Hadrian I to Charlemagne, and from what was shortly afterward done in the Council of Aachen and at Rome by Charlemagne's legates before Pope Leo III. Moreover, already from the Council of Gentilly in 767, in which the legates of the iconoclast Constantine Copronymus had raised questions about this dogma, the faith of the Greeks concerning this article was at least suspect in the Frankish realms.

Thus, Paulinus proceeds to this main point for his purpose: "But afterward, on account of those heretics who whisper (for before Photius, there were no clear testimonies for the existence of this heresy) that the Holy Spirit is of the Father alone and proceeds from the Father alone, it was added: *who proceeds from the Father and the Son* (*qui ex Patre Filioque procedit*). And yet these holy Fathers are not to be blamed, as if they had added or subtracted anything from the faith of the 318 Fathers, because they did not think differently against their sense, but endeavored to supply their blameless understanding with sound methods" (*sed et postmodum propter eos videlicet haereticos, qui susurrant Spiritum Sanctum solius esse Patris et a solo procedere Patre, additum est: qui ex Patre Filioque procedit. Et tamen non sunt hi sancti Patres culpandi, quasi addidissent aliquid vel minuissent de fide trecentorum decem et octo Patrum, quia non contra eorum sensum diversa senserunt, sed inculpatum eorum intellectum sanis moribus supplere studuerunt*).

This is nothing but a legitimate inference from the principles that Paulinus had laid down to demonstrate this very point, presupposing, of course, the truth of the dogma inserted into the Creed, about which there was universal agreement. Nevertheless, to complete the demonstration for the legitimacy of the insertion, as long as the question is considered dogmatically and not from disciplinary laws, Paulinus adds an extensive proof of the revealed truth itself, which he draws from the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, by which they are one in spiration no less than in nature and operation; from the symbolic insufflation of the Son upon the Apostles (John 20:22); from the one common mission of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son; from the fact that the Holy Spirit is proclaimed in Scripture as the Spirit of the Son just as of the Father; and from the fact that the procession named in Scripture from the Father necessarily implies the same procession from the Son, just as baptism in the name of Jesus, because of the consubstantiality of the persons, is understood as baptism in the name of the three persons. Hence, he concludes this part of his discourse, exclaiming: "How catholically and firmly the holy Fathers, established in this stability of faith (concerning the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son), professed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father! How gloriously those who confess that He proceeds from the Father and the Son (*a Patre Filioque*)!" (Mansi, *Tome* XIII, p. 833 sqq.). Against the Photians themselves, Ratramnus disputed very similarly (*Book II, ch. 2*).

3°. Someone might perhaps say that in this matter, the Photians do not differ regarding the substance of the issue; for they do not deny that an ecumenical synod can insert truths of faith into the Creed. But whoever would assert this generally shows that he has not thoroughly examined the Greek disputations, especially in the initial sessions of the Council of Florence (at Ferrara). For they absolutely contended that this is the sense and force of the Ephesian decree: that the universal Church, whether gathered in a synod or outside it, has been deprived of the faculty to add or change anything, even by way of explication, in

the Creed or in sacred Scripture, though it be in a sense entirely true and contained in divine revelation. For this reason, in the third, fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and twelfth sessions, Mark of Ephesus and Bessarion of Nicaea, with the consent and in the name of the others, argued thus (Mansi, *Tome* XXXI, p. 519, 534, 583, 584, 603, 607, 610, 615, 626, 678, 679). "It was decreed by the (Ephesian) Fathers that no one henceforth has the license to change the Nicene Creed in any way, which is the same as saying the Constantinopolitan Creed (*ταύτην τὴν ἄδειαν καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων*); and, he adds, the Council demonstrated this by its action; for because of this prohibition, it did not add the word *Theotokos* to the Creed, though it was most necessary" (Mark, *loc. cit.*, p. 534). Bessarion repeated the same with even more explicit words: "We wish Your Reverence to know that we deny this faculty to the universal Church and to an ecumenical synod; but we do not deny it ourselves, but we believe it was denied by the decrees of the Fathers" (*ταύτην ἡμῖς τὴν ἄδειαν ἀπὸ πάσης ἀφαιρούμεθα Ἐκκλησίας τε καὶ συνόδου τῆς οἰκουμενικῆς... ἀφαιρούμεθα δὲ οὐχ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλὰ νομίζομεν τοῦτο τοῖς ὅροις τῶν Πατέρων κεκωλύσθαι*) (*loc. cit.*, p. 610, 626).

But if now Macarius and, before him, Theophanes Prokopowicz, constrained by the evident nature of the matter and the arguments of Catholics, are forced to admit that an ecumenical council, even after the Ephesian decree, would have the power to insert revealed dogmas into the Creed, by this concession they first depart from the doctrine of their predecessors in the schism, as is clear from what has been said; then, this admission, casually inserted by these authors, contradicts the entire rest of their method of arguing, which is the same and relies on the same arguments as those of their earlier teachers; finally, with this opinion admitted, they must also confess that the Western Church, based on its Catholic principles concerning the value of the Church's consensus and the supreme, universal, and infallible authority of the Roman Pontiff in definitions of faith and morals, rightly professes the dogma of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son (*Filioque*) in the Creed itself. I know that the Photian heretics deny this authority, both of the consensus of the Catholic Church and of the head of the Church; but if this is the case, the dispute can only be about the authority of the Catholic Church and its head in definitions of faith generally, and there can be no dispute about the right by which the profession of the procession from the Son was added to the Creed. For the right to define dogmas of faith and the right to insert those definitions into the Creed are one and the same, as even the Photians must confess if the opinion of Macarius and Theophanes, which I mentioned, is sincere; therefore, when the former right to define dogmas is established, it will also be established, even for the Photians, that there is a right to insert those same dogmas into the Creed.

The Greeks at the Council of Florence perceived this connection of things, and therefore they saw that, to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the insertion of an article, however true and defined, it was necessary for them to maintain that absurd contention: that the whole Church, which certainly has the right to define dogmas, is not permitted to change even a single word in the Creed once it has been sanctioned and is absolutely immutable.

4°. The dogmatic question of inserting a dogma into the structure of the Creed, which the Photians ineptly raised and about which we have spoken thus far, must be entirely distinguished, and is vastly different, from the disciplinary question—though this too is intimately connected with the custody of the deposit—concerning under what circumstances, by what authority, the insertion of truths of faith, about which there is certainty, into the formula of the Creed can be tolerated, permitted, approved, or even sometimes required.

In this matter, there is a great difference between particular formulas of faith, which for specific circumstances of certain regions and Churches were sometimes prescribed by bishops, either individually or of one or several provinces, and the solemn Creeds that, sanctioned by the universal Church, have been received as tokens of faith for common use. Regarding the latter, which we are primarily discussing now, changes by the insertion of truths of faith not previously explicitly contained in them cannot legitimately be introduced except by the same supreme authority under which the universal Church stands, namely, the authority of the Roman Pontiff or of an ecumenical council, at least approving and ratifying a custom already becoming established (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 36, a. 2, ad 2). However, a transgression of this right, in itself, unless the ecclesiastical authority itself is denied, will not be a dogmatic error (as the schismatics dreamed), but a violation of discipline, more or less grave depending on whether only an implicit right in the general hierarchical discipline or an express law stands in the way. Indeed, with the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff, even without approving or expressly permitting, but knowingly and tacitly consenting, the custom of insertion could become, and in many Churches from the sixth to the ninth century seems to have become, to some extent legitimate.

The history demonstrates with how much caution the addition of the *Filioque* particle to the Constantinopolitan Creed, which is under discussion, was approached. First, in the sixth century, this explicit profession was inserted in Spain and Narbonne Gaul (see above, p. 467); from there, it spread to the Frankish realms, Germany, Illyricum, etc. But the Roman Pontiffs constantly taught this faith; however, they did not expressly disapprove the addition in the Constantinopolitan Creed itself, nor did they admit it in the Roman Church. After the Council of Aachen in 809, held on account of disturbances raised against the profession of the procession from the Son inserted into the Creed by a Jerusalem monk (see above, p. 524, note), Charlemagne sent legates to Pope Leo III to obtain sanction for the addition. But Leo, in the profession of faith sent on that occasion "to all the Eastern Churches" and before Charlemagne's legates, certainly asserted and confirmed this article (*cum legati recitassent testimonia ad probandam processionem Spiritus Sancti ex Patre et Filio, Pontifex respondit: 'ita sentio, ita teneo cum his auctoribus et s. Scripturae auctoritatibus. Si quis aliter de hac re sentire vel docere voluerit, defendo; et nisi conversus fuerit et secundum hunc sensum tenere voluerit, contraria sentientem penitus abjicio — Quisquis ad hoc sensu subtiliore pertingere potest, et id scire aut ita sciens credere noluerit, salvus esse non poterit'* [Hardouin, *Tome* IV, p. 969 sq.; Mansi, *Tome* XIV, p. 18 sqq.]). But he did not wish to approve the addition in the solemn and anciently sanctioned Creed (*cum ex commemorata responsione inferrent legati: 'si ergo ita est, immo quia ita est, quod non credere non licet; et non tacendo docere licet, cur non licet cantare vel cantando docere?' reposuit Leo: 'licet inquam, licet docendo cantare, et cantando docere; sed illicite in prohibitis nec scribendo nec cantando licet inserere'* [loc. cit.]). He appealed there to the decree of the ancient Councils, which "prohibited inserting anything into the Creed," and thus certainly understood that decree, as we explained above, that not only corruption through false doctrine but also the insertion of true and revealed doctrine is prohibited unless done by an authority equal to that by which the Creed was sanctioned, namely, the supreme authority of the Pontiff or an ecumenical council, which Leo at that time did not wish to use. Indeed, he urged that the custom introduced among the Franks be gradually corrected, as far as possible without prejudice to true doctrine (*'Si priusquam ita cantaretur, interrogatus essem; ne insereretur, utique respondissem. At nunc, quod tamen non affirmando sed vobiscum pariter tractando dico, quantum menti occurrit, ita mihi videtur posse utrumque fieri: ut paulatim in palatio, quia in nostra sancta Ecclesia non cantatur, cantandi consuetudo eiusdem symboli intermittatur… Si dimittatur a vobis, dimittetur ab omnibus; et ita fortasse… utrumque fieri possit, ut*

quod iam nunc a quibusque prius nescientibus recte creditur, credatur, et tamen illicita cantandi consuetudo sine cuiusque fidei laesione tollatur' [ibid.]).

But after the addition of this explication to the Creed had become almost universal throughout the West, and at the same time, since Photius in the mid-ninth century, the contradiction of the schismatics against the dogma itself had brought about the necessity or at least the opportuneness of that explicit profession, the Roman Pontiffs, by their action, ratified it and adopted it in the Roman Church and the entire Latin Church, sanctioning it with supreme authority. Since this was done not by some solemn decree but by the practice itself, it is not entirely clear when the use first became universal, with the opinions of scholars varying between the mid-ninth century and the eleventh century, from Nicholas I to Benedict VIII. See Lequien (*Damascenum*, I, n. 28, who extends it further, on not very probable grounds, to some successor of Benedict VIII up to Leo IX); de Rubeis (*Ad vitam Georgii Cyprii*, Dissertation II, ch. 4, n. 5, p. 190 sqq.; ch. 5); Em. Hergenröther (*Photius*, *Tome* I, p. 305 sqq.).

SECTION IV.

ON THE MISSION AND INDWELLING OF DIVINE PERSONS CONSIDERED SINGLY

FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE MISSION OF DIVINE PERSONS

CHAPTER I.

ON THE VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE MISSION OF DIVINE PERSONS TO SANCTIFIED CREATURES

THESIS XLII.

On the Notion of Mission in a Divine Person, and on the Distinction Between Visible and Invisible Mission

"Mission, generally speaking, includes some order of the one sent both to the person sending and to the term to which he is sent; hence, mission in divine persons does not imply a diversity of nature, but includes both the eternal procession of the one sent from the sender and an efficacy in time, as well as the manifestation of the person, and on account of the diversity of this efficacy and manifestation, mission is distinguished as visible and invisible."

I. Mission (understood passively) signifies the procession of one from another according to some principle (physical or moral) toward some term. It therefore implies:

a) A real distinction between the sender and the one sent;

b) Some dependence, proper or improper, of the one sent on the sender, according to authority, counsel, or origin (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 43, a. 1);

c) A relation to a term, whether that term is a place, so that the one sent is there where he was not before, or is there in a new way, or whether it is some effect, so that he produces it.

Thus, mission necessarily involves a relation of the one sent to a twofold term: to the sender *from whom* he is sent, and to the term or effect *to which* he is sent. Since this notion of mission is essential, mission in divine persons must be understood according to it, excluding the imperfections that mission in creatures includes. The Arians transferred these imperfections from creatures to mission considered in itself, asserting that the Son is inferior to the Father, and the Holy Spirit inferior to both the Father and the Son, because in Scripture the Son is said to be sent by the Father, and the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son. On the contrary, because the Father and the Son are one, and the Son can do nothing of Himself but does all that the Father does, from this unity of essence and distinction by origin, Christ the Lord Himself infers that the mission of the Son from the Father is such that it requires equality of honor, whereby the one sent is to be honored with the sender: "That all may honor the Son as they honor the Father. He who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent Him" (John 5:18–23). The Fathers frequently refute this Arian fallacy; among others, Augustine indicates the reason why these imperfections are excluded in the mission of a divine person: "It has been sufficiently shown that the Son is not lesser because He is sent by the Father, nor is the Holy Spirit lesser because both the Father and the Son sent Him. For whether on account of a visible creature or rather on account of the commendation of the principle, these things in Scripture are understood not as implying inequality, disparity, or dissimilarity of substance; because, even if God the Father had wished to appear visibly through a subject creature, it would be utterly absurd to say that He was sent by the Son whom He begot or by the Holy Spirit who proceeds from Him" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, IV, n. 32; St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 43, a. 1, ad 1 and 2). Cf. Thesis XXXIII.

Thus, mission in divine persons includes two aspects: the foundation is the eternal and necessary origin of the person sent from the sender, while the formal aspect of mission is completed in some external efficacy, whereby the person proceeding from another is either manifested or begins to be present in a creature in a new way (see Augustine, *De Trinitate*, IV, n. 27–28). For unless the person said to be sent proceeds from the sender, the order essentially included in the notion of sender and sent cannot be understood. Because of the perfection of the divine person and the unity of nature, the dependence of the one sent on the sender cannot be properly so-called, but is only a communication of essence, power, counsel, and operation from one person to another, which is itself the procession of one from another. As for the term to which the mission is directed, because of the same perfection of the person sent, there can be no question of a change, whether local or otherwise, in the person himself, but the change necessarily occurs in the creature, to which the divine person is either specially present and manifested or specially united.

I say *specially present and manifested or united to the creature*, for mission, like the giving of a divine person, according to the language of Holy Scripture and the Fathers, in a sense at least more proper, is said only in relation to indwelling and remaining in the creature (*oikesis*, *mone*, John 14:16, 23; 1 Cor. 3:16, 6:19; 2 Cor. 6:16, etc.). This indwelling is that of God as loving and loved in the supernaturally loved and loving. Hence, every mission of a divine person at least has an order to this indwelling and supernatural sanctification. But we will speak more of this shortly.

From this it follows:

a) The foundation of mission is indeed eternal and necessary, but the mission itself occurs in time and is free, with the freedom of one will in number in the sender and the sent (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 43, a. 2);

b) The terms "come" or "given" to a creature are broader than "sent," for God absolutely considered, or any divine person without respect to procession from a principle, can be said to come or be given according to some effect or charism. But to be sent is understood, from what has been said, only of a person proceeding from another who sends (see Suarez, *De Trinitate*, Book XII, c. 3; Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book VIII, c. 1). On the reason why God is said to come and depart, we spoke in the Treatise on God, Thesis XXXIV.

c) It follows from the above that the mission of a divine person is only to a rational creature and only in relation to supernatural effects and in order to supernatural effects.

II. We have said that the mission of a person is either through the manifestation of presence or through a special union with the creature. By this, a distinction is indicated between a twofold mission, namely, visible and invisible.

Thus, a *visible mission* occurs when a divine person proceeding from another either becomes visible in a visible nature made proper to Him or, with some relation to supernatural indwelling and sanctification, is specially presented through certain signs produced to signify that distinct person. Hence, visible mission is rightly distinguished as:

- *Substantial*, of which kind was the Incarnation of the Word alone: "When the fullness of time came, God sent His Son, born of a woman" (Gal. 4:4, etc.);
- *Symbolic or representative*, of which kind was the Holy Spirit descending "as a dove" upon Christ at His baptism, or upon the Apostles in "tongues as of fire."

Augustine discusses this visible mission of divine persons extensively in *De Trinitate*, Book II: "If, therefore, the Son is said to be sent in that He appeared outwardly in a bodily creature, while inwardly in His spiritual nature He is always hidden from mortal eyes, it is now easy to understand why the Holy Spirit is also said to be sent. For a certain form of a creature was made in time, in which the Holy Spirit was visibly shown, whether when He descended upon the Lord Himself in a bodily form as a dove, or when on the day of Pentecost… divided tongues as of fire were seen. This operation, visibly expressed and offered to mortal eyes, is called the (visible) mission of the Holy Spirit, not as if His very substance, by which He is invisible and immutable like the Father and the Son, appeared, but so that by external visible things, the hearts of men, moved by the temporal manifestation of the one coming, might be turned to the hidden eternity of the one always present. These things appeared as they ought to have appeared opportunely, with the creature serving the Creator and, at His command, being changed and transformed to signify and demonstrate Him as He ought to be signified and demonstrated to mortals" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, II, n. 10–11; see the rest there). Cf. Thesis VI.

Since a representative visible mission has an order to the invisible mission through sanctification, some theologians teach (cf. Suarez, *De Trinitate*, Book XII, c. 4, n. 5 sqq.; Ruiz, disp. 109, sect. 8, n. 9 sqq.) that a visible mission is a manifestation of a present invisible mission, as when the Holy Spirit was sent to

the Apostles, or of one already accomplished, as when the visible mission occurred upon Christ at His baptism. For this reason, the theophanies of the Old Testament, which we discussed in Thesis VI, even if the "Angel of the Lord" is said to be the Word Himself, are hesitated to be called missions of the Son, and are rather called apparitions. The reason is that those apparitions were not ordered to signify sanctification and an invisible mission that was either occurring or had already occurred (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 43, a. 7, ad 6; Suarez, *De Trinitate*, Book XII, c. 6, n. 23; Ruiz, disp. 109, sect. 9, n. 10 sqq.). But since theophanies pertained to the supernatural order and thus at least mediately had a connection with sanctification, disputes about the manner of speaking in this regard are not of great importance. Rather, it should be said that the mission of the Son of God was principal in the Incarnation itself, while those theophanies, as we showed there, were certain preludes and preparations for this visible mission in a hypostatically assumed nature. Therefore, in comparison with this, they are not called, and without qualification should not be called, a mission of the Son of God. The same would almost be said of a mission of the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament, if any visible mission occurred there (cf. pp. 90–91), in comparison with the visible mission of the same Spirit in the New Testament.

Corollary. From the above, it is understood that:

a) The mission of a divine person is not to the sensible thing through which the presence is signified; for that thing is not the term of the mission but a medium assumed to render the mission sensible to men, both those to whom the mission is made and others for whose sake it is at least mediately made.

b) A visible mission of the Holy Spirit can occur and has occurred without a (passive) mission of the Son, and vice versa; although an invisible mission, as we will say later, is necessarily conjoined with both persons and the indwelling of the whole Trinity. For although the efficacy of the visible sign is common to the three persons, the signification can refer to one distinct person (p. 92), just as in the Incarnation, considered efficiently and terminatively, a distinction was necessary, as we showed elsewhere (Treatise on the Incarnation, Thesis XXXII).

c) The sacraments are indeed visible and efficacious signs of sanctifying grace and consequently of the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit, but they are not signs then effected by God to signify the presence of the Holy Spirit; rather, things human or natural in themselves are elevated by God to signify and confer grace (we are not speaking of the permanent Sacrament of the Eucharist). Therefore, in the sacraments, a visible mission of the Holy Spirit cannot be understood, but only an invisible mission (cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, II, n. 11; St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 43, a. 7; Ruiz, disp. 109, sect. 12).

It is also clear from all that has been said that not only is the invisible mission principally intended by God, especially in comparison with the representative mission, but also that the latter cannot be fully understood without the former. Therefore, we must now treat of it, the explanation of which is the primary scope of the present disputation.

THESIS XLIII.

On the Invisible Mission and Indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the Sanctified According to the Doctrine of Scripture and the Fathers

“Both Scripture teaches and the holy Fathers most clearly declare the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit for our sanctification and indwelling in the sanctified, and from this a communion with the divine nature, such that the formal participation in the divine nature is understood as an assimilation through infused grace, as an effect of the indwelling Holy Spirit, while the relative participation is a union with the very indwelling divine person.”

We presuppose as certain that sanctification occurs through supernatural gifts of created grace, which are something ontologically inherent in the soul, ennobling it in itself and in all its faculties, and elevating it to a supernatural mode of being and to a supernatural state and power of acting, so that the rational creature, through these gifts, bears a likeness to the divine nature and life beyond all the exigencies and powers of all substantial creatures, whether angelic or human. This is not the place to discuss these matters, but we assume them from the Treatise on Justification (see Suarez, *De Gratia*, Books VI, VII; Ripalda, *De Ente Supernaturali*, Book VI, disp. 132, and others). However, it is also undoubted, from the doctrine of Scripture, the Catholic understanding of the holy Fathers, and the consensus of theologians, that through sanctifying grace the Holy Spirit Himself is communicated and specially united with the just.

I. Scripture clearly teaches:

1°. That the very person of the Holy Spirit is communicated to us. For on the one hand, it presents the Paraclete as distinct from the Father and the Son, who is given to us to remain with us, and on the other hand, it shows a conjoined but distinct internal communication of the Holy Spirit as the cause and the communication of the gifts of grace as the effect: “And I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete, that He may remain with you forever… you will know Him, because He will remain with you and will be in you (*para hymin menei kai en hymin estai*)” (John 14:16–17). “The charity of God is poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (*he agape tou Theou ekkekhytai en tais kardiais hemon dia Pneumatos Hagiou tou dothentos hemin*)” (Rom. 5:5). Although “spirit” often signifies a habitual disposition of the soul, and a “good spirit” a supernatural disposition through the gifts of grace, in these passages it evidently signifies the very person who is the author of graces, communicated to us. Moreover, in all the passages cited, it should be kept in mind, as shown elsewhere, that the Spirit with epithets such as Holy Spirit, Spirit of the Father, Spirit of the Son, etc., is a personal and proper name of the third person in the Trinity (see above, pp. 11, 365).

2°. This mission into our hearts and communication is such that the divine person makes a dwelling in us and dwells in us as the lover and loved in the beloved and loving, as protector and guardian and giver of the gifts of grace, as the Spirit of our adoption as children of God, as the cause and source of supernatural life, as the seal and pledge of the promised full and beatific possession of God, as God in a rational temple consecrated to Him according to the whole nature of man. “He who loves Me will be loved by My Father, and I will love him and manifest Myself to him.” Christ the Lord, when asked by the Apostles about the mode of this love and manifestation, declares: “My Father will love him, and We will come to him and make Our dwelling with him (*kai monen par’ auto poiesomen*)” (John 14:21–23; 1 John 3:24; cf. above, p. 12; see Athanasius, *Ad Serapionem*, I, n. 31; Cyril, *In Joannem*, pp. 830–831). “You are not in the flesh but in the spirit, if indeed the Spirit of God dwells in you (*oikei en hymin*). … If the Spirit of Him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you (*oikei en hymin*), He will give life to your mortal bodies also through His Spirit dwelling in you (*dia tou enoikountos autou Pneumatos en hymin*). … Those who are led by the Spirit of God are children of God. For you have received the Spirit of adoption of sons, in

which we cry: Abba (Father); for the Spirit Himself bears witness with our spirit that we are children of God. … Likewise, the Spirit helps our weakness; for we do not know what to pray for as we ought, but the Spirit Himself intercedes for us with inexpressible groanings" (Rom. 8:9–27). "Because you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying: Abba, Father" (Gal. 4:6). "In whom [Christ], having believed, you were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise (*esphragisthete to Pneumati tes epangelias to Hagio*), who is the pledge (*arrabon*) of our inheritance" (Eph. 1:13–14; 2 Cor. 1:22, 5:5). "Do you not know that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have from God (*tou en hymin Hagiou Pneumatos, ho echete apo Theou*), and you are not your own?" (1 Cor. 6:19). "You are the temple of the living God, as God says: 'I will dwell in them and walk among them (*hoti enoikeso en autois kai emperipateso*), and I will be their God, and they shall be My people. … And I will be a Father to you, and you shall be My sons and daughters, says the Lord Almighty'" (2 Cor. 6:16–7:1; 1 Cor. 3:16–17).

3°. If these things are so, if the Holy Spirit communicated to us is distinguished from the gifts of grace as the author from the effect, and if it is the divine person Himself who, in the manner declared by Scripture, is given to us, sent, and dwells in us, it follows from this that our communion (*koinonia*) with the divine nature, which Scripture also expressly declares, is understood: "Through whom [Christ] He has given us the greatest and most precious promises, that through these you may become partakers of the divine nature (*hina dia touton genesthe theias koinonoi physeos*)" (2 Pet. 1:4). Communion and participation (*koinonia*, *metoche*, *metousia*), as regards the present matter, must be considered in three ways:

a) *Communion* refers to an intimate union and possession of something in the manner in which it can be possessed by its nature, as is the communion (*koinonia*) of the body and blood of Christ in the faithful (1 Cor. 10:16); in an analogous sense, more closely, a husband and wife are called *koinonoi*: "Your partner and the wife of your covenant" (LXX: *koinonos sou kai gyne diathekes sou*, Mal. 2:14).

b) Closely following is the signification by which *koinonia* refers to participation in the goods of another. All created being is, in some sense, a participation in divine being, insofar as it has its origin from God as its exemplary and efficient cause, or insofar as it is some reflection of divine perfection. But, presupposing this natural participation, even the highest kind in created spirits, revelation manifests to us a participation beyond all the dignity and exigency of created substances. This supernatural participation is a perfect assimilation to the divine nature through sanctifying grace, which affects the soul and transforms it as a supernatural quality. Thus, the "communion with the divine nature" includes two aspects: a *formal* but analogous participation, i.e., a supernatural assimilation to the divine nature, and, with this disposition presupposed and as a bond, a *relative* participation (*metoche*, Cyril, *Dialogues*, VII, T. V, p. 643), namely, an intimate union with the very substance of the divine nature. "Deification," says Dionysius, "is assimilation and union to God as far as possible" (*he pros Theon hosoi dunaton homoiotis te kai henosis*, *Hierarchia Ecclesiastica*, c. 1, § 3; c. 2, § 1). In both senses, just as we are partakers (*koinonoi*) of the divine nature, so it is called the communion (*koinonia*) of the Holy Spirit (2 Cor. 13:13), and we are said to be partakers (*metochoi*) of the Holy Spirit (Heb. 6:4).

c) A clearer declaration of this matter is that, just as the face of Moses sensibly took on splendor from his converse with God, so we are transformed into the image of God through the Holy Spirit (2 Cor. 3:7, 18); and when He appears, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is, and then our divine sonship, which is not yet manifest, will be manifest (1 John 3:2). This also pertains to the sealing and expression of

the image of God through the Holy Spirit, which we mentioned earlier (see Athanasius, *Ad Serapionem*, I, n. 23). A third signification can be added: that many, namely all the saints, are partakers of the divine nature in the manner described, and thus are united with God and in God with one another, so that the principle of unity is…

(Note: The text cuts off here, but the context suggests it would continue to describe the unity among the sanctified as grounded in their shared participation in the divine nature through the Holy Spirit.)

Footnotes Translated:

(1) It is different when the Son, having become man, is said in Scripture to be sent by the Holy Spirit to some office according to His human nature, or when the Fathers sometimes say that He is sent by the Holy Trinity and by Himself, namely, that insofar as He is God, He sends Himself as man. See above, Thesis XXXIII, n. II, and cf. Treatise on the Incarnation, Thesis XLVII.

(2) Regarding the *arrha* (pledge), which is an initiation to be completed in the beatific vision, see Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, n. 56, 40, and other Fathers in Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book VIII, c. 4, n. 6.

(3) In the Septuagint (LXX), the Hebrew term *sochis* is often translated as *koinonos* in this sense, e.g., *'ishshah* (wife).

(4) "The gift of grace surpasses every faculty of created nature, since it is nothing other than a certain participation in the divine nature, which surpasses every other nature. … Thus, it is necessary that only God deifies, communicating a communion with the divine nature through a certain participation of likeness; just as it is impossible for anything to ignite except fire alone" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 112, a. 1). See Basil, *Contra Eunomium*, V, p. 521; Cyril, *Dialogues*, VII, T. V, p. 644.

God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit dwell in the faithful and living members of Christ (John 17:21, 23). See Gregory of Nyssa, *Works*, Vol. I, pp. 849–850; cf. St. Bonaventure, *Compendium of Theological Truth*, c. 9. In all the passages of Scripture, the indwelling of the sanctifying Spirit is presented as connected with the sanctifying gifts, but distinct from them as the supreme summit of God's love toward His creature. Furthermore, the indwelling and abiding of God, or a divine person considered distinctly, in His creature does not simply designate the presence of God, but (presupposing omnipresence) always signifies a special relation and union of God with the creature, which union posits something real not in God but in the creature (cf. *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis XXXIII). Omnipresence, in the hypothesis of an existing creature, necessarily follows from divine immensity, but indwelling arises from free love.

II. The explanation of the holy Fathers and the Catholic understanding of the truth we are addressing must now be compared with Scripture. We will cite a few examples from many, not so much to prove the matter in a general sense, but to establish, as we have done thus far with the testimonies of Scripture, the foundations from the doctrine of the Fathers for some understanding of this indwelling and union.

The holy Fathers frequently teach that in the sanctified there is a participation in the Holy Spirit and a participation in the divine nature. They clearly distinguish, however, the participation in the divine person Himself, considered terminatively, which is a special union and relation to the divine person, from the

formal but analogous participation in the divine nature through the inherent gifts of grace, which flow from the indwelling Holy Spirit into the soul, adorning it, and are both the effect and the bond connecting it to the same indwelling Spirit. (1) Citing the text of Paul in 1 Corinthians 12:4, "There are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit," etc., Athanasius comments thus: "What the Spirit distributes to each is given by the Father through the Word; for all that belongs to the Father belongs also to the Son, so that what is given by the Son in the Spirit are the gifts of the Father. And when the Spirit is in us, the Word who gives Him is also in us, and in the Word is the Father, and thus it is fulfilled: 'We will come, I and the Father, and make Our dwelling with him,' as it is said. For where the light is, there is also its radiance (*apaugasma*); and where the radiance is, there is also its power and splendid grace (*he toutou energeia kai augoeides charis*). This is again taught by Paul, who wrote in his second letter to the Corinthians: 'The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit be with you all.' For the grace and gift given in the Trinity is given by the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit. For just as the grace given is from the Father through the Son, so the communion of the gift cannot occur in us except in the Holy Spirit. Indeed, having become partakers of Him (*toutou gar metochontes*), we have the love of the Father, the grace of the Son, and the communion of the Spirit Himself. From this, therefore, the one power (*energeia*) of the Trinity is shown. For the Apostle does not signify that the gifts are diverse and divided as if from individual persons, but that they are given by the Trinity, and all the gifts are from one God. Indeed, when the Lord says, 'We will come, I and the Father,' the Spirit comes together with them, not in any other way than as the Son dwells in us (*synergeitai to Pneuma ouk allos e hos ho Huios en hemin oikon*). … When the Son is in us, the Father is also present, as the Son says: 'I am in the Father, and the Father in Me'" (Athanasius, *Ad Serapionem*, ep. I, n. 30–31). Here you have described both the indwelling of the persons and a certain order of the indwelling persons (for the participation in the Holy Spirit is said to be most proximate in us), about which we will speak shortly, and distinctly the grace and gifts as the effect of the one common efficacy of the three persons.

Even more clearly, St. Basil describes the connection between the indwelling Spirit and infused grace: "The power and nature of the Spirit, what it is, will become clearer and more evident if we consider how He contains and willingly directs the saints and the entire rational nature. For He gave Himself to the whole multitude of heavenly Powers and the multitude of the just, and every hypostasis of the just, whether great or small, whether of angels or archangels, is sanctified. … And through Him, any of the saints is a god, for it was said to them by God: 'I said, you are gods' (Ps. 82:6). … But it is necessary that He who is the cause of gods being gods is the divine Spirit. For just as that which is the cause of creatures being creatures must necessarily be the Creator, and that which is the cause of the saints being saints must necessarily be holy, so too He who is the cause of gods being gods must necessarily be God. Thus, so great a good and divine possession is the Spirit (*hosiou ktematos ontos tou Pneumatos*). … And that life which the Spirit infuses into another's hypostasis does not separate from Him. But just as the heat of fire is one thing in itself and another when imparted to water or something similar, so too the Spirit has life in Himself (*ten zoein*); and those who are partakers of Him live divinely (*theoprepos*), having a divine and heavenly life (*zoein theian kai epouranion*). The Spirit has nothing adventitious in Himself, but possesses all things eternally as the Spirit of God and shining forth from Him (*paraprepos*), having the principle itself as the source of Himself (*pegaion*), and from there springing forth (*pegazon*). He is the source of the aforementioned goods (gifts of grace); but He Himself, springing forth from God (*pegazon*), subsists in Himself (cf. Thesis XL). What flows from Him are His efficacies. This Holy Spirit God has poured out on us abundantly through Jesus Christ, and He poured Him out, did not create Him, bestowed Him, did not

make Him, gave Him, did not fashion Him" (Basil, *Contra Eunomium*, Book V, Vol. I, pp. 321 sq.). He says similar things elsewhere: "The union of the Spirit with the soul (*oikeiosis pros psychen*) does not occur by approaching according to place. … Shining forth (*ellampon*) in those who are purified from all defilement, He renders them spiritual through communion with Himself; and just as bright and transparent bodies, when a ray falls upon them, become radiant themselves and emit another splendor from themselves, so too souls bearing the Spirit (*pneumatophoroi*) and illuminated by the Spirit become spiritual themselves and (in their own way) emit grace to others: hence the foreknowledge of things to come, the understanding of mysteries, the distribution of gifts (ministerial), heavenly converse, dancing with the angels, unending joy, dwelling in God, assimilation to God, and the supreme object of desire, to become (analogically) a god" (*De Spiritu Sancto*, c. 9, n. 23; cf. ibid., n. 22, 38). Indeed, Basil compares the Holy Spirit, insofar as He is in us, perfects us, and renders us spiritual, to a form, though here he is considering the operations and effects of the Holy Spirit, which truly inhere in us as forms: "Insofar as the Holy Spirit has the power to perfect rational creatures, completing the summit of their perfection (*ten akroteta*, cf. Cyril, *Dialogues*, VII, p. 666, *to akrotaton tes teleioseos*), He has the character of a form. For he who no longer lives according to the flesh but is led by the Spirit of God and is called a son of God and is conformed to the image of the Son of God is called spiritual. And just as the power of seeing is in a healthy eye, so the efficacy of the Spirit (*he energeia tou Pneumatos*) is in a pure soul. … The grace flowing from Him, while the Spirit dwells in those who are worthy and works there, is rightly said to inhere in those who are capable of the Spirit. Where the grace that comes from Him can come and go, it is properly and truly said to inhere" (*De Spiritu Sancto*, c. 26, n. 61, 63).

St. Cyril speaks of this participation in many places, but he no less clearly distinguishes the participation (*metoche*) or union of friendship, by which the divine person Himself is united to us, from the formal but analogous participation in the divine nature through the gift of inherent grace. The Pneumatomachians, denying the divinity of the Holy Spirit, thereby denied that the very person of the Holy Spirit is communicated to us in such a way that, by reason of this union, we can be called partakers of the divine nature, i.e., united to God because we are united to the Holy Spirit; they also denied that grace and sanctification come from the Holy Spirit as essentially holy, and thus as from a principal cause; rather, they affirmed that only grace is communicated to us, and that it is communicated by the Holy Spirit as an external and non-indwelling cause, and as a ministerial cause. Against them, Cyril, in his entire *Dialogue* VII and elsewhere, does not deny the communication of grace; but he proves that the very person of the Holy Spirit dwells in us and that through this indwelling we are participatorily (*metochos*) partakers of the divine nature, i.e., united to God Himself, and that our sanctification comes from the indwelling Holy Spirit by His own power, not as from a ministerial cause.

The interlocutors are Cyril (A) and Hermias (B), who among other things dispute thus: "A. Is it not the Spirit who imprints the divine image on us and, as it were, a seal, inserts a transcendent beauty (*to huperkeimenon kallos*)? B. But they say not as God, but as a minister (*hypourgos*) of divine grace. A. Therefore, it is not He Himself but the grace that comes through Him that is imprinted on us? B. So it seems. A. Then the image of grace, not the image of God, should be called man!" He then interprets Genesis 2:7, "He breathed into him the breath of life," as referring to the communication of the Holy Spirit, and compares it to John 20:22, "He breathed on them and said, 'Receive the Holy Spirit.'" He continues: "A. But if the grace that comes through Him were separated (*dialelymene charis*) from the substance of the Holy Spirit, why did the blessed Moses not clearly say that the Creator of the universe, in producing the living being, breathed grace through the Spirit of life; or why did Christ not say to us,

‘Receive grace through the ministry of the Holy Spirit’? But there He is called the Spirit of life (in Genesis), … and through the voice of the Savior, He is called the Holy Spirit, because He truly causes the Spirit Himself to dwell and be infused in the souls of believers, and through Him and in Him He reforms us into the original form, that is, into Himself or His likeness through sanctification, thus recalling us to the archetype of the image, that is, to the character of the Father. For the true character, perfectly expressing the likeness, is the Son Himself, while the pure and natural likeness of the Son is the Spirit, to whom (the Spirit) we, configured through sanctification, are configured to the very form of God. This the apostolic word will persuade us: ‘My little children,’ he says, ‘for whom I am again in labor until Christ is formed in you’ (Gal. 4:19). He is formed through the Spirit, who reforms us to God (God-like) through Himself. Therefore, when we are formed to Christ, He Himself is imprinted on us and formed in us with beautiful likeness (*eidos poieitai kalos*) as through the Spirit naturally like Him; thus, through God we are reformed to the image of Christ, the ointment by which we are anointed and consecrated, the fragrance by which we become the good odor of Christ” (see Athanasius, *Ad Serapionem*, ep. I, n. 23; Basil, *Contra Eunomium*, Book V, p. 301; Cyril, *Dialogues*, pp. 530, 554, 675; *In Joannem*, p. 932, etc.). Most clearly, St. Jerome, in *Ephesians* 4:30 (Vol. VII, p. 632), distinguishes the Holy Spirit as the seal imprinting from the seal imprinted.

(1) Footnote: “Since the devil is a creature … he does not fill anyone with participation in himself, nor can he inhabit the mind by participation in his substance. … But the Holy Spirit, being God, inhabits the mind by His substance and makes those who participate in Him good; for He Himself is His goodness. … Nor does this remove the fact that He fills the minds of the saints through the effect of His power” (St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, IV, 18; cf. Didymus, translated by St. Jerome, *De Spiritu Sancto*, n. 62).

(2) Footnote: “The divine image imprinted on us and the seal-like transcendent beauty (*to huperkeimenon kallos*). The seal (*sphragis*) imprinting efficiently is clearly distinguished from the image imprinted as its effect. In the same sense and with foundation in the Scriptures themselves, other Fathers call the Holy Spirit the seal (*sphragis*) by which …”

(3) Footnote: “Grace separated (*dialelymene charis*), not united with the substance of the Spirit (*dialyos*, cord, bond). The sense, therefore, is not that grace is the very substance of the Holy Spirit, but that grace is united with the indwelling of the Holy Spirit Himself.”

(4) Footnote: “When, therefore, we are formed to Christ, He Himself is imprinted on us and formed beautifully as through the Spirit naturally like Him (*hoti toinun pros Christon morphoumetha, kai autos hemin ensphragizetai, kai eidos poieitai kalos hos di’ homoiou physikos tou Pneumatos*).”

Cyril continues: “He is the Spirit and conforms us to God, not through ministerial grace but by giving participation in the divine nature in Himself to those who are worthy. … We are reformed into the likeness that is to the Holy Spirit or to God through faith, sanctification, and relation to Him; but, as is clear, by a relation according to participation and adventitiously, though we are called partakers of the divine nature (*koinonoi*). … We are called temples of God, indeed even gods, and we are. Ask the adversaries why this is so, if we are truly partakers only of a bare and non-subsisting grace? But this is not the case. For we are temples of the truly existing and subsisting Spirit; and we are called gods on account of Him, insofar as we are partakers of the divine and ineffable nature through union with Him (*tes theias te kai aporrhetou physeos te pros auto synapheia kekoinonekotes*)” (Cyril, *Dialogues*, VII, Vol. V, Part I,

pp. 638 sq.; see also pp. 694, 644, 657, 669, 672, 673; *In Joannem*, pp. 93, 810, 832; *Thesaurus*, p. 352). Most concisely, Cyril sums up the same doctrine: "Is it not easy for anyone to show from the testimonies of both the Old and New Scriptures that the Spirit, having been and dwelling in those in whom He is, transforms them into a certain other state (*eis heteran tina hexin*) and restores them to newness of life?" (*In Joannem*, p. 919).

Thus, Cyril, like other Fathers, uses this argument to demonstrate the divinity of the Holy Spirit: a) Not only are grace and the effects of the Holy Spirit produced in us, but the Holy Spirit Himself is intimately and specially united to the just, so that by reason of this union with the Holy Spirit, they are said to be and are, by the relation of union, partakers of the divine nature. b) He proves His divinity from the fact that the indwelling Spirit does not confer grace and sanctify as a minister (*hypourgos*), but by His own power (*autourgos*). "What, then, is perfect grace if not entirely the infusion of the Holy Spirit into our hearts, according to Paul's teaching? How, therefore, will there be true grace in us if sanctification is ministered to us through a creature, as the law was through angels? For if the Holy Spirit does not operate by His own power (*autourgos*), but, filled with sanctity from the divine essence through participation, emits the grace given to Him into us, it is clear that the grace of the Holy Spirit is conferred on us through a creature. But this is false. … The Holy Spirit, therefore, operates in us by His own power (*autourgon pros to Pneuma en hemin*), truly sanctifying and uniting us to Himself through the union with Him (*enoun hemas heauto dia tes pros auto synapheias*), and rendering us partakers of the divine nature" (*Thesaurus*, Vol. V, Part I, p. 352). Thus, c) it can be said in the truest sense, as Petavius puts it, "The Holy Spirit, through Himself and through the communication of His substance, makes us holy" (*De Trinitate*, Book VIII, c. 4, n. 8). This, however, must be understood such that the Holy Spirit first efficiently sanctifies by pouring out the love of God into our hearts, and then, as it were, terminatively, He is the one to whom we are united by the bond of grace, charity, and friendship, and thus the indwelling Holy Spirit is the supreme and divine summit of our sanctification, as Sts. Basil and Cyril state. Care must be taken in our age, however, lest an obscure manner of speaking provide an occasion for considering the Holy Spirit Himself as the formal sanctification of our souls. The cause of justification, as the Council of Trent states, "is the merciful God who freely washes and sanctifies, sealing and anointing with the Holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance. … Finally, the sole formal cause is the justice of God, not by which He Himself is just, but by which He makes us just; namely, by which, gifted by Him, we are renewed … each receiving his own justice" (Council of Trent, Session VI, c. 7).

From all that has been said, it is easily apparent in what sense it must be understood when the Fathers sometimes say that the Holy Spirit dwells in the just "substantively" (*ousiodos*), i.e., substantially, and is united to them (see Basil, *Contra Eunomium*, V, p. 297; cf. Gregory Nazianzen, *Oratio* 41, alias 44, n. 11). This is said most truly when the adverb refers to the subject, i.e., by reason of the terms that are united, but it would be false if it referred to the mode of union itself; for in this sense, a "substantive" union is only a union of substances into a unity of nature, which is repugnant to the union of a creature with God, or a union into a unity of hypostasis, as is the union of human nature with the Word (cf. *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis XX). See other Fathers in Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book VIII, c. 4–7; Thomassin, *De Incarnatione*, Book VI, c. 10–20.

Scholastic theologians, by common consensus, hand down this doctrine and explain it more distinctly. Among others, the following can be consulted: St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 43, a. 3, and especially *Summa Theologiae*, I, dist. 14, q. 2; Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 73, m. 4; St.

Bonaventure, *Summa Theologica*, I, dist. 14, a. 2; *Compendium of Theological Truth*, c. 9; Molina, *In I*, q. 43, a. 3; Suarez, *De Trinitate*, Book XII, c. 5, who explains this matter excellently; Lessius, *De Perfectionibus Divinis*, Book XII, c. 11; *De Summo Bono*, Book II, c. 1, n. 4; Ruiz, disp. 109, sect. 1 sqq.; Ysambert, *In I*, q. 43, a. 3; Cornelius a Lapide, *In 2 Peter* 1:4 and in Paul's epistles passim.

THESIS XLIV.

Some Explanation of This Divine Indwelling from the Perspective of Its Term

"If we consider primarily the term of the mission and indwelling for some understanding of this marvelous union, indwelling must be called the union of friendship of the soul elevated by grace with God, for enjoyment begun here and consummated in the next life through knowledge and love (through charity in faith, through charity in vision), so that God, by loving, makes the soul loving and is possessed by charity; and therefore, in the sanctified soul, God remains according to His essence by a new title of friendship, according to His power and presence in a new way."

Following the theologians, we can derive a more distinct understanding of this indwelling and union from Scripture, the declarations of the holy Fathers, and the analogy of faith. In this matter, keeping before our eyes the certain norm of Catholic doctrine, we can and must arrive at saying nothing that is not true; but we will not arrive at fully understanding the entire depth and height of this mystery of divine love, nor can we explain the whole truth, as long as it is said to us: "Now we are children of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be" (1 John 3:2).

It is presupposed that by reason of the immensity of God, one and triune, He is intimately present in all creatures according to essence, power, and presence. But from this necessary presence, God is not said to dwell in a creature in the manner that Scripture and the Fathers present indwelling, nor can this be called a union of the creature with God. Apart from the hypostatic union, properly so-called, union with God on the part of the creature is only the possession of God for enjoying Him as the ultimate end. For complete enjoyment, we will possess God, one and triune, in the light of glory, which presupposes sanctifying grace; but now in this life, those sanctified by grace and charity possess God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit for enjoyment begun and dispositively. Thus, just as through natural gifts we proceed from God as from a principle, which is not a proper union with God, so through the supernatural gift of grace, charity, and ultimately glory, we are led back to God as our ultimate end, and we are truly united to God, one and triune, by enjoying Him. "In the procession of creatures from the first principle, a certain circulation or return is observed, in that all things return as to their end to that from which they proceeded as from their principle. … According to this, the procession of divine persons into creatures can be considered in two ways: either insofar as it is the reason for proceeding from a principle, and thus such procession (into creatures) is considered according to natural gifts, in which we subsist; or it can be considered (the procession into creatures) insofar as it is the reason for returning to the end, and this is according to those gifts alone that proximately unite us to the ultimate end, namely God, which are sanctifying grace and glory. … For in the participations of divine goodness, there is no immediate union with God through the first effects by which we subsist in the being of a creature; but through the ultimate effects by which we adhere to the end, and therefore we grant that the Holy Spirit is not given except according to the gifts that make us pleasing (*gratum facientia*). … For the giving of the Holy Spirit, it is not sufficient that there be a new relation, of whatever kind, of the creature to God; but it is necessary that

it be related to Him as to something possessed, because what is given to someone is in some way possessed by him. A divine person, however, cannot be possessed by us except either for perfect enjoyment, and thus He is possessed through the gift of glory, or for imperfect enjoyment, and thus He is possessed through the gift of sanctifying grace" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, dist. 14, q. 2, a. 2).

Moreover, this possession and enjoyment of God as the ultimate end is through a habit and act, or at least through a habit of knowledge and love (conjoined, of course, not separated, since knowledge alone does not suffice for enjoyment, nor can love exist separated from knowledge). Hence, "above the common mode by which God is in all things, there is a special mode that belongs to rational nature, in which God is said to be as the known in the knower and the loved in the lover; and because by knowing and loving the rational creature reaches to God Himself by its operation, according to this special mode God is not only said to be in the rational creature but also to dwell in it as in His temple" (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 43, a. 3).

But to understand this rightly, it must be noted that this love is one of the most perfect mutual friendship, by which, as St. Ignatius says (*Contemplation for Obtaining Love*, Spiritual Exercises), "the Lord God not only gives of what He has but also Himself, as much as He can, according to His divine ordinance"; while the creature, through the charity given to it, reaches to God by love for enjoyment. Hence, this love of friendship is not only a union according to affection but by its nature also demands and seeks a real union, as St. Thomas explains (*Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 28, a. 1): "A certain union is the effect of love, and this is a real union that the lover seeks with the beloved." Since the charity on God's part is omnipotent, it also accomplishes what it seeks; it can rightly be said that sanctifying grace, which either includes charity or is charity itself, is "as it were a certain bond joining two things or seeking to join them" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VIII, c. 10; St. Thomas, loc. cit.), and is as a new title that demands God's union with the sanctified soul, such that if God were not present everywhere by reason of His immensity, He would become present according to His essence and be united with the sanctified (Suarez, loc. cit., n. 12–13). This itself has its foundation in the fact that love is ordered to enjoying God.

If, therefore, this union is compared with God's existence in all creatures according to essence, power, and presence, the union and indwelling, as we have already deduced from Scripture, is by a new title and moral exigency demanding God's presence according to His essence, not as immense but as loving and loved, communicating Himself to the beloved for enjoyment; it is then a new mode of existence according to power and operation of supernatural effects, and a new mode according to presence through guardianship and supernatural providence as a father toward an adopted son. "For enjoyment of that which is to be enjoyed, the presence of the enjoyable (*phronimon*) and also the due disposition of the one enjoying are required; hence, the presence of the Holy Spirit and His gift, namely the love by which we adhere to Him, are required. But when the Holy Spirit is given to us, He does not begin to be in a new place, but in a new way through the production of a new effect and a new relation, by which the creature is disposed differently toward the Holy Spirit than before, and for this reason He is said to be in the creature differently than before, because He is in it as in one knowing and loving Him, which was not the case before. From what has been said, it is clear that in justification a twofold charity is given to us, namely created and uncreated, that by which we love and that by which we are loved. … From this it follows that, although God is in all things by essence, presence, and power, He is not possessed by all men through grace" (St. Bonaventure, *Compendium of Theological Truth*, c. 9).

It follows from what has been said, as a corollary, that:

a) The union we speak of is a new relation of the creature to God, most real on the part of the creature, founded in the gifts of grace and supernatural ontological elevation; but in God, who is immutable goodness, it posits nothing real, yet it is a true union through a change not in both but in only one of the united terms, which is the creature. This immutability of God is far more easily understood here than in the hypostatic union, where it is equally certain and must be reconciled by the change made in the united human nature (cf. *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis XXXIII).

b) It is false, as some Scholastics said, that the Holy Spirit can be invisibly sent without the supernatural gifts being conferred on the creature. The invisible mission is for the union and indwelling of the proceeding person; but this union and indwelling cannot be conceived without a supernatural change in the united creature.

Footnotes Translated:

(1) "Since the devil is a creature … he does not fill anyone with participation in himself, nor can he inhabit the mind by participation in his substance. … But the Holy Spirit, being God, inhabits the mind by His substance and makes those who participate in Him good; for He Himself is His goodness. … Nor does this remove the fact that He fills the minds of the saints through the effect of His power" (St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, IV, 18; cf. Didymus, translated by St. Jerome, *De Spiritu Sancto*, n. 62).

(2) "The divine image imprinted on us and the seal-like transcendent beauty (*to huperkeimenon kallos*). The seal (*sphragis*) imprinting efficiently is clearly distinguished from the image imprinted as its effect. In the same sense and with foundation in the Scriptures themselves, other Fathers call the Holy Spirit the seal (*sphragis*) by which …"

(3) "Grace separated (*dialelymene charis*), not united with the substance of the Spirit (*dialyos*, cord, bond). The sense, therefore, is not that grace is the very substance of the Holy Spirit, but that grace is united with the indwelling of the Holy Spirit Himself."

(4) "When, therefore, we are formed to Christ, He Himself is imprinted on us and formed beautifully as through the Spirit naturally like Him (*hoti toinun pros Christon morphoumetha, kai autos hemin ensphragizetai, kai eidos poieitai kalos hos di' homoiou physikos tou Pneumatos*)."

(5) "We are reformed into the likeness that is to the Holy Spirit or to God through faith, sanctification, and relation to Him (*pros to Pneuma to Hagion etoi pros Theon dia pisteos kai hagiasmou kai tes pros auto synapheias*), as is clear, by a relation according to participation and adventitiously, though we are called partakers of the divine nature (*koinonoi*)."

(6) "Of the divine and ineffable nature through union with Him (*tes theias te kai aporrhetou physeos te pros auto synapheia kekoinonekotes*)."

(7) “To the extent that we differ from Petavius’ interpretation, we will explain the reasons for our disagreement below with the proposed arguments.”

(8) “Many theologians think that the justice which is through infused sanctifying grace and adoptive sonship are distinguished such that sonship is, absolutely speaking, separable from grace. On this supposition, Lessius (loc. cit.) and Petavius (*De Trinitate*, Book VIII, c. 5, n. 9, 12; c. 6, n. 3; c. 7, n. 8) hold that the proper formal reason for adoptive sonship is not sanctifying grace but the very substance of the Holy Spirit applied to us. We do not think this is true; but we say that the indwelling Holy Spirit is the ‘summit of perfection’ of both sanctity and adoption, not as a formal cause, but as an efficient cause and as the term to which we are united (see Cornelius a Lapide, *In 2 Peter* 1:4). However, we no less reject the arbitrary censure of Ripalda, who attacks Lessius’ opinion as ‘suspect, approaching the opinion of heretics who assert that we are justified by an extrinsic form, which the Council of Trent condemns with anathema’ (Ripalda, *De Ente Supernaturali*, Book VI, disp. 132, sect. 8, n. 94 sq.; sect. 10, n. 127; cf. Viva, *De Gratia*, disp. IV, q. 3, n. 3 sq.). The only doubt could be about what we say, that the indwelling Holy Spirit efficiently sanctifies, since grace seems to be prior as a disposition to the indwelling of the Spirit. To this, St. Thomas responds: from the perspective of the recipient, the reception of gifts as a disposition is prior by reason, but from the perspective of the end and the agent, ‘we receive the Holy Spirit before His gifts … and this is simply prior’ (*Summa Theologiae*, I, dist. 14, p. 2, a. 1, solut. 2).

CHAPTER II.

ON THE INDWELLING CONSIDERED WITH RESPECT TO THE ONE DIVINE NATURE AND THE DISTINCT PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERSONS

THESIS XLV.

On the Common Indwelling of the Three Persons, Because They Are One in Nature

“If the divine persons who dwell in the saints are considered from the intimate economy of the Most Holy Trinity, as taught by the Catholic faith, and from the clear doctrine of Scripture and the Fathers, this indwelling of the persons is such that they are one, and therefore it is entirely one and common to the three persons. Hence, it does not seem to be asserted, as some few theologians have inferred from certain statements of the Fathers, especially St. Cyril, that there is a peculiar mode proper to one person and not common to the three persons, by which the Holy Spirit sanctifies us through the union of His person.”

Here we undertake to explain how the union of the Holy Spirit with the sanctified, which we have demonstrated, relates to the indwelling of the other divine persons. It is repugnant that one person should dwell in the manner described without it being the indwelling of God, one and triune, and thus of all three persons.

1°. This is evident in general from the internal economy of the Most Holy Trinity. For not only, by virtue of the unity of essence, are all the persons in each other, as we have said regarding circumincession (*perichoresis*, cf. Thesis XIV); but also, the operation *ad extra* (toward creatures) is necessarily one for the three persons, just as their nature is one (cf. Thesis XII). Hence, just as *ad intra* (within the Trinity), all attributes and all formal reasons are one and common to the three persons except for the mutually

opposed relations by which the persons are constituted and distinguished, so too all relations *ad extra* are common to the three persons, or are of God, one and triune, except for that relation which is founded on a hypostatic function; for this can be proper to one person, because the persons are formally distinguished from one another as persons by real distinctions. However, a hypostatic function, under the formal aspect of hypostasis, according to which there is a real distinction, is neither known by faith nor understood, given faith, except as sustaining a nature, as it is commonly said, or having a nature as its own. Thus, the Incarnation of the Word, considered efficiently, is of God, one and triune, but terminatively it is of the Word alone, because, as stated, having a nature as its own is a function of the hypostasis under the formal aspect of being a hypostasis; and the Word, under this formal aspect of hypostasis, is really distinguished from the Father and the Holy Spirit. In sum: one divine person cannot be related *ad extra* by a function proper to itself and not common to the three, unless that function is hypostatic, because only under the formal aspect of hypostasis is one person distinguished from the others in the Most Holy Trinity; but no hypostatic function *ad extra* has been revealed to us or can be understood except as an extension of hypostatic power to sustain a created nature, which is the hypostatic union (see above, Thesis XII, n. II; *Treatise on the Incarnation*, Thesis XXXIII). However, the union of the Holy Spirit with the just, which we are discussing, is certainly not a hypostatic union; therefore, this union is necessarily the same for the Father and the Son.

2°. In Scripture, the indwelling of one of the distinct persons is explicitly taught. "We will come to him and make Our dwelling with him" (John 14:23). The holy Fathers, just as they prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit from the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, as we saw in Thesis XLIII, so too from the communion of this indwelling with the Father and the Son, they prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit, because the indwelling and participation of one person, by reason of the unity of nature, is necessarily common to the three. "As we are the temple of the Father and the Son, so too of the Holy Spirit, not many temples but one temple, because it is the temple of one power" (St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto*, Book III, c. 12, n. 91; c. 16, n. 112; see the rest there). St. Cyril, whom Petavius thought most clearly taught not a separate but a different indwelling of the Holy Spirit from that of the Father and the Son, no less clearly teaches the indwelling of the divine persons as they are one God by unity of nature. "Christ says, 'We will come, I and the Father, and make Our dwelling with him.' For when our Savior Christ dwells in us through the Holy Spirit, the Father, who begot Him, will also certainly be with us, for the Spirit of Christ is also that of the Father. … Therefore, when the Only-Begotten dwells in our hearts, the Father is by no means absent; for the Son has the Father in Himself, being of one substance with Him, but He is also naturally in the Father. … I would gladly ask those who, out of great ignorance, have embraced heresy against the glory of the Spirit and arm their tongues against it: if the Spirit is created and alien from the substance of God, as you claim, how does God dwell in us through Him? … Therefore, the Spirit is not created. If this is true, as it certainly is, the Spirit is God and from God, as we have said; for nothing is ever thought to be uncreated except God by nature alone, from whom the Holy Spirit ineffably proceeds, as He Himself, from whom He is, dwells in us (*ex hou homoiotetos aporrhetos to Pneuma Hagion hos autos ex houper estin en hemin katoikei*); for He is proper to His substance and, as it were, the quality of His holiness (*poiotetos hosper tes hagiotetos autou*)" (Footnote 1). Against the Anomoeans, who wage war against the Son, I will say something opportune: "We will come and make Our dwelling with him. … If the Son is entirely diverse in nature and understood as being in some proper nature, how is it not necessary to believe that there are two Gods in us who keep the commandments? But if we are called temples of one God, not of two, with the Father and the Son dwelling in us, what reason reduces these two

to unity, when, according to your madness, there is no place for identity of substance? For it would be necessary either to say that Christ spoke falsely to us and that only the Father dwells in us through the Spirit, or that He (Christ) dwells in us, but the Father is absent. But this is absurd; for there is one God in us when we have received both. … And indeed, the divine Paul did not call us temples of two Gods but of one: 'You are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you.' You see that he says we are made temples of God, not of Gods, when the Father and the Son are compared in the identity of substance" (Cyril, *In Joannem* XIV:23, Vol. IV, pp. 831–832). Most explicitly, he speaks in *Dialogue* VII, which is on the divinity of the Holy Spirit. After citing many testimonies of Scripture, he concludes: "Is it not finally clear that we acknowledge what the Father is, what the Son is, what the Spirit is, by hypostatic distinction; yet, by the bond of natural unity, all things are certainly of all—advent (*parousia*), words, participation (*methexis*), operation (*energeia*), glory, and whatever adorns the divine nature" (Vol. V, Part I, p. 642). See also Cyril, *Thesaurus*, p. 336; and Athanasius, *Ad Serapionem*, ep. I, n. 20, 30–31; ep. III, n. 6; ep. IV, n. 4.

3°. Therefore, since indwelling arises from gratuitous love (Footnote: "How He wills to shine forth (*ellampein*) in His friends and how He will dwell in them, He declares, saying: 'My Father will love him'" [Cyril, *In Joannem*, p. 830]), as we explained above, God, one and triune, dwells under the formal aspect of being God who is charity, under which, as under any absolute attribute, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not distinguished; but this charity is really the three persons together and each of them. Hence, we (with all due respect to the great authority of Dionysius Petavius) cannot find demonstrated in Scripture or the Fathers, nor reconcile with certain principles, a special mode of union of the Holy Spirit with the just that is proper to the third person alone and not common to the three. Petavius (*De Trinitate*, Book VIII, c. 6, n. 5–8) undertook to prove this union with the just proper to the person of the Holy Spirit, but what kind of union this is and how it can be conceived, he himself refused to say, because, as he states, he did not yet have a sufficiently clear understanding of the matter (ibid., n. 6). His fundamental argument is that the Holy Spirit personally is and is called the gift and the sanctifying power. But since these signify nothing other than proceeding love, they indeed show a peculiar exigency, as it were, in the personal character of the Holy Spirit, but not a mode of union proper to Him alone, as we will soon explain; otherwise, we would also imagine that the Word is united to our intellect in a mode proper to it alone, and many other things scarcely consistent with the unity and simplicity of God. The other arguments he adds from St. Cyril are that the Spirit is called *autourgos* (self-acting) of our sanctification; the gold by which we are gilded; and finally, as it were, a quality in us, as Petavius interpreted the Doctor. But all these do not seem to prove what the most learned man intended.

a) That he understands the Holy Spirit in us as *autourgos* as sanctifying through the application of His own substance does not seem to be at least the immediate sense of Cyril; for *autourgein* (to act by one's own power) Cyril opposes to the heretics' *hypourgos tes charitos* (minister of grace), as if the Holy Spirit were only a ministerial cause of grace. Much less does *autourgein* signify a sanctification distinct from that of the Father and the Son, as Petavius claims (c. 6, n. 7).

b) That Cyril says in *Thesaurus* (p. 352) and elsewhere that our sanctification is not through another created medium but immediately from God through the Holy Spirit does not speak in comparison with created grace, but to deny that the Holy Spirit is a created medium between us and God through whose ministry we are sanctified (cf. Petavius, c. 4, n. 10).

c) That Petavius says, based on Cyril's doctrine, that the Holy Spirit is in the saints "as it were a quality" is not too pressing; Cyril often says that the Holy Spirit is "as it were the quality of God's holiness" (of the Father and the Son); just as he sometimes calls Him the fragrance from the substance of God to signify His divinity and to co-signify His procession and distinction (see *Dialogue* VII, pp. 673–674; *In Joannem*, pp. 810, 832, etc.). When he compares the Spirit in us to a vivifying humor in a vine or to a quality, there either the name "spirit" refers not to the person but to the grace of the Holy Spirit, or in the context it is not difficult to explain it as referring to the indwelling Spirit by reason of efficient causality. For the Spirit is the efficient cause of supernatural life, in which He is not distinguished from the Father and the Son. Both explanations are admitted by Cyril's words in *In Joannem* (pp. 867–868): "Fruitless branches," he says, "are cut off from the vine, Christ, and cast into the fire, that is, having lost that vivifying Spirit (*Pneuma*) which we once had from the vine. For just as the talent is taken from him who buried it in the ground, so, I think, from the branch the humor or quality-like Spirit is taken." Those punished by rulers are first stripped of their dignities; so too the soul to be punished by the supreme judge must first be deprived and stripped of the grace of the Spirit.

d) That Petavius says (c. 4, n. 10), according to Cyril, that the just are "as it were gilded by the Holy Spirit," is indeed most true and beautifully said in the sense explained above, provided it is not understood as the properly so-called formal cause of justification; but Cyril, in the passage cited by Petavius from *Dialogue* VII, does not say "we are gilded by the Holy Spirit"; but says: the Holy Spirit "gilds us with the glory of sonship."

THESIS XLVI.

On the Proper Character of the Holy Spirit in the Aspect of Gift

"According to the doctrine of the Fathers drawn from Scripture, the proper personal character of the Holy Spirit should be considered that He proceeds as giftable and therefore is a gift in some peculiar way; this aspect ultimately reduces to His procession by way of subsistent love."

There are two distinct questions: whether the person of the Holy Spirit is united to the saints in some mode proper to Him alone and not common to all three persons, and whether in the person of the Holy Spirit, according to His proper personal character, there is a peculiar aspect and, as it were, disposition (in its root) toward this sanctifying union. The latter can be and is demonstrated to be true without it following that the former, a proper mode of union, which we said above must be denied, is also true. Thus, in the mystery of the Incarnation, with which this divine indwelling has an analogy, it is one thing to ask whether in the personal property of the Word there is some reason why it, rather than another person of the Most Holy Trinity, should fittingly become man by hypostatic union with human nature, which the holy Fathers and theologians affirm (Petavius, *De Incarnatione*, Book II, c. 15; St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, III, q. 3, a. 8); and another to ask whether, because of that personal property, the union of the Word with human nature has a mode so proper to it that, if another divine person became man, the mode of union would be different from the hypostatic union of the Word, to which the response must be negative. Indeed, in the distinct personal properties, there is a peculiar analogy and, as it were, disposition of one person over the others toward certain external operations, on which the appropriation of

works to one person over the others is founded (cf. Thesis XIII); yet it is not permissible to attribute to one person over the others a peculiar and proper mode of operation, which is entirely one for the three and indistinct, just as the divine nature itself is (cf. Thesis XII).

Therefore, after considering the indwelling common to the three persons, we now ask whether and how there is a peculiar aspect of this union with the sanctified in the proper personal character of the Holy Spirit. The affirmation of this peculiar aspect, and indeed its explanation, is contained in the fact that the third person of the Trinity is taught to proceed as a gift.

That the Holy Spirit, by His very personal character, has the proper aspect of a gift can be deduced from Scripture, not so much because He is often said to be given (cf. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XV, c. 19), but rather by those arguments by which we showed His procession by way of love terminating the affection in the Father and the Son (cf. Thesis XXVI); for these two—that the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love as the term of producing affection and that by His proper personal character He is a gift—differ only as the definition and the defined, as will become clear in the progress of the explanation. Hence, Augustine, who most frequently teaches that the Holy Spirit proceeds as the love of the Father and the Son, says in other words: "He proceeded not as born but as given, and therefore He is not a Son" (*De Trinitate*, V, c. 14).

The Fathers long before Augustine understood this property of the Holy Spirit; indeed, Augustine himself testifies that this character of distinction of the Holy Spirit is declared "by learned and great interpreters of the divine Scriptures, because they proclaim Him to be the gift of God" (Augustine, *De Fide et Symbolo*, n. 19, Vol. VI). Certainly, the most ancient Fathers designate the Holy Spirit by this name as proper in the enumeration of the persons of the Most Holy Trinity, as Justin (*Cohortatio ad Graecos*, n. 32); Hippolytus (*Contra Noetum*, n. 14). See others in Ruiz, *Disputationes*, 75, sect. 1, and Petavius, *De Trinitate*, Book VIII, c. 3. The Fathers whose opinions we cited when treating the procession by love demonstrate the matter itself. However, Augustine more clearly declared this property in many places, and after Augustine, other Fathers and all the theologians of the School in *Summa Theologiae*, I, dist. 18; and St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 38. Augustine, among other things, discourses thus: "In that the Holy Spirit is properly called the Holy Spirit, He is said relatively, since He is referred to both the Father and the Son, because the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of both the Father and the Son. But this relation does not appear in this name; it does appear, however, when He is called the gift of God. For He is the gift of the Father and the Son, because He proceeds from the Father, as the Lord says; and what the Apostle says, 'He who does not have the Spirit of Christ is not His,' he says of the Holy Spirit Himself. Therefore, the gift of the giver and the giver of the gift, when we say this, we say both relatively to each other. Thus, the Holy Spirit is the ineffable communion of the Father and the Son. … Therefore, so that the communion of both (i.e., the Father and the Son, each of whom is both spirit and holy) may be signified by the name that befits both, He who is the gift of both (*donum amborum*) is called the Holy Spirit. … Further, it is asked whether, just as the Son, by being born, has not only that He is the Son but that He is at all, so too the Holy Spirit, by being given, has not only that He is a gift but that He is at all? … Or does the Holy Spirit always proceed, not from a point in time but from eternity; but because He so proceeded as to be giftable, was He already a gift even before there was anyone to whom He could be given? For a gift is understood differently when it is called a gift, and differently when it is called given; for a gift can be a gift even before it is given; but it cannot be called given unless it has been given. … The Spirit is eternally a gift, but temporally given" (*De Trinitate*, V, n. 12–17).

Thus, the gift, insofar as it is a proper and personal name of the Holy Spirit, is relative to the giver, the Father and the Son, whose gift it is, not as a possession of dominion, but as a principle from which it proceeds; but the procession is designated not only indeterminately but in such a way that the one proceeding, by the very mode of procession, has the aspect of being giftable. Now, every gift has its proper aspect of a gift from the gratuitous liberality by which it is given or is giftable (Footnote: "A gift is not so called because it is actually given, but because it has the aptitude to be given" [St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 38, a. 1, ad 4]), and thus from love; hence, love, by its intimate nature, is the first gift, from which all other things are given, which do not have the aspect of a gift from themselves but, as it were, extrinsically, insofar as they are given from love. Hence, in the Most Holy Trinity, the Son indeed proceeds from the Father and is also giftable; but because He is giftable not from His internal personal character, by which He is the Word of the paternal intellect, but only insofar as there is love in God, from which the Son is also given—"For God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son" (John 3:16)—therefore, the name of gift does not designate the proper personal character of the Son (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, dist. 18, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3). But the Holy Spirit, whose constitutive personal character is that He is the love produced by the affection of the Father and the Son, by this very personal character is the gift of the Father and the Son.

From this it is clear that the name of gift, taken relatively and strictly, coincides in meaning with the designation of proceeding love, and this, in turn, with the sanctifying power (*dynamis hagiastike*), which several Fathers present as the proper character of the Holy Spirit (cf. Thesis XXVI, n. II), except that "gift" and "sanctifying power" more clearly express the relation (aspect) to creatures. "The love that is from God and is God is properly the Holy Spirit, through whom the charity of God is poured into our hearts, through which the whole Trinity dwells in us. Therefore, most rightly, the Holy Spirit, while He is God, is also called the gift of God. What else is this gift to be understood as, if not charity, which leads to God, and without which no other gift of God leads to God?" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XV, c. 18). (Footnote 1: When Augustine says the Holy Spirit is properly love, properly charity, he opposes the proper to the common and absolute, as he himself explains in many places there.) (Footnote 2: See the explanation in St. Bonaventure, *Compendium of Theological Truth*, c. 9: The Holy Spirit is the charity by which we love God, efficiently and exemplarily, but not formally as an inherent habit or act of our charity.) (Footnote 3: "A gift must in some way belong to the giver; but this belonging is said in multiple ways; in one way, by way of identity … and thus the gift is not distinguished from the giver" [St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 38, a. 1]. Cf., however, St. Bonaventure, *Summa Theologica*, I, dist. 18, q. 4.)